




Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity

Ancient History

Franz Steiner Verlag

Edited by ED SANDERS
and MATTHEW JOHNCOCK

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*Emotion and Persuasion
in Classical Antiquity*

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The papers included in this volume are, of course, among the strongest of those delivered at the conference, but more importantly those that best fitted together into a coherent collection, whose voices form a collaborative and constructive conversation. One of our guest speakers, Catherine Steel, whose other commitments have not allowed her to contribute to this volume, nonetheless kindly gave us copious advice on structuring it, and we have to a large extent gratefully accepted her suggestions (though of course we bear full responsibility for any criticism of the result!).

While both organizing the conference and putting together a book proposal, we received good advice from Lene Rubinstein, Jonathan Powell, Chris Kremmydas and Ahuvia Kahane. Lene Rubinstein, Jonathan Powell, Chris Carey and Angelos Chaniotis all kindly read a draft of the volume introduction and made helpful suggestions. We are grateful to all of them for their advice and support. Finally, we thank Franz Steiner Verlag for publishing the resulting volume.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Chr. Wilck.</i>	Mitteis, L. and U. Wilcken (1912) <i>Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde</i> (Leipzig and Berlin)
<i>CT I–III</i>	Hornblower, S. (1991–2008) <i>A commentary on Thucydides</i> (Oxford, 3 vols)
DK	Diels, H. and W. Kranz (eds) (1964) <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> (Berlin, 11 th edition, 3 vols)
<i>DT</i>	Audollent, A. (1904) <i>Defixionum Tabellae</i> (Paris)
<i>F. Delphes III</i>	(1909–85) <i>Fouilles de Delphes, vol. 3. Épigraphie</i> (Paris)
<i>FGrH</i>	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923–58) <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, vols 1–3C</i> (Berlin and Leiden)
<i>GL</i>	Campbell, D. A. (ed., trans.) (1982) <i>Greek Lyric</i> (Cambridge, MA)
<i>GV</i>	Peek, W. (1995) <i>Griechische Versinschriften, vol. 1</i> (Berlin)
<i>HCT I–V</i>	Gomme, A. W., A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover (1945–81) <i>A historical commentary on Thucydides</i> (Oxford, 5 vols)
<i>IACP</i>	Hansen, M. H. and T. H. Nielsen (eds) (2004) <i>An inventory of Archaic and Classical poleis</i> (Oxford)
<i>I. Assos</i>	Merkelbach, R. (1976) <i>Die Inschriften von Assos. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 4</i> (Bonn)
<i>I. Cret</i>	Guarducci, M. (1935–50) <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> (Rome)
<i>I. Ephesos</i>	Wankel, H. et al (1979–81) <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 11–17</i> (Bonn)
<i>IG</i>	(1873–) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (Berlin)
<i>IGBulg</i>	(1956–97) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae</i> (Sofia)
<i>IGR</i>	Cagnat, R. (1911–27) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i> (Paris)
<i>IGUR</i>	Moretti, L. (1968–90) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae urbis Romae</i> (Rome)
<i>I. Heraclea Pontica</i>	Jonnes, L. (1994) <i>The Inscriptions of Heraclea Pontica. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 47</i> (Bonn)
<i>I. Kyzikos</i>	Schwertheim, E. (1980) <i>Die Inschriften von Kyzikos und Umgebung, vol. 1: Grabtexte. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 18</i> (Bonn)
<i>I. Labraunda</i>	Crampa, J. (1969–72) <i>Labraunda: Swedish excavations and researches, vol. 3: The Greek inscriptions</i> (Lund)
<i>IMT Skam/ NebTaeler</i>	Barth, M. and J. Stauber (eds) (1993) <i>Inschriften Mysia & Troas</i> . M. Leopold Wenger Institut. Universität München. Version of 25.8.1993 (Ibicus). Packard Humanities Institute CD no. 7, 1996. – Troas, ‘Skamander und Nebentäler’, nos. 101–398. Includes: Frisch, P. (1975) <i>Die Inschriften von Ilion. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 3</i> (Bonn)

<i>I.Priene</i>	Hiller von Gaertringen, F. (1906) <i>Inscriptionen von Priene</i> (Berlin)
<i>I.Smyrna</i>	Petzl, G. (1982–90) <i>Die Inscriptionen von Smyrna</i> , vols I–II 1/2. <i>Inscriptionen griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien</i> 23–24 (Bonn)
KA	Kassel, R. and C. Austin (eds) (1983–2001) <i>Poetae comici Graeci</i> (Berlin and New York, 8 vols)
LIMC	(1981–97) <i>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</i> (Zürich and München)
<i>Milet</i>	(1908–) <i>Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit d. Jahre 1899</i> (Berlin)
ML	Meiggs, R. and D. Lewis (1988) <i>A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century BC</i> (Oxford, revised edition)
MW	Merkelbach, R. and M. L. West (1967) <i>Fragmenta Hesiodica</i> (Oxford)
NGCT	Jordan, D. R. (2000) ‘New Greek curse tablets’, <i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i> 41, 5–46
OCD	Hornblower, S. and A. Spawforth (eds) (2003) <i>Oxford classical dictionary</i> (Oxford, 3 rd edition)
OED	Simpson, J. and E. Weiner (eds) (1989) <i>The Oxford English dictionary</i> (Oxford) (also www.oed.com)
OGIS	Dittenberger, W. (1903–5) <i>Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae</i> (Leipzig)
OLD	Glare, P. G. W. (2012) <i>Oxford Latin dictionary</i> (Oxford, 2 vols)
<i>P.Cair.Zen.</i> I–III	<i>Zenon papyri: Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire</i> , C. C. Edgar (ed.) (1925–31) vols I–4; O. Guéraud and P. Jouguet (eds) (1940) vol. 5 (Cairo)
<i>P.Enteux</i>	Guéraud, O. (ed.) (1931–2) <i>Requêtes et plaintes adressées au Roi d'Égypte au IIIe siècle avant J.-C.</i> (Cairo) (nos. 1–113 and appendix of four texts) [MF 1.52]
PGM	Preisendanz, K. and A. Henrichs (eds) (1973–4) <i>Papyri Graecae magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri</i> (Stuttgart, 2 nd edition)
<i>P.Oxy</i>	(1910–) <i>The Oxyrhynchus papyri</i> (Oxford)
RO	Rhodes, P. J. and R. Osborne (2003) <i>Greek historical inscriptions, 404–323 BC</i> (Oxford)
SEG	(1923–) <i>Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum</i> (Leiden and Amsterdam)
SGD	Jordan, D. R. (1985) ‘A survey of Greek <i>defixiones</i> not included in the special corpora’, <i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i> 26, 151–97
SM	Daniel, R. W. and F. Maltomini (eds) (1990–2) <i>Supplementum magicum</i> , vols 1–2 (Opladen)
<i>Syll.</i> ³	Dittenberger, W. (1915–1924) <i>Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum</i> (Leipzig, 3 rd edition)
TAM	(1901–) <i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i> (Vienna)
West	West, M. L. (ed.) (1989–92) <i>Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantata</i> (Oxford, 2 nd edition, 2 vols)

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INTRODUCTION

Ed Sanders

EMOTIVE TECHNIQUES AND PERSUASIVE GENRES

Emotion arousal played an integral role in Greek persuasion at least as far back as the Homeric epics, the earliest surviving Greek literary texts. At the start of the *Iliad*, the priest Chryses seeks to persuade Agamemnon to give up his enslaved daughter Chryseis. He prays for Agamemnon's and his army's military success and safe return home, before offering a boundless ransom in exchange. We might expect this wish and exchange offer to arouse emotions: goodwill or possibly friendship, gratitude, perhaps desire for the goods. Homer does not mention these, but does say that while the other Achaeans are won over to Chryses' side – shouting their approval (ἐπευφήμησαν, 1.22) – Agamemnon is not pleased (οὐκ ... ἦνδανε, 1.24) and refuses. Agamemnon utters a harsh threat against the priest, which in turn arouses his fear (ἔδεισεν, 1.33) and persuades him to do as commanded, i.e. leave. Chryses then calls on the god Apollo for support: he addresses him by a variety of flattering epithets, lists all the things he has done for Apollo, and asks that the god avenge his tears. Whether or not the flattery and reminders arouse Apollo's goodwill or gratitude (not stated), they certainly arouse his anger on Chryses' behalf (χωόμενος κῆρ, 1.44; χωομένοιο, 1.46), and he punishes the Achaian army in revenge.¹

Emotive argumentation had, therefore, long been part of persuasive strategies. However, our interest for this volume begins with the *conscious reflection on and practice of* emotive techniques of persuasion: i.e. the art, skill or science (*technê*) of rhetoric, and oratory that knowingly incorporates such techniques. These were well established by the time Aristotle complained waspishly, in the introduction to his treatise *The art of rhetoric* (usually called simply *Rhetoric*),² about rhetoricians' tendency to over-focus on emotional arousal. Aristotle says that 'Slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror' (*Rh.* 1.1, 1354a16–18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν), and again that 'one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter's rule' (*Rh.* 1.1, 1354a24–6: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἶ

1 Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–2 tells us that anger involves a desire for revenge. Rubinstein (2004) shows how often calls for punishment or retribution (*kolazein/timôreisthai*) are coupled with calls for anger (*orgê*) in Attic courtroom oratory.

2 Written probably in the third quarter of the fourth century BCE – see Kennedy (2007) 6.

τις ᾧ μέλλει χρησθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν), and he complains that those who write treatises on rhetoric treat of little else (*Rh.* 1.1, 1354a11–16).

Such rhetorical theorists were included among, or were direct intellectual descendants of, the sophists – itinerant teachers who wandered Greece from the mid-fifth century BCE taking on paying pupils, mainly the sons of the leisured classes.³ Many of the most famous sophists gravitated to Athens which, thanks to the revenues of its empire, had a large wealthy/leisured class in this period, who wanted their sons trained (*inter alia*) to address the Assembly.⁴ Sophists had a variety of interests, but rhetoric was frequently one of the subjects on their curricula. This interest is foregrounded in the most famous depiction of sophists in literature, in Aristophanes' comedy *Clouds* (dated 423 BCE), in which Socrates is lampooned as representative of the sophistic agenda: corrupting the young, not believing in the traditional gods, introducing new divinities,⁵ and teaching his pupils to wield morally wrong arguments so well as to overcome morally right ones.⁶

One of the most important sophists – and most influential rhetoricians – was Gorgias. He features as one of Socrates' interlocutors in Plato's *Gorgias*, but in this dialogue his description of oratorical technique concentrates on the persuasive exposition of an argument, not arousing emotions. Socrates, in contrast, stresses the affective aspect when he says that oratory consists of the knack of producing gratification and pleasure in the audience through flattery (*Pl. Grg.* 462c3–7: ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα ... χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας; 463a8–9: καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν). Gorgias's own *Encomium of Helen*, however, certainly recognizes the importance of emotional persuasion, advising that:

Speech is a powerful lord that ... can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity. (8) ... The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (14)⁷

It is perhaps this sort of approach that Aristotle complains about.

By the late 420s, oratorical appeals to emotion were common enough to be satirized at length in Aristophanes' comedy *Wasps* (dated 422). Early in the play we get a report that Kleon – a demagogue, described by the hostile historiographer Thucydides as 'very violent' (βιαιότατος, 3.36.6.4) – has enjoined jurors to turn

3 See Gagarin (2002) 9–36 on the sophists.

4 On the sophists in Athens, see Wallace (1998).

5 The real life Socrates was in fact executed on just these charges, according to Plato (*Ap.* 24b). See Hansen (1995) from the Athenian point of view.

6 See Dover (1968) xxxii–lvii on the association of these charges with the sophist movement, and Aristophanes' choice of Socrates to represent them. In the play *Unjust Argument* (*Adikos Logos*), as his name implies, wins through mastery of eristic reasoning rather than emotional techniques.

7 Trans. Kennedy (2007) 253–4.

up with three days' worth of grievous anger, in order to punish offenders (Ar. *Vesp.* 243–4: ὀργὴν ... πονηρὰν ... ὥς κολωμένους ὧν ἡδίκησεν). The enthusiastic juror Philokleon later describes how defendants ask for pity (οἰκτιρόν μ', 556), then try everything they can to get off a charge: they bewail (ἀποκλαίονται) their poverty and attribute their misfortunes to it; they quote myths, fables and jokes to make him laugh; they drag their children out front to bleat (βληγᾶται) in concert, while the defendant himself trembles (τρέμων) and entreats him as a god to approve his accounts, asking him to have pity on hearing his son, or be persuaded by his daughter – this, he says, makes him relax his anger a little (562–74). And in the mock trial later in the play, Bdelykleon entreats Philokleon to have pity on (οἰκτίρατ') the dog Labes, and brings in Labes' puppies, whom he instructs to beg and entreat while whimpering (κνυζούμενα) and crying (δακρύετε) (975–8).

While this could be dismissed as comic fantasy, the fact that it could be staged in front of an Athenian audience suggests it is unlikely they would find such behaviour unrecognizable. Firmer evidence comes from [Lys.] 20 (*For Polystratos*), a lawcourt speech delivered not many years after this,⁸ in which the speaker says: 'Nevertheless, gentlemen of the jury, we see that if somebody brings forward his children and weeps and laments (κλαίῃ καὶ ὀλοφύρηται), you take pity (ἐλεοῦντας) on the children ... and pardon the father's crimes on account of the children' (20.34); he then begs: 'we [not having children to bring forward, but an aged father] bring forward our father and ourselves, and beg (ἐξαιτούμεθα) ... pity (ἐλεήσατε) on our father, who is an old man (γέροντα ὄντα), and on us' (20.35).⁹ The language and the behaviour are almost identical to that described in *Wasps*.¹⁰

Other theatrical techniques were also available to orators. In Aristophanes' comedy *Acharnians*, Dikaiopolis seeks leave to dress up for his trial, so as to look totally wretched (Ar. *Ach.* 383–4: ἑάσατε ἐνσκευάσασθαι μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον). In both this play (711) and very frequently in Aristophanes' *Knights* (274, 276, 285–7, 304, 311, 626, 1380), speakers use shouting, shrieking or a thunderous voice to terrify audiences. Perhaps the most striking example of this in a real speech comes not from Classical Athens, but from an Assembly speech given in the Sicilian city of Enguion in the late third century BCE. The speaker Nikias fakes possession by supernatural beings in order to freeze other citizens in fear long enough for him to flee the city safely (Plut. *Marc.* 20.5–6).¹¹ Other emotions can be aroused in this

8 Todd (2000) 217 dates the speech to 'probably 410 or possibly 409'.

9 Trans. Todd (2000) 226–7; the appeal for pity is repeated, slightly amplified, at 20.36; cf. also, e.g., Dem. 21.99, [Dem.] 53.29 for further comments on this theme. On appeals to pity, see particularly Johnstone (1999) 109–25, Bers (2009) 77–98; more generally across the ancient world, Naiden (2006).

10 On emotional arguments paralleled in oratory and (satirized in) Old Comedy, see Carey (this volume).

11 See Chaniotis (1997) 234–5 on this episode.

way too: e.g. Aristotle describes how voice and other delivery techniques such as gesture, dress and dramatic actions can engender pity (*Rh.* 2.8, 1386a32–b5).¹²

Despite his quibbles about the extent and manner in which other rhetoricians advised orators to manipulate emotions, Aristotle was perfectly happy for emotions to be aroused through proofs (*pisteis*).¹³ He argues: ‘Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character [*êthos*] of the speaker; the second on putting the listeners into a certain frame of mind [*ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς*]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the argument [*logos*] of the speech itself’ (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a1–4), then confirms *re* the second that ‘persuasion may come through the listeners, when the speech stirs the emotions [*pathos*]’ (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a14–15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν).¹⁴ Having spent some time talking of other issues, he returns to emotions in a lengthy section of the treatise (*Rh.* 2.1–11), which he introduces as follows:

The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We [i.e. Aristotle] must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them.... The same is true of the other emotions.¹⁵

The following chapters are devoted to discussions of one emotion or a pair of ‘opposite’ (*enantion*) emotions: 2.2 and 2.3 respectively on anger (*orgê*) and calming down (*praünsis*); 2.4 on friendship (*philia*) and hatred (*misos*); 2.5 on fear (*phobos*) and confidence (*tharsos*); 2.6 on shame (*aischunê*) and shamelessness (*anaischuntia*); 2.7 on gratitude (*charin echein*) and briefly ingratitude (*acharistein*);¹⁶ 2.8 on pity (*eleos*); 2.9 on indignation (*nemesis*); 2.10 on envy (*phthonos*); and 2.11 on emulation (*zêlos*) and scorn (*kataphronêsis*).¹⁷ The order of these emotions is somewhat indiscriminate. With the exception that emotions relating to others’ bad or good fortune are grouped together at the end,¹⁸ there is no obvious reason for the order selected, and Aristotle does not advise directly on

12 On aspects of performance in Greek and Roman oratory, see Kremmydas, Powell and Rubinstein (2013). Hagen (this volume) explores the emotionally persuasive use of tears in Roman oratory and historiography.

13 Dow (2007) is persuasive on resolving the ‘contradiction’ between *Rh.* 1.1’s criticism of emotional techniques and *Rh.* 1.2’s advocacy of emotional proofs; cf. Dow’s bibliography for further scholarship on this issue.

14 Trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2155, slightly modified.

15 *Rh.* 2.1, 1378a19–26, trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2195. See Leighton (1996) on the ways in which emotion can contribute to alteration of judgment. Frede (1996) discusses how emotions are ‘attended’ by pain and pleasure.

16 Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156–68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (*charis*) and unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128; Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with gratitude.

17 He describes a number of unnamed emotions too.

18 On this group, see Sanders (2014) 59–64.

which emotions may be appropriate for different sorts of speech,¹⁹ or which will work well together. A second surviving rhetorical treatise from the Classical period, probably by Anaximenes,²⁰ also discusses emotion arguments – primarily in the chapters on deliberative and judicial oratory (respectively chs 34 and 36), in which he describes three friendly emotions (pity, goodwill and gratitude) and three hostile ones (anger, hatred and envy) as particularly important.²¹

The second set of ancient source material of particular relevance to this volume is oratory, beginning with the group of speeches written and (mostly) performed in Athens in the period c. 420–322 BCE, known as the ‘Attic oratorical corpus’. This corpus contains approximately 105 judicial speeches (both prosecution and defence speeches, on matters of both public and private law, as well as adjudications),²² sixteen deliberative speeches (delivered to the Athenian Assembly), and a handful of display speeches (mostly funeral speeches, delivered by a leading politician to honour the war dead), as well as some letters,²³ political tracts and rhetorical exercises. Unlike the rhetorical treatises – the extent of whose relation to practical oratory is debatable – this corpus tells us how persuasion was actually ‘done’ in this very fruitful literary period: these speeches, letters and tracts demonstrably use emotional techniques as part of their persuasion strategies.²⁴ Such techniques are both overt, with emotions explicitly called for, and covert, with emotions aroused indirectly by the judicious use of words and phrases that act as psychological triggers.²⁵

Both these types of evidence – theoretical (rhetoric) and practical (oratory) – have their counterparts in later antiquity too. Survivals from the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean are limited,²⁶ but a large number of speeches survive from the Imperial period, mostly given in a civic context (e.g. the speeches of Dio of Prusa). More relevant to this volume are rhetorical treatises and speeches from the Roman Late Republic and Principate. The Ciceronian corpus is vast,²⁷ and contains many speeches utilizing emotional techniques.²⁸ Of interest too are his

19 Judicial, deliberative and display being the three subdivisions he discusses at *Rh.* 1.3 – other types such as hortatory, supplicatory etc. presumably being hybrids.

20 This treatise, the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, is contained within the Aristotelian corpus. Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is longstanding and probably correct.

21 See further Sanders (this volume).

22 Griffith-Williams (this volume) considers two adjudications in inheritance disputes.

23 For emotive persuasion in literary letters, see Westwood (this volume).

24 For a brief introduction to emotion in Classical Greek rhetoric and oratory, see Konstan (2010).

25 On explicit *versus* covert emotion arousal, see further Sanders (2012a) 160–1 and (2014) 88–98.

26 Though on this period see particularly Kremmydas and Tempest (2013).

27 There are only two non-Ciceronian complete speeches in Latin pre-200 CE: a panegyric by Pliny praising Trajan, and a (self-)defence speech by Apuleius on a charge of seduction by magic – see Powell (2011).

28 Cicero’s use of emotional techniques has tended to be taken for granted in scholarly studies. The use of emotion has been highlighted especially in the closing sections of his defence speeches, where an appeal to pity (*commiseratio*) is a standard ingredient; cf. Winterbottom (2004). Gildenhard (2010) 36 notes Cicero’s at first sight surprising tendency to pre-

rhetorical works, in particular (for our purposes) *De oratore*, which contains a large section discussing emotional techniques (2.178–216), partly a recapitulation of Greek rhetorical ideas, but particularly adding deeper discussions of voice, gesture and dress.²⁹ A second important Roman rhetorician is Quintilian, who also discusses emotional techniques at length (*Institutio* 6.1.7–2.36).

A third type of evidence of great importance to this volume is literary representations of speeches. These primarily occur in historiography.³⁰ Ever since Herodotus, it was a recognized part of ancient historiography to include speeches – especially deliberative and hortatory speeches (those used to effect political-strategic decisions, and to encourage armies before battle) – that contributed to the unfolding of the events portrayed. They are more or less prominent in different historiographers, but they appear to be universally used, and are frequently reported in direct speech (*oratio recta*) – though sometimes in indirect (*oratio obliqua*).³¹ Historiographers were not merely recording facts, but creating works of literature, and accordingly they had a choice both of which speeches (out of the vast number actually given) to include,³² and how accurately or not they wished to portray those speeches.³³ Literary representations of persuasion are not confined to historiography: speeches appear in a wide variety of other genres,³⁴ and other forms of verbal interlocution can also be persuasive.³⁵

One other type of persuasive literature should be discussed, and that is the technical or didactic treatise, which seeks to persuade the reader. Treatises survive from at least as early as the Classical period (fifth to fourth centuries BCE), and become increasingly common in the latter part of that period and into the Hel-

sent himself as in the grip of strong emotion. On emotion in Ciceronian oratory, see also Webb (1997); Powell (2007); Craig (2010).

29 For a brief introduction to emotion in Roman rhetoric and oratory, see Hall (2007).

30 See in particular Sanders, Fragoulaki, Winter, Knight and Hagen (this volume).

31 The inclusion of speeches in *oratio recta* and *obliqua* as a narratological technique significantly predates the historiographic genre, going back at least as far as Homer – see Fox and Livingstone (2010) 544–6.

32 E.g. Finley (1972) 26–7, in turn quoting Dion. Hal. *Thuc.*: ‘Why this particular Funeral Oration, he asked? The occasion was neither glorious nor significant. The answer, he suggested, is that Thucydides wanted a Funeral Oration by Pericles at any price. Or why, he asked, are we given the long debate on the *reconsideration* of the decision to put all Mytilenian males to death, when we properly ought to have had the original debate?’

33 Thucydides is famously ambiguous about the accuracy of the speeches he records, saying: ‘I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν] by each situation’; trans. Warner (1972) 47.

34 For example, see Johncock (this volume) on speeches in Ovid’s epic poem *Metamorphoses*.

35 Iurescia (this volume) discusses quarrels in Roman comedy, manufactured by one character for the purposes of persuading another.

lenistic (third to first centuries BCE) and Roman.³⁶ They cover a very wide range of topics, from medical through military to mathematical or economic. The Hippocratic and Galenic corpora are examples of the first. Xenophon was also a prolific author, whose surviving works include several treatises.³⁷ Treatise writers might attempt to arouse a reader's emotions, as part of their persuasive technique. Other genres too can arouse a reader's emotions, most particularly poetry.³⁸

Finally, we should be aware of the very many types of persuasion that are not literary. These include personal letters (preserved on papyri) and petitions (on papyri or carved in stone). They also include prayers or curses addressed to gods (also on papyri or inscribed), left at religious sanctuaries or in graves, or thrown down wells. They also include civic inscriptions, intended to persuade a variety of readers. While some of these types of source material might be written by men (or women) with some degree of learning, many more were written by those with little learning, and were not crafted using literary techniques of persuasion – albeit that they might have generic conventions of their own.³⁹

THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THIS VOLUME

This volume addresses the variety of ways in which emotions form part of strategies of persuasion, both within societies and between groups and individuals in the ancient world. It considers different strata of society (civic equals, armies and their commanders, emperors and their subjects, gods and humans), and diverse media of communication. Persuasion may be effected by narrative, exhortation (explicit or covert), or physical actions. Emotional strategies can be aimed at superiors, inferiors or one's equals; to strangers or friends; and deployed for personal gain or the public good. As we have seen, they can appear in oral communications (judicial, deliberative, display, hortatory, supplicatory etc.) designed to be heard once, their representations in literature, or in written communications that can be read again and again (e.g. treatises, other literary works, letters, inscriptions).

No single volume could cover the usage of emotion in persuasive strategies in the entirety of ancient written literary and non-literary media, and this book does not attempt to take such a 'handbook' approach. Rather (and reflecting its origin as a selection of the best papers from a recent conference),⁴⁰ the volume presents exciting new thinking in areas of this subject that are currently commanding research (and growing public) interest.

In recent years scholarship on emotive persuasion techniques has focused primarily on two areas: rhetorical techniques as propounded by technical treatises

36 On technical treatises in the Hellenistic period, see Gutzwiller (2007) 154–67.

37 See e.g. Winter (this volume).

38 See Johncock and Hammond (this volume) for examples.

39 See Chaniotis, Dickey and Salvo (this volume).

40 Held by the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric (COR) at Royal Holloway, University of London, on 27–28 June 2013.

(Aristotle, Anaximenes, Cicero, Quintilian);⁴¹ and explicit exhortation to feel a small group of emotions (anger, hatred, envy, gratitude, pity, goodwill) in Attic forensic oratory.⁴² This volume is consciously designed to move beyond these two areas of scholarship, to examine the use of emotion in rhetorical *practice* in a wide variety of literary genres, non-literary (inscriptional and papyrological) texts, and even physical movement.⁴³ And it does so, in some cases, by employing a range of theoretical methods (such as conversational analysis, speech act theory and pragmatics)⁴⁴ that have proved effective in other areas of classical scholarship, or in emotion studies in other disciplines (e.g. linguistics, sociology, psychology).

Part I recognizes that our first significant evidence for the Greek understanding of, theorizing about and use of emotion as a rhetorical technique comes from the specific historical society of Classical Athens. This is both because of the unusually wide participation in oratorical practice thanks to the radical democracy, and due to the establishment of philosophical schools in that city during that particular period. Accordingly the first section of the book is devoted to that one society. However, it looks at types of speeches never before examined in connection with emotions, and draws connections to other contemporary genres. **Carey**'s chapter explores arguments, in both forensic and deliberative oratory and with supporting evidence in historiography and Old Comedy, that play to hostility towards a politically dominant individual or faction as part of the competition for power. **Griffith-Williams** considers the choice of using, or not using, emotional arguments alongside rational ones in speeches in inheritance cases, a specific class of forensic speech so far largely ignored in studies of emotion. **Sanders** turns to deliberative speeches, arguing that a completely different set of emotions (fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride) is pertinent to this branch of oratory than those used in forensic speeches, evidenced by both the Attic corpus and representations of speeches in Thucydidean historiography. **Westwood** considers Demosthenes' *Letters*, written in his exile to the Athenian Assembly and Council, showing that in their emotional strategies – narrative of nostalgia to arouse pity

41 E.g. Aristotle: Fortenbaugh (1975) and (1979); Grimaldi (1980) *re Rh.* 1.1–2 and (1988) *re Rh.* 2.1–11; Conley (1982); Leighton (1996); Nussbaum (1996); Viano (2003); Ben-Ze'ev (2003); Konstan (2003) and (2006); Sanders (2014) 58–78; Dow (2015). Aristotle and Anaximenes: Konstan (2010). Aristotle to Cicero: Wisse (1989). Cicero: Fjelstad (2003); Powell (2007); Craig (2010). Cicero and Quintilian: Schryvers (1982); Webb (1997); Hall (2007). Quintilian: Cockcroft (1998); Katula (2003a) and (2003b).

42 E.g. Johnstone (1999) 109–25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212–31 on gratitude; Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers (2009) 77–98 on pity; Sanders (2012b) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and pity; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. On the Roman side, see Webb (1997) on indignation and pity; Craig (2010) on indignation. Also *re* invective, which implicitly has emotional aspects, see e.g. Steel (2006) 50–2; Powell (2007); Seager (2007).

43 See Jackson (this volume) on the last of these.

44 On which see respectively Hammond, Iurescia and Dickey (this volume). Eckert (this volume) uses sociological theories of 'trauma'.

and goodwill, and arousal of nostalgia in the reader/listener – they function very like actual speeches.

While Part I necessarily concentrates on (Classical) Greece, the attention of the remainder of the book is divided almost equally – though not symmetrically – between Greece (of all periods) and Rome. The following three Parts focus on three different directions in which study has spiralled out from Attic oratory. While it will become apparent that there is a range of interconnections between chapters in different sections, the organization that has been chosen highlights three particularly notable thematic groupings.

Part II examines a variety of ways in which emotion is used in the formation of community identity. **Chaniotis** considers how the authors of epigraphic texts from *poleis* across the Greek eastern Mediterranean sought to create a feeling of community through emotional arousal – a form of purportedly communal emotional performance. **Fragoulaki** returns to Thucydides, and considers two dramatic rhetorical occasions, in which emotional persuasion techniques are (or are consciously not) used internally between speaker and audience, and externally between Thucydides and his readers. **Eckert's** is the first chapter to take us to Rome, with an interdisciplinary approach to the emotional response to cultural trauma (arising from Sulla's proscriptions), and its rhetorical use in Ciceronian forensic oratory and a range of later genres that borrow from and extend Cicero's techniques. Finally, **Jackson's** chapter examines Plato's description of how emotions could be incited, moulded and instilled in a community through participation in choral dance techniques, leading to their socialization and mass persuasion to behaviour appropriate to the *polis*.

Part III considers emotive persuasion strategies in situations of unequal power. **Winter** compares Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* (*Cavalry Commander*), a technical treatise containing instruction in the manipulation of the emotions of one's men, political superiors and the enemy, but no examples, with practical examples in the same author's historiographical *Anabasis*. **Knight** examines narratives of *ira Caesaris* in poetry, philosophy and historiography, showing how Roman emperors could judiciously use displays of anger to persuade their subjects to submit to imperial control, and how this technique could be abused. **Hagen's** chapter provides a counterfoil, moving from Cicero's theoretical advice on the rhetorical use of tears – as a somatic indicator of a variety of emotions – to practical examples in Roman historiography of emperors using tears as an emotive tool to persuade and control their subjects. **Johncock** takes us from the human to the divine, examining speeches in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in which frequently a human tries, but fails, to persuade a god; however, Ovid succeeds in persuading his reader of the speaker's case, and inspiring him or her to pity.

Part IV has two foci, contributing to a greater or lesser extent to each chapter: linguistic formulae used to generate emotion, and genre-specific emotive persuasion. **Dickey** uses pragmatic theories of politeness to examine a shift from making requests via bald imperatives (Classical period) to the emergence of a language of politeness (Hellenistic period, both literary and papyrological texts), which reflects changes in language suggesting heightened emotion. **Salvo** exa-

mines how curses and magic spells (inscriptions and papyri) addressed to gods aimed to arouse the god's emotions to persuade him/her to make a mortal fall in love with the writer; the god's methods of doing this effectively comprise a secondary persuasion strategy that also might include emotion arousal – though different emotions to those aroused in the god. **Iurescia** takes a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach to quarrels in Roman comedy, exploring linguistic techniques through which negative emotions (anger and fear) can be aroused to throw a collocutor's judgment off-balance and manipulate them. Finally, **Hammond** uses discursive psychology to examine Catullus's emotional discourse – his choice of language and invention of linguistic terms – which both expresses the emotions of characters in his poems, and arouses the reader's emotions to persuade them of the verisimilitude of the depicted conversations.

As well as the connections between chapters in the same Part, a wide range of further thematic links will become apparent (and the reader's attention will be directed to these by the frequent cross-references between chapters). It is worthwhile here drawing attention to some of these thematic interconnections. While most of the chapters deal with *arousing* emotions in order to persuade, some (Chaniotis, Fragoulaki, Knight, Hagen, Dickey) instead/also deal with *displaying* or *performing* emotions – truly felt or otherwise – to persuade. Griffith-Williams and Fragoulaki both compare in depth two attempts at persuasion, one of which is made using emotional arguments, the other (at least at the surface level) avoiding them. Several chapters (Chaniotis, Hagen, Salvo, Johncock) focus on or refer to persuasion of gods. And several (Fragoulaki, Salvo, Johncock) involve persuasion of the reader.

We hope *our* reader is persuaded – emotionally or not – of the value of this collection.

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PART I:

EMOTION IN CLASSICAL GREEK ORATORY –
NEW DIRECTIONS

BASHING THE ESTABLISHMENT

Chris Carey

Politics in Classical Athens (479–322 BCE) was in many respects unlike politics in modern democracies. In the modern world even in systems where the hold of government on power is shaky, or where power is exercised through coalitions, there is a degree of stability which allows for the continued exercise of power. There is also a single target for attack, in that power is consistently exercised by a definable (usually collective) entity. In Athens in contrast power was much more fluid. The absence of a concept of a state, for which Athens substitutes the *polis*, means that the government is the *dêmos*. Power amounts to influence over the *dêmos*. The existence of multiple competing groupings without the explicit ideological underpinnings of modern political parties means that influence can move around the system more freely. However, even within this system there is room for continuity. Fluidity is not chaos. Political factions could maintain a degree of influence for finite but extensive periods of time and we can at certain points in the fifth and fourth centuries identify the dominant group. So though there is no government in our sense, there is an approximation to what we would call ‘the establishment’.¹ The notion itself, then as now, is itself both fluid and subjective. It can be the most influential faction, or more radically it can be the political class (*hoi politeuomenoi*) as a whole. The system is not binary, since we may have half a dozen or more factions operating at any time. Unlike the courts, where we have an explicit contest between named individuals, in the Assembly the need to focus on public policy, and the absence of a simple two-way contest limits (though it

1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the establishment in this socio-political sense as ‘a social group exercising power generally, or within a given field or institution, by virtue of its traditional superiority, and by the use esp. of tacit understandings and often a common mode of speech, and having as a general interest the maintenance of the *status quo*’. The claim to first use is disputed but the *OED* finds it as early as Rose Macauley’s *Told by an idiot* in 1923: ‘Thus, it will be observed, do the moderns of one day become the safe establishments of the next’. There is no Greek equivalent. But there are a number of terms which can be used to express the notion of a larger or smaller group which exerts influence on a regular basis, usually as a broad category rather than as a subset: *hoi politeuomenoi* (‘the politicians’), [*hoi*] *rhêtores* (‘the Assembly speakers’); this can then be narrowed to *hoi nun politeuomenoi* (‘the current politicians’). Probably the term that comes closest to expressing the notion of a narrower circle again with a grip on policy is the term used by Demosthenes at 4.1, *hoi eiôthotes [legein]* ‘the regular speakers’, which suggests a recognizable group to whom less well known people will defer, or his *hoi tauta politeuomenoi* (3.1, ‘the people responsible for these policies’), which indicates the dominant political configuration. In general however it is context usually which identifies the scope of the target group and the nature of its influence.

does not remove) the space for explicit group competition and individual abuse.² The focus has to be on policy failure. But it is still important for anyone seeking to enter the sphere of influence to align not just the ideas but also the feelings of the audience with himself and create a commensurate affective gap between the audience and those most likely to influence it. This chapter looks at ways of creating this emotional divide, specifically in the Assembly, though I make occasional forays into forensic oratory for illuminating parallels and to show the essential continuity across the spectrum of civic debate.

One useful tactic within this process of alienation and realignment is to set up a binary antithesis between the insider and the outsider. This is seen at its simplest, and at its least emotive, in the apologetic opening of the *First Philippic*, where Demosthenes explicitly draws attention to his status as a relative newcomer and justifies his decision to speak early in the debate on the ground that the policies of ‘the usual speakers’ have failed to deliver:³

If the question to be debated were a new one, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the usual speakers had declared their opinions, and if I was satisfied with any of their proposals, I should have stayed silent, and if not, I should then have tried to express my own views. But since the case is that we are still debating a point on which these people have often spoken before, I can reasonably be excused if I rise first to address you. For if in the past they had offered the right advice, there would be no need for deliberation today.⁴

The antithesis is developed with more overt appeal to the emotions in the attacks on those in charge of policy in the speech on the *Syntaxis* (speech 13) and the *Third Olynthiac* (speech 3):

But, it may be said, this was the only respect in which things were better then than now, but in other respects they were worse. Not a bit of it; but let us examine any instance you choose. The buildings they left behind them to adorn the city – temples, harbours and their accessories – were so fine and so splendid that they have left no room for those who come after to surpass them; the Propylaea there, the docks, the colonnades and the other buildings, with which they beautified the city which they handed down to us. But the private houses of those who held power were so modest and so suited to the title of our constitution that if any of you knows the homes of Themistocles and Cimon and Aristides and the illustrious men of the day, he can see that they are no more splendid than those of their neighbours. But today, men of Athens, in its public works the city is happy with the provision of roads and fountains, stucco and nonsense (and I blame not those who proposed these constructions – far from it – but you, if you suppose that these are enough for you), while personally the individuals who control any of the public funds have some of them set up private houses which are not just prouder than those of the masses but more magnificent than our public building, and others have bought up and cultivated estates more vast than they ever dreamed of before. The reason for all this change is that then the people was lord and controller of everything and the rest were happy to accept

- 2 That the effect is, however, to limit the space rather than to preclude is nicely illustrated by Demosthenes, *Exord.* 53, who criticizes the constant squabbling among the regular speakers before going on to engage in a little mudslinging himself.
- 3 Translations of Demosthenes and Isocrates are based on the Loeb edition, with adjustments, sometimes substantial. Other translations are my own.
- 4 Dem. 4.1 = *Exord.* 1.

from them some share of honour and authority and reward; but now, on the contrary, these men control all these benefits and manage everything, while the people are in the position of lackey and appendage, and you are happy to accept whatever they dole out to you.⁵

Alternatively let someone come forward and tell me what has made Philip powerful if not ourselves. 'But, my good man,' he might say, 'if our position abroad is bad, things in the city itself at least are better.' And what could one say by way of proof? The fortifications we are plastering, the streets we are paving, the fountains and such nonsense? But turn and look at the men whose policies have produced these results; some of them have gone from rags to riches, others from obscurity to eminence, some have set up their private houses more magnificent than the public buildings, and as the city's prosperity has declined, so theirs has increased. And what is the reason for this and why is it that everything was good then and not right now? Because then the people had the nerve to take action and march out itself and was lord of the politicians and controller of all the benefits and each of the rest was happy to receive from the people a share of honour and office and other good things. But now on the contrary the politicians control the benefits and manage everything, while you the people are hamstrung and stripped of money, allies and are in the position of lackey and appendage, happy if these people dole out the Theoric money to you and celebrate the Boedromia, and – most manly thing of all – you even feel grateful for what belongs to you.⁶

But within this more overtly adversarial approach there is room for further variation. Both speeches condemn the current policies and politicians in strong terms. But where the *Syntaxis* speech puts the emphasis throughout on the dominant group, the *Third Olynthiac* takes a broader approach, in that it expands the focus to attack the role of politicians generally and their relationship with the people. This in a sense is the ultimate presentation of the outsider position, since it implicitly contrasts the speaker not just with a subset of those active in politics but with the whole political establishment in the largest sense. The effect is almost to take him outside politics, though Demosthenes had in fact by this time been politically active for at least half a dozen years. The same gesture of stepping back from the political process can be seen in *Exord.* 53.1, where Demosthenes castigates the mutual recrimination of the Assembly speakers:

The hubbub of bickering, men of Athens, which has tended throughout time to damage the city has now arisen from the same quarter as always. It's not so much these people who deserve to be criticized (they do it perhaps from anger and competitiveness, and above all because it is in their interests) but you, if when you have assembled for matters of great public significance you sit and listen to personal abuse and cannot reason in your heads that the constant traded insults from all the orators when nobody is on trial make you pay the price for their mutual attacks.

This basic antithesis between insider and outsider forms the foundation for a number of other antitheses designed to generate audience hostility and isolate and unseat the opponents. These show a striking persistence over time and across contexts or genres; evidently it was felt that they worked.

5 Dem. 13.28–31.

6 Dem. 3.28–31.

One such is the public-private divide.⁷ This divide often presents itself explicitly in terms of the uneven distributions of the financial benefits of public policy, certainly in Demosthenes. This dichotomy of benefits maps neatly onto the realities of the democratic process in Athens, where, despite the role played by *isêgoria* embedded both in democratic ideology and (through the herald's cry: 'who wishes to speak') in political procedures, initiative comes from a relatively small elite, though the ultimate say goes to the *dêmos*. The core is given at its most succinct at Dem. 3.29, cited above: 'Some have set up their private houses more magnificent than the public buildings, and as the city's prosperity has declined, so theirs has increased.'

The attack which we find in the *Syntaxis* and the *Third Olynthiac* recurs again in the speech for the prosecution of Aristocrates:

In those days the city's state was wealthy and splendid, but in private life no man was higher than the masses. Here is the proof: if any of you knows the sort of house that Themistocles or Miltiades or any of those illustrious men of old lived in, he can see that it is no more magnificent than those of the mass of citizens. On the other hand, both the city's buildings and structures were on such a scale and of such quality that no room was left for those who come after to surpass them. Witness the Propylaea there, the docks, the colonnades, the Piraeus and all the structures with which you see our city adorned. But today each of the men who take part in public life enjoys such surfeit of wealth that some of them have set up private houses more magnificent than many public buildings; and others have bought up larger estates than all you people in the court possess together; while, as for the public buildings that you put up and whitewash, I am ashamed to say how mean and shabby they are.⁸

The antithesis is elaborated differently in each case. But the difference is at the level of detail and all alike place great emphasis on the fact that the individual politicians have houses which are more substantial and impressive than the civic buildings. This can never have been literally true. And the claim is especially unreliable at a time when, as Demosthenes himself acknowledges, sustained efforts are being made to beautify the city and improve vital aspects of the infrastructure, dismissed in these cases as nonsense and mere plaster. This is hyperbole of a high order. But it has the advantage of articulating economic division at its most physical and visible. Athens never espoused the principle of radical redistribution of wealth. And there were almost no legal limits on what could be purchased. So there was nothing to prevent a wealthy individual from amassing as much property as he could. But the fact that possession and expenditure are legal does not make them acceptable. The many references to public *euergesia*, benefaction or service to the state, through liturgies and voluntary donation (*epidosis*) in our sources, and the public honours granted in reward,⁹ indicate that there is a consensus around the idea of what should be done with wealth in a democratic culture. This is a consensus which persists throughout the history of democracy and

7 I discuss this antithesis more fully in Carey (2014).

8 Dem. 23.206–8.

9 On rewards for *euergesia* see Liddel (2007) 160–74.

which probably extended beyond democracy to include other political systems.¹⁰ Certainly within Athens expenditure on the public good is laudable; expenditure on self-indulgence or on ostentatious display is reprehensible. This mind-set can be seen in the comic attacks on the gourmands and gourmets who can be seen in the market buying fish and other delicacies, but especially fish.¹¹ It can be seen in Demosthenes' attacks on Meidias for elaborate display of means and expenditure:

That is how I have behaved towards you; but how has Meidias? To this day he has never been leader of a syndicate, though he was not robbed of any part of his inheritance by anyone but received from his father a large property. Where then is his splendour, his public services and his magnificent expenditure? I can see none, unless one observes the house he has built at Eleusis huge enough to overshadow everyone in the vicinity, that he drives his wife to the Mysteries, or anywhere else that he¹² wishes, with a pair of white horses from Sicyon, and he swaggers about the market-place with three or four servants in attendance, speaking of beakers and drinking-horns and cups loud enough for the passers-by to hear.¹³

There is an assumption, in a society which is hostile to conspicuous consumption, that individual properties will be modest and ostentation will be the preserve of the state buildings. The alleged magnificence of private property, though it would not contravene any law, is a sign of deviation from this ideal, and consequently when applied to the politicians as a class or the dominant group is evidence of a larger degeneration in public life.

There is however more at work here than an inappropriate balance between private and public. The wealth is by implication undeserved; at Dem.13.30 (see above), this is wealth beyond the wildest dreams of the politicians. Its scale (in context) also prompts the question: where does the money come from? The Athenians were aware that their politicians, like ours, attract all sorts of benefits and payments by trading on their influence,¹⁴ and that politics is a route to wealth. But the rags to riches *topos* used in 3.29 (see above)¹⁵ is one that regularly appears in contexts of speculation and corruption.¹⁶ This is made explicit in Aristophanes' use of the *topos* in *Wasps*:

Philocleon: And where does the rest of the money [sc. from the empire] go?

Bdelycleon: To these 'I won't betray the Athenian riffraff
but will fight for the masses forever'. For you, my father,
elect them to rule you, softened by these cheap statements.

10 For elite support for civic activities in non-democratic contexts, see briefly Rhodes (2003) 108.

11 See Davidson (1993) and (1997) 3–35, and Sommerstein (1996) 330–1, 351.

12 Or 'she'; the Greek is ambiguous.

13 Dem. 21.157–8.

14 Hyp. 5.25: 'You readily allow the generals and the public speakers to receive considerable rewards. They have received this right not from the laws but from your leniency and generosity. You impose just one condition, that the money they receive should be through their influence with you, not against your interests.'

15 It recurs at [Dem.] 8.66 about those supporting the status quo of peace with Philip.

16 Cf. Lys. 25.27, 27.9; Dem. *Exord.* 53.3.

And they in turn take bribes of fifty talents
from the allied cities with threats and menaces like these ...¹⁷

Forensic speeches too are explicit in presenting the opponents as a kleptocracy, as we saw in Dem. 23 and Dem. 21.¹⁸ The allegation in Assembly speeches is often less explicit. But even here the hearers are tacitly invited to fill in details in order to build a further antithesis of public poverty *vs* individual theft on to the basic public-private antithesis.

There is a further dimension to this. Conspicuous consumption and display are evidence not just of a contempt for the ideology of public service but also of a contempt for the masses (explicit at Dem. 13.30). So the indignation excited by the improper expenditure is exacerbated by an invitation to feel the indignation proper to arrogance. These properties are not just *σεμνοτέρως*, 'more grand', but *ὑπερηφανωτέρως*, 'more proud', 'more arrogant'. The narrative of arrogant contempt for the masses is made more stridently in Demosthenes' speech for the prosecution of Timocrates:

And then they malign you in private conversations, as though they were gentry, when they conduct themselves like badly behaved, ungrateful servants. And indeed servants who are set free, judges, are never grateful to their masters for their freedom, but hate them above all mankind, because they know about their former slavery. In the same way politicians are not satisfied with having risen from poverty to riches at the expense of the polis, but actually insult the mass,¹⁹ because the mass know what the style of life of each was when they were young and poor.

There is more at work however than moral disapprobation. The account of flamboyant parade of wealth is also meant to appeal to envy.²⁰ The antithesis between the many and the few in Dem. 13 is a narrative of exclusivity. Though the antithesis between private and public buildings appeals to a sense of the correct balance between citizen and *polis*, the second person used in the comparison between the enormous rewards of the rich and the pickings of public funding which the audience receives (3.31: 'you even feel grateful for what belongs to you'; 13.31: 'you are happy to accept whatever they dole out to you') personalizes the antithesis. The same is true of the use of the motif by Aeschines:

And the people are discouraged by their experiences, like someone senile or out of his mind; they preserve only the name of democracy, while they have surrendered the real thing to others. Then when you go home from Assembly meetings, you have not decided policy but like men coming from a picnic you have been given a share of the leftovers.²¹

17 Ar. *Wasps* 1665–70

18 Cf. also Lys. 27.1–4.

19 Dem. 24.124.

20 For the complex relationship between resentment at undeserved good fortune and resentment at goods one does not possess, which meet in the Greek term *phthonos*, see Sanders (2014) 41–6, 77–8; and for the role played by this complex in Athenian oratory, Sanders (2014) 88–98.

21 Aeschin. 3.251

The contrast is presented in more personal terms in the *Aristocrates* speech (23.208), where the speaker claims that the politicians own more land than the jurors put together. That the contrast is meant to excite not just disapprobation for an inappropriate approach to public service but also envy, is made explicit at Isocrates 8.124:

Nevertheless, despite the many reminders we have of how the city fared under both kinds of leadership, we are so happy with the depravity of our politicians that, though we see that many of the other citizens have lost their ancestral property because of the war and the disorders which these people have caused, while they have risen from poverty to riches, yet we are not offended nor do we resent [*phthonoumen*] their prosperity....

This antithesis between the elite and the masses becomes part of a narrative of past and present which contrasts the splendour of the private properties of contemporary politicians with the simplicity of those of the great politicians of the past.²² In the reconstructed past of the Assembly and the court the politicians of old were simpler men who were content to serve the *dêmos* and to build fine buildings for the city but live in modest dwellings themselves. The vagueness with which these houses are described and located is enough for the modern reader to doubt the factual basis of the comparison. But it plays to a regular tendency, not peculiar to the ancient Greeks, to see the past as a better place. The names are significant here – Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon. As always in fourth-century oratory they are chosen with care. These are the authors of the defeat of the Persian invader and the creation of the fifth-century empire. There is a tacit appeal to the narratives of the epideictic tradition, of a better age which contrasts the piffling politicians of today, a point which becomes explicit in the *Third Olynthiac*.

This narrative of arrogance and acquisitiveness need not only be expressed in terms of property. Like most good tropes it is flexible and we find it used in Aeschines 3 (in line with its specific context) in terms of the rewards offered to or demanded by politicians:

Now let Demosthenes demonstrate in his speech whether there is any record of a decree to crown any of these men. So were the people ungrateful? No, they were great-hearted and those men were worthy of the city. They thought their honour should reside not in written words but in the memory of those they had aided, and this memory from that day to this has remained immortal. And it is worthwhile recalling what rewards they did receive.

There were those who in that period, men of Athens, endured much labour and great dangers and defeated the Medes at the river Strymon. When these men returned home, they asked the people for a reward and the people gave them great honours by the standards of the day, namely the right to set up three stone Herms in the Portico of the Herms, on condition that they did not inscribe their own names on them, so that the inscription would be perceived as belonging to the people, not the generals.²³

22 For the potent appeal of nostalgia in Athenian political oratory, see Westwood (this volume).

23 Aeschin. 3.182–3.

The leaders of the past were happy to allow the *dêmos* to take the credit; those of today insist on a purely personal reward. This is a different way of thinking about profit but one which is potentially effective in a culture which places so much emphasis on *timê*, honour.

This antithesis between past and present can be handled in other ways. Though present and past politicians can be contrasted to signal the abuses of those in politics, the antitheses in play can be multiplied by bringing the *dêmos* itself into the antithetical framework. Demosthenes does this twice, both in the *Syntaxis* speech and in the *First Olynthiac*. Unlike the public/private antithesis this one, at least in Demosthenes, involves a direct confrontation with the audience. In speech 13 Demosthenes, having (literally) rubbished the achievements of those who have used the Theoric fund to beautify the city with ‘roads and fountains and white-wash and other idiocies’, suddenly switches ground and lets the political opponents briefly off the hook to attack the *dêmos*. It’s not their fault; it’s the fault of their audience of enablers: ‘and I blame not those who proposed these constructions – far from it – but you, if you suppose that these are enough for you’ (13.31). The *dêmos* should not put up with it. Though the *dêmos* is often seen as continuous through time, in this case there is a contrast between the *dêmos* as it was in the past and as it now is. The *dêmos* in the past was the master (*despotês*), a very strong term which conjures up the kind of power relationship we meet in the governing metaphor of Aristophanes’ *Knights*,²⁴ where the *dêmos* (personified) is a homeowner and the politicians are his slaves. The *dêmos* controlled and the politicians were content (*agapêton*) with whatever the *dêmos* chose to give them. Now the relationship is reversed. The *dêmos* is now an appendage (*prosthêkê*) and a servant (*hupêretês*). As well as the *phthonos* and indignation excited by the wealth trope, there are here additional emotional effects. One is indignation against those who have curtailed the power of the *dêmos* and reduced it to the role of a lackey. The other is shame to be held in thrall to a few individuals, especially given the traditions of Athens. This effect is made explicit at §35,²⁵ where Demosthenes notes that if they were some insignificant state there would be no need for him to advise them to be more ambitious; but they are Athenians and heir to glorious tradition which they are neglecting:

If I knew you were Siphnians or Kythnians or some other such people, I would be advising you to show less pride. But since you are Athenians, I counsel you to make ready your forces. For it is shameful to desert the position of pride which our ancestors handed down to us.

Again the epideictic tradition, though only implied, offers fertile ground for the creation of potentially powerful emotional effects.

The element of confrontation in Dem. 13 however has a higher risk attached to it than the other antitheses we have been discussing. The desire to shoot the messenger is a natural one and there is a very real prospect that the audience will respond to the challenge to shake off their torpor by turning their anger against the

24 See especially *Knights* 40–68.

25 Cf. 23.208.

speaker. The risk is partly neutralized by careful choice of language – the *dêmos* is reduced to the role of *hupêretês*, ‘servant’, ‘underling’, not the more degrading and potentially insulting *doulos*, ‘slave’. The other precautionary measure is to stress that the situation can change. There is hope that things can get better and the answer is in the hands of the *dêmos*. Nobody likes to be told that their faults are incurable. So the latter part of the speech stresses the positive target to which they should aspire and the possibility of achieving it. This is an invitation to recover and restore, not a narrative of irreversible decline.

The strategy of confrontation is broadly the same in the *Third Olynthiac*.²⁶ One key difference is that the degraded position of the *dêmos* is dealt with at greater length (3.30–1). There Demosthenes is explicit about the danger that the Athenians will blame the whistle-blower rather than the guilty parties:

People cannot, I suppose, have a proud and vigorous spirit, if their actions are mean and paltry; for whatever a man’s behaviour is, such must be his spirit. By Demeter, I should not be surprised if I got more harm from you for pointing out this situation than the men who are responsible for it. For you do not allow free speech on every subject, and indeed I am surprised that you have even allowed it now.²⁷

However, along with the increased risk that comes with spelling out humiliation in detail, comes an increased opportunity to direct the resentment against the preferred target. The loaded language of debilitation and degradation comes with a pronounced emphasis on the source. Unlike speech 13, which blames the *dêmos* explicitly, here the focus is on those who have circumscribed its ambitions. This is in line with a general tendency in both forensic and symbouleutic oratory to locate error, injustice and failure not with the *dêmos* which makes the decisions but with the advisers who shape them.

A variation on this is Aeschines’ allegation in his 330 BCE attack on the now dominant Demosthenes that ambassadors from foreign cities now go to the private houses of the leading politicians rather than to the Boule and the Ekklesia:

Or don’t you think it monstrous that the Council chamber and the Assembly are ignored, while the letters and embassies come to private houses, not from people of no consequence but from the leading men of Asia and Europe?²⁸

Here what we have is a neat twist on the motif of private affluence vs public squalor. The large private dwellings of elite politicians do not merely rival public buildings in splendour but actually usurp their function, becoming a substitute for the public buildings where business should be conducted in a democracy. The inversion is enhanced by the reference not just to cities but to whole continents kowtowing to the cabal in question. The roles of the Council and the Assembly in receiving foreign envoys and determining the response are now superseded by

26 The criticism takes a different form in *Exord.* 53.1, where the failing of the *dêmos* resides in accepting the constant bickering of the regular speakers instead of deciding policy.

27 Dem. 3.32.

28 Aeschin. 3.250.

Demosthenes and his cronies. This goes far beyond the issues of conspicuous consumption, contempt for the masses, bribery and malversation of public funds. It offers a base both for potent resentment and anxiety in that what we have is a parallel state within a state. Power is being leached from the collective to a group which operates effectively as an oligarchy. This furtive operation as an alternative to collective debate in the constitutional bodies is one of the features which distinguish the oligarchic man functioning within a democracy, according to Theophrastus:

He has a penchant for saying things like ‘*We* must get together and consider this and get away from the mass and the Agora and cease involving ourselves with public office and being insulted or honoured by these people’, and ‘either they or we must run the city’.²⁹

It is exactly this kind of private sneering at and conniving against the *dêmos* which Demosthenes attributes to his opponents at 24.124 (cited above).

The appeal here is to a different kind of *phthonos*, resentment at encroachment on one’s prestige or privileges. The *dêmos* was always jealous of its control over policy and advising the *dêmos* was always commensurately fraught, since in addition to the political dynamics in play in any specific situation there was a systemic need to remind the public speakers where power lay. As Demos, the personification of the Athenian masses, observes in Aristophanes’ *Knights* (1111–50), he likes to raise up his politicians and then strike them down. It is the job of the outsider to create the emotional context for a clipping of wings of this sort. There is an additional dimension. The regime of the Thirty effectively put paid to oligarchy as a serious political project in Athens; for much of the fourth century there was no plausible alternative to democracy. Hence for instance Isocrates when arguing for a more restricted democracy feels compelled to acknowledge (at length) the crimes of the Thirty and the virtuous conduct of the democracy, at some cost to the force of his case for change (7.56–63). But the memory of the revolutions of the late fifth century persisted and anxiety could become acute at moments of crisis. One such was the period after the devastating defeat by Philip of Macedon at the battle of Chaeronea, when the Athenians explicitly legislated against the possibility that the Areopagos may be complicit in an attempt to undermine the democracy with a law of 337/6 prescribing loss of political rights for any of its members who served under a regime which supplanted the democracy.³⁰ The attempts of both Demosthenes and Aeschines to present their opponent as an enemy of democracy indicate that there was still fertile ground for suspicions of subversive ambition.

As the *Aristocrates* speech and Aeschines 3 indicate, the devices which we have been considering are not specific to Assembly speeches but are equally useful in court. Given the overlap in function between the courts and the Assembly, it would be surprising if it were otherwise. More interestingly perhaps, we can trace a degree of continuity not merely across contexts but over time, not merely the

29 Theophr. *Char.* 26, *Oligarchy*.

30 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.79; Harding (1985) no. 101.

two decades which separate Dem. 3 and Aeschin. 3 but more strikingly between the fifth and the fourth century. For the model which Demosthenes constructs for the operation of the political system is already present in comedy. It is in comedy that we first encounter the contrast between the present and past politicians. The most sustained presentation is probably the elaborate coinage image in the *antepirrhema* of *Frogs* (718–37), which contrasts the current debased leadership with the politicians of the past. But the contrast predates the *Frogs*. It is articulated more fervently in the *Demes* of Eupolis, whose plot was based on the resurrection of past politicians to help the city out of the mess it was in:

In truth though there is much to be said I'm at a loss for words.
 So pained am I when I see our political life. We old men didn't run the city like this.
 To start with our city's generals were
 from the greatest houses, foremost in wealth and birth.
 To them we prayed like gods; for gods they were.
 And so we were secure. But now, wherever it may be,
 we go on campaign with trash we choose as our leaders.³¹

It should not surprise us to find comedy and oratory sharing this motif, since many of the motifs we meet in oratorical attack are prefigured in comedy. And both share the same need to appeal to a mass audience. But the rapprochement between forms goes beyond the generalized contrast between past and present. We find a sustained attack on contemporary political leadership in Aristophanes' *Wasps* which uses terms very similar to those used in our fourth century sources. The speaker, Bdelycleon, is a concerned son trying to rescue his father from what he presents as the pernicious influence of the demagogues. The attack is again an outsider's attack of the sort used in Dem. 3 in that all the currently influential speakers are implicated:

Consider then; you and all the others could be rich,
 but you've been hemmed in somehow by these so-called democrats.
 You rule countless cities, from the Pontos to Sardis
 but you get from it nothing but this paltry pay, and even that
 they drip into you like oil with a flock of wool, just enough to keep you alive.
 They want you to be poor, and I will tell you why.
 It's so that you may know your handler, and, if he looses you
 on to one of their foes, you'll leap on him with fury.
 If they wished to provide a living for the people, nothing would be easier.
 We have a thousand towns that now pay us tribute;
 if they instructed each of these to feed twenty Athenians,
 then twenty thousand of our citizens would live on here,
 in garlands with nothing but richest milk,
 enjoying pleasures worthy of the trophies of Marathon.
 But now like olive pickers you follow the man who pays you.³²

31 Eupolis *Demes* fr. 383 KA.

32 Ar. *Wasps* 698–712.

The excluded party according to Bdelycleon is the democratic juror (682–5):

Isn't it absolute slavery to see all these people in office
 them and their flatterers, and drawing pay?
 As for you, you're content,³³ if someone gives the three obols which as rower
 and in land battles and sieges you earned with hard labour.

The language is very close to Demosthenes, with the provocative suggestion that the Athenians are content/grateful (verb *agapan*) to be given a share of the benefits of the democracy which they control. The uneven distribution of wealth which we have seen in the orators is if anything stronger here, since the politicians are creaming off for themselves the fruits of a vast empire on the basis of their fraudulent democratic credentials, while passing on small benefits to the masses in terms of jury pay, here in the person of Philokleon. And the mechanism is the same, to give small rewards to the *dēmos* as a means of maintaining control. The same derogatory imagery is used, in that the *dēmos* is reduced to the level of a pet. Not merely the ideas but the language and imagery here are so close to the *Third Olynthiac* as to suggest that Demosthenes has Aristophanes in mind. But less important than the specific intertextual influence is the shared and emotive rhetoric of attack on a corrupt, arrogant elite who masquerade as servants of the people.

There is inevitably an element of reductiveness in the kind of taxonomy I have offered. In a large gathering the emotional psychology I have described will play out differently for different members of the audience. And since it is often difficult to disaggregate mixed emotional responses, the audience members themselves would have struggled to define their response. All the emotional effects can be substantiated by the texts in context and in comparison one with another; the amalgam cannot, as long as one operates with a model of collective psychology which is not one of mechanical homogeneity.

But the reader is bound also to ask: how frequent is such rhetoric? As so often in the study of the ancient world what we have is a fragmentary picture. So it is difficult to be sure if recurrent features which impress themselves on the modern reader were as frequent or as visible in the infinitely greater lost body of Athenian oratory. But the fact that Aristophanes, Aeschines and Demosthenes use the same arguments suggests that we are looking at a recurrent rhetoric, even if we cannot test its absolute frequency. The uncharted space between Aristophanes and Aeschines must have contained a number, probably a substantial number, of attacks along these lines.

This in turn prompts a further question. The rhetoric we have identified is to some extent a cliché by the time Aeschines uses it to attack Demosthenes, at least to the extent that the hearers will have encountered the arguments on many

33 Cf. Lys. 27.4: 'As it is, such is the state of the city that you no longer feel angry for their thefts but gratitude for what they give you, as though you were working for them rather than them stealing your property.'

occasions. One might be tempted to conclude that the rhetoric has lost value over time. This however would be a mistake. We need to bear in mind that this rhetoric does not win the argument. It is a tactic, not a strategy. It needs to be located within a persuasive strategy and its persuasiveness will itself depend on that strategy as part of a synergetic process. We need also to understand the nature of rhetorical and political cliché. Detached disdain for political rhetoric is possible only for the ‘quietist’ (*apragmôn*) derided by Pericles,³⁴ the man who withdraws from engagement with political life, or for the armchair politician reading Greek (or any) oratory with hindsight. By definition those who serve on the juries or who listen to debates in the Assembly are engaged. They have to make a decision and their response to any one component will depend on context and on the plausibility both of the speaker and of the claim in that context. But the persistence of such claims indicates their continuing currency. The dynamics of power remain the same over time: the risk of corruption, arrogance and complacency from its extended exercise. The belief in a better past is again a recurrent and persistent factor. The anxieties which surround public policy-making in Athens remain the same. The fears of subversion of the democracy persist. They may not be a consistent presence; and they may only become acute at moments of crisis. But they are always there.

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RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL PERSUASION IN ATHENIAN INHERITANCE CASES

Brenda Griffith-Williams

INTRODUCTION

Terence Rattigan's play, *The Winslow Boy*, is set in London just before the First World War. The plot concerns a Naval cadet called Ronnie Winslow who is wrongly accused of theft, and expelled from his boarding school. His father hires an eminent barrister, Sir Robert Morton, to defend him. Ronnie's older sister dislikes Morton, thinking him cold and unfeeling, but when she sees him break down in tears after the court has ruled in Ronnie's favour, she changes her mind and apologizes for misjudging him. She asks him why he is so afraid of his emotions, and he replies: 'Because, as a lawyer, I must necessarily distrust them. ... To fight a case on emotional grounds is the surest way of losing it. Emotions muddy the issue. Cold, clear logic, and buckets of it, should be the lawyer's only equipment.'

The fictitious barrister in Rattigan's play exemplifies an attitude that is prevalent among legal professionals in the (modern) real world. Judges and lawyers are trained to analyse cases logically and dispassionately, and the ordinary people who serve as jurors in the English Crown Court are often reminded by the judge presiding over a case that they must be guided by reason, not emotion, in reaching their verdicts. In this chapter I look at persuasion, and consider whether it is possible to distinguish meaningfully between 'rational' and 'emotional' persuasion, in the context of the Athenian legal system, where the attitude to emotions was different from what a modern lawyer would expect. The ordinary Athenians who served in the courts as *dikasts*¹ had no help from professional lawyers or judges, and there was nothing to discourage them from reacting emotionally to what they heard in court – quite the reverse.²

In practice, a rigid opposition between emotion and reason probably does not reflect the realities of judicial decision-making in either the ancient or the modern

- 1 From the Greek *dikastês*. The functions of the Athenian *dikasts*, who sat in large panels, combined those of a modern judge and juror. For more information, see Todd (1993) 82–91.
- 2 Cf. Carey (1994) 177: 'The implicit assumption in the modern court is that the jurors will arrive at a dispassionate decision. The approach is implicitly clinical. The Athenian assumption is the reverse. The jurors are asked to become emotionally involved; they are often explicitly invited to feel anger or resentment, even hatred, for the speaker's opponent. It is assumed that the jury respond to what they hear in court exactly as they would respond to the same events in the outside world.'

world.³ Even professionals are not immune from emotional persuasion, and untrained lay adjudicators are all the more likely to be susceptible to it. In an adversarial legal system such as that of Classical Athens, or of modern England and Wales, the role of an advocate or speechwriter is to make the best possible case for his client, and the susceptibility of the adjudicators to emotional persuasion is a factor to be exploited as far as the system will permit. Neither a defence advocate in a modern jury trial nor an Athenian logographer (speechwriter) could openly admit that a client was in the wrong, but both might privately hope for a ‘perverse’ or ‘irrational’ result. And both might certainly try to influence the jury by emotional as well as rational means of persuasion.

Aristotle, in his advice to orators on how to persuade an audience, defines the emotions in terms of their effect on judgment:

The emotions (*ta pathē*) are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger (*orgē*), pity (*eleos*), fear (*phobos*) and all similar emotions and their contraries.⁴

My concern here is not with the arousal of specific emotions such as anger or pity,⁵ but with emotion in general (*pathos*) as distinct from reason or logic (*logos* or *logismos*). One of the dictionary definitions of the English word ‘emotion’ is ‘strong feelings, passion; (more generally) instinctive feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge’. ‘Reason’ is defined, *inter alia*, as ‘the power of the mind to think and form valid judgements by a process of logic’.⁶ We cannot, of course, know for sure how far instinctive feeling contributed to the decisions made by the Athenian dikasts, because in the majority of cases we do not know what their decision was; and even when we do, we can only guess what went through the mind of each individual dikast before he cast his vote. We can, however, study the techniques used by Athenian logographers in their forensic speeches to engage the sympathy of the dikasts at an emotional level as well as appeal to their reason. Speeches from Athenian inheritance disputes are particularly worth considering from the perspective of emotion and persuasion, because much of the evidence and argumentation used in them seems to appeal specifically to the emotions of the dikasts – although, as I hope to demonstrate, that perception requires some qualification. I have chosen to compare and contrast two speeches, Isaeus 7 (*On the Estate of Apollodorus*) and Isaeus 9 (*On the Estate of Astyphilus*), which display some obvious similarities in their narrative and argumentation, but also some striking differences of structure, style and language.

3 Cf. Konstan (2006) 20: ‘Over the past thirty years or so, investigators in several disciplines have increasingly recognized that emotions typically, and perhaps necessarily, involve a substantial cognitive component. The traditional opposition between reason and emotion is no longer the reigning paradigm in science or philosophy.’

4 Arist. *Rh.* 2.1, 1378a 24–27; trans. Freese (1926) 172.

5 On the arousal of specific emotions in Athenian juries, see, e.g. Rubinstein (2004) and Sanders (2014) 77–99.

6 www.oed.com consulted 16 February 2015.

THE SPEECHES

The legal point at issue in both cases is the validity of an adoption: Thrasyllus, the speaker of Isaeus 7, claims to have been adopted by his uncle Apollodorus, while the anonymous speaker of Isaeus 9 tries to persuade the dikasts that his half-brother, Astyphilus, did *not* adopt the son of his cousin Cleon. In accordance with Solon's law, at least as it was interpreted in the fourth century BCE,⁷ an Athenian with no legitimate sons could adopt anyone he chose as his son and heir, either *inter vivos* or by will, provided he was of sound mind, unimpaired by old age, drugs or disease, and not acting under the influence of a woman or under constraint.⁸ A man who adopted *inter vivos* would introduce his adopted son to his phratry (and *genos*, if he belonged to one), and enrol him in his deme, as if he had been a natural legitimate son,⁹ and when he died the adopted son would succeed automatically to his estate. In the event of a dispute about the adoption, the son would be expected to produce witnesses who could testify that the formalities had been properly carried out. The procedure was different for someone claiming to have been adopted by will, who first had to obtain the authority of the court before he could be enrolled in his adoptive father's phratry and deme and take possession of the estate. So the law applying to these cases was clear, but the facts, as in any such dispute, were impossible to prove beyond doubt. Isaeus's task was to persuade the dikasts that his clients' version of the facts was the true one – or, at least, more likely to be true than that of their opponents. Before we consider in detail how he went about this, it may be helpful to start with a brief summary of the story told by each speaker.

Thrasyllus, the speaker of Isaeus 7, says that he was adopted *inter vivos* by his mother's half-brother, Apollodorus. His opponent, who claims the estate as next of kin, is a first cousin, the daughter of Apollodorus's paternal uncle Eupolis.¹⁰ Apollodorus, according to Isaeus, did not complete the formalities of the adoption in person because, after introducing Thrasyllus to his phratry as his adopted son,

7 Cf. Rubinstein (1993) 17.

8 The law is cited at [Dem.] 46.14, and partially quoted at [Dem.] 44.68. It is also frequently referred to in the speeches of Isaeus, e.g. 2.13, 4.16, 6.9, 10.2.

9 After the reforms of Cleisthenes in the sixth century BCE, membership of a deme (one of 139 districts in Athens and rural Attica) was a prerequisite for Athenian citizenship. Membership of a phratry (a kinship group whose membership passed from father to son) was no longer compulsory, but it appears that most fourth-century Athenians did belong to a phratry. Membership of a *genos*, a kinship group whose members performed certain religious cults, was less widespread, but membership of both phratries and *genê* was still used in court cases as evidence of legitimate birth or citizenship, or legally valid adoption.

10 Athenian women could not appear in court as litigants, so Thrasyllus's opponent was represented by her husband, Pronapes. If Thrasyllus's mother had been Apollodorus's full sister, she (since he had no brothers) would have been his next of kin, entitled to claim Apollodorus's estate if he had died leaving no direct descendants. Since, however, they were only half-siblings by the same mother, the cousin who opposed Thrasyllus had a better claim as next of kin because she was related to Apollodorus through his father. For Thrasyllus, therefore, it is essential to convince the dikasts that Apollodorus adopted him; otherwise, he has no claim to the estate.

he died before the meeting of his deme at which he was planning to enrol him; but Thrasyllus produces witnesses who testify that Apollodorus made his intentions perfectly clear to his fellow demesmen, who duly enrolled Thrasyllus, according to Apollodorus's instructions, after his death. Isaeus evidently did not consider this account of the adoption, persuasive as it seems, sufficient on its own to make his client's case, so he also tells us about the history of the family. Apollodorus's father, Thrasyllus senior, died on the Sicilian expedition of 415–3 BCE, leaving a substantial fortune. Since Apollodorus was still a child, his father's brother, Eupolis, became his guardian, but he mismanaged the estate and defrauded Apollodorus of a substantial amount of property. Apollodorus's mother, in the meantime, had remarried, and her second husband, Archedamus, took pity on his young stepson Apollodorus, brought him up in his own household, and, when he came of age, helped him take successful legal action against Eupolis. Apollodorus repaid Archedamus's kindness by contributing to his ransom when he was taken prisoner of war, and later helped him out of some financial difficulties. After Archedamus died, Apollodorus became the *kurios* of his half-sister, the daughter of his mother and stepfather, making provisional arrangements for her marriage before he set off on military service. Apollodorus and Eupolis, on the other hand, remained enemies, and such a large amount of money was involved that there was no possibility of a reconciliation.

The speaker of Isaeus 9 says that Astyphilus, his half-brother by the same mother, died abroad on military service. The speaker himself came home from a military campaign to find Astyphilus's cousin, Cleon, in occupation of Astyphilus's estate. Cleon told him that his son had been adopted by Astyphilus in a will which he had deposited with his maternal uncle, Hierocles, before leaving Athens for Mytilene. The speaker attacks the will as a forgery, produced in collusion between Cleon and Hierocles, and claims the estate for himself as next of kin.¹¹ He brings witnesses who testify that Hierocles offered to sell a forged will to any of Astyphilus's friends who would give him a share in the estate. The speaker also tells us that Astyphilus's father, Euthycrates, died as the result of a fight with his brother Thudippus, Cleon's father, over the division of their paternal estate. There is a clear imputation of homicide, although Thudippus was apparently not prosecuted,¹² and the incident led to an irreconcilable enmity between the two branches of the family. Astyphilus's widowed mother remarried while Astyphilus was still a small child, and she took him with her to the household of her new husband, Theophrastus, who was the speaker's father and apparently also

11 The speaker of Isae. 9 shares with Thrasyllus the disadvantage of matrilineal kinship (note 10, above): he was related to Astyphilus only through their mother, so Cleon, as a cousin of Astyphilus on his father's side, would have had a better claim to the estate as next of kin. (For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the two speeches, see Griffith-Williams (2014).) The speaker deals with this by claiming that Cleon's father had been adopted into a different family, so that Cleon had lost his legal relationship with Astyphilus. This appears, however, to be a weak point in his story, since Isaeus brings no evidence to support it. Cf. Griffith-Williams (2008) 259 and (2013) 157.

12 Cf. Phillips (2013) 70.

Astyphilus's guardian. Both the speaker and his father, Theophrastus, were on terms of close affection with Astyphilus. The two boys were brought up and educated together from infancy, and never had a quarrel. Theophrastus cultivated Astyphilus's paternal estate and doubled its value, handing the property over in good order when Astyphilus came of age. Theophrastus always took both of the boys together to the religious ceremonies, and it was he who chose a husband for Astyphilus's sister and gave her in marriage.

The parallels between the two speeches are striking: in addition to their accounts of the disputed facts, both speakers tell stories about family relationships, hostile or friendly, that had their roots in earlier generations. Modern scholars have sometimes described these stories as 'non-legal' or 'extra-legal': not relevant to the legal issue of the validity of the disputed adoptions, but simply designed to appeal to the dikasts at an emotional level and elicit their sympathy for the speakers. As I have argued elsewhere,¹³ I think this is mistaken: the evidence about family relations *is* relevant to the legal issues because, in each case, it supports the point that the speaker is trying to prove. Isaeus, in fact, is arguing from probability. No reasonable person would want to leave an inheritance to an enemy – or, in a culture like that of Classical Athens, where enmity itself could be inherited – to the son or daughter of an enemy. So, if the dikasts believed these stories, it would be perfectly logical for them to conclude, in the one case, that Apollodorus probably did adopt Thrasyllus to avoid leaving his estate to his cousin; and, in the other, that Astyphilus probably did not adopt Cleon's son.

Isaeus, nevertheless, undoubtedly did want the dikasts to be emotionally moved as well as intellectually engaged by his clients' stories, and some elements of the stories enable him to appeal directly to their emotions by exploiting sentimental stereotypes or emphasizing the religious aspects of the Athenian inheritance system. But in order to understand how he set about the task of persuasion, we need to look not only at the content of the stories but also at the ways in which he presents them. Argumentation from probability was a way of appealing to the dikasts' reason, especially when it was linked with evidence such as testimony from credible witnesses or citations from the law;¹⁴ but a logographer could also enhance the emotional or non-rational impact of a speech in a variety of ways, including some relatively simple stylistic or rhetorical devices. Repetition of a key word or phrase, for example, will help to ensure that the dikasts remember a particularly important 'fact', and may make it seem more plausible. An apostrophe to the opponent, or a direct address to the court in the vocative, can (though it does not invariably) mark an emotional high point in a speech,¹⁵ adding an element of

13 Griffith-Williams (2012).

14 Modern psychological research has shown that people are likely to find an argument more persuasive if it is supported by evidence, especially when the source of the evidence is cited and is recognized as authoritative – see Reynolds and Reynolds (2002) 429–30.

15 Dickey (1996) 196: 'Within orations, Greek addresses (except when used to signal a change of addressees) tend to mark key points, divisions or emotional moments in the speech ...'; cf. Denomé (1974) 136: 'Ce contact avec les juges, ... Isée l'établit de façon beaucoup plus di-

drama and engaging the sympathies of the audience in a way that bypasses rational analysis. A logographer can also manipulate the audience's reaction to the story he tells through the attitudes and emotions he attributes to the characters in his narrative, and by the way in which he structures the speech, presenting some elements of the story from different points of view (in narratological terms, by changing the focalization) or by planting 'seeds'¹⁶ or telling parts of the story out of chronological sequence (narrative anticipation or postponement). And in the context of inheritance, in particular, a speaker's use of kinship terms instead of names can subtly emphasize his own (or undermine his opponent's) claim to the estate in dispute.

A superficial comparison of the two speeches, taking these features into account, might suggest that Isaeus 7 was intended to appeal more strongly to the reason, and Isaeus 9 to the emotions, of the dikasts. Isaeus 7 is measured in tone and logically structured, while Isaeus 9 makes more use of emotive religious terminology and its structure is more fluid. Closer analysis, however, will show that the distinction between rational and emotional persuasion is not always straightforward, and that the interplay between them is complex.

ISAEUS 9: ON THE ESTATE OF ASTYPHILUS

Isaeus makes a complete break with the conventional structure of a forensic oration in this speech, where there is no formal proem and no clear division into sections. The speech opens with a brief statement of the speaker's case, moving without the usual connective devices directly into the first narrative.¹⁷ There are as many as eleven separate narrative passages in all, some of which are very short, and seamlessly interwoven with argumentation. The effect of this, as no doubt Isaeus intended, is to make it more difficult (especially for someone listening to the speech rather than reading it) to distinguish between objective fact and subjective comment or interpretation.

The frequency with which the speaker addresses the dikasts directly in the second person plural (nineteen times in a speech of thirty-seven paragraphs) clearly heightens the emotional appeal of a speech. On the other hand, the use of witness testimony in Isaeus 9 might seem to appeal to the dikasts at a more

recte par l'apostrophe. Tantôt, il s'adresse aux juges en usant des formes conventionnelles: *ô andres* est utilisé en 143 occasions.... En fait, ces apostrophes ne se bornent pas à solliciter discrètement l'attention des membres du tribunal; elles veulent aussi les associer intimement à l'argumentation de l'orateur.'

16 In narratological theory, a 'seed' is 'a piece of information, the relevance of which will only later become clear. The later event thus prepared for becomes more natural, logical or plausible' – De Jong (2001) xvii–xviii; cf. De Jong (2014) 86–7.

17 In Athenian forensic speeches after Antiphon, the transition from proem to first narrative is commonly marked by the explanatory particle *γάρ*, often combined with an address to the dikasts; cf. Edwards (2004) 318–9.

rational level. There are thirteen individual items of testimony, more than in any of Isaeus's other surviving speeches; but when we consider the content of these statements, it emerges that only three of them relate to important and contentious 'facts', while the rest concern peripheral and probably uncontested matters. Moreover, two significant and highly contentious 'facts' – the adoption of Thudippus into a different family¹⁸ and the fight in which Euthycrates was said to have been fatally wounded by Thudippus – are not attested at all. It is also noticeable that Isaeus 'stretches' the testimony adduced in this speech by breaking it down into small items rather than consolidating it as he does elsewhere.¹⁹

The first section of narrative, where Isaeus describes Cleon's illegal occupation of the estate and then Astyphilus's funeral, foreshadows the idealized and emotive description of domestic harmony in the household of Theophrastus:

And so firmly has Cleon here believed, both previously and now, that no-one but himself would get the estate, that as soon as Astyphilus's death was announced, when my father was ill and I was abroad on military service, he entered into possession of the land and said that anything else left by Astyphilus belonged entirely to his own son, before any decision from the court. But when my brother's remains were brought home, the person who pretends to have been adopted long ago as his son did not lay them out or bury them, but Astyphilus's friends and fellow soldiers, seeing that my father was sick and I was abroad, themselves both laid out the remains and performed all the other customary rites (*nomizomena*), and they led my father, ill as he was, to the tomb, well aware of Astyphilus's affection for him. (9.3–4)²⁰

There is a great deal more in this passage than a straightforward narrative of events. In the first place, the speaker not only puts Cleon firmly in the wrong by accusing him of occupying Astyphilus's estate without seeking legal authority, but also casts doubt on his claim to the estate by pointing out that he did not conduct the funeral, as would have been expected if his son had really been adopted as Astyphilus's heir. At the same time, the speaker forestalls any criticism of his own absence from the funeral by explaining that he was abroad at the relevant time (a point that he repeats after the witness testimony from Astyphilus's friends has been read). And he emphasizes his own claim to the estate by referring to Astyphilus as 'my brother' (as he does six more times in the course of the speech).²¹ Then he introduces his father, Theophrastus, who was too ill to go to the funeral on his own, but was taken there by Astyphilus's friends and fellow soldiers. There is an obvious emotional appeal in the picture of the frail old man paying his last respects to his beloved stepson, and it plants the seed for the speaker's later portrayal of the affectionate relationship between Astyphilus and Theophrastus, perhaps making the dikasts more disposed to believe it.

The account of Astyphilus's funeral gains credibility because it is focalized through Astyphilus's friends, some of whom are present in court as witnesses.

18 Note 11, above.

19 The use of witness testimony in Isae. 9 is discussed more fully in Griffith-Williams (2008); cf. Griffith-Williams (2013) 154–6.

20 Translations from Isaeus's speeches are based on Edwards (2007), with minor adaptations.

21 Cf. Griffith-Williams (2013) 160–1.

Other changes of focalization in this speech enhance the credibility of aspects of the story which are not independently attested, and sometimes impute knowledge or motivation to someone other than the speaker in a highly prejudicial way. When we read the speech in print, we may wonder how the speaker could possibly have known what was in the minds of those whose thoughts or feelings he purports to relate; but the Athenian dikasts, who heard the speech delivered orally only once, probably did not have time to reflect on such questions. Astyphilus, for example, is said to have ‘hated [*misein*] Cleon so much and with such good reason that he would far sooner have stipulated that none of his relatives should ever speak to Cleon than have adopted his son’ (9.16), and the speaker repeats the point, at 9.31, that Astyphilus, ‘so hated [*misein* again] Cleon’. The language of ‘hatred’ conveys very strong negative emotion, involving a degree of real revulsion, and Isaeus does not use *misos* or *misein* in any of his other speeches of relations between family members.²² We should, nevertheless, remember that emotions, as understood by modern cognitive science and suggested by Aristotle, are not *simply* instinctive reactions but may also have a cognitive basis.²³ So, given that Euthycrates had (allegedly) been killed by Thudippus, Astyphilus’s hatred would not necessarily have seemed disproportionate or unreasonable to his contemporaries.²⁴

Astyphilus himself is also the focalizer at a critical point in the story when he learns that his father, Euthycrates, on his deathbed, solemnly enjoined his family never to allow any of his brother Thudippus’s family near his tomb. Isaeus thus reminds us of the religious dimension to the Athenian inheritance system, which features prominently in this speech:

Astyphilus, then, heard about these things while still only a child both from this man and from his other relatives, and from the moment he was old enough to understand he never spoke to Cleon, and until the day he died he considered it impious [οὐχ ἡγοούμενος ὅστιον εἶναι], when Thudippus bore such responsibility for his father’s death, to speak with the man’s son. (9.20)

Hierocles becomes the focalizer when he offers a forged will to Astyphilus’s friends, and is said to have known that the estate rightfully belonged to the speaker: ‘Even before the estate was claimed, gentlemen, Hierocles knew full well that it would devolve to nobody else but me’ (9.24). There is a verbal echo here of

22 The only other instance of *misein* in Isaeus’s surviving speeches is in a gnomic statement at 3.66: ‘No man hates his own advantage or puts the interests of strangers ahead of his own.’ In other speeches where hostile relations between family members are described, the word *echthra* (‘enmity’) and its cognates occur frequently. On *echthra* in Isae. 7, see p. 52 below, and cf., e.g., Isae. 1.9, 32, 33; 2.29, 40; 5.30.

23 Note 3, above; cf. Konstan (2006) 30–1: ‘Aristotle’s cognitively based account of the emotions may be seen as the analytic counterpart to the contemporary cultural disposition to view the emotions as responses to stimuli in the environment, as opposed to self-subsisting inner states that are recognized through their corporeal manifestations.’

24 Konstan (2006) 187–8 cites Isae. 9.16 and 31 among several examples of the Greeks’ conception of hatred as ‘not simply a reflex of revulsion, but a considered antagonism or animosity based on an ethical judgment’.

the speaker's own confident assertion, in the opening paragraph of the speech, that the estate of Astyphilus belonged 'to no-one but me' (9.1).

After producing witnesses to testify that Astyphilus never attended the sacrifices with Cleon – as he would surely have done if he had intended to adopt Cleon's son – the speaker rounds on Hierocles, addressing him directly, as the real villain:

And yet, Hierocles, even though you received many kindnesses from my father Theophrastus when you were not doing as well as you are now and from Astyphilus, you do not properly return the favor [*charis*] to either of them: you are depriving me, Theophrastus's son and your own nephew, of what the laws granted to me, and you are inventing lies about Astyphilus now that he's dead and doing your part to make his bitterest enemies his heirs. (9.23)

This is one of only six examples in Isaeus's speeches of an apostrophe to an opponent (or, as in this instance, an opponent's associate), a rhetorical device which enhances the emotional and dramatic impact of the accusations against him, particularly that Hierocles has failed to show gratitude (*charis*) for the kindness shown to him by Theophrastus and Astyphilus. Having already introduced Hierocles as the maternal uncle of both himself and Astyphilus, the speaker reminds the dikasts of that relationship, and emphasizes his own (real or feigned?) sense of betrayal by referring to himself as 'your own nephew'.²⁵

Isaeus picks up the religious theme, and the language in which it is expressed, in the emotionally charged epilogue to the speech:

Do not then, gentlemen, give Astyphilus an adopted son he never adopted himself during his lifetime, but confirm for me the laws that you yourselves passed; it is according to them that I claim the estate and make a most pious request, gentlemen, that you make me heir to my brother's property.... Therefore all of you take my side, gentlemen; if you are persuaded by Cleon to vote in any other way, consider what you will be responsible for. First, you will cause the bitterest enemies of Astyphilus to go to his tomb and perform the ceremonies [*hiera*] over him; second, you will invalidate the solemn injunctions of Astyphilus's father Euthykrates, which Astyphilus himself died before violating [*parabênai*]; and finally, you will convict Astyphilus after his death of insanity; for if he adopted this man as his son, whose father was his most bitter enemy, how will those who hear about it not conclude that he was out of his mind or destroyed by drugs? (9.34, 36–7)

It is worth noting that the speaker addresses the dikasts three times in these three paragraphs, an indication of their heightened emotional tone, but I do not entirely agree with Usher's observation that this passage 'concentrates on sentiment rather than reason'.²⁶ The final reminder that a vote for Cleon would convict Astyphilus of insanity is a clear reference to Solon's law, and we have here another example of argumentation from probability: if Astyphilus really did adopt the son of his bitterest enemy, he must have been insane, and so his will would have been in-

25 Cf. Griffith-Williams (2013) 165.

26 Usher (1999) 149: 'The final emotional appeal (36–7) cleverly concentrates on sentiment rather than reason, in the form of the dishonour that would be done to the memory of Astyphilus if his wishes were flouted.'

valid. In fact, I think the passage demonstrates that rational and emotional persuasion are sometimes so closely intertwined that it becomes very difficult to disentangle them.

ISAEUS 7: ON THE ESTATE OF APOLLODORUS

This speech, in contrast to Isaeus 9, has a clear, logical structure, starting with a proem of four paragraphs which includes a conventional *captatio benevolentiae*. The beginning of the first narrative is marked, in the usual way, by the particle γάρ and an address to the dikasts: ‘For Eupolis, gentlemen ...’ (7.5).²⁷ In the main body of the speech the narrative is broken down into three discrete sections, each followed by the relevant testimony, and four separate arguments from probability alternate with the ‘factual’ narrative and supporting testimony. The frequency of direct addresses to the dikasts (seven in forty-five paragraphs) is among the lowest in all Isaeus’s speeches.

Thrasyllus apparently did not have a close personal bond with his adoptive father, Apollodorus, but, like the speaker of Isaeus 9, he emphasizes their blood relationship by the use of kinship terms, referring to himself five times as Apollodorus’s nephew and enjoining the dikasts at the end of the speech to ‘remember that I am the deceased’s nephew, but [my opponent] is only his cousin’.²⁸ Isaeus also emphasizes the ties of gratitude and affection between Apollodorus and his half-sister (Thrasyllus’s mother) and stepfather (Thrasyllus’s grandfather). After Archdamus died, Apollodorus became his half-sister’s *kurios*, as Isaeus explains in a passage which plants the seed for Apollodorus’s adoption of the half-sister’s son,²⁹ and where the emotional tone is heightened by an accumulation of kinship terms:

And when he was about to leave for Corinth on military service, in case anything should happen to him, he disposed of his property in a will, leaving it to Archdamus’s daughter, my mother and his own sister and giving her in marriage to Lakratides, who has now become hierophant.³⁰ (7.9)

Apollodorus survived the war and had a son, but some years later the son died unexpectedly. Isaeus uses Apollodorus himself as the focalizer in this part of the narrative:

Apollodorus had a son he educated and cared for, as was only fitting. While this son was alive, he hoped to make him heir to his property, but when he fell ill and died in the month of Maimakterion last year, Apollodorus, depressed [*athumêsas*] by all his troubles and complaining about his advanced age, did not forget those he had been well treated by originally,

²⁷ Note 17, above.

²⁸ Note 10, above.

²⁹ Griffith-Williams (2013) 52.

³⁰ A member of the house of the Eumolpidae and high priest of the cult of Demeter at Eleusis, who displayed the sacred emblems at the Eleusinian mysteries.

but came to my mother, his own sister whom he valued above all others and said he thought he should adopt me; he asked her permission and received it. (7.14)

Female stereotypes, positive or negative, often feature in Athenian inheritance disputes. Thrasyllus's opponents probably portrayed his mother as an unscrupulous schemer, using the death of her half-brother's son as an opportunity for her own son to gain possession of a large fortune, and exploiting the elderly Apollodorus's vulnerability to foist on him an adopted son whom he hardly knew.³¹ Their aim would have been to convince the dikasts that the adoption was invalid under Solon's law because Apollodorus adopted Thrasyllus under the influence of a woman, so it is crucial for Thrasyllus to convince the dikasts that Apollodorus was acting freely on his own initiative in proposing the adoption. He clearly could not bring any witness testimony to the private agreement between his mother and Apollodorus, so he appeals instead to the Athenians' sentimentality about women: what could be more natural for an old man, grieving and distraught at the loss of his son, than to turn for help to his beloved sister? The juxtaposition of the kinship terms 'mother' and 'sister', indirectly emphasizing Thrasyllus's own relationship to Apollodorus, again adds to the emotional appeal.

This passage is part of a longer narrative section about the adoption; it concludes with Apollodorus's introduction of Thrasyllus into his phratry, which is supported by witness testimony (§§16–17, where the emotional appeal is enhanced by two references to the oath sworn on the sacrificial victims (*hiera*)). After this the narrative is interrupted by a legal argument about the order of intestate succession, through which Thrasyllus tries to undermine his opponent's claim to the estate as next of kin. The inclusion here of three citations from the law on intestate succession, even though they are not directly relevant to the main issue – the validity of the adoption – would have given an appearance of authority and objectivity to Thrasyllus's case.³²

It is only after this digression – by which stage the dikasts would probably have formed the impression that Apollodorus had completed the formalities of the adoption – that Isaeus reverts to the narrative about the adoption, which is in fact still unfinished. He covers what was evidently the most contentious part of the story – the enrolment of Thrasyllus in Apollodorus's deme after the latter's death – in only two paragraphs:

31 Stories about the exploitation of vulnerable elderly victims are a common feature of disputed inheritance cases, ancient and modern; cf. Friedman (2009) 2. Athenian examples include the stories of Euctemon in Isae. 6 and Ciron in Isae. 8.

32 Isaeus and other Athenian logographers sometimes use the phrase 'from the laws themselves', implying that they expected the dikasts to attach particular evidential value to citations from the law, as distinct from other forms of evidence such as witness testimony (Isae. 3.35, 8.30, 10.15; Dem. 38.9; Aeschin. 3.30, 46; Hyp. 3.13, cited by Griffith-Williams (2013) 134–5); cf. Carey (1996) 34: '... we also find speakers using laws to support tangential issues, for instance to demonstrate allegations of the sort classified by rhetoricians under the heading *diabolê* (that is, intended to create hostility toward the opponent) ...'.

Before I returned from the Pythaid festival, Apollodorus told his demesmen that he had adopted me as his son, had registered me among the members of his *genos* and *phratry*,³³ and had entrusted his property to me; and he urged them, if anything should happen to him before I returned, to enter me in the deme register as Thrasyllus son of Apollodorus and not to fail in this. The demesmen listened to this, and, even though our opponents complained at the deme elections that he had not adopted me as his son, based on what they heard and what they knew, they swore the oath with hands on the victims and registered me, just as he had asked them to, so well known amongst them was my adoption. (7.27–8)

Unlike the rest of the narrative in this speech, which is generally clear and precise, these paragraphs pass rapidly over events and leave some significant points obscure (although the detail about the oath sworn on the victims again adds to the emotional appeal by underlining the religious aspect of the ceremony). So, even in a speech with an apparently straightforward and logical structure, Isaeus has tried to manipulate his audience's reaction by means of narrative postponement.

After finishing the story of the adoption, and introducing witnesses who attest to the enrolment of Thrasyllus by Apollodorus's fellow demesmen, Isaeus proceeds to an attack on the character of Thrasyllus's opponent and her sister. His approach to character and emotion in this speech is more restrained than in Isaeus 9: there is no equivalent to the direct invective against Hierocles; and Apollodorus is not said to have 'hated' Eupolis as Astyphilus 'hated' Cleon. (Apollodorus and Eupolis are described as irreconcilable enemies, which implies hatred, but without focusing on the element of instinctive revulsion.)³⁴ As we shall see, however, the use of character as a means of persuasion in Isaeus 7, though ostensibly rational and objective, also carries an emotional appeal.

Eupolis had two daughters, the wife of Pronapes (Thrasyllus's opponent) and the wife of Aeschines, and a son who was also called Apollodorus. Thrasyllus says that after the death of this Apollodorus, the sisters and their husbands ought to have given him a son by posthumous adoption, but they neglected to do so and sold off his property, leaving his *oikos* 'shamefully [*aiskhrôs*] and disgracefully [*deinôs*] empty' (§31).³⁵ This was a state of affairs that no Athenian would have wanted:

All men who are soon to die take precautions not to leave their families [*oikoi*] without heirs [literally 'not to leave their houses empty']³⁶ and to ensure that there will be somebody to offer sacrifices and perform all the customary rites [*nomizomena*] over them. And so even if they die childless, they at least adopt children and leave them behind. And not only do they decide to do this for themselves, but the city too has publicly so decided, since by law it enjoins on the archon the duty of ensuring that families [*oikoi*] are not left without heirs.³⁷ (7.30)

33 Note 9, above.

34 Apollodorus and Eupolis were 'always at enmity' (*ἐχθρῶς ἔχοντες*, §8); cf. §§11, 12, 29, 33, 44. Enmity (*echthra*) is not an emotion, but 'represents the state of affairs that obtains when people regard each other with mutual hatred' – Konstan (2006) 194.

35 On the various definitions of *oikos*, and the meaning of the 'empty *oikos*' topos, see MacDowell (1989).

36 Forster (1927) translates this clause as '... to prevent their families from becoming extinct'.

37 Forster (1927): 'preventing families from being extinguished'.

Even here, in the only reference in this speech to a religious motive for adoption, Isaeus chooses to emphasize the civic importance of the continuity of the *oikos*, reminding us that there was no firm dividing line between the sacred and the secular in Athenian society. The ‘empty *oikos*’ topos would, nevertheless, have aroused strong feelings of sympathy in the dikasts, and it may well have been a significant factor in persuading some of them to vote for Thrasyllus.³⁸

As in the account of Apollodorus’s decision to adopt Thrasyllus, Isaeus again seeks to make the argument more persuasive by using Apollodorus as the focalizer. It is not Thrasyllus, but Apollodorus himself, who has drawn the appropriate conclusions from the behaviour of Eupolis’s daughters: seeing how they treated their own brother’s estate, how could he, as their cousin, expect anything better from them? Similarly, when Thrasyllus speaks of his own conduct towards his parents and record of public service, it is not just to put himself in a good light but to explain why Apollodorus considered him a suitable candidate for adoption:

He knew exactly how I behaved towards my father and mother, that I was attentive to my relatives and knew how to look after my own affairs; and he was well aware that in my position as Thesmothete I was neither unjust nor greedy. So it was not in ignorance but with full knowledge that he was putting me in control of his property. (7.34)

Apollodorus’s decision to adopt his half-sister’s son is thus presented as a perfectly rational one, and the emotionally charged, religious language that pervades Isaeus 9 is less frequently used in Isaeus 7, where the emphasis is on civic responsibility rather than religious duty: Apollodorus and his father, like Thrasyllus himself, were useful citizens, performing liturgies for the benefit of the city, while Apollodorus’s cousins are wastrels who have already squandered one inheritance and do not deserve to be given another.

CONCLUSION

This analysis has revealed that, despite the more overtly emotional appeal of Isaeus 9, and the more measured tone and logical structure of Isaeus 7, both speeches include elements of *pathos* and both appeal to the reasoned judgment as well as the emotions of their audience. There are several factors that may contribute to the difference in tone and structure between the two speeches. One is the personalities of the respective speakers, and in particular their relations with their deceased relatives: there was (as Isaeus tells the stories) a stronger emotional bond between Astyphilus and his half-brother than between Apollodorus and Thrasyllus. I have also suggested that the structure of Isaeus 9 may have been partly designed to conceal some weaknesses in the speaker’s evidence (though it would be

38 Cleon, in his response to the speaker of Isae. 9, probably used a similar argument to persuade the dikasts that Astyphilus did adopt his son: if they awarded the estate to Isaeus’s client, they would be depriving Astyphilus of the heir he wanted. For a fuller discussion of the ‘empty *oikos*’ topos, see Griffith-Williams (2012) 146–8.

unwise to conclude, especially since we do not have the opponents' speeches, that Thrasyllus's case was necessarily stronger). Another significant factor, in my view, is the different causes of the family quarrels: an alleged killing in Isaeus 9 and fraudulent management of the estate by a guardian in Isaeus 7. While both crimes are sufficiently serious to arouse strong feelings in the victims and their kin, the more emotive religious connotations of homicide provide a better opportunity for Isaeus to seek an emotional response from the dikasts.

In sum, Isaeus was a highly skilled logographer who, while drawing on a repertoire of rhetorical and stylistic commonplaces, did not write to a formula but tailored his speeches to the circumstances of each case and the people involved. He made the best use he could of the material available to him by building on the distinctive features of the stories his clients had to tell and exploiting the pathetic aspects of those stories as far as possible. It cannot reasonably be said that one speech is more persuasive than the other, nor is it always easy to draw the line between rational and emotional persuasion. As these two speeches show, 'the task of persuasion is a complex one, involving the emotional response of the hearer as well as the cognitive faculties.'³⁹

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³⁹ Carey (1994) 184.

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PERSUASION THROUGH EMOTIONS IN ATHENIAN DELIBERATIVE ORATORY*

Ed Sanders

INTRODUCTION AND RHETORICAL THEORY

Aristotle states in the *Rhetoric* – the most comprehensive surviving rhetorical treatise from Classical Greece – that there are three modes of persuasion: logical reasoning (*logos*), arguments from character (*êthos*) and ‘putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind’ (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a1–4: ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς), which he confirms shortly after (1356a14–15) means by emotion (*pathos*). He later tells us that when people change in respect of their emotions, they change their judgments (2.1, 1378a19–20: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις).¹ He goes on (*Rh.* 2.2–11) to discuss a somewhat idiosyncratic list of emotions that can usefully be aroused in oratory. These include anger (*orgê*) and calming down (*praünsis*), friendship (*philia*) and hatred (*misos*), fear (*phobos*) and confidence (*tharsos*), shame (*aischunê*) and shamelessness (*anaischuntia*), gratitude (*charin echein*) and ingratitude (*acharistein*),² pity (*eleos*), indignation (*nemesan*), envy (*phthonos*), emulation (*zêlos*) and scorn (*kataphronêsis*),³ and a number of minor described but unnamed emotions.

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1 The sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, in his *Encomium to Helen*, agrees: ‘Speech is a powerful lord that ... can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity’ (8); ‘The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion’ (14); trans. Kennedy (2007) 253–4.

2 Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156–68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (*charis*) and unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128. Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with gratitude.

3 I prefer scorn to the usual contempt, which I think is a mistranslation here. Aristotle describes contempt elsewhere, when he says *kataphronêsis* is treating someone as if they are of no account (2.2, 1378b14–17). Here it means a disdainful desire not to be, or have something, like someone else (*Rh.* 2.11, 1388b22–8) – hence contrary to emulation. English scorn covers both (contemptuous and disdainful) senses of *kataphronêsis*. The contemptuous version will appear below (main text). On different emotion scripts included within one word, see Kaster (2005) and Sanders (2014).

Aristotle famously divides speeches into three types – forensic (courtroom), deliberative (e.g. Assembly/Council) and epideictic (display) – but he does not give any explicit advice as to which emotions are most appropriate for each type of speech. His near contemporary Anaximenes, in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*,⁴ is more helpful. In a chapter dealing with forensic oratory, he says that six emotions are particularly pertinent: three friendly emotions (pity, gratitude and goodwill – the last similar to Aristotle’s friendship) for ourselves, and three hostile emotions (hatred, anger and envy) for our opponent (*Rh. Al.* 36, 1444b35–45a18).⁵ This is reasonable: trials concern what people have done in the past; anger and gratitude are aroused by specific past actions, while the other four emotions respond to present impressions created by past actions. A large amount of scholarship has been published on these emotions in Attic oratory, and the evidence cited is overwhelmingly – usually entirely – from forensic speeches.⁶

Accordingly, it is a useful shorthand to consider these six as ‘forensic emotions’, and I refer to them as such below. This does not mean that they are the only emotions aroused in forensic oratory, or that they do not appear in other forms of oratory; rather, that they are the six emotions most commonly associated with judging. Cases in the Athenian lawcourts were sometimes quasi-deliberative, when the lawcourt substituted for the Assembly (e.g. the various Lysias speeches concerned with upholding the post-403 amnesty, or Demosthenes’ attempt to overturn Leptines’ law in *Against Leptines*), and in these cases other, ‘deliberative emotions’ could come into play as well.

So what are the emotions most associated with deliberation? Here Anaximenes is less helpful.⁷ In his chapter dealing with deliberative oratory, he dis-

4 This treatise is contained within the Aristotelian corpus. Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is longstanding and probably correct, though the author’s identity is irrelevant to my argument.

5 Note that Anaximenes uses *eu diatithenai* for goodwill here – and elsewhere *eumeneia* (36, 1441b36–42a7) and *philia* (34, 1439b17) as well as *eunoia* (29, 1436b16–37). *Eunoia* is the term regularly used in the Attic corpus to request goodwill. I discuss Anaximenes’ goodwill (various terms) and its relationship to Aristotle’s *philia* in Sanders (forthcoming). For both Anaximenes’ and Aristotle’s lists of emotions, cf. Winter (this volume) 179–81.

6 E.g. Johnstone (1999) 109–25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212–31 on gratitude; Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers (2009) 77–98 on pity; Sanders (2012) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and pity; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. Carey (1996) devotes half a page (406) to emotional arguments in deliberative oratory (in both the Attic corpus and Thucydides), following a longer discussion of forensic speeches. Konstan (2010) on rhetoric and emotion mostly discusses rhetoricians, the few examples from actual speeches all being forensic.

7 As are modern scholars – see previous note. Hesk (2009) 147–50 and Usher (2010) on deliberative oratory, and Fox and Livingstone (2010) on rhetoric and historiography, barely mention emotions. Hunt (2010), on deliberative debate in Demosthenes’ period, sometimes states that arguments – e.g. involving familial relations (108), the state being at risk (139), or farms being burned (141–2) – would have been emotionally laden; occasionally he identifies specific emotions – e.g. that Athenians would feel shame and outrage at being compared to slaves (115), or shame and anger at those who threatened their womenfolk (147–8). Debnar (2001),

cusses the same six emotions as he does for forensic oratory (*Rh. Al.* 34, 1439b15–17). This is not completely wrong: just as some forensic speeches also have a quasi-deliberative function, some deliberative speeches have a quasi-forensic one – for instance in Thucydides, Sthenelaidas’s angry speech urging Sparta to war to punish Athenian aggression (1.86), or Cleon’s speech arousing anger and seeking punishment of Mytilene for rebelling (3.37–40).⁸ Some Thucydidean speeches completely blur the boundaries between the two types of oratory – e.g. at Plataea’s ‘trial’ by Spartan judges, which has both political and judicial implications, the Plataeans attempt to arouse pity (3.53–9), and the Thebans attempt to quash it and arouse anger in its place (3.61–7). In the Plataean speech (and elsewhere) there are also occasions when a speaker says his listeners should aid a city because they were aided by them in the past – deliberative policy informed by gratitude or goodwill.⁹ However, these are relatively uncommon examples, which do not account for most of the emotional arguments of the large majority of deliberative speeches, whether in Thucydides or in the Attic corpus.

Returning to Aristotle, and reading between his lines, we find that we *can* piece together some advice on the emotions appropriate to deliberative oratory. He argues that the three types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative and epideictic) refer to three different time periods, and that deliberative oratory refers to the future (*Rh.* 1.3, 1358a36–b20). This is reasonable, as those deliberating and taking decisions will aim to affect future events. Accordingly, I believe Aristotle is indirectly counselling that we should expect emotions that are directed towards the future to be most suitable to this sort of oratory.

We have already seen that the six ‘forensic emotions’ refer either to past actions or present impressions arising from past actions. If we look at Aristotle’s definitions of other emotions, we find that several of them do appear to be future-directed. Fear, he tells us, relates to some destructive or painful future evil (*Rh.* 2.5, 1382a21–2: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ). Confidence is also future-directed, being hope with imagination (2.5, 1383a16–19: τὸ τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ <φόβῳ... ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων).¹⁰ These emotions should

on Thucydidean speeches to Spartan audiences, occasionally mentions specific emotions but without elaboration, e.g.: ‘there is evidence enough in Sthenelaidas’ speech of the role that passions played in bringing about the war. He deftly appeals to Spartan pride as well as to the fear of growing Athenian power’ (76). Pelling (2012) 289–96 also briefly discusses some emotions (mainly pity) in some Thucydidean speeches.

8 On Cleon’s quasi-forensic argumentation throughout this speech, see Fulkerson (2008) and Harris (2013) 97–104.

9 On goodwill in Greek interstate relations, see Mitchell (1997) and Low (2007) 51–3, 155.

10 While hope and confidence overlap to a large extent in English, such divergence as they have seems to be that hope suggests the strong desirability of a certain outcome, while confidence suggests a strong expectation of that outcome. This distinction may or may not be reflected in ancient Greek, but here at any rate I follow Aristotle in considering them two aspects of the

therefore be particularly applicable to deliberative speeches. Shame – a concern about falling into disrepute – relates to things present, past and future (2.6, 1383b12–14: ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνῃ λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων), and so should apply to all three types of speech. Aristotle does not discuss pride – one of his more obvious omissions – but clearly a concern with our continued good reputation will be as pertinent to deliberative speech as shame.¹¹ These observations by Aristotle all seem reasonable, and lead me to posit fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride as emotions particularly pertinent to deliberative oratory – i.e. the emotions that should principally be aroused in order to persuade those deliberating to choose a particular course of action. So, let us turn to actual deliberative speeches, and see if this is indeed the case.

DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES IN THE ATTIC ORATORICAL CORPUS

In the Attic corpus, deliberative speeches are mostly written by Demosthenes, but not exclusively,¹² and the fact that we have speeches by several authors will lend stronger weight to my conclusions. We should note that there are sections of all deliberative speeches that do not obviously use emotional arguments at all – they either describe the current political situation, or offer advice, or use other types of rhetorical argument.¹³ Some speeches use emotional arguments very little, while others use them a lot. While I will refer to a range of speeches, I structure my discussion around the three *Olynthiacs*.¹⁴ This is partly because their emotional arguments are particularly detailed, and cover a larger than usual proportion of the speeches. But in addition, the fact that we have three speeches all written by the

same emotion. As in Aristotle, fear is the opposite of both hope and confidence (as I distinguish them) in English.

- 11 Orators sometimes explicitly ‘flag’ (i.e. label) the emotions they are trying to arouse, but not always. Some emotions lend themselves to explicit exhortation only in certain circumstances – see e.g. Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. Others do not lend themselves to explicit mention but can only be aroused covertly (i.e. without labelling) – see e.g. Sanders (2014) 79–99 on envy. This is not the place to consider this question at length, but it would appear that fear is less often, confidence and shame more often, ‘flagged’ by the speaker as the emotion sought. (Pride cannot be flagged as it has no label in Classical Greek – though there are many for being arrogantly over-proud.) Where desired emotions are not ‘flagged’, we must rely on comparing the arguments used with those Arist. *Rh.* 2.2–11 associates with each emotion, and our own common sense.
- 12 Dem. 1–10 and 13–17 are deliberative speeches (11 and 12 are letters or tracts, written for publication rather than the Assembly). Dem. 7 is certainly, Dem. 17 almost certainly, and Dem. 13 possibly pseudonymously attributed; Dem. 10’s authenticity was once disputed, but is now generally accepted – see Trevett (2011) 113, 177–8, 224, 287–8; MacDowell (2009) 226–7, 344, 355, 380–1. The only other deliberative speech in the Attic corpus is Andoc. 3.
- 13 Emotional arguments can also interact with other (i.e. *logos* or *ēthos*) arguments.
- 14 Though I take them out of order, for thematic reasons.

same author and delivered within a short time period in very similar circumstances, strongly suggests that speakers would have had a range of emotional arguments they could choose from, and situations did not necessarily demand one specific emotional response. In these three speeches, we can see Demosthenes almost experimenting with which emotional arguments might have the best effect.

In the *First Olynthiac*, Demosthenes sets the tone early for the emotional response he wants: he says the most especial reason Athenians have for fear (1.3: ὥς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος) is that Philip will wrest from them something of theirs. Philip attacked Olynthus, and the Olynthians now both hate and fear him (1.7: ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι, βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν) – sc. these being the right emotions on incurring Philip's interest. After a long exposition of the current political/military situation, Demosthenes express his fears for the future if Philip is allowed to succeed: Athenians should consider what he has done so far; he will gain more and more, while we (Athens) lose more and more; by nature Philip cannot rest on his laurels; he will come closer and closer, right up to Attica (1.12–15). After offering some advice, Demosthenes then arouses confidence or hope that something can be done: he argues that things are not as good for Philip as they seem; he expected a swift victory, but that has not happened; the Thessalians no longer cooperate with him, depriving him of money; he will therefore find it harder and harder to pay his mercenaries; others he has conquered may also be induced to rebel; and he concludes by saying that Philip's difficulty is Athens's opportunity (1.21–4). He then switches back to fear: Athens will have to fight either in Olynthus or here, and Athenians should consider the comparative detriments of fighting in each place; if he comes to Athens, the Thebans will join him; the financial losses of fighting in Attica would be huge, and Attica's farms would be devastated (1.25–7).

Fear turns out to be a particularly common emotion in deliberative speeches. While some speeches in the Demosthenic corpus use very little emotional argumentation, where emotions are aroused we find fear is the most frequent emotion played to. In the *Third Olynthiac* Demosthenes says he has no small fear (3.8: οὐδὲ τὸν φόβον ... μικρὸν ὀρῶ) and then briefly rehashes arguments from the *First Olynthiac* that Thebes hates Athens, while their ally Phocis has no money; if Philip comes to Attica, Athens will be in great danger; that danger will be on their doorstep, and so great that Athens will have to ask for others' assistance, rather than providing it as they could in Olynthus (3.8–9). In *On the Peace* he arouses fears of all Athens's enemies joining together at once (5.17–19). The *Second Philippic* worries at length about Philip's tendency to continual encroachment (6.20–5). The *pseudo-Demosthenic On Halonnesus* raises the spectre of Macedonia becoming a sea power (7.14–16). And in the *Third Philippic* Demosthenes tries to make his audience feel fear by stressing that the danger is right here, right now; lists the dangers should war break out (9.17–18); and details Philip's military innovations (9.49–51).

Fear arguments are particularly prevalent in *On the Chersonese*. Early in the speech Demosthenes says that doing nothing is not pious, raising a fear of the

gods' disapproval, and also not safe; he worries about Athens displaying the same behaviour that caused the present disaster; and he talks of Macedonia's standing army and Philip's pre-planning, in contrast to Athens's continual unreadiness (8.8–12). He says that disbanding the army is against Athens's interests, there are dangers in putting off a decision till later, and they will be forced to surrender the Hellespont to Philip (8.17–18). He argues that all Philip's actions are aimed directly at Athens's democratic constitution, and its power, interests and possessions, which he wants for himself (8.39–45). Most of these arguments are repeated later in the speech, as well as a concern that some Athenian politicians will betray the city to Philip (8.55–63).

Lest one object that the rise of Philip was a uniquely dangerous period and perhaps that is what led to a greater prevalence of fear arguments, a brief look at speeches prior to his rise – or before its effects on Athens became clear – will show that this is not the case. Demosthenes' *On Organization* arouses fear at Athens losing its allies while it fails to organize (13.7–8), being found militarily unready when eventually it needs to fight (13.11), and at its democracy being undermined (13.14–15). *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* talks of untrustworthy alliances with oligarchs, and oligarchs threatening Athens's democratic constitution (15.18–19). And decades earlier, Andocides' *On the Peace with Sparta* at great length suppresses fears of a risk to the democratic constitution if they make peace (3.1–12), and arouses it at the thought of Persia stepping in militarily should Athens defeat Sparta (3.15), or of losing Athens's strongest ally (Boeotia) to stick with a weak one (Argos; 3.26–8). And he concludes with a warning (with examples – induction strengthening the argument) that every time Athens has chosen war instead of peace it has suffered disaster (3.30–2). This is the one deliberative speech in the Attic corpus written long before the rise of Macedonia, and we still find it dominated emotionally by attempts to suppress and arouse fear.

Hope and confidence arguments are considerably less frequent than fear ones. For hope, we can postulate that one normally needs to arouse fear before one can give reasons to hope, and indeed it is rare in Attic oratory that we see hope arguments without first seeing fear ones. This is not necessarily the case with confidence, but perhaps Athens's chronic naval and military weaknesses in Demosthenes' politically active period suggests why this emotion appears less frequently (as we shall see, it is far more common in Thucydides).¹⁵

As well as the hope arguments seen in the *First Olynthiac* (1.21–4, as above), the *Second Olynthiac* argues that Philip has treated far too many allies shamefully and this will come back to bite him (2.8–10); if Demosthenes' advice is followed, Philip's alliances will crumble and he will be left isolated, and on its own Macedonia is weak; and his subjects will realize they have no share in his glory, but only the sufferings of his constant campaigns (2.13–16). The *First Philippic* refers to Athenians' despair and hopelessness (4.2: οὐκ ἀθυμητέον ... οὐδ' εἰ πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ), and Demosthenes argues that the rationale for their past

15 This weakness seems mainly due to the reluctance of Athenians to serve in the navy, and problems with the management of operations by ineffective commanders – see Cawkwell (1984).

despair should become one for future hope (4.2: ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ χεῖριστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει), because: their present situation is only a result of their lack of actions, not attempts that have failed; Philip acquired lots of easily conquerable cities that were formerly friendly to Athens, and should be easily conquerable in return; and Philip (like anyone else) will have allies that hate, fear and envy him (4.2–8). In a couple of later speeches too, Demosthenes repeats some of these arguments, and suggests Athens can hope for victory if it follows his advice (8.46–7; 9.5). Fear and hope arguments occur more widely and more diffusely than this, but these are the main passages that play to them at length.

Turning to the *Third Olynthiac*, we see some other emotions. The speech starts with an analysis of the situation, then the short section previously mentioned that plays to fear (3.8–9), then offered advice. After this opening, sections 15 to 28 – nearly half of the speech – involve arguments that play to civic pride and shame. The section begins with shame: Demosthenes says it is Athenians' duty to fight, but they are shirking it; they will be dishonoured if Philip captures Olynthus; they will have abandoned their land to a barbarian, and deserted on the field of battle (3.16–17). He then starts to interleave with his shaming remarks, claims designed to boost Athenians' pride: he suggests Athenians are prudent and honourable, and will not neglect their duties even for no pay; if they've fought Greek cities, they will not let a barbarian enslave Greeks just because they are not paid to fight (3.20).

He next moves into full eulogy of Athenians gone by – a line of argument familiar from funeral speeches, designed to arouse civic pride and spur contemporaries to live up to the supposed great deeds of their ancestors. Demosthenes compares himself to great statesmen of the past (3.21),¹⁶ thus introducing the topic, and goes on to talk of their ancestors' achievements (3.23–6): they commanded willing obedience from Greeks for decades; they accumulated a vast amount of money; the king of Macedonia was their subject, as is the proper relationship of a barbarian to Greeks; they won many battles by land and sea; and their deeds ensured their great renown for posterity (3.24). At home, they used the city's wealth to build beautiful buildings; they were moderate in their way of life, such that those politically active had no better houses than anyone else and acted disinterestedly for the common good. In short, they showed good faith towards other Greeks, were pious towards the gods, and had equality amongst themselves (3.25–6). And then, by comparing his contemporaries to their ancestors, he reawakens shame: Athenians have been robbed of their own land; they have frittered away vast amounts of money for no gain; they have lost in peacetime the allies gained in wartime; and they have trained a great enemy for themselves through their actions and inactions (3.27–9).¹⁷

16 Westwood (this volume) also mentions Demosthenes' comparison of himself with other statesmen – mostly of the present rather than the past.

17 The speech continues with a virulent attack on rival politicians – blackening the opponent being more commonly a forensic technique, suggested too by the emotions the passage aims to arouse (anger, hatred, envy); see note 21 below, and further Carey (this volume) 31–2.

As with fear and hope, arguments designed to arouse shame and pride are not confined to this one speech. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes chides the Athenians for spending the entire period of Philip's rise procrastinating, hoping for others to act, blaming each other, putting each other on trial, and hoping some more (2.25). Early in the *First Philippic*, he castigates Athenians for not doing what is needed, and says that the greatest necessity for free men is shame at their current situation (4.10–11). Later in the same speech he devotes a lengthy section to the emotion, saying it is shameful for Athenians to deceive themselves and put off doing disagreeable things, constantly being at the mercy of events rather than shaping them (4.38–9); they spend forever running around to relieve wherever Philip is attacking, rather than taking the war to him (4.40–1); and they are getting a reputation for dishonour and cowardice and all manner of other shameful traits, since instead of punishing Philip, Athenians spend all their time trying to avoid suffering harm from him (4.42–3); this makes their enemies laugh at them (4.45). In *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes mocks all the ineffectual speeches given by this or that politician, while Athenians sit on their hands and give Philip free rein to rampage around Greece (8.34–7); later in the speech he describes Athens as humiliated and a laughing-stock (8.67). In the *Fourth Philippic*, he reproves Athenians for acting indolently (10.20), and says that free men feel shame, and if they do not then perhaps it is because they are already slaves (10.27–30); he later calls them the idlest (10.49), and says they are bewitched by leisure and tranquillity (10.54). Shame arguments are seen outside the Philip speeches too: in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes tells the Athenians they will gain a reputation for being less brave than the Argives, and scared of a foreigner and a woman (15.22–3).

Pride arguments also crop up regularly. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes lists Athens's achievements and supposed previous good conduct, in: standing up to Sparta in defence of justice for all Greeks; repeatedly not taking offered chances for self-aggrandizement; and repeatedly spending their money and risking their lives for others (2.24). The *Second Philippic* contains a long section celebrating the reasons for Philip choosing to ally with Thebes and Argos instead of themselves: Philip prefers ambition and universal domination to peace, quietness and justice – the traits Athens is famed for; Athens is driven by selflessness, justice and a desire to avoid sacrificing other cities for Athens's gain (6.7–9); Philip judged that Athens would not abandon the common justice of Greece and desire for Greece's goodwill for any amount of profit, not just by considering their current conduct, but also their conduct at the time Persia invaded and Athens abandoned their whole land rather than become the greatest power in Greece under Persia; also Athens's fleet is superior to others' (6.10–12). In the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes celebrates Athens's history of opposing oppressors and liberating Greece, and takes pride in their ancestral reputation (10.12–14, 73). And in *On Organization*, he again celebrates Athens's past achievements (13.21–2, 26).

Turning to the *Second Olynthiac*, we have already seen short passages arousing hope (2.8–10, 13–16), civic pride and shame (2.24–5), but its other emotions

are more unusual for deliberative oratory. Near the beginning is a section aiming to arouse indignation or anger against Philip by rehearsing his past crimes: he breaks oaths, is untrustworthy and base; he said he would give Athens Amphipolis, but did not; he broke an alliance to hand Potidaea over to the Olynthians; he handed over Magnesia to the Thessalians; he habitually pretends friendship with a city, then betrays them to another city to win their friendship in turn; he has shown bad faith to everyone he has had dealings with, which shows his own bad character; he has gained power by greed and villainy, and cannot retain it by crime, perjury and lying (2.5–10).

As in forensic oratory, the listing of someone's crimes and their 'labelling' aim to incite indignation, anger or outrage. Chaniotis has talked about 'acoustic signals',¹⁸ words whose use – especially repeatedly – aims to arouse emotions or impel some other predictable response. In our own culture we might think of politicians or newspapers using words such as 'scrounger', 'benefit cheat', 'rapist', 'paedophile', and in some circles 'immigrant' or 'Tory' – words the user expects to arouse a visceral reaction in a listener or reader. In Athens it is very likely that words such as 'greed', 'villainy', 'crime', 'perjury' and 'lying' aroused strong hostile reactions from an audience. This is a trick borrowed from forensic oratory, and one Demosthenes was very good at.¹⁹ In this speech he is attempting to arouse anger at Philip to get Athenians to punish him. Anger is by far the most common forensic emotion that we see in deliberative speeches. Such an emotional technique is used in several other extended passages in the Demosthenic corpus in relation to Philip,²⁰ and sometimes too Demosthenes attempts to arouse anger against his fellow politicians, either for being corrupt and venal or for doing Philip's bidding.²¹

We should be aware that anger is a hierarchical emotion: it is (at least in Greek culture) mainly felt by superiors towards inferiors, people they can punish.²² To bolster Demosthenes' argument in the *Second Olynthiac* that Athenians should see Philip as an inferior (2.5), it is perhaps not surprising that contempt is also played with, uniquely in this one same speech in the deliberative corpus.²³ Philip's sol-

18 Chaniotis (2009) 200.

19 On hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory, see Sanders (2012). Kremmydas (2013) 61–2 notes that Demosthenes (and others) could attribute mildly derogatory character traits to the *dēmos* to show how someone had manipulated and deceived them, and he postulates this would arouse their anger; one of these traits is *euētheia* (naivety), which Demosthenes refers to here (2.6: τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν εὐήθειαν).

20 Dem. 4.49–50; 9.26–35; [Dem.] 7.32–44.

21 Dem. 3.29–32; 6.30–4; 8.64–6; 9.53; 10.58–9, 62–3, 75. Anger is probably not the only hostile emotion that comes into play here – hatred is a possible adjunct to anger in all these passages, and in Sanders (2014) 97–8 I argue that envy is relevant to Dem. 3.29–32; cf. Carey (this volume).

22 See Konstan (2006) 61–65 on Hecuba's (Eur. *Hec.*) different reactions to the deaths of Polyxena and Polydorus: she reluctantly accepts the first out of necessity, but revenges the second because she has the power to do so.

23 In Thucydides' deliberative speeches, contempt is seen more often, paired regularly with confidence.

diers are described as no better than any others, and indeed worse because the best are weeded out; Philip himself is labelled worthless, is depicted as jealous of anyone around him of any worth, and a leader of drunk and licentious toadies that consist partly of all the most degraded and un-martial people driven out of Athens (2.17–21). Contempt – like indignation – is also felt by superiors towards inferiors, and in this sense they are functionally distinct from – indeed opposed to – fear, which is felt by inferiors towards superiors.²⁴ It should not surprise us either, then, that this is one of the few deliberative speeches in which fear arguments do not appear at all.

We have seen that the range of emotions appealed to in surviving deliberative speeches in the Attic corpus is – largely as expected – fear, hope and confidence, civic pride and shame, as well as contempt (which involves a lack of fear and high level of confidence), with anger the main forensic emotion seen. However, the range of speeches we have is very limited, coming as they almost entirely do from one 25-year period, and mostly from the pen of one man.²⁵

THUCYDIDES' DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES AT ATHENS

To test these findings, I compare them to the results of a second, distinct corpus: deliberative speeches reported in historiography. Herodotus and Xenophon are prone to giving speeches in *précis*, and frequently in indirect speech, which does not allow much space for emotional arguments to be developed. Thucydides, however, gives a significant number of orations at length, and in direct speech.²⁶ While there are legitimate questions as to how reliably he presents speeches,²⁷ my main concern is not so much with whether the arguments used in any particular speech are historically accurate, but rather with the types of arguments used in his deliberative speeches as a whole. They would have needed to sound plausible to contemporary readers, and therefore we should expect similar sorts of emotional arguments in Thucydides' speeches, taken as a whole, to those his readers would have heard in their own assemblies. In this light, it is notable that his deliberative

24 Konstan (2006) 132, discussing Aristotle's list of people we fear (*Rh.* 2.5, 1382a33–1382b18).

25 Though, as mentioned earlier, the presence of some speeches by writers other than Demosthenes boosts confidence in these conclusions.

26 Deliberative speeches reported at length are: Thuc. 1.32–6, 1.37–43, 1.68–71, 1.73–8, 1.80–5, 1.86, 1.120–4, 1.140–4, 2.13 (in indirect speech), 2.60–4, 2.71, 3.9–14, 3.37–40, 3.42–8, 3.53–9, 3.61–7, 4.17–20, 4.59–64, 4.85–7, 4.98 (in indirect speech), 5.85–111 (in dialogue form), 6.9–14, 6.16–18, 6.20–3, 6.33–4, 6.36–40, 6.72 (in indirect speech), 6.76–80, 6.82–7, 6.89–92, 7.11–15 (in letter form). For a comprehensive list of speeches in Thucydides see West (1973).

27 Scholars are quite reasonably troubled by the following statement at Thuc. 1.22.1: 'I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν] by each situation'; trans. Warner (1954) 47.

speeches use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Attic corpus, and I use some of the speeches to the Athenian assembly for illustration.²⁸

Before the Peloponnesian War begins, Corcyran envoys plead for military aid from Athens against Corinth, and Corinthian envoys beg Athens not to provide it. Both sides recognize they are asking Athens to judge a quarrel, and so there is a forensic element to this decision which will require arousal of appropriate emotions. The Corcyrans admit that they cannot call on friendship and gratitude for past services, since they have not rendered any (1.32.1); they do attempt to arouse pity at the fate that awaits them if Corinth and its allies conquers them (32.5), and mention their great danger (33.1 and 35.3–4); and they arouse indignation at a Spartan unfairness that allows Corinth allies but not Corcyra (35.3).

However, these forensic-style arguments are presented only briefly. The Corcyrans swiftly move on to draw attention to their naval skill, playing on Athens's desire for gratitude from – or simply desire for – a client with a strong navy, which they will acquire painlessly and which will boost their military strength (32.5, 33.1–2, 35.5, 36.1). The Corcyrans also play on fears of future wars – Sparta wants war with Athens, and so does Corinth, which attacked Corcyra first to neutralize its large navy (33.3); they should look at how the Corinthians are treating Corcyra, and not trust them (34.3); rejecting Corcyra will leave them weaker (36.1), and if Corinth conquers Corcyra their combined navy will rival Athens's, so Athens should beware of allowing this (36.3). As well as arousing fear of the consequences if their advice is not taken, they allay any fears of Spartan reprisals if it is (35.1, 36.1). Finally, they cement their advantage by dangling before Athens secure routes to Italy and Sicily (36.2) – another desire argument. In this speech fear is one of two emotions primarily played to, and the other is desire. The latter is an emotion we do not see significantly in Demosthenes, whose prominence came at a period when Athens was mainly on the defensive; but it is clearly an element of Thucydides' thesis that one of the causes of the war was Athenian rapacity, and we find this emotion played to several times in speeches at Athens.

The Corinthian envoys, responding to the Corcyran speech, misjudge the Athenians and the context of the speech. They overestimate Athens's willingness to judge impartially and ignore its own benefit, so spend nearly half the speech trying to arouse indignation at Corcyran crimes (1.37.1–40.1), and another quarter playing on gratitude and friendship for their own support for Athens in the past (41.1–42.1, 43.1–2). When they eventually turn to arguments that will arouse deliberative emotions – again desire and fear – they continue to get it wrong. In discussing Corcyra's crimes, they manage to reinforce Corcyra's own arguments

28 Concentrating here on speeches at Athens provides the nearest comparison to the Attic corpus, and removes other potential variables that might arise from differing *polis* outlooks or value systems. Thucydidean speeches to other cities' assemblies (notably Sparta's) do in fact use the same emotions, albeit weighted somewhat differently – as I discuss in my as-yet-unpublished papers 'Different strokes for different folks' (delivered at the European Social Science History Conference, 12th April 2012) and 'Thucydides and emotional incitement to war' (delivered at the Classical Association conference, 14th April 2014), both available on request.

about the desirability of the alliance, mentioning its strategic position, wealth and huge navy (37.3, 38.5, 42.4). On the fear side, they threaten Athens with war (40.2–3, 42.2) and the dangers of encouraging subordinate allies to revolt (40.4–6) – but Corinth should be well aware that Athens is unlikely to be swayed by fear arguments alone, as they later instruct the Spartans about the Athenians' hopeful, optimistic outlook (1.70),²⁹ and indeed Athens votes for the Corcyran alliance.

After Sparta declares war, the Athenians hold an assembly to discuss how to respond. Some argue for peace; however, the decisive speech is given by the politician Pericles. He starts by ramping up anger and indignation at Sparta's plotting, and preferring immediate war to arbitration (1.140.2). He then plays on the Athenians' pride at wanting to show themselves able to hold what they have without Spartan interference, and the shame they would feel at giving in to them and so appearing fearful and slavish (140.5–141.1). This decreases the likelihood of his audience giving Spartan arguments a fair hearing, and ensures a receptive ear for what follows. He next – at great length – suppresses any fears of losing to Sparta, arguing that the Spartans are not suited to a long campaign nor one overseas due to having few monetary reserves (141.2–142.1), and explains how Athens can counter any threat (142.2–143.2). This suppression of fear of the enemy is a good lead-in to what follows: arousal of confidence in Athens's own naval abilities (142.3–5, 143.1, 143.3–5), as well as contempt for their opponents' aversion to risk and lack of skill (142.7–8). Finally, following a statement that the Athenians have many other grounds for hope for a good outcome (144.1: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι), he plays on pride at their ancestors' achievements and desires for similar honour (144.3–4).

A year into the War, Athens's hinterland had been invaded and devastated twice, and a plague had hit the overcrowded city, killing large numbers. These enormous sufferings had brought a mood of despair (2.59.2: ἄποροι) and desire for peace. Pericles speaks to dissuade them.³⁰ He first attempts to suppress despair, by arguing that the plague is a one-off disaster while all the other problems were expected (61.2–62.1), so as to create receptiveness for what follows. He next argues at length for confidence in eventual victory (62.1–3), as before coupling this with contempt for their opponents (62.3–4). And eventually, having restored their optimism, he raises the spectre of what their subject states might do should they be freed (63.1–2) – a fear argument. Concurrently, we find arguments designed to arouse shame at their irresolution (61.2) and falling below the standards of their fathers and losing what they already possess (62.3), and pride in being citizens of a great city whose past achievements and current glory they must live up to (61.4, 63.1, 64.2–3).

Though Cleon treats his speech after the Mytilenian revolt in 427 as forensic, calling for *orgê* (see above) at their *hubris* and arguing for *timôria* (punishment),

29 If someone is of a very optimistic disposition, it is necessary to show them why any particular hopes are unrealistic before they will be receptive to fear arguments. Similarly when someone is in despair, you must give them back some hope before they will be amenable to confidence arguments – see below.

30 Cf. the start of Demosthenes' *First Philippic*.

Diodotus's response is instructive. He explicitly draws a contrast between the lawcourt and the Assembly (3.44.4: ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικάζομεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν), saying anger is unhelpful and inappropriate in deciding what to do in an Assembly: they must think of the future rather than the present (3.44.3: περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλευέσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος), and how best to deter other cities from revolting.³¹ Raising this spectre constitutes a fear argument, and he continues to play on fear by discussing at length the problems with putting down future revolts if the precedent set is capital punishment for every citizen, not guilty as well as guilty (3.45–6).

In 425, after the capture of Pylos, Spartan envoys come to Athens to sue for peace. They first attempt to dampen the Athenians' hopes for the future by arguing that the current Athenian military position is only due to good luck, which might change (4.17.4–18.3). Once that hope (as they believe) has been dampened, they attempt to arouse fears that something will happen to cause unending enmity from Sparta, such that they will permanently lose the chance for peace (20.1).

Ten years later, the Athenians debate an expedition to capture Sicily. At the assembly meeting, two prominent politicians make speeches: Nicias, who is against the expedition; and Alcibiades, who is in favour. Nicias tries to dissuade them by arousing fear of renewed warfare with Sparta if Athens divides and weakens its forces (6.10.2–4), of Sicily joining in on Sparta's side (11.4–6), and of their being led astray by Alcibiades (12.2); and he tries to suppress what he calls their '*duserôs*', their 'sick desire' (13.1).³² Alcibiades responds by suppressing fear of his youthful counsel and of Sicilian military power (17.1–3, 5–6), and arousing contempt for the divided and disorganized Sicilians and confidence in an easy victory (17.3–4). He ends with dire warnings of how Athens has grown so large it must keep growing or be conquered in turn (18.3), and that Athens will atrophy if it does not quickly throw itself back into war (18.6).

We have found that the speeches Thucydides puts into the mouths of those addressing the Athenian Assembly use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Demosthenic corpus 75 years later. This is not distinct to speeches addressed to Athenians. In an Appendix to this chapter (p. 73), I give a rough and ready summary of the emotions played to in all deliberative speeches in Thucydides.³³ From this summary it can be seen that what I call the 'deliberative emotions' – fear, hope (and suppression of despair), confidence (and its adjunct contempt), desire, shame and pride – are the primary group of emotions aroused in deliberative oratory in order to persuade assemblies.

However, unlike in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, where anger is the only forensic emotion that figures prominently, Thucydides' deliberative speeches use five of the forensic emotions – anger, hatred, pity, gratitude and friendship –

31 See further Harris (2013) 104–5.

32 Thucydides, commenting in his own voice, also describes the Athenians as feeling *epithumia* (appetite – often used in a sexual sense) and *erôs* for the expedition (6.24.2–3): they are so 'turned on' at the thought of acquiring Sicily, that their reason is completely overruled.

33 And some quasi-deliberative ones – e.g. where an army in the field has to make the decision, the army functions as a miniature assembly on the move.

on a regular basis, if as a group less so than the deliberative emotions. This suggests that judging other cities is an important part of deliberation. However, Thucydides' regular inclusion of forensic emotions is more nuanced than it appears on the surface. First, the majority of his speeches are delivered to Athens or Sparta (the two strongest cities), and it is notable that the speeches delivered to other cities – cities without the power to sit in judgment – are generally more heavily biased towards the 'deliberative' emotions. It is also apparent that arguments designed to arouse friendship, hatred and gratitude are primarily made by visiting envoys (for obvious reasons), rather than by citizens of the addressed *polis*. This explains why these three emotions are far more common in speeches reported in historiography than in the Attic corpus, where all deliberative speeches are made by citizens.

We can further note that arguments appealing to forensic emotions are clustered heavily in a few speeches, notably: a) the Corinthian and Athenian speeches to Sparta (1.68–71, 1.73–8), and b) Cleon's and Diodotus's speeches after the Mytilenian revolt (3.37–40, 3.42–8), both pairs of which have strong elements of a trial about them; c) the Plataean and Theban speeches to Spartan judges (3.53–9, 3.61–7), which are forensic in all but name; and d) Alcibiades' speech to Spartans (6.89–92), where he has to dispel high levels of hostility towards him personally before he can persuade them on policy. Outside these speeches, the proportion of arguments appealing to forensic emotions again falls drastically.

Finally, the disparity between these two sets of emotions, and particularly the predominance of fear arguments, is most apparent if one looks in detail at the longer speeches (which the table in my Appendix does not do). For example, Pericles' speech at 2.60–4 suppresses anger and rouses goodwill in chapter 60 only, while deliberative emotions are aroused in all four of the following chapters. In Hermocrates' appeal to the Sicilians at 4.59–64, fear and hope feature in all six chapters, though this only gives one 'X' each in the table. Nicias's speech discussed earlier has fear arguments in five chapters, but hope and suppression of desire only in one. And when Hermocrates addresses the Camarinaeans, fear arguments again appear in all five chapters, while pity, pride, shame and hope appear only in one each. Taking these various factors into account, it should be clear that the emotions I have for convenience labelled 'deliberative' – and particularly fear – do indeed predominate in Thucydides' deliberative speeches.

CONCLUSION

The evidence from both the Attic corpus and Thucydidean deliberative speeches shows that we can confidently posit fear (in particular), hope, confidence, contempt, shame, pride and (in Thucydides at least) desire as the primary deliberative emotions – i.e. the emotions most important for an orator to arouse in an assembly, when trying to persuade them towards a particular course of action. This is not to say that forensic emotions such as anger, pity or gratitude do not have a place; but when they do, it is generally in situations where the deliberation

has a quasi-forensic aspect to it, i.e. when the deliberating city is in a position to judge and either reward or punish the city about which it is deliberating. This is more obvious in Thucydides than the Attic corpus, which is not surprising given Athens's relative weakness (i.e. inability to punish) in the mid-fourth century compared with the late fifth.

I have postulated that the emotions that principally relate to deliberative oratory do so because they are primarily concerned with the future, and this is the time period most relevant to political deliberation. This is based partly on evidence pieced together from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and partly because this deduction seems to accord with common sense. Thucydides provides corroborating evidence in Diodotus's speech, where he explicitly chastises Cleon for arousing anger and talking about punishment, on the grounds that this is not a lawcourt (where such arguments would be appropriate) but an Assembly, where they need to consider what is best for the future; he continues by playing on fear – which I have shown is the most common deliberative emotion in Thucydides, Andocides 3 and the Demosthenic corpus's deliberative speeches – rather than using forensic emotions (e.g. suppressing anger or arousing pity), which might at first appear the more logical response to Cleon's arguments.

Finally, focusing (in the Attic corpus) primarily on the three *Olynthiacs* has shown that, even for three speeches delivered by the same person in similar circumstances only weeks apart, a range of very different emotional arguments are possible. The *First* uses primarily fear and confidence/hope; the *Third* primarily civic pride and shame; while the *Second*, as well as hope and pride, plays with indignation and (uniquely in the Attic corpus) contempt. This suggests that speakers would have had a wide range of emotional arguments they could choose from – albeit primarily from the deliberative emotions listed above – and situations did not necessarily demand one specific emotional response.

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APPENDIX: EMOTIONS AROUSED (OR SUPPRESSED) IN THUCYDIDES' DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES

Ref.	Speaker	Addressee(s)	Fear	Hope	Confidence	Contempt	Desire/Greed	Despair	Shame	Pride/Desire for honour	Suspicion	Hatred/Hostility	Anger/Indignation	Envy/Jealousy	Pity	Gratitude	Friendship/Goodwill	Emulation	Respect	Grief
1.32-6	Corcyran envoys	Athenian Assembly	X				X			X			X		X	X	X			
1.37-43	Corinthian envoys	Athenian Assembly	X				X		X			X				X				
1.53	Corinthian envoys	Athenian army							X											
1.53	Athenian army	Corinthian envoys	X																	
1.68-71	Corinthian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X					X	X				X	X	X		X			
1.73-8	Athenian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X						X			X	X	X	X		X			
1.80-5	Archidamas	Spartan Assembly	X	X					X	X										
1.86	Shenelaidas	Spartan Assembly	X						X	X			X							
1.90	Spartan envoys	Athenian Assembly																		
1.90	Themistocles	Athenian Assembly																		
1.91	Themistocles	Spartan Assembly	X																	
1.120-4	Corinthian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X			X														
1.140-4	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X		X	X			X	X			X							
2.13	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X		X	X						X								
2.60-4	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X	X	X			X	X	X			X				X			X
2.73	Plataians	Plataians		X															X	
3.9-14	Mytilenian envoys	Peloponnesian Assembly					X					X			X		X		X	
3.30	Teutiaplus of Elis	Peloponnesian generals	X																	
3.37-40	Cleon	Athenian Assembly	X						X			X	X	X	X					
3.42-8	Diodotus	Athenian Assembly	X						X			X	X	X	X					
3.52	Spartan envoys	Plataian Assembly																		
3.53-9	Plataian envoys	Spartan generals	X						X			X	X		X	X				
3.61-7	Theban envoys	Spartan generals										X	X		X	X	X			
3.71	Corcyran oligarchs	Corcyran Assembly																		
4.17-20	Spartan envoys	Athenian Assembly	X	X	X					X		X					X			
4.21	Cleon	Athenian Assembly			X		X													
4.22	Cleon	Athenian Assembly											X							
4.27	Cleon	Athenian Assembly											X							
4.59-64	Hermocrates	Sicilian Assembly	X	X																
4.85-7	Brasidas	Acanthian Assembly	X	X	X							X				X	X			
4.97	Boiotian envoy	Athenian army	X																	
4.98	Athenian envoy	Boiotian army																		
4.120	Brasidas	Scionian Assembly			X												X			
5.85-111	Athenian envoys	Melian Assembly	X	X	X				X											
6.9-14	Nicias	Athenian Assembly	X	X																
6.16-18	Alcibiades	Athenian Assembly	X		X	X	X							X		X		X		
6.20-3	Nicias	Athenian Assembly			X															
6.33-4	Hermocrates	Syracusan Assembly	X		X	X														
6.36-40	Athenagoras	Syracusan Assembly	X		X							X				X				
6.72	Hermocrates	Syracusan Assembly			X		X													
6.76-80	Hermocrates	Camarinaean Assembly	X	X			X	X	X					X	X		X	X		
6.82-7	Athenian envoy	Camarinaean Assembly	X		X						X	X					X	X		
6.89-92	Alcibiades	Spartan Assembly	X	X	X						X	X	X			X	X			
7.11-15	Nicias	Athenian Assembly	X																	
29	10	16	3	6	3	13	8	2	11	15	6	10	8	12	1	2	1			

NOSTALGIA, POLITICS AND PERSUASION IN DEMOSTHENES' *LETTERS*

Guy Westwood

INTRODUCTION: THE VOLUNTARY EXILE

In the winter of 324/3 BCE,¹ fourteen years after the Macedonian defeat of the Greek alliance at Chaeronea and six years after the delivery of his most celebrated speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes was convicted and fined by an Athenian jury for appropriating funds left in trust in Athens by Alexander the Great's absconding treasurer, Harpalus.² Guilty or not, Demosthenes could not pay the fine, and retreated into a self-imposed 'exile' at places including Aegina, Troezen and Calauria.³ From this period of several months in mid-323 there survive four *Letters*, numbered I to IV, which have been convincingly reordered chronologically as III–II–IV–I⁴ and which are now normally thought authentic.⁵ I proceed here on the assumption that they are.⁶

In this chapter I aim to show that an important part of Demosthenes' persuasive strategy in the *Letters* – a strategy aimed constantly at effecting his restoration, regardless of individual letters' subject matter – consists in generating nostalgic⁷ emotions in his audience for an ideal Athens which resembles the city as it was prior to defeat by Philip at Chaeronea in 338.⁸ This was the period when Demosthenes was Athens's most prominent policymaker, and his own political standpoint much clearer-cut, with the current problems of dealing with Alexander and his subordinates not yet on the horizon.⁹ He invites his audience to apply this

1 All subsequent dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.

2 See Worthington (2013) 310–25 for an account.

3 For these locations: Plut. *Dem.* 26.5 and *Dem. Epist.* II.19–20.

4 Goldstein (1968) 45–63; Clavaud (1987) 19–50; Worthington (2006) 101; MacDowell (2009) 414. Otherwise unmarked Roman numerals in this chapter refer to the Demosthenic *Letters*.

5 Goldstein (1968) 3–5; Clavaud (1987) 7; Worthington (2003) and (2006) 99–101; MacDowell (2009) 408. Some remain unconvinced: Lehmann (2004) 217; Carlier (2006) 311; Will (2013) 224 note 3. We have two other *Letters* (V and VI) set respectively in the 350s and in 322; these do not enter this chapter.

6 This chapter concerns literary dynamics, however, and does not require the author to be Demosthenes, as opposed to an artistically skilled and historically knowledgeable imitator.

7 'Nostalgia' defined (*OED* 2a) as 'sentimental longing for or regretful memory of a period of the past, esp. one in an individual's own lifetime; (also) sentimental imagining or evocation of a period of the past'. For other definitions, see Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 194–201.

8 Clavaud (1987) 27.

9 Demosthenes as collaborationist, at least post-330: Goldstein (1968) 80–1; Worthington (2013) 313–16.

nostalgic vision to his whole career up to the present by careful restaging in new contexts of arguments which audience members could identify as typically (though not necessarily exclusively) Demosthenic, including arguments from his self-defence against Aeschines in *On the Crown* (of 330), which he encourages audience members to recollect. He cannot have expected many people to remember the arguments in detail; it must therefore be their Demosthenic flavour, and the fact that they worked in 330, and could work again, that matters most,¹⁰ regardless of how they may have fared if he also used them in court in 323. As we shall see, he complements these dynamics by projecting his *own* nostalgia both for his (conjured) past and for Athens and the Athenians *tout court* in emotive ways. Demosthenes' repackaging of his old arguments for the present – a revisionary tool to affect perceptions of events in his recent career – is also supported by a conscious engagement with key *topoi* of the collective post-Chaeronea rhetoric of those who had previously opposed Philip, especially Lycurgus and Hyperides.¹¹

In the *Letters*, we find Demosthenes seeking to evoke a variety of emotions in his audience (pity, shame and guilt among them), but these texts' overall emotional profile can also be characterized by talking in terms of the nostalgic experience (which itself can involve a range of emotions). The idea that in these *Letters* Demosthenes communicates nostalgic affect which is personal (or at least projected as personal) via typically Demosthenic routes, and thereby encourages similar affect in audience members, can be supported by recent psychological and sociological research on nostalgia as a social emotion.¹² A vital function of nostalgia (as opposed to simple homesickness, which is clearly in play here too but is rightly considered separately in modern psychological scholarship),¹³ is the fostering of feelings of social value or connectedness in nostalgic subjects which then allow them to cope with one or more of a range of types of identity challenge which the real, lived present offers: social threat, exclusion, marginalization, or loss of status or significance (perceived or actual), or indeed mortality itself.¹⁴

Two forms of this that matter here are, first, the discontinuity imposed by moving to a new place for career or other life reasons – i.e. Demosthenes' 'exile' – and, second, and more importantly, the loss of political independence (and status on the world stage) which the Athenians had experienced since Chaeronea in

10 Goldstein (1968) 29–30, 73–4.

11 See Todd (2009); Herrman (2009); De Martinis (2012). An example is the participation of *Letters* IV and I in the wider understanding – common to *On the Crown*, Demosthenes' *Funeral Oration* (esp. 19–21), and Hyperides' *Against Diondas* (137v–136r) – that Chaeronea's outcome was the result purely of Fortune (see e.g. Todd (2009) 170–1 and note 33). It also exemplifies the much broader cultural nostalgia of the Lycurgan period; see Lambert (2010) and Azoulay and Ismard (2011) for orientation in this area.

12 For this formulation: e.g. Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 206; (2008) 306; (2006) 198.

13 On this separation: Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 193–4; (2004) 202.

14 Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 208–49, esp. 218–32 and 240–4; Zhou *et al.* (2012) 40; Routledge *et al.* (2008); Wildschut *et al.* (2006) 979–82, 984–6; Sedikides *et al.* (2006) 205–10; Sedikides *et al.* (2004) 206–8; Davis (1979) 32–7, 69. Compare Kaplan (1987) 485 on pathological nostalgia as a 'screen affect'.

338.¹⁵ This outcome was what Lycurgus's past-facing policies were aimed at negotiating,¹⁶ but also what Demosthenes was known for having tried to prevent prior to Chaeronea, and this past policy stance continued to be fundamental to his political personality in the 330s and 320s. Moreover, nostalgia may (as Demosthenes does in these *Letters*) look to the past (or rather the imagined past) for its material, but it is also orientated towards dealing with present circumstances and anticipating future ones.¹⁷ Demosthenes uses it persuasively, the goal being his restoration and his positive message for the Athenians in the present being that they can be strong again one day: this is what Boym has termed 'restorative nostalgia', operating at both a personal and a collective level.¹⁸ Finally, while often ambivalent (or 'bittersweet') in its overall experiential complexion, nostalgia for the most part organizes itself in (positive) 'redemption' sequences (things were bad, but they got better) rather than 'contamination' sequences (things were good, but they deteriorated).¹⁹ This seems key to Demosthenes' persuasion here: in attempting to transmit his own nostalgia to his audience, he is encouraging them to complete the 'redemption' narrative and relive the time of his (and their own) prestige by restoring him now. He could have placed the accent on the deterioration of their prestige (a pragmatic point, and the one Aeschines makes in *Against Ctesiphon*, his prosecution speech in the Crown trial, blaming Demosthenes for it),²⁰ but here, as in *On the Crown*,²¹ the positive status for Athens which follows logically from accepting Demosthenes' version is where the emphasis lies, and the point (as in Demosthenes' Assembly speeches) becomes one about the potential of past glories to translate into dynamism in the present and future if interpreted – and enacted – correctly.²²

The evocation of a generalized nostalgic *tone* – rather than making focused appeals to pity (which do occur, but only at points) also helps Demosthenes respond to the difficulties facing him in writing these *Letters*. First, his great civic achievements were fifteen years in the past (and their persuasiveness possibly jeopardized by the arguments of the prosecutors at the Harpalus trial).²³ Second, his exile itself was self-imposed, as indeed he admits at one point (III.39–40). Finally,

15 Personal discontinuity: Davis (1979) 41, pursued by Sedikides *et al.* (2006) 203–5 and (2004) 208–10. Wider cultural discontinuity: Davis (1979) 101–8; Lowenthal (1989) 20.

16 Lycurgus as past-facing: esp. Azoulay (2009). Compare Davis (1979) 141: 'mass nostalgia reactions are most likely to occur in the wake of periods of severe cultural discontinuity'; see also Boym (2001) 15–17.

17 Routledge *et al.* (2008) esp. 137–8; Davis (1979) 10–13; Lowenthal (1989).

18 Boym (2001) 41–5.

19 Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 201–2, 205, 207; (2008) 305; Wildschut *et al.* (2006) 976–82; Sedikides *et al.* (2006) 203; (2004) 204–5.

20 See e.g. Aeschin. 3.134.

21 Seen especially in the 'paradoxical argument': Dem. 18.199–208; Yunis (2000) – Demosthenes' argument as the one which preserves Athenian reputation.

22 See Sanders (this volume) 64–5 on the discourse of hope in deliberative oratory.

23 Din. 1, e.g. §§28–36. Note also Demosthenes' relative inactivity since 338: Worthington (2000). (NB, though, Hyp. Dem. 12, which seems to attest his continued prominence – but this may be ironic.)

he had the obvious problem of distance to confront, so had to make a virtue of the epistolary form.²⁴ *Letters* I–IV can be analysed in similar ways to deliberative and forensic speeches²⁵ – the epistolary ‘genre’ is notably porous to others²⁶ – but with the help of the nostalgia strategy Demosthenes capitalizes emotionally upon his *non*-presence, concentrating on developing an imaginary present Athens where each *Letter* is being publicly read live,²⁷ and shaping it in such a way as to make patent its potential for resembling the pre-Chaeronea Athens if he is restored. The possibility of his being there delivering a speech instead is dwelt on (I.2–4), and he even contributes moments that look set up for real-time oratorical *deixis*.²⁸ At a more general level, typical Demosthenic arguments are made with particular emphasis, and Demosthenes’ overwrought foregrounding of his advancing age and precarious situation figure him as a commodity at risk of exhaustion – implying that the Athenians need to use him again before that happens.²⁹ By a process of stylistic play, he dramatizes a phenomenon which his audience are free to diagnose as deterioration, but which is accompanied by the familiar virtuosity in other areas of presentation.³⁰ This works as a means of arousing pity (‘what is absence/exile’ *doing* to our great orator?) and also interest: it simultaneously prompts nostalgic recollection of the great man in his prime and seeks to validate the consequent speculation that only the returned original, whatever his transgressions, will do. This creative use of the epistolary form – to foster tension and provoke concern – invites comparison with Ovid’s exile poetry, and in particular Williams’s demonstration of the poetic use to which Ovid puts his ‘pose of creative decline’ – announcing his deterioration (and indeed his metamorphosis into a Getic rather than a Roman poet) while simultaneously ‘delivering’ at a high level of technical skill.³¹ But there was also an archetypal literary example of the nostalgic wasting away in ‘exile’ which Demosthenes himself could imitate creatively: the Homeric Odysseus.³²

24 Well-summarized by Reed (1997) 186–90, Trapp (2003) 38–42, and Morello and Morrison (2007) vi–xii.

25 See e.g. Goldstein (1968) 97–132 esp. 101–17; Clavaud (1987) 7, but also 17–19.

26 Hodgkinson (2007) 283–8; Ceccarelli (2013) 291–2 on Isocrates.

27 If indeed in the Council and/or Assembly, probably by a clerk: MacDowell (2009) 417–18. This might emphasize the letter’s writtenness: Ceccarelli (2013) 268 with note 14; but cf. Clavaud (1987) 18–19. I assume here that these texts *were* read in their desired performance context; but the important thing is that the dynamics I trace are clearly meant to conjure that atmosphere.

28 Most impressively III.42: ‘if you look [προσβλέπετε] to the famous [περιφανὲς] prestige of the Areopagus Council’. See Clavaud (1987) 30 and 178, with e.g. Harpocration s.v. Πρωπύλαια, and Hobden (2007).

29 Advancing age: II.13, and especially III.38. This may also respond to Hyperides’ highlighting of Demosthenes’ age (i.e. ‘old enough to know better’) at the Harpalus trial (*Dem.* 21–2).

30 And indeed arrogance: Goldstein (1968) 172–3 on II.

31 Williams (1994) esp. 50–99, 153.

32 Odysseus is often a starting-point in psychological scholarship on nostalgia: e.g. Sedikides *et al.* (2015) 191; (2008) 304; Wildschut *et al.* (2006) 975.

ATHENS IN VIEW: DEMOSTHENES' PERSONAL NOSTALGIA

In the *Odyssey*, the pain involved in Odysseus's nostalgia as he languishes on Ogygia and 'longs for death' (Athene's words: *Od.* 1.59) consists not purely in homesickness, but in the damage being done to his own potential for proper kingly (and paternal, marital etc.) self-expression while he remains with Calypso. Demosthenes' wider evocation of audience members' nostalgia for former Athenian prestige has to come from calculated emotive projection of his own nostalgic feelings for his own prestige among them, and in *Letter II* he mediates that by what looks like an invitation to the audience to apply the key Homeric passage from *Odyssey* Book 5 (151–3, 156–9):³³

She found him sitting on the shore. His eyes were wet with weeping, as they always were. Life with its sweetness was ebbing away in the tears he shed for his lost home.... The days found him sitting on the rocks or sands, torturing himself with tears, groans and heartache, and looking out with streaming eyes across the watery wilderness.³⁴

Demosthenes' use of location is crucial. Attica can certainly be glimpsed from Poseidon's sanctuary on Calauria (modern Póros), and like Odysseus, Demosthenes says he looks out to sea constantly, projecting his own goodwill (εὖνοια) onto the opposite coastline (II.20: 'from here each day I can gaze [ἀφορῶ] at my country, towards which I know I have as much affection as I pray I may have from you').³⁵ (His tears, to match Odysseus's, will follow in II.25.) The fact that, unlike Odysseus at this point in *Odyssey* 5,³⁶ Demosthenes can even clearly see his country serves to sharpen the pathos, as does the contrast in the same paragraph between Odysseus's complete (if stultifying and debilitating) security while on Ogygia and the precariousness of Demosthenes' existence on Calauria: 'I settled [here] ... for my safety, which I hope is assured me because of the god (I am not certain about that; for the safety of a man in jeopardy is weak and unclear when it is in the hands of others who may do as they wish)'.

At stake in II.20, then, and underlined by this concern about the future, is Demosthenes' construction of a fragile and trouble-ridden persona which is at odds with his obvious continuing virtuosity as a writer. In different ways, the two halves of his description of his sojourn at Calauria here – a place where (like Odysseus on Ogygia) he does not want to be, and yet has chosen to be – are meant to evoke pity and point to his absence, encouraging his audience to contemplate how their present circumstances could be improved were he there in person. Were he there, they would not have to grapple with the tensions he confronts them with: restoring him would cancel out the exigencies imposed not only by physical but also by literary distance, and reminding them of his goodwill (εὖνοια) towards them (just as he does after a tirade in *Letter III*: §44) explicitly invites them to

33 First noted by Neupert (1885) 31; Goldstein (1968) 165 note 178.

34 Trans. Rieu (2003) 66–7. Other *Odyssey* passages are relevant too, e.g. 9.27–8.

35 All translations from Demosthenes' *Letters* are from Worthington (2006).

36 As opposed to the poignant moment when he comes briefly within sight at *Od.* 10.29–30.

make this happen, not least as it recalls the formula for crowning distinguished statesmen, as we see in the speeches from the Crown trial – a trial which disputed the legality of Demosthenes' *third* such crowning, we may note.³⁷ The language in II.20, then, consciously stimulates recollection of Demosthenes' services, echoing official decrees even as it professes to give a sincere account of Demosthenes' emotional state. A little further on, he openly declares that 'what faces me now ... are grief and tears, a yearning [πόθος] for my country and for you, and the thought of what I have suffered, all of which make me grieve' (II.25).

Unlike *Letter II*, the other three are ostensibly about things other than Demosthenes' exile: III is about the sons of Lycurgus (imprisoned because they could not pay a fine supposedly incurred by their dead father – another nakedly political business),³⁸ IV is about a calumny against Demosthenes from a certain Theramenes; I is about the encouragement of political harmony the better to confront the international situation after Alexander's death. But all are actually just as much about Demosthenes' restoration as *Letter II* overtly is, and continue to develop the interplay between personal nostalgia and provoked nostalgia: in III, Demosthenes describes Lycurgus's career in such a way as to recall himself (namelessly) too; in IV, he responds to Theramenes in a way reminiscent of his defence in *On the Crown* against his detractors of the 330s; and in I it is palpable that the missing ingredient needed for Athens to regain its position is his presence. In each of these four texts, Demosthenes ensures that the past – even the quite recent past – presses close, and that alternatives to the present recommend themselves as part of an alternative, Demosthenic, vision of Athens.

This overall vision remains consistent across the individual *Letters*. Versions of Athens – her glorious history and timeless values – had been essential to Demosthenes' framing of political issues in both his Assembly and lawcourt speeches right from his 350s debut onwards. One of the key points at stake in his two great court clashes with Aeschines had been which orator could provide the more compelling and meaningful version of whichever aspects of the city's past were being treated.³⁹ In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes had gone a step further: his contrast between his own consistent activity on Athens's behalf even through the crisis of defeat by Philip, and Aeschines' marginal role in the same period, culminates in a grand and compelling self-assimilation to the roll of great Athenian leaders, asserting Demosthenes' primacy in the present generation and consequently his place in the *longue durée* of the very Athenian civic past on which he and Aeschines had drawn for their key examples and parallels (319–20):

37 *Eunoia* in the Crown trial: see Aeschin. 3.246 and Dem. 18.54 for the formula (one of twenty-six appearances of the noun in Demosthenes' speech), with Cook (2009) esp. 36–52. Sanders (forthcoming) argues that protestations of *eunoia* towards the *dēmos* in forensic (primarily defence) speeches are intended to arouse a reciprocal goodwill from the *dēmos* towards the speaker. II.20 itself echoes Dem. 18.1 and 8.

38 Clavaud (1987) 22.

39 On this feature see esp. Clarke (2008) 252–61; Hesk (2012) 219–26; and for Aeschines, Steinbock (2013).

So you too, scrutinize me in comparison to the politicians of this generation, in comparison to yourself, in comparison to anyone at all. I yield to no one.⁴⁰ When the city was still in a position to choose the best policy, and there was competition among all to show loyalty to the state, I was recognized as offering the best advice of all politicians, and everything was handled through my decrees, laws and diplomacy.⁴¹

Of importance here is that the moment being referred to ('when the city was still in a position to choose the best policy') is autumn 339, when Philip seized Elatea, provoking panic at Athens and an Assembly debate where Demosthenes took the lead, advocating making common cause with Thebes and ultimately cementing the alliance that opposed Philip at Chaeronea. This was a critical moment in *On the Crown* as well, capping a famous passage of dramatic description and re-playing of his speech at the Elatea debate (18.169–78) with a summary of his major contribution (179: 'I did not deliver the speech without moving a proposal, nor did I move a proposal without serving as envoy, nor did I serve as envoy without winning over the Thebans'). Echoing and reworking *On the Crown* in the *Letters* in 323 was worth Demosthenes' while because its framings of issues could still crystallize what he had to offer (and remind listeners of his past services) in an economical and compelling way. The epistolary form, though, turns these echoes into effective persuasion. The distance evoked and exploited by the *Letters* becomes in a sense analogous to the distance between the addressees and the events of the 330s: allowing Demosthenes back will enable them to close this other gap too. I now turn to two case-studies of how this works in detail: how the nostalgic vision is evoked in the two longest *Letters*, and how the form and exigencies of the letter itself make a difference to the emotional texture and traction of Demosthenes' appeals.

CASE STUDY 1: LETTER III (CONCERNING THE SONS OF LYCURGUS)

Demosthenes' priority is to represent his own contribution in the 340s and 330s as the paramount one: the past he presents to his audience needs to be first and foremost a *Demosthenic* past. This nostalgic 'rewriting' of a much more complex period serves both to depict a Demosthenes attempting to comfort himself (nostalgia here as a psychological coping mechanism to respond to loss of status and physical marginalization) but also to remind his hearers of Athenian prominence before 338 (thus playing into wider cultural nostalgia). This is important to *Letter III*, which comes first in chronological sequence. Lycurgus – whose posthumous reputation is on the line in the imprisonment of his sons – is carefully bleached of special characteristics by Demosthenes,⁴² such that he can easily serve as the latter's proxy:⁴³ what are stressed are his outstanding qualities as a statesman.⁴⁴

40 Note Yunis's (2001) 286 rationale for this vigorous translation of οὐδέν' ἐξίσταμαι.

41 All translations of *On the Crown* are from Yunis (2005).

42 Clavaud (1987) 26–7.

43 Another Demosthenic proxy in a very similar context is Euphraeus of Oreus: Dem. 9.59–62.

Twice at least in III we get the motif that the *dêmos* has a habit of showing its affection for a man only as long as he is useful to it, marginalizing him once his utility value expires.⁴⁵ This is meant to encourage in Demosthenes' audience feelings of shame and pity not only for Lycurgus (the obvious referent at III.9) but for Demosthenes himself too, and is reinforced by a contrast between the Athenians' cruel treatment of Lycurgus's sons and Philip's gracious treatment of the Athenian captives at Chaeronea – striking given the Athenians' pre-eminent reputation for civilized behaviour (*paideia*: 11–13). This treatment gains added point from referencing Demosthenes' blackly humorous demolition in *On the Crown* of Aeschines' pretentious invocation of the concept of *paideia* in his peroration; this may well have been memorable.⁴⁶ Demosthenes seeks to channel a memory of this 330 political flashpoint which has room only for a single ideal model of the glorious Athenian past, with Demosthenes as its latest instantiation, which had prevailed over a version flawed precisely because it was Aeschines mediating it.

In the idealized penumbra of 338, Philip's noble actions are cast as just as much part of the positive civic narrative as the display of Athenian prowess on the battlefield itself (and indeed actually respond to it).⁴⁷ It works well that Philip is presented here (as he had been in Demosthenes' *Second Philippic*) as particularly attuned to his opponents' civic history (and as ready to honour it as any Athenian).⁴⁸ Philip's death in 336 will have left him susceptible to idealizing interpretations by 323 which would have been unthinkable, say, before Chaeronea, but it is key to Demosthenes' strategy here that distance be created between the domestic problems of the present and the uncomplicated demonstration of virtue which he can suggest the Athenians had been capable of in 338. This strategy is typical of the wider persuasive deployment of nostalgia: applying constructed pasts to present needs, and above all stressing the contrast between them.⁴⁹

A similar rupture is created later in the letter between the services of numerous recent popular politicians and generals and their current situation: dead or cashiered by the *dêmos* they served (III.31). The first category lists Lycurgus as its final member, but Demosthenes situates himself emphatically at the end of the second ('you yourselves have exiled'⁵⁰ others, such as Charidemus, Philocles and

44 III.4: 'he held firm to policies that he thought were in the best interests of the people, and from then on he was conspicuous in saying and doing [καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων] the right thing.' The words given in Greek here recall the formula for Demosthenes' own crowning in 330: Aeschin. 3.49, 50, 237; Dem. 18.54 (with Cook (2009) 34).

45 III.9, 15.

46 Aeschin. 3.260; Dem. 18.127.

47 Compare his tears over the dead of the Sacred Band: Plut. *Pel.* 18.7.

48 Dem. 6.8–11; see also [Dem.] 12.7.

49 Davis (1979) 10–12; Chase and Shaw (1989) 9; cf. Howard (2012) 643; Sedikides *et al.* (2004) 203.

50 The word used here, *προήσθε*, really means 'abandon': cf. Braccisi (1967) and Clavaud (1987) 173.

myself").⁵¹ This arrangement serves to focus his disapproval specifically on the present day, the present political line-up, and what its members encourage the *dêmos* to do (and why); the main point is that he is not there with them to show them what they ought to be doing. Demosthenes sets himself up, as he had done repeatedly in his Assembly speeches, as a fundamental enabler of self-criticism in the arena of popular politics,⁵² a point he would make again explicitly in *Letter II* (§11), this time in a context where his restoration is explicitly in point. But the list at III.31 has a further specific nostalgizing function. The perception that contemporaries or consociates are following individuals' own biography plays a noticeable role in nostalgic reminiscence,⁵³ just as collective nostalgia itself binds generations,⁵⁴ and piecing together the named individuals' biographies reveals that here Demosthenes is effectively mourning the passing of a large part of his own generation of popular politicians (δημοτικῶν); most of these men were born roughly c. 400–c. 380.⁵⁵ The elegiac tone of this roll-call not only projects his own sense of sorrow at the transformation of the political landscape, but invites the audience to consider how the gap left by these men and what they represented can be filled. What the list itself simultaneously implies is that restoring those in a position to be restored (Demosthenes and Philocles – incidentally, the two men on the list who were convicted in the Harpalus affair) may help achieve that.

Essential to building the desirability of the alternative political situation that Demosthenes is trying to sketch in *Letter III* are three persuasive features. The first is Demosthenes' choice repeatedly to co-opt nebulous 'other Greeks' as witnesses of what the Athenians are doing and will do – not clarifying who these are allows him all the more easily to displace his own criticisms onto a category of people whose opinions are thus very hard to dismiss.⁵⁶ This comes under the rhetorical heading of *fictio personarum* (creating a non-present speaker),⁵⁷ and this form of it – invoking the absent as a check on others' actions in the present – is used both in deliberative and (often more vividly)⁵⁸ in forensic contexts. Here, it

51 Compare his devious self-insertion into a list of worthies at *Third Olynthiac* 21, a quarter-century earlier.

52 See Mader (2007).

53 Davis (1979) 52–3; cf. Holak and Havlena (1992) 384–6; Havlena and Holak (1991) 324.

54 Davis (1979) 111–16.

55 Demosthenes himself: born 384/3. Nausicles: an age-mate of Aeschines (Aeschin. 2.184), so c. 390: Harris (1988) 214; Chares: born c. 400: Davies (1971) 569; Diotimus, a rich trierarch in 348 (Dem. 21.208), and, like Demosthenes, anti-Macedonian and demanded by Alexander in 335 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.4): see MacDowell (1990) 413; Menestheus: born early-mid 380s: Davies (1971) 249–50; Ephialtes: born by 380/79, as he was *stratêgos* in 350/49 (Androtion *FGH* 324 F 30); Lycurgus: born c. 390: Davies (1971) 351; Charidemus: born c. early 390s: Davies (1971) 571. Philocles is the odd one out: Davies (1971) 540 ('born not much later than 370'). We cannot calculate the birth-dates of Eudoxus and Euthydicus.

56 III.1, 5, 7–8.

57 Goldstein (1968) 135 note 14, 138–9.

58 Contrast, for example, Aristotle's Assembly speaker Cydias and his concern for Greek opinion (Arist. *Rh.* 2.6, 1384b32–5) with Hyperides (*Dem.* 22), who indicates *real* visiting Greeks observing the trial. Forensic oratory can co-opt the dead to play a similar role: cf. Dem. 19.66; 23.210; Lys. 12.99–100; Andoc. 1.148.

helps foster nostalgia because it stimulates audience members directly to contemplate the similarities and differences between speech and letter, and thus the gap of Demosthenes' absence. That this is a major concern, especially in III, is made clear by the way that he opens the section of the letter which is explicitly about him (35–45) (35: 'If I were present, I would explain these things to you with my own voice, but since I am in a position in which I wish anyone who slandered me might find himself, I have written what I want to say in a letter'); and by his assertion of paradoxical power as (absent) master of the relevant information, giving some details and withholding others (7–8). In *Letter II*, he does something very similar but specifies the critics, claiming that various Troezenians were criticizing Athens but that his response to them was restrained, which led to their honouring him for his integrity (19). What Demosthenes is capitalizing on in all this is the field of persuasive possibilities of non-presence: he is in a sense 'there' with them giving the advice, but not physically present so cannot be refuted face to face; and second, he is hard to refute in the abstract because exile could reasonably be thought to have put him in touch with wider Greek opinion, just as he claims. Emphasizing that the default Troezenian proclivity was to think well of Athens (18–19) motivates his audience to feel shame at their current behaviour and to contemplate a time when Athens's credit was much higher (post-Persian Wars; see below).

Another unifying element in *Letter III* is that Demosthenes makes careful bids to maintain his command of events, even in exile where he cannot possibly have a full picture of the political situation at home. When he claims (25) to be able to talk authoritatively about what is happening 'now' ('In those cases none of those who now protest [τῶν νῦν βοώντων] said that the laws were being subverted'), he does so in general terms and with recourse to examples from the recent but not immediate past (24–6). Being denied physical presence certainly forces him to talk mainly in terms of the past and, of course, the future; but even though he may have had very up-to-date knowledge of events in the city,⁵⁹ it matters for his chosen exilic pose that he should not seem *too* up-to-date.

Third, he encourages recollection of his Assembly speeches, and the vein of optimism amidst severe criticism which was one of their hallmarks,⁶⁰ by reassuring his audience of his goodwill towards them (44), just as in the Assembly speeches he expressed his commitment to getting the Athenians to recover their *natural* brilliance – one validated by the sweep of great ancestral achievements – and negate recent backsliding by positive action. This often meant a quiet conclusion,⁶¹ and, like his *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*, *Letter III* caps a dramatic denunciatory passage (42: 'remember the trial of Aristogeiton and hang your heads in shame') with a much milder epilogue (44: 'Do not think that I am angry when I say this, for I would not feel that way towards you').⁶² Again, the fostering of nostalgia consists in inviting reminiscence of his past stern criticism of the *dēmos*

59 This is suggested by I.5, which is still vague.

60 As e.g. at Dem. 1.25, 3.33 and 8.77.

61 As e.g. at Dem. 3.36, 4.51 and 9.76.

62 II.25–6 works the same way.

in Assembly situations (cf. II.11) – he constructs himself as the critic from afar who is still as mindful for the health of the Athenian citizen body as he ever was – and in this case the positive action recommended is, of course, Demosthenes' own restoration. But his capitalization on the porous character of the epistolary form – at times (e.g. III.44–5) conferring an overtly deliberative feel; at times (e.g. III.1–8) sounding more identifiably forensic; and at times concerned to mark the current communication off very clearly as a letter not a speech (III.35) – has a key role to play in ensuring that his audience are left with a series of interpretative quandaries and only one real point of clarity: that voting to restore Demosthenes will change things for the better.

CASE STUDY 2: *LETTER II (CONCERNING HIS OWN RETURN)*

In *Letter II* – where Demosthenes' restoration is the avowed aim in writing – this nexus is communicated even more overtly, plotting a narrative of great events in Demosthenes' career explicitly with reference to their place in the narrative of the city's relationship with Philip. At II.10 he recalls his victory in debate with the famous intellectual Python of Byzantium, Philip's envoy, in 344: 'The older men would know – and it's only right that you tell the younger ones – about the Assembly meeting for Python of Byzantium, when he came with the envoys from the Greeks, to show that the city was acting wrongly, but left when he achieved the opposite effect, after I alone of the speakers at that time [μόνου τῶν τότε ῥητόρων] defended your rights in the matter'. This version of the episode makes two things clear: first, that the city was still on course in 344; and second, that Demosthenes alone was keeping it there. Again, Demosthenes is plumbing for two things: for his resentment at being marginalized – and with this kind of service to his credit – to be recognized; and for the audience to crave a return to the kind of situation in Greek interstate relations where defiance was a viable option, and where an envoy from Philip could simply be stymied in debate by a paradigmatic product of Athenian intellect, rhetorical skill and non-negotiable commitment to political freedom – and this result could simply be accepted by the beaten party.

Demosthenes' decision to feature this episode – rather than, say, his successful eleventh-hour embassy to Thebes in 339, mentioned above – reveals his wider strategies. First, the suggestion that the younger men will need to be informed may respond to a realistic requirement, but above all develops Demosthenes' pose of self-marginalization in the present, as well as reinforcing the separate identity of his 'alternative Athens': it is now set apart not only by the literary and physical distance implied in Demosthenes' construction of it but also by an explicit generational one, highlighting the gap for audience members of roughly Demosthenes' age and encouraging them to dwell on its positive associations. Second, the passage recalls a similar section of *On the Crown* (136: 'as Pytho[n] grew brazen and poured forth a flood of accusations against you, I did not retreat. I stood up, [and] spoke against him'), confirming its place as part of Demosthenes' core

narrative about himself – it may have been used in the Harpalus trial too. Third, it recalls another notable moment in Demosthenes' Assembly career: in *On the Peace* (of 346/5) Demosthenes asserts that he was the only speaker to oppose the 348 expedition to Euboea, and was proved right by the outcome (5: 'I was the first, indeed the only one to come forward and oppose it [πρῶτος καὶ μόνος παρελθὼν ἀντεῖπον], and I was virtually torn apart by those who were trying to persuade you, for the sake of small profits, to commit many great errors').⁶³ By prompting audience members to 'recall' these other moments, as well as 344 itself, Demosthenes invites them to consider (with despondency) the reduced possibilities for this kind of ideal Athenian democratic *parrhêsia* in the Macedonian-dominated present. This seeks to stimulate a complex of emotional reactions, among them resentment (indeed perhaps suppressed anger) about the situation, respect for Demosthenes' former efforts, and embarrassment about the *dêmos*'s role in Demosthenes' exile – but it is important that all Demosthenes asks of his audience is that they *remember* the debate with Python in 344. This is not a call for revolt. In order to stimulate the audience to contemplate his restoration, Demosthenes seeks to transmit the usefulness to him of his own reminiscences – his personal story – as part of a personal coping mechanism while in exile, to his Athenian audience, as a way for them to envisage a better future. Demosthenes' appeal for his restoration holds out the possibility that Athenian freedom of action does not have to be consigned to the past – carefully eliding the pragmatic, collaborationist character of his actual political behaviour of the preceding decade or so.

That it is his personal past – or an imagined version of it – is essential. The world he is trying to conjure is the world of the 340s, when he was rising to prominence and gaining growing support for his resistance to Philip post-346 – and when suppressing Philip's territorial ambitions still looked achievable. As we have seen, projected nostalgia works by fashioning pasts for present needs, so whether he was *in fact* the only opposing speaker in the two Assemblies is not the point – he is using this layered illustration in *Letter II* to remind his audience of what it is that he has that nobody else has: supreme integrity allied to supreme rhetorical ability, with the result that he was content to be the 'only' opposing speaker when that opposition mattered, just as he was the 'only' Greek politician to resist Philip's blandishments (μόνος again, II.8, as in *On the Peace* 5).⁶⁴ Other parts of the letter are also concerned with emphasizing the authoritativeness both of Demosthenes' presentation of his *own* past and of the validity and functional importance of his versions of the longer past. At II.16, we read: 'I have never done you any wrong, as the gods and heroes testify. And all time down to this

63 Trans. Trevett (2011) 92. Demosthenes' emphasis on his singularity here also corresponds interestingly with Davis's idea that nostalgic reminiscence fastens particularly on moments in individuals' pasts where they felt acutely the uniqueness of their own identity: Davis (1979) 39–44 (cf. Kaplan (1987) 476 on the intensity with which pathological nostalgic patients 'constantly repeat an assortment of nostalgic activities and fantasies that represent the most poignant conflicts and pleasurable experiences in their life').

64 See Goldstein (1968) 241 on Hegesippus's role.

very moment is my witness...' This strongly recalls his claim in *On the Crown* (172) that he was the right person to take a policy-directing role at the approach of Philip in 339 because he had been the only statesman who had correctly evaluated the situation from the beginning.⁶⁵

Even more importantly for his self-representation, Demosthenes explains at II.18 that his very rationale for going to Troezen was historical: he knew Troezen had taken in Athenian evacuees in the Persian Wars ('I did not go to a city in which I was likely to perform outstanding services but to one where I knew our ancestors had gone when faced by the danger from Persia').⁶⁶ Lurking within this nexus must be the historical Athenian Demosthenes enjoys citing most in his speeches, Themistocles⁶⁷ (and perhaps Alcibiades too).⁶⁸ In both Themistocles' and Alcibiades' cases, exile fundamentally altered their relationship with the city, and both ended up in Persia. Demosthenes seems to dissociate himself carefully from them here. This might well have been necessary given that Demosthenes' relations with Darius are a commonplace in his opponents' attacks in 330 and 324/3,⁶⁹ but in any case the striking picture that then emerges is of a Demosthenes who stands alone as an embodiment of the Athenian state of 480 itself, temporarily in exile. In creating the impression that the 'real' city, effectively reposed in him, has gone to Calauria, he encourages his audience to seek reunification, as it were, 'with itself', in taking him back. At the least, his self-presentation as someone who naturally pursues the legacy of Athenian glory in aspects of his own life – and stays true in spite of ill-treatment – serves to recommend him as a leader Athens still needs: who has the past, present and future in mind in everything he does. As elsewhere in the *Letters*, his concentration upon these themes while emphasizing his non-presence and gesturing to his literary detachment serve as protreptic to the audience to close both gaps.

CONCLUSION

In directing these *Letters* to the Athenian Council and Assembly, Demosthenes aims both to remind the *dêmos* of why it put foreign policy in his hands for three climactic years, of his special virtues as a statesman, and specifically of his gifts and his personal integrity as an Assembly speaker, and to sum up what he would like them to feel they have lost. He does so by placing his political record in a rich, explicitly nostalgized, hinterland of civic achievement which aims to efface the humiliation incurred during the Harpalus trial, and by exploiting the gap between his oratorical presence and physical absence, marked and problematized by the epistolary form. We can add that this is a strategy pursued at no cost to himself – this is no forensic situation, with an opponent waiting to upend Demo-

65 And compare III.44–5 and especially I.4, which uses the same vocabulary as Dem. 18.172.

66 See also Hyp. *Ath.* 31–2, and Hdt. 8.41.1 and Plut. *Them.* 10.5.

67 See in particular Dem. 20.73–4, 18.204, 23.205.

68 Note Demosthenes' own comparison of his return with Alcibiades' at Plut. *Dem.* 27.7.

69 Aeschin. 3.239–40, 258–9; Din. 1.10, 18; Hyp. *Dem.* 17, 25.

sthenes' emotive versions of the past. Authority-creation in this case goes unchallenged in a direct way; speakers may have risen to use arguments to reject Demosthenes' pleas, but it is unlikely that they troubled to engage much with his strategy. The nostalgic glow remained.

We know that none of the *Letters* succeeded in their object, and are ignorant about key aspects of how they reached their recipients, and who those recipients actually were. But as persuasive texts intended at some level for a conceptualized Athenian *dêmos*, they seek to conjure a better alternative version of reality by looking to evoke in their recipients a range of emotions, especially desire for the better times with which that fictive and in some senses carefully rose-tinted alternative reality could be associated. Demosthenes situates himself at the heart of that, motivating his addressees to realize that all that is required to make that reality a genuine one again is to restore him, closing the very gap which the *Letters* themselves exploit for their emotive effects. In the end, perhaps appropriately, it took an active decision from the 'exile' himself – to abandon his carefully-chosen writing-space for the 'real' world again, joining Athenian embassies in the Peloponnese at the outbreak of the Lamian War and performing as if he had never been away – to bring this to pass.⁷⁰

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PART II:

EMOTION AND THE FORMATION
OF COMMUNITY IDENTITY

DISPLAYING EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY – THE EPIGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Angelos Chaniotis

EMOTIONAL DISUNITY, EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES, EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY

One of the best-known Greek ‘prayers for justice’ – a subgroup of curses – is a text found in Amorgos:¹

Mistress Demeter, queen, as a suppliant I throw myself before you, I, your slave [ἱκέτης σου προσπίπτω δὲ ὁ δοῦλος σου]. He received my own slaves; he taught them evil; he counselled them; he gave them advice; he corrupted them; he felt joy [κατέχαρε]; he encouraged them to go to the agora; he incited them to run away – a certain Ephaphroditos [did all this]. He charmed my slave girl, so that he could have her as his wife against my will. It is for this reason that she has run away, together with the others. Lady Demeter, having suffered all this and having no other support, I flee to you for refuge, asking you to be merciful and make me obtain justice. May you make the one who did all this to me be able neither to stand nor to walk; to find no fulfilment either in the body or in the mind; to be served neither by a male nor by a female slave, neither by young nor by old; if he has a plan in mind, let him not be able to accomplish it; may a curse seize and take hold of his household; let him never listen to the cry of a baby; let him never prepare a table of joy; neither shall a dog bark nor a cock crow for him; when he sows, let him not harvest; when he arrives(?), let him see no fruit [earnings?]; neither the earth nor the sea shall bring him fruit; let him have no blessed joy; let him perish in a bad way together with everything he owns. Lady Demeter, I implore you, because I have suffered injustice; listen to my prayer, goddess, and pass a judgment of what is just, so that you give the most terrible and harsh sufferings to those who think of this affair with joy [καταχαίροντες], those who have given me and my wife, Epiktesis, sorrow, those who hate us [μισοῦσιν ἡμᾶς]; queen, listen to us, for we have suffered, and punish those who take pleasure in seeing us [ἡδέως βλέποντας] in this misery.

The author of this prayer is an anonymous man, who claims that a certain Ephaphroditos, a slave, had seduced a slave-girl and had persuaded her along with other slaves to run away. The anonymous man spells out his frustration at becoming the laughing stock of his community. Loss of face was for him as important as loss of property. Presumably, his runaway slaves had sought asylum in a shrine or at an altar in the agora, requesting to be sold to another owner. Having no

1 For epigraphic corpora I use the abbreviations of *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (SEG). IG XII.7 p. 1. Recent discussions: Versnel (1999); Faraone (2011) 38–9; Chaniotis (2012b) 100–1. All translations are mine. I am very grateful to Jonah Rosenberg for correcting my English and to the editors of the volume for their suggestions.

possibility of prosecuting them, the frustrated man could appeal only to divine assistance. What he requested was the suffering of both Epaphroditos and those who felt *Schadenfreude* at his humiliation. We will hardly find another Greek text in which emotions are directly referred to, indirectly expressed and expected to be aroused so densely.

This text is of great significance for the study of emotions, but here I am only concerned with one of its aspects: the existence of contrasting emotions within a small community; differently put, the existence of emotional disunity. The author contrasts the emotions felt by him and his wife – sorrow and humiliation – with the emotions felt by his opponents and the spectators – joy and *Schadenfreude*. With regard to shared emotions, we can recognize three different groups: the victims (the man and his wife), the runaway slaves and the spectators. A fourth party is the goddess. By pleading to Demeter, the author clearly and repeatedly underlines the inequality between him, as a suppliant, and the goddess.² He designates himself a slave; he metaphorically falls on his knees applying the body-language of prostration, usually associated with women, barbarians and servants; he addresses the goddess as a queen; he underscores his status as a suppliant. The author clearly wishes revenge. But instead of expressing his anger, he wishes to make the goddess angry and to direct her divine wrath against his opponents.

Such emotional disunity is the norm in human experience. One's success is another's failure; the joy of one man arouses the envy of others; when someone feels grief for a loss, others feel pity and fear that they may be struck by a similar calamity; they may also feel a sense of relief for not being the victim themselves. In everyday life, only small groups share the same emotions, and these emotions are contrasted with the emotions of others. In the aforementioned text a husband and his wife share the sorrow for a loss, several slaves share the hope for an improvement of their situation, and some citizens have *Schadenfreude* for the humiliation of someone they possibly disliked or envied. Emotional dissonance characterizes human relations, not emotional unity.

We can nevertheless distinguish situations in private and public life in which shared feelings are not only expected but indeed desired and for this reason enhanced through various media. As we shall see, such situations are 'marked', since they bear special social and cultural meaning. When shared emotional responses are the object of conscious intervention by political, social or cultural agents – office-holders, priests, instructors, philosophers and so on – they are an object that a historian of society and culture cannot ignore.

This phenomenon has various facets, one of which has been the subject of innovative and influential research by the historian of mediæval Europe Barbara Rosenwein, who has coined the term 'emotional communities'.³ As 'emotional communities' Rosenwein designates 'groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions.' In the context of European history in the Middle Ages, Rosenwein recog-

2 Cf. Johncock (this volume) on prayers to gods in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, similarly an unequal relationship.

3 Rosenwein (2006).

nized the co-existence within the same society and culture of different, even contradictory, values and models and the adjustment of emotions to different environments (e.g. the family, the court and the church). With the introduction of this concept, Rosenwein made an important contribution to the study of emotions in history. Her concept permits the study of ‘emotional dispositions’ that may co-exist in the same society, viz. emotional *communities* (in the plural).

In this study, I am concerned with emotional *community* (in the singular), that is, with a community of people who are expected to feel the same emotions in a certain situation; their shared emotional response is enhanced by conscious intervention. Emotional community in this narrowed sense is the desired, prescribed and enhanced response to a particular situation. It is not simply emotional arousal – the arousal of an emotion in an individual – or individual empathy but emotional arousal connected with a feeling of community and togetherness, with the realization that one is not alone in feeling something but joins a group precisely on the basis of shared emotions.

Focusing on Greek inscriptions, I shall discuss two aspects of emotional community in this sense and their relevance for the study of persuasion. First, inscribed texts reveal how emotional community is displayed in a community; second, in some cases, the inscribed monument itself contributes to this process. Inscriptions have hardly been systematically studied in connection with emotions in history.⁴ But this is not the reason that I have selected them for this study. The main reason is that inscriptions are public texts of a particular kind. As with any other kind of text, epigraphic texts are the product of composition, but also have monumental, commemorative and performative features.⁵ Engraved on non-perishable materials, inscriptions are an important medium of communication and of preservation of memory. Their impact on audiences is connected with their public and monumental character, that is, with their exact setting (a sanctuary, a cemetery, the marketplace etc.), with their decoration with reliefs and painted images, and with the part they played in rituals and oral performances, such as the spontaneous or regular reading aloud of inscriptions and their association with oath ceremonies.⁶

‘SHARED EMOTIONS’: FROM POLITENESS TO TOGETHERNESS

A funerary epigram for an ephebe in Athens (second/third century CE) is a good example for the overlay of monumental, commemorative and performative features in an inscription. The text is inscribed on a monumental stele in the form of an aedicula. The relief representation attracts the attention of a passer-by. The image of an almost nude young man stands on a rectangular base, flanked by his

4 For an overview see Chaniotis (2012b).

5 See Chaniotis (2013a) with further bibliography.

6 Loud reading of inscriptions: Chaniotis (2012a); on the re-enactment of mourning through the reading of epitaphs see Day (1989); on reading and reperformance of epigrams see Day (2010).

parents. The mother has put her right arm around the shoulders of her son's statue. From its very nature as an epitaph the text is commemorative, but also has a performative dimension because it presents the young man as speaking from his grave and compels the reader to lend his voice to the deceased young man. The reader listens to his own voice repeating the words of the dead.⁷

Paramonos, son of Euhodos, from Piraeus, Athenian ephebe. Having felt joy together with many others many times in my few years [πλειστάκις εὐφρανθεὶς ὀλίγοις ἔτεσιν μετὰ πολλῶν], I lie here below, struck by deep sleep. Occupying a place among the stars together with Kastor and Pollux, I am a new Theseus.

Manipulating Paramonos's voice,⁸ the author of the text seeks to diminish the grief for his premature death. The knowledge that Paramonos has joined the Dioskouroi in heaven gives comfort. The only memory from his short life that accompanies him in death is the memory of many joyful moments, of pleasures that he shared with many others. Since the epigram first explicitly refers to Paramonos as an ephebe and then assimilates him with Theseus, the archetypical ephebe, it is reasonable to assume that the 'many' who shared Paramonos's pleasures and joys were his fellow ephebes. But even if this should not be the case, still the text conveys the image of togetherness; shared joy emerges as a privilege and a value.

That shared emotions are a feature of togetherness is clearly expressed in texts that directly or indirectly prescribe shared joy or shared grief. When a victory of King Demetrios Poliorketes was announced in Ephesos (306 BCE), it was resolved by the assembly that the people:

should join him in his joy [συνησθῆναι] for the good things that have been announced concerning the king and his army. All the Ephesians and those who inhabit the city shall wear wreaths for the announced fortunate things. The *essēnes* [religious officials], the priestess and the *oikonomos* [a financial magistrate] shall offer a sacrifice for good news to Artemis [[θύειν δὲ καὶ εὐ]αγγέλια] and they shall pray that in the future more fortunate things happen to king Demetrios and the people of the Ephesians.⁹

The decree makes clear that the entire population should constitute a community of joy. The festive nature of the day is marked with external signs and rituals: all shall wear wreaths, the sign of the exceptional nature of that day, and priests and other officials shall offer sacrifices. Here, and in similar cases, a decree does not simply aim to arouse an emotion; it prescribes its display. The authors of the text may not be in a position to dictate what people feel, yet they allow no exceptions in the display of joy. Not to join the king and the citizens in a display of joy (*sunhēdesthai*) means not to be part of the community. The sacrifice associates the local goddess as well in this community of joy, indirectly attributing the fortunate events to her intervention and expressing gratitude and hope. The authors of the

7 SEG XLVI 286.

8 On this phenomenon, see Casey (2004).

9 I.Ephesos 1448.

decree directly link the display of shared joy with the expectation of a shared fortunate future under Artemis's patronage.

Another example of prescribed emotional display, not joy this time, but grief, is offered by a decree issued by Messene after the death of a local benefactor (first century BCE):¹⁰ 'all the inhabitants of the city, in view of [- - - shall mourn [his death]] as if he were a relative [or, a friend]. The entire population shall attend his funeral; and he shall be offered a crown worth twenty gold staters.' Although the first verb (*penthein*) is only restored, the restoration is very probable. The fragmentary decree distinguishes between participation in the funeral (*ekkomida*) and another response not preserved on the stone. Since that response is designated as befitting a friend or a relative (*philos*), it most likely is mourning (*penthein*). *Penthos* is a ritual, not an emotion – which is *lupê*; but this ritual is connected with the display of grief. The emotional display of the entire population (*pantas, pandêmei*) transforms a city into a virtual family that jointly mourns for the loss of someone who is everyone's *philos*. The conscious use of the participle *katoikountas* (inhabitants) cancels for the duration of the funeral the legal distinctions between citizens, foreigners and slaves. The shared display of affection and grief unites the city, regardless of social and legal status; and it enhances togetherness.¹¹

The verb *sunhêdomai*, which is used in the aforementioned Ephesian decree, literally means 'to feel delight/pleasure together with someone else'. Both this verb and the synonymous *sunchairô* ('to feel joy together with someone else') are widely used in standardized formulae of politeness, often by envoys sent by a subordinate community to a superior authority – a king, a representative of the Roman Empire, or the emperor. When we encounter these verbs in the context of ceremonial display of loyalty and of politeness, their meaning is very close to that of 'to congratulate'.¹² These verbs do not always or necessarily express genuine

10 *IG* V.1.1427. For prescribed emotion cf. an inscription from Messene (second/third century CE) that reports how a Roman magistrate ordered the population in Messene to show joy during the celebration of an annual festival for Caius Caesar: *SEG* XXIII 206: 'he issued the order that all shall wear crowns and offer sacrifices, free of business and calm (ἀπράγμονας ὄντας καὶ ἀταράχους)... He also commanded us to spend this day every year with sacrifices and wearing crowns, as cheerful (ἰλαρώτατα) and [- -] as possible'. Brief discussion in Chaniotis (2011) 263.

11 For the illusion of the virtual family during the funerals of benefactors, see Chaniotis (2006) 223–26; for the temporary cancellation of legal distinctions in festivals see Stavrianopoulou (2009). See also below the comments on a similar decree of Kyzikos (p. 100).

12 On emotional terms in standardized formulae of politeness, see Dickey (this volume). On formulations of politeness more generally, see Dickey (2001). For the use of these verbs in the sense of 'congratulate' see e.g. *IG* XII.6.6 (Samos and Antiocheia on the Maeander, c. 167 BCE): συνήδεσθαι μὲν Ἀντι<ο>χεῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ γεγονότι προσορισμῷ [τῆς χώρας] ('we join the Antiochians in their delight for the delimitation of their territory'); Reynolds (1982) 41–48 no. 6 ll. 43–45 (Octavian and Aphrodisias, 39/38 BCE): ὑμεῖν τε συ[v]ηῖδομαι ἐπὶ τ<ῷ> ἔχειν τοιοῦτον πολεῖτην ('I congratulate you for having such a citizen'); *I.Heraclea Pontica* 2 ll. 18–19 (an association of theatre artists and Herakleia, second century CE): συνηδόμενοι δὲ ὅτι τοιοῦτον εὐτύχησε πολεῖτην ('congratulating you for the fortune of having such a citizen'); *SEG* XXIV 1108–9 (Histria and the provincial governor, c. 200 CE): συνήσθησαν ἐπὶ τῇ

feeling. For instance, in many texts we encounter references to envoys either instructed to fulfil or reported to have fulfilled the following action: ‘to embrace someone and join him in his joy’ (ἀσπάζεσθαι ... συνχαίρειν or συνήδεσθαι).¹³ The use of a stereotypical formula shows that this behaviour was not individualized but followed standard diplomatic protocol. It was a ritualized manner of approaching a partner in a negotiation, usually a more powerful party in an asymmetrical communication.

A decree of Maroneia in Thrace (c. 41–46 CE) evidences such a mechanical display of shared joy in ceremonial encounters with the emperor. The decree concerns embassies to be sent to the emperor whenever the city’s privileges were endangered. To ensure the speedy dispatch of the embassy, the authors of the decree formulated in advance a text to be used automatically by those who wished to make a proposal in the assembly on such an occasion. The text to be applied at any given time in the future instructs the future embassy to approach the emperor and ‘embrace him on behalf of the city and express mutual delight [συνηθεῖσα] that he and all his household are in good health and that things develop in the best manner for him and for the Roman people’.¹⁴ Since the Maronitans could not possibly know in advance what the real situation would be in the future – whether the emperor would be in good health or had broken his leg while hunting, whether he had been victorious or had just lost a child¹⁵ or an army – it is clear that such a passe-partout expression is just a theatrical display of loyalty devoid of any emotion.¹⁶

ἡμετέρα ὑγιεία καὶ παρουσία (‘they showed mutual joy for our health and our presence’). *Sunhêdomai* is also used in letters of Roman authorities to cities, e.g. in several letters of Roman magistrates who felt joy for honours awarded to Opramoas of Rhodiapolis (c. 150 CE); Kokkinia (2000) 21–45 nos. II G 10, III A 13, X F 9; see also a letter of a Roman provincial governor to the city of Gytheion: *IG* V.1.1147. For other examples of routine expressions of shared joy (*sunhêdomai*) see e.g. *IG* XII.5.481; *SEG* XLI 1003; *I.Cret.* III.iv.9; *I.Priene* 14; *OGIS* 6.

- 13 *I.Labraunda* 5 (Mylasa and Philip V, c. 220 BCE); *I.Labraunda* 6 (Mylasa and the dynast Olympichos, c. 220 BCE); *Milet* I.9.306 (the Ionian Koinon and King Eumenes II, 167/6 BCE); *IG* II² 1224 ac L. 18 (the Athenian citizens in Myrina and Athens, 166 BCE); *Syll.*³ 700 L. 41 (Lete and the Roman *quaestor* Marcus Annius, 118 BCE); Reynolds (1982) 20–6 no. 4 (Plarasa/Aphrodisias and King Nikomedes IV?, second/first century BCE); *IG* XII.6.7 (Samos and Augustus, 5 BCE?); *IGR* IV 1756 (Sardes and Augustus, c. 5 BCE); *IGR* IV 145 (Kyzikos and Kings Rhoemetalkis and Polemon, 37 CE).
- 14 *SEG* LIII 659.
- 15 Envoys of the association of Dionysiac artists visited Marcus Aurelius in 158 CE to express joy at the birth of a child; by the time the embassy reached the emperor, the child had died. In his response, the emperor wrote that he appreciated the gesture, even if things did not develop as one would have wished (*I.Smyrna* 600: ‘the affection that you showed by sharing the joy [συνησθέντες] for the birth of a son became nonetheless clear, although things turned out contrary to our wishes’).
- 16 Other examples of *sunchairein* or *sunhêdesthai* in connection with the communication between city and emperor: *IGR* IV 1756 (Sardes and the reception of the *toga virilis* by Caius Caesar, Augustus’s grandson, c. 5 BCE): ‘we shall send an embassy on these matters, which

The recipients of such embassies were at least sometimes aware of the difference between a genuine expression of shared joy and ceremonial protocol. The letter of the Roman proconsul Quintus Oppius to Plarasa/Aphrodisias (ca. 85 BCE) makes this clear.¹⁷ As the proconsul reports, ‘(your envoys) met me in Kos, joined us in our joy [συνεχάρησαν], and gave me the decree in which it was reported that you feel great joy [χαίρειν μέγας] at my presence’. But Oppius adds:

And I certainly believe this [ἀσφαλῶς πιστεύω], in view of your good intentions toward myself and our public affairs. For during that difficult time when I sent you letters from Laodikeia requesting that you send me soldiers, you were among the first to send them; and you did this in accordance with what good allies and friends of the Roman people are obliged to do.

It was not polite words that convinced Oppius, but deeds. That the Roman magistrate recognized this particular expression of joy as trustworthy shows that he regarded other displays of joy as politeness.

Although in many displays of mutual joy we are clearly dealing with ritualized and theatrical gestures, we should not disregard the importance of such a display of shared emotion as a medium that contributed to the establishment and maintenance of relations, and to the feeling of togetherness. When a citizen of Kolophon who was facing the death penalty in Rome was saved (late second century BCE), the Kolophonians received ‘envoys from the kin and friends who reasonably joined us in the delight [κατὰ λόγον συνηδόμενοι] for this and offered joint sacrifices’.¹⁸ The author of this text links the mutual joy and the joint sacrifice with the expected bonds of affection among friends and relatives. In cases such as this, sharing in the joy of a community with words and rituals expressed togetherness. Similarly, when an honorific epigram of Tlos for a certain Hippolochos (second century BCE) asks all Lykians to share the joy for this honour (σύνχαϊρ’, ὦ Λυκία), this request reflects the idea that community – membership in the Lykian federation – obliges shared emotions.¹⁹ A decree of Ephesos expresses gratitude to the Roman magistrates that facilitated a donation by Vibus Salutaris,

will come to Rome and congratulate [συνχαρησομένην] him and Augustus’; *I.Assos* 26 (decree of Assos for the enthronement of Caligula, 37 CE): ‘an embassy, consisting of the first and best Romans and Greeks shall be appointed, which will approach him and share in his joy [συνηρησομένην]’; *F.Delphes* III.4.301 (Delphi and Hadrian, 118 CE): ‘you shared in the joy [[συνηδόμενοι] for me succeeding my father in his rule’; *IGBulg* II 659 (letter of Septimius Severus to Nikopolis ad Istrum, 198 CE): ‘you shared the joy [συνησθέντες] and celebrated a public festival upon the announcement of the good news concerning our success’; *I.Ephesos* 2026 (Ephesos and Caracalla, c. 200–5 CE): ‘you share my joy [συνήδεσθέ μοι]’.

17 Reynolds (1982) 16–20 no. 3.

18 *SEG* XXXIX 1244 ll. 48–50.

19 *TAM* II 580; cf. *I.Ephesos* 12 (third century CE) ll. 5–6: [συν]ηδομένης ὡς οἰκείους τοῖς πάν[τω]ν ἀγαθοῖς (‘our city feels shared joy for the things that are good to all, as if they were her own benefits’); cf. *IG* XII.468: the Koans share the joy of the Greeks for the victory over the Gauls (278 BCE).

adding that they joined them in their joy (συνηδόμενοι) for the benefaction ‘as if being genuine citizens or our city’ (104 CE).²⁰ Feeling with a community means being part of a community. The same idea emerges from a letter of Antoninus Pius to Koroneia in Boiotia, shortly after his accession to the throne in 139 CE.²¹

By justly commemorating my divine father [the deified Hadrian] and feeling delight for my rule, as is appropriate [κατὰ τὸ προσήκον ἐπὶσθημένοι], and eagerly sharing the joy [συνηδόμενοι] for my son [i.e. the adoption of Marcus Aurelius as his successor] you do what is proper [πρέποντα] for Greek people [Ἑλλήσιν ἀνθρώποις].

For Koroneia, sharing in the emperor’s success and in the joy for the appointment of his successor was an expression of loyalty. The emperor recognized this as fulfilment of a duty, as the words τὸ προσήκον and πρέποντα show. But the fulfilment of this duty of shared joy made Koroneia a worthy member of the community of the Greeks and, as the use of the word ἄνθρωποι suggests, of the human *oikoumenē* that lived under his rule. Display of emotion appears here as the foundation of community. With attitudes such as these, concerning shared emotions, we shall now examine how inscriptions, on certain occasions, insinuate, display or construct emotional community.

INSINUATING EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY: DECREES AND ACCLAMATIONS

Inscribed decrees, such as the previously discussed decrees of Ephesos and Messene (pp. 96–7), provide abundant evidence of how the leading elite of civic communities, that is, the elite responsible for the proposals that were passed by the assembly, took measures in order to display emotional community, both directly and indirectly. When Apollonis, a local benefactor, died in the city of Kyzikos (first century CE), a decree concerning her funeral stipulated that ‘all the inhabitants of the city in one body [*pandēmei*], men and women, shall mourn [*penthēsai*] for her.’²² The expressions used in this decree to express inclusiveness in a community of grief deserve closer examination. Exactly like the decree of Messene for the funeral of a benefactor, the decree of Kyzikos does not refer to the citizens alone, but to all the inhabitants of the city, thus associating foreign residents in the mourning for the loss. The participation of the entire population is stipulated again with the (redundant) word *pandēmei*. And then the author clarifies the obvious: all means all, ‘men and women’. Pleonasm is not bad style but means of endorsing the prescription (cf. references in note 35). The day of the funeral is marked; the burial transforms the entire city into a community of grief.

20 *I.Ephesos* 27 A ll. 80–1.

21 *IG VII* 2870 ll. 7–9: καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πατρός μου δικαίως μεμνημένοι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ προσήκον ἐπὶσθημένοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ υἱοῦ μου προθύμως συνηδόμενοι πρέποντα Ἑλλήσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιείτε.

22 *SEG XXVIII* 953 ll. 39–40.

By inscribing the decree, the authorities of Kyzikos gave it permanence; they not only set up a memorial for Apollonis but also a memorial of the emotional community her death had created in their city. Decrees like this prescribe the creation of an emotional community only for a specific, limited period. We, the future readers, are not invited to share in this feeling of grief, as happens in the case of epitaphs (see below pp. 103–7), but we are invited to witness the efforts of Kyzikos to display gratitude and to honour a benefactor.

The conscious choice of words that denote uniformity and underscore the sense of community – *pandēmei*, *pantes* and verbs composed with *sun-* – emerge in certain decrees as a strategy aiming to create the impression of the existence of an ad hoc emotional community. A good example is provided by a decree of Aphrodisias during the First Mithridatic War (88 BCE). Its intended audience was a Roman general and the local population; its content is the theatrical display of loyalty, courage and determination for battle:²³

The People decided to elect as ambassadors men from among those who are honoured and hold trust and are well disposed [*eunoikos*] towards the Romans. They shall go to Quintus Oppius, the proconsul, to inform him of the disposition [*hairesis*] of our People towards him and all the Romans. They [the envoys] shall also inform him that our whole People together with our wives and children and all our property [*πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἡμῶν σὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ τέκνοις καὶ τῷ παντὶ βίῳ*] is ready to risk all for Quintus and the Roman cause; and that without the rule of the Romans we do not choose even to live.

The text is so effective in its rhetoric of concord and unanimity that only a careful reading shows that this emotional community had little to do with reality. The text insinuates a community of loyalty and courage that united people of different gender, age and legal status in this moment of crisis: ‘our whole People together with our wives and children and all our property’. However, neither the women, nor the children, nor the slaves had attended the assembly that passed the decree; no one had asked them about their opinion or their feelings. The text uses the word *hairesis*, that is, disposition, in this case the friendly disposition towards the Romans. But this alleged disposition is contradicted by Aphrodisians’ election as envoys of ‘men who were well disposed towards the Romans’. If everyone were well disposed toward the Romans, as the authors claim, then what was the point in looking for trustworthy and loyal envoys? Emotional community reveals itself here as a textual construct; it is insinuated through the careful selection of words.

In the case of the decree of Aphrodisias, the ad hoc emotional community of self-sacrifice and courage is combined with an allegedly permanent emotional disposition: loyalty and affection. The text does not conceal that the relation between the Aphrodisians and the Romans is asymmetrical: it is the relation between dependent community and its ruler. The emotional community constructed by texts, especially decrees, sometimes aims to provide the emotional foundation for

23 Reynolds (1982) 11–16 no. 2. Discussion of the emotional aspects of this text: Chaniotis (2013b) 746–9.

such an asymmetrical relation. This is quite clear in a decree of Assos in honour of Emperor Caligula (37 CE):²⁴

The rule of Caius Caesar Germanicus Augustus, for which all men [πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις] have hoped [ἐλπισθεῖσα] and prayed, has been proclaimed, and the world has known no bounds to its delight [οὐδὲν δὲ μέτρον χαρᾶς]. Every city and every nation [πᾶσα δὲ πόλις καὶ πᾶν ἔθνος] is eager to behold the face of the god as the greatest delight that the present age can offer to mankind....

One immediately notices the repetition of *pas* (every) and the insinuation of a community of joy and hope uniting the Roman Empire on the occasion of Caligula's enthronement. By issuing this decree, Assos displayed its determination to join the rest of mankind in a relationship of unlimited affection toward the emperor.

Such texts have multiple audiences. Addressed to the people, they endorse the prescribed emotion; addressed to the higher authority, they demonstrate loyalty and at the same time express the expectation of future favours. Inasmuch as these texts influenced attitudes and behaviours, they were part of a persuasion strategy.

What decrees could only mention was ceremonially displayed by acclamations. Acclamations occurred on marked occasions, usually during a public or religious celebration or a meeting.²⁵ The repetition of words or of similar sounds is an effective device that gives emphasis to a message and increases its emotional impact. Since acclamations apply short and concise formulas of praise, they can easily be employed by a large crowd. But this does not mean that acclamations are spontaneous and unplanned. Texts are never composed by a crowd; they are composed by individuals; for the performance of acclamations some instruction, even if only a minimal one, is required. But exactly because they are performed in unison, they can ideally express unanimity, and by expressing it enhance it.

The recording of acclamations on stone, only sporadically attested in the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, became very common in Late Antiquity, precisely when the number of decrees dramatically decreases. Exactly as inscribed decrees demonstrated emotional community, inscribed acclamations were a memorial of unanimity. The acclamations for the benefactor Albinus in Aphrodisias are a good example (ca. 480 CE).²⁶ Albinus had donated a building – the restored west portico of the South Market – and acclamations praising him were performed presumably during its inauguration. Some time after the ceremony, the texts of the acclamations were inscribed on its columns.

God is one, for the whole world! Many years for the emperors! Many years for the prefects!
Many years for the Senate! Many years for the metropolis! Look around, Albinus! Up with the
builder of the hall! Lord, lover of your country, remain for us! Your buildings are an eternal

24 *I.Assos* 26.

25 On acclamations in the popular assembly: Fernoux (2011) 134–50; on the emotional impact of acclamations: Kuhn (2012); on religious acclamations: Chaniotis (2009); on acclamations in Late Antiquity: Roueché (1984) and (1989b), Kruse (2006), Wiemer (2004).

26 Roueché (1984) and (1989a) 126–36 no. 83.

reminder, Albinus, you who love to build. The whole city says this: Your enemies to the river! May the great God provide this! Up with Albinus *clarissimus*! He should be sent to the Senate! Envy shall not prevail over fortune. Up with Albinus, the builder of this work also! You have disregarded wealth and obtained glory, Albinus *clarissimus*. Albinus *clarissimus*, like your ancestors a lover of your country, may you receive plenty. With your buildings you have made the city brilliant, Albinus, lover of your country. The entire city, in one voice, says this in acclamations: who ever does not notice you, Albinus, does not know God.

The citizens of Aphrodisias present themselves here, in perfect unison, as a community of gratitude, and this makes us forget the agency behind the acclamations: the men who composed the texts and initiated their engraving. The expressions ὅλη ἡ πόλις ('the entire city') and ἡ πόλις ὅλη ὁμοφώνως ('the entire city in one voice') imply concord and unanimity. And yet the acclamations contradict themselves by implying that Albinus faced envy and the hatred of enemies – possibly for religious reasons; there were people who did not acknowledge his service. Those who did not join this emotional community of gratitude were enemies and godless; they should be banished, extinguished, thrown into the river.

CONSTRUCTING DIACHRONIC EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES OF WORSHIPPERS AND MOURNERS

Inscribed decrees and acclamations insinuated the existence of emotional community on a particular occasion. This community was to be remembered but not to be recreated in the future. Those who read for instance the text about the emotional community in Apollonis's funeral are not supposed, years later, to join the community of mourners. They are perhaps expected to feel gratitude towards this woman – and, more generally, towards benefactors – or encouraged to follow her example of affection towards her *polis* in expectation of similar rewards. But the original audience of the decree constitutes a different community from that of future readers. A different situation occurs when we study texts that promote a diachronic emotional community, crossing the boundaries of time, and inviting future readers to join in an eternally growing emotional community. Whereas the emotional community insinuated by decrees and acclamations comprised people who cohabited in time and, often, in space, the emotional community of worshippers and mourners is timeless and only spatially bound to a particular sanctuary and grave.

Important evidence for the construction of the emotional community of worshippers is provided by a heterogeneous group of texts that record various manifestations of divine power; they are found in abundance in sanctuaries and consist of dedications, narratives of healing miracles, acclamations for the gods, praises, hymns, aretalogies (accounts of gods' miraculous power) and records of divine punishment. These inscriptions, accompanied by images, urged the participants in cult to share the same feelings: gratitude for past assistance, hope for

future protection, and fear of punishment for transgressions.²⁷ When a woman declares in her dedication ‘I thank Mother Leto, for she makes the impossible things possible’,²⁸ this statement fills the reader with confidence and hope that his prayers may also be fulfilled. When people read about the punishment of a thief by the god Mes and see in an image how the thief has been forced to bring the garment he had stolen from a bath to Mes’s sanctuary,²⁹ they may fear that divine wrath will prosecute them for their own sins and transgressions. When pilgrims read that a woman dedicated her slaves to the Goddess at Gyrbiata ‘for it is thanks to her and her miracles that I am alive’,³⁰ they are not only filled with hope but they also receive an exemplum of proper behaviour: they are urged to show gratitude and praise the goddess.

This is also the function of the healing miracles of Asklepios in Rome (late second century CE) that repeatedly mention that the healed individual publicly thanked the god and that the audience joined him in his joy [συνεχάρη].³¹ The audience of a miracle was an emotional community based on joy and hope. Dedications and records of miracles in sanctuaries attracted the attention of visitors, commemorated past manifestations of divine power, and invited every new visitor to be part of a diachronic emotional community of worshippers, united in the belief in divine power.³²

The same interdependence of attention, commemoration and emotional arousal can be observed in the case of epitaphs in cemeteries; only the emotions expected to be aroused differed. Epitaphs recreated the original community of mourners (see note 6), reassuring the deceased individuals that they had not been forgotten. The authors of epigraphic records of divine power reassured the gods, the transcendental audience of emotional community in sanctuaries, of the worshippers’ faith. The authors of epitaphs reassured the transcendental audience of emotional community in cemeteries – the dead, eternally confronted with mortality – of eternal commemoration.

27 Discussion of such texts in connection with emotional arousal and emotional community: Chaniotis (2011) and (2012c).

28 Petzl (1994) 140–1 no. 122 (Ortaköy, second/third century CE).

29 Petzl (1994) 3–5 no. 3 lines 2–11 (Saittai, 164 CE): ‘A sceptre was set up in case someone should steal something from the bath. When a garment was stolen, the god angrily prosecuted the thief and made him, after some time, bring the garment to the god. And he confessed. Through a messenger the god ordered the garment to be sold and (the manifestation of) his power to be written on a stele.’

30 *SEG* XLIII 435 (Kyrrhos, 206 CE): ‘Quinta, daughter of Porios, from Kyrrhos, donated Lyko and Zosimos to the Virgin Syrian Goddess at Gyrbiata; for it is thanks to her and her miracles that I am alive. They are slaves born in the household.’

31 *IGUR* I 148 ll. 9–18: καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἡγαρίστησεν τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὁ δῆμος συνεχάρη αὐτῷ (‘and he thanked the god in public and the assembled people rejoiced together with him’); καὶ ἐλθὼν δημοσίᾳ ἡγαρίστησεν ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ δήμου (‘and he came and thanked the god in public in front of the assembled people’); τοῦ δήμου παρεστῶτος καὶ συναϊρομένου (‘in the presence of the assembled people who were sharing in the joy’); καὶ ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ἡγαρίστησεν δημοσίᾳ τῶν θεῶν (‘and he came and publicly thanked the god’).

32 Chaniotis (2011) and (2012c).

In the case of epitaphs, the simplest method of emotional arousal is to address the reader in direct speech, usually presenting the deceased individual as speaking from the grave. A good example is an epitaph from Athens (late sixth century BCE).³³ ‘Man, whoever you are who walks on this road, even if you have other things in your mind, stand still and have pity/lament.’ This early text is short and direct. It is not clear who is speaking. It could be the deceased individual, the stone or an unidentified author. An explanation for the pity is not given directly. The future reader is addressed not with a word such as ‘passer-by’ (*parhoditēs*) or ‘stranger’ (*xenos*), as in most cases, but with the word *anthrōpos*, ‘man’. He is thus reminded of his human nature and, therefore, of his own mortality. In this text, the feeling of pity and grief is rooted in the realization of the unavoidable common fate of humans.

In later texts, the strategies of emotional arousal are more elaborate, as in a text from southern Asia Minor (Antioch in Pisidia) in the Imperial period.³⁴ ‘Stand by me [μείνον], as you pass by! Stand, stranger! Do not pass without noticing me [μὴ με παρέλθης], but find out about me and feel compassion with my parents, who are painted here.’ Here, it is clear who is talking: the deceased man. By manipulating his voice (cf. note 8), the author of the text gives the message the authority of a higher transcendental speaker. We can hardly ignore the voice of someone who has suffered death. The request is endorsed through repetition and pleonasm, two widely applied strategies of emotional arousal.³⁵ The imperative μείνον (‘stay’) is repeated twice, and the message ‘stay!’ is reiterated with a synonym (‘don’t pass by’). But the strongest and most effective media of emotional arousal follow. The ‘stranger’ is asked to learn the identity of the deceased individual (‘find out about me!’). If he follows the dead man’s request to look at the painted image of the parents, the passer-by will not only be reminded of the unnaturally early death but also receive a visual impression of the bereaved. The deceased young man and his parents step out of anonymity. Thus prepared, the stranger, no longer a stranger, is asked not to feel something alone, but to join the bereft in their pain and grief: ‘feel the same grief [σύμπασχε] as my parents’.

Thus, such a short and seemingly ordinary text reveals itself as a carefully composed appeal to compassion. It arouses emotions that are timeless; it invites us even today to reflect, to try to understand and to feel empathy. Greek epigrams on stone are the result of a long development and refinement of techniques of persuasion, rhetoric and emotional arousal, achieving this through a variety of textual and linguistic media.³⁶ In an epigram from Teichioussa (Imperial period),³⁷ our empathy is aroused indirectly as the deceased person reminds us of his early death: ‘Having completed eighteen years of life I came to the nightly realm of

33 *IG* I³ 1204.

34 *SEG* XXXI 1283. The first verse also in Merkelbach and Stauber (2001) 206 no. 16/23/06 (Aizanoi, 247 CE); cf. *SEG* XLI 1166 (Galatia, third century CE): ‘Wanderer, do not pass without noticing me, but stand and look at the charming place.’

35 Chaniotis (2012b) 111 and note 92.

36 Lattimore (1942); Tsagalis (2008); a few examples in Chaniotis (2012b) 107–11.

37 Merkelbach and Stauber (1998) 73 no. 01/18/05.

cruel oblivion. For this reason, strange traveller, shed wailing tears [γοερὸν βάλε δάκρυον] for me.’ And then, according to the principle of reciprocity, the dead young man offers us something in return, if we do join the group of those who endlessly shed tears for his death: ‘and for this service may a god grant you every happiness.’

The techniques by which the authors of epitaphs urged readers to be part of a community of mourners were very diverse. When epitaphs claim that the entire community had shed tears,³⁸ how can one allow himself not to be part of this community? When he is addressed as ‘friend’ (*philos*),³⁹ not ‘passer-by’ or ‘stranger’, how can he not look upon the deceased with affection? Similarly, by confronting the reader with a rhetorical question – ‘who did not shed tears for the unfulfilled hopes of my parents when looking at me?’⁴⁰ – the author is confident that he will achieve the desired response. In an epigram from Bithynia (late second century CE), written by an individual with limited education (as we can infer from mistakes in spelling), the reader’s response is already predicted.⁴¹

Menios son of Molorchos for Antiochos, made me for his son, who lived 18 years, from his own property. ‘Why do you read me, stranger, shedding tears [δάκρυον]? Feel no grief [μὴ λυποῦ]!’ ‘I feel grief [λυποῦμαι] for a premature death, before (the death of) the parents.’ Farewell.

The speaker (the monument) is surprised that the passer-by, a stranger, reads the inscription in tears, and urges him not to feel grief. But the passer-by responds that premature death causes him grief, thus indirectly urging future readers of the text to feel likewise and join a virtual community of mourners.

Vividness is one of the most effective media of emotional arousal for the purpose of perpetuating the emotional community of grief. *Enargeia* is an important element of Greek oratory and literature, from the fourth century BCE onwards.⁴² This term refers to the efforts of orators, poets or narrators to paint a mental picture of a scene, and to give the reader or listener the impression that he is an eyewitness to the event that is being narrated. The emotional impact was thereby increased. The connection of a text’s *enargeia* and the audience’s em-

38 *IG* II² 3756 (early third century CE): ‘all the people shed tears for my fate’; *IG* II² 7447 (Athens, late second century CE): ‘the entire people of Athens shed tears for me’; *IG* IX.1.234/235 (Larymna, second century BCE): ‘with one spirit [ὁμοφρονέως], the entire city shed tears’; *SEG* LX 1337 (Bithynia, third century CE): ‘I died giving grief [λυπήσας] to everyone.’

39 E.g. *IG* II² 10116; *IG* V.2.359; *IG* IX.2.1276; *IG* XII.2.644; *GV* 432, 1013; *IEphesos* 1628; *I.Kyzikos* 507; *I.Smyrna* 529.

40 *IG* VII 1883 (Thespiai, c. 150 CE).

41 *SEG* LX 1352 (Prusa ad Olympum).

42 Zanker (1981), Zangara (2007) 55–89, Otto (2009), Webb (2009) 87–105, Chaniotis (2013c) and (2013d).

pathy was well-known to ancient teachers of rhetoric, and is explained by Polybius in his criticism of Phylarchos:⁴³

And being eager to stir the hearts of his readers to pity [εἰς ἔλεον], and to enlist their sympathies by his story, he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their breasts; and again of the tears and lamentations of men and women, led off into captivity along with their children and aged parents. And this he does again and again throughout his whole history, by way of bringing the terrible scene vividly before his readers [πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινὰ].

Without directly addressing the readers, without asking them to feel empathy and join the community of mourners, the author of an epitaph can achieve empathy in a more subtle manner: he makes the readers eyewitnesses of an individual's death through detailed, vivid descriptions. A good example of such *enargeia* in the detailed description of an individual's death is offered by the epigram for a child who drowned in a well:⁴⁴

When the sun was setting towards the chambers of the night, after I had taken my supper, I came together with my maternal uncle to bathe. And, right away, the Fates made me sit on [the edge of] a well, there. As I was undressing, the worst Fate took me away. As soon as the daimon saw me at the bottom of the well, he delivered me to Charon. But my uncle heard the noise of me falling into the well and started looking for me right away. However, there was no hope for me to live among the mortals. Running came my maternal aunt; she tore off her tunic. Running came my mother; she stood there beating her chest. Immediately my aunt fell to Alexander's feet, begging him. Seeing this, he no longer hesitated but jumped into the well right away. When he found me drowned in the bottom, he brought me out in a basket. Right away my aunt grabbed me, as I was wet, in a hurry, wondering whether there was any life left in me. Thus a bad Fate covered me, the wretched one, before I could see a palaestra, barely three years old.

The poet 'paints' a scene in the twilight, appealing to our senses. We see the hectic and rapid movement; we hear the sound of the boy falling into the water, the desperate cries of the mother, the distressed begging of the aunt; we feel the boy's wet body. Made eyewitnesses of a child's death by this narrative, we join in their distress and grief those who had experienced this tragedy.

EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY: A PERSUASION STRATEGY ON 'MARKED' OCCASIONS

The selected inscriptions discussed in this chapter were carefully composed in such a way as to imply a collective feeling shared by all members of a community on a certain occasion or expected to be shared by future readers.

43 Polyb. 2.56.6–8. On this passage see more recently Thornton (2013), with earlier bibliography.

44 Merkelbach and Stauber (1998) 365–6 no. 03/05/04 (Notion, Imperial period). Discussed in Chaniotis (2012b) 108–9.

The background of all these texts are situations that I would characterize as 'marked': situations that are bearers of special social and cultural meaning. Emotional community was insinuated or constructed in marked spaces such as the sanctuary, the theatre, the assembly, the cemetery and the court. It is constructed in gatherings of people that are dominated by prescribed behaviour, such as a festival, a dramatic performance, a meeting of the assembly, a funeral or a symposium. For this reason, some elements of performance can be observed in these situations. An extreme example of emotional community in this sense is offered by ancient drama, performed in a space dominated by conventions and rituals, and, if we follow Aristotle's definition of tragedy, aiming at the arousal of shared emotions in the audience that is expected to be united in a community of pity and fear in order to achieve *katharsis*.⁴⁵

With the exception of epitaphs, the discussed texts share a background as regards the relation of the agent of the communication and the audience: they concern asymmetrical relations, relations of dependency and hierarchy. The emotional communities – of grief after the death of a benefactor; of joy after the victory of a king; of joy and hope after the enthronization of an emperor; of courage when faced with an enemy of a hegemonic power; of gratitude for the services of a donor; of fear, hope and gratitude when faced with manifestations of divine power – are communities whose shared emotions define their relation to a stronger partner: a representative of the élite, a king, Rome, an emperor, a god. In this regard, the construction of emotional community is an important medium in the establishment of authority. In the case of epitaphs the perceived audience of emotional community is the deceased. Mortality, the common human fate, places the deceased on the same level with the eternally-growing and -renewed community of mourners, and this makes empathy possible; and yet as transcendental beings, the deceased evoke awe and are beyond the reach of the living, withdrawn to the unknown and unexplored realm of death.

The asymmetrical relations that underlie emotional community as expressed and provoked through inscriptions link the subject of emotional community with the subject of persuasion. According to a reasonably simple and comprehensive definition, persuasion is the attempt of an agent to influence the behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, intentions and motivations of an individual.⁴⁶ Emotional arousal, the emotional engagement of the agent, and the emotional conditions of the communication between agent and audience have been recognized as significant aspects in the process of persuasion.⁴⁷ The existence of emotional community may facilitate persuasion.

The display of collective feeling has agents, usually members of the élite, who hide themselves behind the anonymity of 'the people' and the perceived unanimity of collective feeling. Also the inscription of selected texts – public documents, records of acclamations – had agents identifiable as representatives of authority. By inscribing selected texts they made the emotional community that

45 Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449b 23–28.

46 Cf. Seiter and Gass (2010) 33.

47 Cf. Petty and Cacioppo (1986); Eagly and Chaiken (1993).

was displayed on one particular occasion a part of a selective commemoration of the past; they set standards to be followed. Standards are also set by texts recording divine manifestations or commemorating the dead. In those texts, the emotional community is intended to be continually renewed in the future, as every new reader of a text is expected to join a virtual community of worshippers who feel hope, fear and gratitude in the case of religion, and of mourners who feel grief, confronted with the common destiny of mortals, in the case of funerary monuments.

But no matter whether we are dealing with the ad hoc emotional community expressed by public documents or the perpetually growing emotional community of worshippers and mourners, emotional community is a strategy of persuasion in the complex relations and negotiations between unequal partners: cities and kings, citizens and the élite, dependent populations and the imperial power, the mortals and the gods, the living and the dead. Thus the concept of the emotional community can be fruitfully applied as an heuristic tool for the study of the emotional background and emotional aspects of ancient texts and ancient phenomena of social, political and cultural life.

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EMOTION, PERSUASION AND KINSHIP IN THUCYDIDES: THE PLATAIAN DEBATE (3.52–68) AND THE MELIAN DIALOGUE (5.85–113)*

Maria Fragoulaki

INTRODUCTION

Thucydides' speeches surely reflect rhetorical practices (and probably theoretical works) of his own day, but he might also himself have influenced the development of the genre. This can be inferred from the study of the surviving samples of fifth-century oratory (such as fragments of Antiphon) and from the richer evidence we have on fourth-century speeches and rhetorical treatises, such as the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.¹ In addition to the persuasion exercised by the speakers in the *History*, Thucydides' own authorial persuasion vis-à-vis his audience offers another means of tracing his affinities with oratory. These affinities go well beyond the speeches and include major features of his historical writing. For example, the restriction of the range of motives so as to guide his audience's attention to the explanation he himself favours is characteristic of forensic oratory;² and so are his historical method and the explicit aim of discovering the truth.³ This discussion will look at the role of emotions in Thucydides' speeches, paying special attention to the presence, or absence, of intercommunal kinship ties between the cities taking part in the process of persuasion. Two levels of persuasion will be taken into account: the persuasion that takes place among the speaking historical actors in the *History* (which can be termed here 'internal') and the

* I would like to thank the participants of the conference for stimulating discussion and the editors, Ed Sanders and Matthew Johncock, for their meticulous care and suggestions; all improved my discussion in a number of ways. Omissions and mistakes remain my own. In this chapter, all passage citations bearing no indication of author refer to Thucydides; and all dates are BCE, unless otherwise stated.

1 Macleod (1983) chs 9, 10, 11 *et passim*; Hornblower (1987) 45–72; Pelling (2012) 281–315 also subtly considers tragedians' and comedians' versions of rhetorical reality. See Lucian *Hist. Conscr.* 51 on the difference between the historian's task and that of the orator. On speeches in Thucydides and the relationship between oratory and history, see e.g. Luschnat (1971) 1162–83; Stadter (1973); Pelling (2000) chs 2, 4, 6; Grethlein (2010) 205–40; Marincola (2011), containing further bibliography.

2 Baragwanath (2008) 85.

3 Plant (1999); Rood (2006).

persuasion that takes place between Thucydides as historical author and his audience ('external').⁴

Emotional and ethical factors are central to all wars, and especially ethnic conflicts. The Peloponnesian War was a destructive war between Greek communities, mainly Sparta and Athens and their respective allies, which took place between 431 and 404. Thucydides' everlasting impact on history writing is owed to the combination of a wry and detached analysis of the factors that motivate and govern wars and pages of astonishing pathos and emotionality. His political analysis is artfully combined with his reporting of an ethnic war in which he himself took part, and the final outcome contains rich and valuable material on collective and individual emotions and ethics: dramatic descriptions of destruction, mourning and death, along with the moral condemnation of total warfare and the social dissolution caused by the war, but also hope, desire and *erôs*.

Emotions and ethics are central to all processes of persuasion. Two of the three interrelated categories of 'artificial evidence' (*entechnoi pisteis*, proofs constructed by speech), according to Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1.2, 1356a 1–25) are: *êthos* ('the moral character projected by the speaker in order to establish himself as a credible source of information and opinion'), and *pathos* ('the emotion induced in the hearer as a means of creating in him a state of mind favourable to the speaker and unfavourable to his opponent').⁵ All three categories of *entechnoi pisteis* are interrelated in the process of persuasion. Emotion cannot be dissociated from the perception of moral character or from reasoning, cognition and construction of argument. Aristotle's dichotomy between persuasion through character and persuasion through the emotions produced in the hearer has at times led to false distinctions between arousal of emotions and judgment, which are not underpinned by modern theories of emotions; for example, there is no such thing as an 'unemotional and impartial auditor'.⁶ Oratory, therefore, is the natural space for the study of emotions and the ways in which they affect decision-making and action.

Speeches in the Greek historians of the Classical period are no exception. About 'austere' Thucydides, it is worth remembering that his *enargeia* ('vividness') and *pathos* have been praised since antiquity (Plut. *Nikias* 1.1), and that in the fifth century (as well) '[t]he same citizens who were audience and judges of theatrical or musical competitions were also audience and "judges" of political competitions and public orations'.⁷ This discussion will take into consideration

4 For in-text and extra-textual audiences and different levels of persuasion in Herodotus, see Baragwanath (2008) 298–300 *et passim*.

5 Carey (2007) 229. The third category was, according to Aristotle, *logos* itself (rational argument).

6 Fortenbaugh (1992) 228; *pace* Gill (1984). Turner and Stets (2005), for modern theories of emotions (see also main text below with note 20). Carey (1994) 36–45, on the importance of *êthos* in law-courts.

7 Chaniotis (2013) 215–16; cf. Thucydides' Cleon's famous invective *κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντας ... θεαταὶ λόγων ... ἀκροαταὶ ἔργων* (3.38.4); for Cleon's own theatrical demeanour in public speaking, see Plut. *Nikias* 8.6. Chaniotis (2013) makes ingenious use of some Hellenistic decrees, which are held to reflect the emotional language, vividness and theatricality of actual

two dimensions of *pathos*: the emotions which the speakers aim to induce in their audiences, the ‘target’ of persuasion, and the emotional statuses of the speakers themselves in the course of their addresses.⁸ Evidence of emotion (*pathos*) in the speaker affects in fact the way in which the moral character of the speaker (*êthos*) is perceived by (internal and external) audiences and reminds us of the connections between *êthos* and *pathos* made by ancient criticism.⁹ *Êthos* will be examined not only in connection with the Aristotelian definition of the term in the *Rhetoric* (‘the moral character of the speaker’), but also with the theatrical sense of the term, as applying to Aristotle’s *Poetics* (15, 1454a 22–24): there *êthos* is the aspect related to the truthfulness and plausibility of the character, or else to dramatic characterization (τὰ ἀμύρτοντα ἥθη, ‘appropriateness of character’).¹⁰

Although they clearly relate to the forensic, deliberative and epideictic samples of ancient oratory, Thucydides’ speeches are also part of a historiographic project, which means that they are hybrids of real-life situations and the author’s own rhetorical strategies and construction of persuasion. The best representation of their hybrid nature (rhetoric and history) is Thucydides’ own famous methodological statement about the composition of his speeches and the degree and kind of his intervention in reporting ‘what was actually said’ (τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα, 1.22.1–3); it has been discussed exhaustively by scholars and no further analysis will be offered here.¹¹

The *History* contains not only direct but also indirect speeches, which deserve equal attention, both in terms of rhetoric and internal persuasion, and in terms of their role in the narrative.¹² This generates questions related to the author’s choices and/or sources of information, such as the reason why a speech is reported directly or indirectly, its length, or its position in the whole structure, along with another set of questions pertaining to the number and the names of the speakers. Sometimes Thucydides uses an enigmatic plural to describe the speakers who address an assembly in a political/civic or a military context, leaving us to wonder about the details of this group address, resembling the voice of a chorus. This is the case for example with both speaking parties of the Melian Dialogue, or with

speeches and of Hellenistic historiography. One of these documents is the famous Xanthos-Kytenion decree (third century, Curty (1995) no. 75), whose emotional impact lies precisely in the predominant role of intercommunal kinship in it.

8 Hagen (this volume) considers the importance of the speakers themselves feeling the emotion that they are trying to engender in their audience.

9 Gill (1984); Russell (1990).

10 Carey (1994) 39–43.

11 See e.g. Orwin (1994) 207–12; Rood (1998) 46–8; Greenwood (2006) 63–8.

12 For the need of equal attention to both direct and indirect speeches, see e.g. *CT* III.32–5; Scardino (2012). Arist. *Rh.* (1.3, 1358b20–9) for expediency or harm, as the aim (τέλος) of the deliberative speaker; and justice or injustice, as the aim of the forensic speaker.

the addresses of the Thebans and the Plataians in the Plataian debate.¹³ Of special interest is also the naming and non-naming of the speakers. As one might expect, when a speech is attributed to a single speaker, we are often given his name – but not always.¹⁴ Conversely the expectation in the case of a ‘choral’ address is that the speakers are anonymous. A remarkable exception though are the two Plataian speakers in the Plataian debate, who appear with their names and patronymics. This creates a sharp contrast with the anonymity of the group of Theban speakers (whose number is not specified either) and the five anonymous Spartan judges, who are the deciding body of this debate, and to whom both the Plataians’ and the Thebans’ persuasion is directed.¹⁵

The majority of the speeches in Thucydides belong to the broader category of deliberative speeches, as they have a clear political dimension concerning matters such as gains and losses of diplomatic, territorial and economic nature, which affect a city’s position on the map of power relations and ultimately its position and fate in the war. Yet, as already mentioned, especially in times of war, practical motives and questions are closely related to ethical ones; arguments relying on past character and deeds influence decisions about the future, and assemblies are at times transformed into courtrooms. This is also apparent in the deliberative speeches in the *History*, which often have a forensic aspect, some to a greater degree than others.¹⁶ The forensic aspect of the speeches is occupied with questions of retribution, conventional morality and hierarchical order on the interstate level, which are related to the cultural values of the society in which the debate takes place. The interlocking of the deliberative and forensic strands might also be seen in the frequency of the rhetorical *topoi* of *xumpheron* (expediency) and *dikaion* (justice) in the *History*, which appear in close relation to each other. But even when the actual words *xumpheron* and *dikaion* are not used, these concepts are central to all processes of collective decision-making in Thucydides (and beyond).¹⁷ *Antilogies* (exchanges of longer antithetical speeches) such as the debate on the so-called *Kerkyraika* affair (1.32–44) or the Mytilenaiian debate (3.37–48) are representative examples of the mixture of deliberative and forensic elements, and so is the Plataian debate, one of the two debates discussed in this chapter. There is a consistent preoccupation with moral questions and juxtaposition of ex-

13 This choral idea of address is often found in pre-battle exhortations. Cf. 7.65.3, where the address is attributed to ‘the generals and Gylippos’; with *CT* III.683; *HCT* IV.444. For battle speeches in Thucydides, see Luschkat (1942); Leimbach (1985); Pritchett (2002), esp. 37–80.

14 6.25, the short indirect speech of ‘a certain Athenian’ might be seen as a structural match with the short direct speech of a Syracusan general in 6.41.

15 See below. 3.52.5 (Plataian speakers), cf. Hornblower (1987) 51–3.

16 Of the longer speeches, in addition to the deliberative (or symbouleutic) and forensic (or dikanic) genres, there is also the Funeral Oration (2.35–46), the only epideictic (display) speech in the *History*, and a number of pre-battle exhortations (for the problem of historicity, see e.g. Hansen (1993); Pritchett (1994)). For a categorization of oratory in Thucydides, see Marincola (2001) 82–3; Carey (1994) 33–4, on similarities between forensic and political oratory and processes. For a mixture of registers in Herodotus’s speeches, see Zali (2014) 255–7.

17 For the use of moral language in interstate relations from different perspectives, see Low (2007); Fragoulaki (2013).

pediency with justice in the Melian Dialogue as well, so a forensic dimension might be detected there too, although it has been viewed as ‘an ideal form of deliberation’, on the grounds that the Melians’ reliance on conventional morality is refuted by the Athenians’ pragmatism and prudential line of argument, and it is the latter who set the rules of the deliberation.¹⁸

The following discussion of emotions and persuasion in Thucydides will take into consideration a parameter that has not received adequate attention so far: the kinship ties between the communities represented in Thucydides’ speeches. In real-life courtrooms, kinship connections between the litigants – and/or between the litigants and the witnesses they present to court – are an important factor, since they interact with a set of material, ethical and emotional parameters integral to the decision-making process.¹⁹ By the same token, at critical moments when the fate of whole communities is usually the object of decision-making, as in Thucydides’ speeches, it is necessary and revelatory to pose the question: what is the relationship, if any, among the communities who take part in the deliberations, that is, the cities who deliver the speeches by means of their representatives and the city assemblies (and city-representatives) who act as audiences and deciding bodies? This discussion adopts a relational and contextual approach to emotions. Drawing on the methodological traditions of sociology and anthropology, the relational approach analyses emotions *in situ* ‘as they occur during sequences of interaction’.²⁰ Power and social hierarchies have an important influence on these sequences, and consequently intercommunal kinship provides a valuable cultural framework for the study of collective and individual emotions. This chapter argues that it is only through awareness of the intercommunal kinship dynamics that we are able to understand fully and assess the emotional dynamics of persuasion in the Plataian debate and the Melian Dialogue, and the ways in which emotions, or absence of them, influence decision-making and action.

In order to assess the role of intercommunal kinship in the web of ethical and emotional criteria in deliberative processes, a preliminary note is needed on terminology and the theoretical approach employed.²¹ Kinship has been central to a long trajectory of anthropological enquiries. Modern approaches have challenged traditional models used to describe and understand the ways in which entities can be related to each other. Since the 1970s there has been a gradual destabilization of the dichotomy between nature and culture (or substance and code) and in ‘the ways in which boundaries – of nations, cultures, species, races, persons, bodies,

18 Macleod (1983) 55–6. Yet even if the standard features of courtroom procedure are absent in historiography (most obviously the implementation of a punishment on the defendant, if found guilty, as in the cases of the Mytilenian and the Plataian debates in Thucydides), standard forensic language and moral reasoning are arguably enough to sustain the forensic dimension: e.g. 1.42.2–4, the possibility of counterbalancing a past offence with a present favour (observe *ἐγκλημα λύσαι*, ‘absolve of offence’); cf. 1.140.2 *ἐγκλήματα διαλύσασθαι*.

19 Humphreys (1986); Griffith-Williams (this volume).

20 Spencer, Walby and Hunt (2012) 5; cf. Barbalet (1998); Kemper (1978).

21 Fragoulaki (2013) 1–29.

cells – have been breached’.²² New reproduction technology (such as IVF treatment), surrogacy, or new narratives and perceptions about adoption have been put on the map of kinship today. And in the so-called ‘pre-modern’ societies of today’s world, a variety of transmitted substances other than blood have been recognized as creating kinship, such as milk, semen, bones; or memory itself. For the Amazonian peoples, for example, memory is a form of substance that is located in the body and creates kinship.²³ These modern data might provide useful cultural intermediaries for our dialogue with ancient societies.

The question of ‘intercommunal ties’ as represented in Thucydides’ speeches will be addressed through two main categories of ties: that of *xungeneia* (Thucydides’ word) and that of ‘relatedness’, an established term nowadays among anthropologists who study kinship patterns beyond biology.²⁴

(a) *xungeneia* refers to ties involving descent between communities: the relationship between a colonizing *metropolis* (mother-city) and its *apoikia* (colony) or, by an extension of an obvious sort, the relationship between colonies of the same mother-city, what we could call ‘sister-cities’. This category also includes the racial affinity through membership of the same ethnic group of the Greeks (Ionians, Dorians, Aioliens etc.); and it also includes claims of shared mytho-historical genealogies. In this last case, both mythical and historical ancestral figures that are shared between communities may be equally effective in the construction of kinship claims. As is amply documented in literary and epigraphic sources, the relationship between these communities was characterized by a high degree of emotionality, and there were certain formal obligations, both in peace and in war, which kin communities were expected to fulfil towards each other, and especially an *apoikia* towards its *metropolis*.²⁵ The breach of these expectations was of course a common phenomenon, especially in war contexts, where alliances were often made in spite of *xungeneia*. It should be noted that such kinship ties were often taken for granted, not only by Thucydides, but also by Herodotus, who is generally thought of as much more outspoken about these connections.²⁶

(b) The category of ‘relatedness’ comprises various forms of kinship between communities that are not based on intercommunal descent (that is, on *xungeneia*), but on a range of socio-cultural and political institutions of the ancient Greek world. These included interstate links through interpersonal connections by means

22 Franklin and McKinnon (2001) 21.

23 Sahlins (2013) 8–9 *et passim* – cf. “‘Substance’ is as constructed as “code” – for what is to be conveyed in procreation is not mere physical substance but social status’ (4); land and geography as part of one’s human substance, among peoples of New Guinea and New Britain, compared to the ancient myth of Athenian autochthony (7 with note 3).

24 Carsten (2000).

25 E.g. *IG I3* 46 (= *ML* 49; *Brea*, c. 445); *RO* no. 29 (*Paros*, c. 372); 1.25.3–4. Cf. Curty (1995); Graham (1964).

26 For explicit and implicit (e.g. *Knidos-Taras*, *Hdt.* 3.138.2) statements of kinship ties in Herodotus, see Hornblower (2013) 21–3.

of ritualized friendship (*xenia*); *proxenia*;²⁷ intermarriage; grant of citizenship (naturalization); shared cults and festivals; and the export and exchange of cultural products and forms. These cultural and political institutions had the value of foundational events, that is, moments of special significance and meaning in the collective memory of communities that initiated new self-perceptions and life-cycles. In terms of a community's attachments and affiliations, they created new kinship statuses.

Emotions, subjectivities and cultural factors played a preponderant role in the experience and expression of all types of intercommunal kinship. To put that another way, all types of kinship (both *xungeneia* and non-*xungeneia* ones) constituted a unified and essentially cultural whole. We will see this in the examination of the Plataian debate and the Melian Dialogue, in which awareness of the kinship ties, or absence of them, between Thucydides' speaking historical actors brings to the fore the emotional dynamics and the ways in which they are used in the construction of persuasion.

THE PLATAIAN DEBATE (3.52–68)

'The Plataian debate' is a hybrid genre of deliberative and pseudo-forensic character. It takes place in 427 in Plataia, a small city of Boiotia in central Greece with a huge symbolic importance for all the Greeks of the Classical period. The city was a locus of panhellenic memory, on account of the famous battle which the Greeks fought and won near Plataia some fifty years before the debate and marked their freedom from the Persians. In 427, the Plataians were forced to capitulate after a prolonged siege by the Spartans. The debate records the final act of the Plataian drama, which stretches intermittently over books 2 and 3 (out of the eight) of Thucydides' unfinished *History*, over the years 431–27. The object of these deliberations is the fate of the Plataians after their capitulation to the Spartans: the decision that is to be taken is critical, because it concerns the salvation or destruction of the city and the remaining inhabitants. The representatives of three Greek communities take part in this debate, which consists of an exchange of speeches delivered first by the Plataians, then by the Thebans, before an audience of five Spartans who would act as judges (*δικασταί* is Thucydides' term (3.52.2)). In judicial terms, the Plataians and the Thebans are fellow litigants, while the Spartan judges are those who are going to take the final decision, thus being the target of persuasion. It is obvious why this exchange of speeches about the fate of Plataia is often referred to as a trial.²⁸

27 Where an individual works, by diplomatic representation in his own city, for the interests of another city.

28 Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 42, who calls the Plataian speech a 'defence' (*ἀπολογία*). On the debate: Macleod (1983): 227–46; Connor (1984) 91–5; Debnar (2001) 125–46; Price (2001) 103–26; Morrison (2006) 65–80; Grethlein (2012); Fragoulaki (2013) 119–39; Steinbock (2013) 120–3, 135–6; Pelling (2000) 61–81 (on the whole sequence of Plataia).

It must be emphasized from the start that, in the very texture of the arguments that both sides employ in order to persuade the Spartan judges about the rightness of their cause, ties of intercommunal kinship play a prominent role. These ties relate not only to the three communities whose representatives are present in the trial, but also to a fourth one, who are physically absent, but omnipresent in the speeches of both the Plataians and the Thebans. These are the Athenians: the fourth major pole in the intercommunal dynamics of this trial and of the whole of the Plataian episode.

The matrix of kinship ties between the four cities involved (Plataia, Thebes, Sparta, Athens), as emerging from Thucydides and external sources, is as follows: Plataia was an alleged colony of the Thebans and therefore both cities belonged to the same ethnic group, that of the Aioliens. This assertion in its strongest form is focalized through the Thebans in the debate (3.61.2; cf. 7.57.5). But each of the two Aiolian cities, Thebes and Plataia, were related by powerful ties, of different sorts, to the two big enemy-cities of the Peloponnesian War, Dorian Sparta and Ionian Athens: the Thebans, and consequently their colonial offspring, the Plataians, are related with the Spartans through mythical genealogical links between the Aiolian and the Dorian *ethnê* that reflect oral traditions, as early as the seventh century.²⁹ Yet there is also an episode of more recent history that joins the Plataians with the Spartans, and this is the Persian Wars and the common struggle for freedom, to which we will return. At the same time, the Plataians enjoy a form of Athenian citizenship in virtue of a rare and very interesting collective grant, which had been made at some earlier date: normally citizenship of one *polis* excluded citizenship of another.³⁰ Thucydides records this puzzling citizenship and a generally intimate connection between the Plataians and the Athenians, which is also supported by external sources and simulates closely that of a loyal colony with its mother-city. This tie was so strong that by the third century the Plataians are said to have actually claimed that they were colonists of the Athenians.³¹ This was in fact an act of collective ethnic transformation, since the Plataians had ‘broken off’ from the relationship with their mother-city, Thebes, and consequently from the Aiolian *ethnos*, their ‘natural’ ethnic space on account of their colonial descent from Thebes. As with the bad relationship between Dorian Kerkyra and its own mother-city Corinth, the hostility between Thebes and Plataia is another in-spite-of-kinship case in the *History*, which generates, on the side of the *apoikia* (Plataia), a need for justification of this choice and, on the side of the *metropolis* (Thebes), a need for condemnation and retribution. As in human families, emotions run high and the arguments of both sides are constructed on both practical

29 Aiolos and Doros, sons of Hellen: Hesiod fr. 9 MW; Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.7.3. Date of composition of the Catalogue, c. 580 (Fowler (1998)). Also: Megara–Boiotia, 4.72.1, with Hellanikos *FGrH* 4 F 78. Cf. *CT* II.240 and 67–8; Curty (1995) no. 11, recording *συγγένεια* between Akraiphia in Boiotia and Megara, second half of the second century CE.

30 For collective grants, see e.g. ML 94, with Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 95.

31 Citizenship: 3.55.3, 63.2. Cf. 2.6.2–4, 3.56.6; Hdt. 6.108. 1; Lys. 23.6; Apollod. [Ps.-Dem.] 59.104–6; fr. 11 Austin (2006) 200, third century, ascribed to Ps.-Dicaearchus or to Heraclides Creticus.

and moral grounds. On the intercommunal level, these grounds pertain on the one hand to national security, and on the other to thwarted expectations and feelings of resentment, hatred and disappointment at what is perceived by each community as violation of the ethical order of kinship.

In the Plataian debate, the Plataians refer repeatedly to their alienation from and hatred towards their mother-city Thebes, expressing in fact feelings that go some way back to the end of the sixth century (3.54.1 πρὸς τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα ‘in the quarrel with Thebes’; 3.59.2, 4 ἐχθίστοις ‘most hateful’ (twice)).³² The Thebans, on the other hand, being in the position of the mother-city which has been slighted, and disadvantaged in practical terms, express their deep resentment at what they feel as unlawful abandonment of ancestral Boiotian customs by the Plataians. For ancestral customs the Thebans use the key word πάτρια (‘hereditary’, ‘ancestral’; cognate of πατήρ, ‘father’), which reflects, in linguistic terms, the analogies between familial and intercommunal models of kinship (3.65.2, ἐς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστήσαι, ‘restore you to the ancestral traditions of the whole Boiotian community’; 3.66.1; cf. 3.61.2, ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν, ‘we founded Plataia’). The Thebans charge the Plataians with injustice and defiance of kinship obligations, for the sake of their attachment to the (Ionian) Athenians, which they consider unlawful and ‘unnatural’, because it lies outside the circle of the ‘natural’ friends of the Plataians, who ‘properly’ belong among the Aiolian family:

They acted unlawfully without having received provocation at our hands, but through hatred (μίσει) rather than according to a just (δίκη) judgment, and they could not possibly pay now a penalty equal to their guilt, for they will suffer a lawful sentence (τιμωρίαν). (3.67.5)³³

The Thebans accuse the Plataians of being motivated by hatred in their dealings with their mother-city, while they themselves experience anger and hatred; at the same time they try to make the whole of the Greek world participants in these negative feelings, including of course the Spartans. The first instance of fierce hostility between two communities in the *History* linked by colonial ties is the feud between Corinth and Kerkyra, described in paradigmatic detail by Thucydides.³⁴ Here in the *Plataiika* the pattern is repeated and is immediately recognizable. Appeals to ὀργή were often combined with requests for τιμωρία or κόλασις (punishment) in Athenian courts, and this is precisely the case with the Theban speech.³⁵ The Theban plea was successful and Thucydides’ concluding

32 Cf. Hdt. 6.108. See Eckert (this volume) on the cross-generational emotional effect of cultural trauma.

33 Cf. 3.64.4: ‘Who, then, would more justly be hated (μισοῖντο) by all the Hellenes than you...?’

34 Fragoulaki (2013) 121, on the *Kerkyraika* and the *Plataiika* as two big narrative circles in the *History*, where the *xungeneia* theme is dominant; Crane (1998) 97–124, on the anger of Corinth.

35 For appeals to anger and punishment as strategies of pre-empting the opponent’s appeals to pity, see Rubinstein (2004); Allen (2000), on anger and punishment; Allen (2003); Konstan (2006) 41–76 on anger, 185–200 on hatred; Sanders (2012), on hostile emotions in Athenian

remarks on the whole episode provide an explanation of the decision of the five Spartan judges and their hostility towards the Plataians:

Indeed it was almost wholly for the sake of the Thebans that the Lakedaimonians in all their dealings with the Plataians showed themselves so thoroughly hostile (οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι) to them, thinking that the Thebans would be serviceable in the war then just beginning. (3.68.4)

This condemnatory verdict and the whole of the debate reflect the role of emotions in the process and outcome of persuasion, and their interaction with practical and ethical considerations. The kinship dynamics in this quadrilateral of cities have a vital role in this interaction.

Both the Plataians and the Thebans meet the expectations concerning the rules of persuasion, in the sense that both aim to convince the Spartan judges about their just and righteous character and conduct (their *ēthos* in the rhetorical sense). Especially for the Plataians this was undeniably a great challenge. Pity (ἔλεος) was a staple of trial speeches and according to Aristotle it was an emotion felt for the undeserving victim of adversity (*Rh.* 2.8, 1385b13–16; *Poet.* 13, 1453a 3–5).³⁶ As expected by people who struggle to save their lives, the Plataians' plea aims to stir the pity of the five Spartan judges, and a powerful emotional card they play is that of expected gratitude, a standard mechanism of arousing clemency. In disputes between individuals taken to Athenian law courts, a claim to *charis* (a service to the community) aimed at reminding the audience of a debt of gratitude, which could be repaid in the form of compassion (ἔλεος) or leniency (συγγνώμη). A legal case was particularly appropriate for such recompense, since the defendant needed to demonstrate a record of democratic ethos and patriotism.³⁷

In the trial of Plataia, as a highlight of their self-justificatory argument, the Plataians stress their crucial role in the land-battle of Plataia in 479, which they present as a benefaction of their city to the Spartans and the whole of the Greek

oratory (mainly 420–322 BCE); Sanders (this volume), on forensic and deliberative emotions in Thucydides' speeches.

36 Konstan (2001) 34–5, 46–7 *et passim*; also discussing problems of Greek terminology and corresponding English words (pity, compassion etc.); cf. Konstan (2006) 201–18; Johnstone (1999) 109–25. On the interrelation of pity and anger in Athenian law-courts: Rubinstein (2014); Bers (2009) 77–98.

37 Carey (1994) 33: 'The importance of gratitude was universally acknowledged, and it is common for litigants to remind the jury of benefactions bestowed on the city by self or family, including ancestors, in order to stake a claim, often explicit, to their gratitude (Lys. 3.47, 18.27, 20.30; Isaeus 4.27, 7.37–41; [Dem.] 50.64)'. On *charis* in law-court speeches, see Rubinstein (2000) 212–31; Fisher (2003), on liturgies, *eisphorai* and public displays in Athens, as forms of *charis* (benefactions), keeping the envy of the *dēmos* at bay. On gratitude, Konstan (2006) 156–68. For gratitude (χάρις) in Thucydides' speeches, see 1.32.1, 33.1, 41.1, 42.3; 2.40.4; 3.37.2, 6.12.1 *et passim*. Macleod (1983) 112–13, 116–17, 121–2, on pity in the Plataian debate. For claims of benefaction in interstate kinship rhetoric, see Fragoulaki (2013) 11, 86, 130, 229, expressed by terms such as *charis*, *euergesia*, *eupragia*, *eu paschein* etc.

world (3.56.4, 57.1). The Persian Wars were an exploitable piece of panhellenic history and collective memory, which had the power to create close connections between those Greek cities that had a role, or claims of a role, in this self-defining moment of Hellenism. This memory was so strong, lasting and unmediated, that it was arguably kinship itself, as in the case of the Amazonian peoples of South America, mentioned earlier. It is no accident that memory has a special place in the Plataian battle for persuasion. As we saw already, the only named individuals in the debate are the two Plataian speakers. Both bear names and patronymics that are significant, and appropriate for the occasion: Astymachos, son of Asopolaoas, and Lakon, son of Aeimnestos. All names might be authentic, but I would like to pause briefly at the second pair. It is possible that Lakon's father, Aeimnestos ('Mr Everlasting Memory' (3.52.5), the second half of the word being a cognate of μνήμη 'memory'), had taken part in the battle of Plataia and then named his son Lakon, in commemoration of a significant and famous episode described in Herodotus.³⁸ But even if he is not the same man as the one in Herodotus, or even a relative of his, the significance of this patronymic in Thucydides is that it has the power to evoke the Persian Wars context in a compelling manner; and to resonate unmistakably with memory words such as ἀμνημονεῖν ('to forget') or ἀναμνησκόμεν ('we remind'), which the Plataians use repeatedly in their pleas to the Spartans not to forget (3.54.5 οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀμνημονεῖν 'should not be forgotten'; 3.59.2).³⁹ 'Real' or 'fictitious', Aeimnestos's name is part of Thucydides' artful studding of the Plataian debate with memory words and must not be missed.

As for the words πατέρες ('fathers') and πάτριος ('ancestral'), they are used by the Plataians (unlike the Thebans, as we have seen) not in connection with ancestors of their own or of their mother-city, that is Boiotians or Thebans, but in connection with the forefathers of the Spartan judges who fought at Plataia. The Plataians dwell on the fact that the Spartan ancestors were buried in the soil of Plataia, on their tombs as significant nodes of memory, and the rituals that have kept this memory alive (3.58.4–5). These Spartan ancestors are presented as nothing less than kinsmen of the Plataians themselves and of all the Greeks in an extended sense, by means of panhellenic kinship (3.58.5, πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς). The Plataians do not use their Aiolian ethnic background as a point of connection with the Spartans as Aioliens towards Dorians; this would be inept, because it would also evoke the Plataians' 'natural' closeness to the Thebans. Instead the Plataians invest in their connection with the Spartans as the two Greek

38 Hdt. 9.72.2 (alternatively, but probably wrongly, Arimnestos; cf. Hdt. 9.64.2); cf. CT I.443–4; Fragoulaki (2013) 126–7.

39 Notice 3.57.3 ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ... ἐξαλεῖψαι ('you then obliterate [Plataia] and its entire population from the whole Greek world'): ἐξαλεῖψαι has semantic overtones of *damnatio memoriae*, especially since it is in contrast to ἀναγράφαι ('inscribe'), used in the same context for the inscription of the name of Plataia on the tripod at Delphi (Serpent Column). For epigraphic uses of ἐξαλείφειν for the obliteration of something inscribed, see e.g. SEG 33.679, ll. 8–9, ἐξαλήλειπται ἢ ἐγγέγραπται τῶν γραμμάτων τῶν μνημονικῶν, *et passim*, second century; *IMT Skam/NebTaele* 182, ἐξαλείψαντας τ[ὸ] [ὄνομα], ll. 129–30; cf. ll. 124–5. For 'literary epigraphy' and the challenges of the task, see Liddel and Low (2013).

cities which saved Greece from the Persians, since the Spartans had a special claim as liberators of Greece. Thinking in terms of Aristotle's definition of the *entechnoi pisteis* (see above), the Plataians are very much occupied with both *êthos* (the moral character of the speaker that makes him worthy of confidence) and *pathos* (the emotional effect of the speech on the hearer).⁴⁰ While the Plataians try to elicit the pity of the Spartans, at the same time they try to retain their citizenship, alliance and intimate connection with the Athenians, defending it as just: it would not have been honourable, they say to the Spartans, to betray the Athenians, who offered them alliance and citizenship at a critical moment when they needed protection from the Thebans, whereas the Spartans, to whom they first turned for help, rebuffed them and bade them apply to the Athenians instead (3.55.2).

How effective was the Plataian persuasion? We have already referred to the pseudo-forensic character of this debate. This exchange of speeches is often called a mock-trial, a pseudo-debate or a 'travesty of legal forms',⁴¹ because the final decision seems clearly to have been predetermined, and besides the forensic procedure was seriously violated. Thucydides reports that when the Spartan judges arrived at Plataia they presented no charges, but simply summoned the Plataians and asked them a single question: had they done anything to the benefit of the Spartans and their allies in this current war? (3.52.4) The inevitable answer would have been 'nothing', but the Plataians requested that they be given the opportunity to speak at length, and they were thus allowed to deliver their speech.

Almost all discussions of this debate point out the weakness of the Plataians' moral position and emotional appeal, and the overall ineffectiveness of their speech ('a waste of time'),⁴² as the tragic end of the city also showed. But the *effectiveness* of the Plataian persuasion and its impact on the form of the debate itself require more attention as well.⁴³ As Thucydides says, the Thebans were afraid that the Spartans might be moved and yield somewhat to the Plataian plea. It was as a consequence of this fear that the Thebans demanded that they deliver a speech as well, so as to counterbalance the longer speech of the Plataians; 'we wouldn't have asked permission to make this speech, if the Plataians had briefly answered the question', is the opening sentence of their address (3.61.1, with 3.60). The Plataian speech was as persuasive as it could be in these circumstances, and in order to appreciate it fully we must be conscious of the role of inter-communal kinship in the 'trial of Plataia': kinship was a powerful motivator of

40 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Thuc.* 42) praises the Plataian 'defence' as 'adorned with authentic natural colouring (ἀληθεῖ δὲ τινὶ καὶ φυσικῷ κεκοσμηθῆαι χρώματι). The arguments are full of emotion (πάθους μεστά) and the language does not distract the listener from them.' See Greenwood's (2006) 57–60 analysis of Dionysius's passage against a Gorgianic background. Konstan (2005), on the workings of pity in the Plataian episode and in Athenian politics more generally.

41 Macleod (1983) 105.

42 Macleod (1983) 108; Connor (1984) 91–5, on the weakness of both the Plataian and the Theban speech; Pelling (2000) 72.

43 Cf. Debnar (1996) 96; Debnar (2001) 136; Pelling (2000) 80.

collective emotions, a central value of ancient Greek society, and ultimately an important factor in collective decision-making and action.

THE MELIAN DIALOGUE (5.85–113)

As in the case of Plataia, the debate about Melos marks the culmination of a period of aggression against the people of another small city of Greece, this time a Dorian island of the Cyclades, who have found themselves entangled in the conflict between Athens and Sparta in the course of the Peloponnesian War. The aggressors now are the Athenians, who, as Thucydides reports, in the summer of 416 decided to attack the Melians for a second time with the clear intention of bringing them into the Athenian empire. The first Athenian attack had taken place ten years earlier and is briefly recorded by Thucydides in his narrative of the summer of 426. As in that first attack, this time again the Melians ‘did not want to obey’ (*hupakouein*), as Thucydides says (5.84.2; cf. 5.114.1; 3.91.2, first attack).⁴⁴ Yet the Athenians make it clear that the Melians would have to make a choice between war and security (5.111.4). Choosing war practically meant annihilation for the Melians, in view of the complete lack of balance of power and resources between the two cities, at least in Thucydides’ presentation, and as the outcome of this conflict confirms.⁴⁵

The Melian Dialogue is placed by Thucydides in the summer of 416, that is in the context of the second Athenian attack against Melos, and it is the only debate in the *History* cast in dialogue form. It is generically path-breaking: it has been called ‘our earliest example of dialectic in a dramatized and historicized dialogue form’.⁴⁶ Thucydides stages the debate as taking place in Melos between the representatives of the two communities who are the interlocutors: the Melians and the Athenians. The Athenians place before the Melians a dilemma of life and death: they try to persuade them to take the more sensible path of interest combined with security, as opposed to justice and honour practised with danger, as they point out, and to agree to become tributary allies of the Athenians (5.111.4 with 5.107; cf. 5.84.2–3). The Melians on the other hand try to persuade the Athenians to let them enjoy their freedom by being friends and allies of neither the Athenians nor the Spartans (5.94, 5.112.3). As in the Plataian debate, the arguments of both sides are constructed around the big rhetorical *topoi* of expediency and justice, viewed

44 Greenwood (2008) 15–28 on *hupakouein* in the nexus of power politics and dialectic.

45 For the discrepancy between Thucydides’ representation of the Melian community as weak and that emerging from external sources, see in more detail Fragoulaki (2013) 161 with note 140 (e.g. the Athenian assessment for the Melian tribute as the robust sum of 15 talents in 425/4 (*IG I3* 71.1.65), archaeology etc.). See ML 67 for the Melian contribution to the Spartan war fund, with *IACP*, p. 759.

46 Lowe (2000) 93. The bibliography on the Melian Dialogue is extensive; see e.g. De Romilly (1963) 273–310; Hudson-Williams (1950); Stahl (2003) 159–72; Macleod (1983) 52–67; Connor (1984) 147–57; Bauslaugh (1991) 142–6; Bosworth (2009); Crane (1998) 237–57; Price (2001) 195–204; Kallet (2001) 9–20; Morrison (2006) 81–99; Tritle (2006) 485–7; Scardino (2007) 467–82; Greenwood (2008) 15–28; Barker (2009) 219–21; Pothou (2011) 270–2.

from different angles by each side. Unlike the Plataian debate though, persuasion circulates, as it were, between the two interlocutors, since the speaking parties are the only internal audience. There is no third-party arbitrator who is going to take the final decision. Both sides have a decision to make, as we saw, but it is clear that the resolution of the matter lies with the Athenians, who possess the power of determining the final outcome of this conflict. In a sense, the Athenians are both one of the two opposing parties of persuasion and the decision-makers. Thus they are both in and outside the *battle* of persuasion. In fact for them persuasion is not really a battle: it is rather a *game* they can either play or not. And they choose to play it. The Greek word *agôn* (ἄγών) (5.101) serves in fact both meanings ('battle' and 'game') and it might be argued that its use in the debate expresses the different perspectives of persuasion: a battle for the Melians and a game for the Athenians. If the 'trial' of Plataia is a travesty of legality, the Melian Dialogue is one of dialectic, as has been aptly pointed out.⁴⁷

The Athenians are cast in the role of the ruthless exponents of political realism, while the Melians are the embodiment of dignity in the face of danger and steadfastness in eternal values and moral principles: justice, manly honour and, above all, *xungeneia* (e.g. 5.90, παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ συμφέρον; 5.101, οὐ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἄγών; cf. 5.91.2; 5.104; 5.105.3; 5.111). The *xungeneia* based on the colonial tie between the Spartans and their *apoikoi* the Melians, along with the ethical obligations emanating from kinship are recognized by both the two interlocutors and the historical narrator (5.84.2, 89, 104, 106, 112). The Melians are confident that they have justice on their side and that their mother-city, Sparta, will come to their help, if not for any other reason, at least on account of *xungeneia* and shame (5.104; cf. 5.84.2, 106; Hdt. 8.48; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3). In their replies, the Athenians clearly state that the Melians are unreasonable and naïve to think that the Spartans will help them; instead they urge them to abandon their big illusion and behave more sensibly while there is still time (5.111.3). The outcome of the Melian episode, as Thucydides presents it, is that the Melians were indeed living a big illusion: the fate of the city was death, slavery and repopulation. As for the Spartans, the kinsmen on whom the Melians based their hopes, they are the biggest absentees in this drama.

Readers from antiquity to the present have found the Dialogue untruthful and unpersuasive: it could not have taken place, they protest.⁴⁸ The way the Melians give their battle for persuasion defies expectations: people facing death do not normally discuss power and justice so academically and with such emotional detachment. One of the striking paradoxes of this debate is that it is in fact the Athenians who appear to be more engaged with the emotion of fear, rather than the Melians, who demonstrate an astonishing composure. The fear of the Athenians though is related to a status of power and not one of weakness. It is brought

47 Macleod (1983) 109.

48 Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 41 (protesting that the language and behaviour of the interlocutors do not match their characters and situations; 'I do not know how these words can be considered appropriate (προσήκοντα) in the mouths of Athenian generals', ch. 40); cf. Hudson-Williams (1950).

in as an explanation of their policy regarding their national security and the administration and maintenance of their empire: if they yield to the Melians' proposal, they fear that they might themselves appear fearful and weak before their subjects, which will incur danger for their empire (5.97, 99, 111).⁴⁹ A stylistic indicator of the absence of emotionality between the interlocutors of the Dialogue is the absence of addresses. As Dickey argues, '[a]ddresses are used to set off key points in the dialogue, such as the climax of an argument or a moment of emotional intensity'.⁵⁰ Out of the twenty-nine consecutive speeches in the Melian Dialogue, she also notes, none 'contains an address except the Melians' last statement, in which they report their final decision to the Athenians', not to yield and defend their freedom (5.112).⁵¹ Thinking in Aristotelian terms, the Melians' dramatic characterization, that is, their *êthos* as Aristotle defines it in the *Poetics* (5, 1450a 5–6), is unsuccessful. But their *êthos* in the ethical sense, that is their moral character as defined in the *Rhetoric* (1.2, 1356a 4–6), is impeccable.⁵²

The Plataian speakers in the Plataian debate are the exact opposite. Their moral character is arguably questionable, but their dramatic characterization is absolutely convincing. We saw them doing their best to induce pity in the Spartans by stressing what united them, while at the same time defending their close relationship with the Athenians; and they did not perform too badly.⁵³ By contrast, the Melians, instead of trying to find points of convergence with the Athenians, persistently stress their kinship with the Spartans, the Athenians' enemies, and their faith not only in the moral but also in the practical value of this connection (5.104, 110, 112). Even if we discern, with Macleod, the Melians' effort in 5.90 to induce pity in the Athenians, by suggesting that they themselves might meet with adversity in the future and thus be in need of fair and equitable treatment, by 5.110 we find the Melians having moved so far from such a line of argument, as to remind the Athenians, in a tone of almost concealed threat, of the vulnerable points of their own empire, which would provide the Spartans with alternative ways to support the Melians.⁵⁴ It is revealing that, in reply to this point, and at an advanced stage of the Dialogue, the Athenians deliver their longest retort, which

49 Cf. Macleod (1983) 58.

50 Dickey (1996) 194.

51 Dickey (1996) 194. On the emotionality of addresses, see Griffith-Williams (this volume).

52 See above on these two types of *êthos*.

53 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Thuc.* 42) considers the Plataian speech the best among those speeches in Thucydides' work that are 'pure, clear and suitable for the battles (or: contests, ἀγῶνας) of real life'; cf. note 48.

54 Macleod (1983) 58–9 takes *Thuc.* 5.90 as 'a good example of the application of rhetorical psychology like Aristotle's', on the basis of Aristotle's definition of pity (*eleos*) (2.8, *Rh.* 1385b13–16). I see it though as a technical analogy, reflecting Thucydides' own purposeful interaction with rhetorical conventions, rather than psychological truth. Pelling (2012) 295 aptly protests: 'there is an eloquent difference from the self-directed aspects of pity, as Aristotle defined it and as we see it in Herodotus and tragedy'. The pity the Melians seem to evoke does not result from the realization of the fragility of the human condition, which is universal; what Diodorus, via his speaker Nikolaos, calls 'the sympathy which nature has planted in all' (ἡ κοινὴ τῆς φύσεως ὁμοπάθεια); with Konstan (2001) 89–91.

rounds off the main argumentative phase of the debate, by pointing out the unexpectedness of the Melians' making of their case:

But what strikes us is that, though you agreed that this would be a negotiation for your survival, at no point in this long discussion have you said anything which people might take as grounds for thinking that you will survive ... so far there has been no logic in your attitude (πολλήν τε ἄλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε). (5.111.2)

The Athenians with some astonishment state that what they have heard so far is surely not what we would call *ta deonta* (the appropriate things), which is Thucydides' own term in his methodological statement.⁵⁵ Had the Melians' reaction to threat not been so unexpected, what sort of arguments could they have used which might have made their salvation a less remote possibility? And, since it is the function of emotions in the process of persuasion that occupy us in this discussion, how could they have tried to elicit the pity of the Athenians in a sustained and pithy manner, and also elicit a more favourable attitude overall towards people in their position? Kinship was undoubtedly for the Greeks one of the most effective mechanisms for stirring *pathos* and for creating an emotional background that could promote the aim of persuasion. So could the Melians, Dorians as they were, have found something to connect them with the Ionian Athenians? 'He who seeks will find' is often applicable in kinship diplomacy.⁵⁶ The Persian Wars could certainly have been exploited by the Melians. We know from Herodotus, with whom Thucydides often interacts, that the Melians were the only Dorian islanders (apart from the Aeginetans, a naval power in their own right) who took part in the battle of Salamis in 480 (Hdt. 8.46.4, 48; the single piece of information about Melos in Herodotus). The Melians could have called upon this shared past; earlier in the *History*, we hear the Athenians capitalizing upon their role in Salamis and their service to the Greeks in the Persian Wars (1.73–5).

How then can we address the Dialogue's unreality or untruthfulness? And how can this untruthfulness be reconciled with the fact that the Melian Dialogue has been acknowledged both as a compelling piece of historical analysis and as artful writing? To put this another way, has the seeming untruthfulness of the Dialogue weakened Thucydides' own persuasive power over his ancient and modern audiences? The generic cross-fertilization of the Dialogue is a scholarly topos: epic, drama, lyric and, above all, the philosophical dialogue are acknowledged influences.⁵⁷ Thucydides' consistent engagement with sympotic literature in the Melian Dialogue also deserves special attention, as I have argued elsewhere.⁵⁸ We

55 Thucydides' *ta deonta* (1.22.1) seems to have a rational and a psychological dimension (a 'what' and a 'how', we may say), i.e. what the most rational approach to a practical problem is and by what means the presentation of the case will be made most effectively. 'How' may also be related to Aristotle's explanation of *pathos*, the second of the three kinds of artificial evidence (see above), 'putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind' (τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς, *Rh.* 1.2, 1356a3); cf. Macleod (1983) 68–9, *ta deonta*.

56 For the term, see Jones (1999).

57 *CT* III.219–20; Hudson-Williams (1950).

58 Fragoulaki (2013) 162–79.

must be alert to the fact that Thucydides' contemporary audiences were surely readier to read the sympotic code of the Dialogue through its texture.

I would like to suggest that there are two things that lend dramatic credence and persuasiveness to this bold generic experiment of Thucydides. First, the fact that this dialogue between state representatives is presented as taking place behind closed doors: the Melian *dêmos* was kept away from the Athenian delegations, as Thucydides notes (5.84.3). Second, and most important, the absence of any claim of kinship between the interlocutors. It is the absence of kinship that permits and dramatically justifies the absence of emotion in this contest (or battle, or game) of persuasion between 'strangers' (the actual word *agôn* is used in the Dialogue, as we saw). Clashes between kinsmen produce fierce emotions and passionate rhetoric, as Thucydides shows with consistency in his *History*. If the Melians were to call upon some form of kinship with the Athenians, their tone and language would have to be different, in line with other speakers in the work who protested to their kinsmen or supplicated them in the name of kinship. But Thucydides, who knew well the emotional and ethical realities of kinship, saved for the Melians a different and unique role in his work. This role was the idealized weak, isolated and resistant Greek Other against the imperialist Athenians. The key factor that enabled Thucydides to cast the Melians in such a role with persuasiveness was their unrelatedness to the Athenians.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that intercommunal kinship was a powerful mechanism of political persuasion in the ancient Greek world, which formed the basis of the construction of arguments used and of the emotional dynamics of persuasion. I have used the Plataian debate and the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides as two representative and complementary examples of the role of emotions in contexts of kinship diplomacy. Awareness of kinship ties (or their absence) between the actors/ speakers in Thucydides' *History* can provide a socio-political framework which enables us to delineate and assess the function of emotions in political persuasion between Greek communities and Thucydides' own construction of 'persuasiveness' as author of a pioneering historical prose.

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‘THERE IS NO ONE WHO DOES NOT HATE SULLA’: EMOTION, PERSUASION AND CULTURAL TRAUMA

Alexandra Eckert

A remarkable comment on the Roman dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla comes down to us in Pliny the Elder’s *Natural History*. Pliny composed this multi-volume encyclopaedic work during the reign of Emperor Vespasian (69–79 CE) to collect the knowledge of his time. Although about 150 years had passed since Sulla had prevailed in the final battle of the civil war at the Colline Gate on 1 Nov 82 BCE,¹ Pliny states that there is no one who does not hate Sulla (*Sullam nemo non oderit*).² He attributes this widespread and intense emotional response toward Sulla to the many thousands of Romans who had perished on Sulla’s orders during the civil war and Sulla’s ensuing rule of terror.³

In November and December 82 BCE, Sulla became dictator with unprecedented power and introduced proscriptions.⁴ The names of proscribed persons were written on public lists. A Roman who appeared on these lists was outlawed, condemned to death and his property confiscated with immediate effect. Being proscribed also had severe consequences for the family of the citizen in question. His wife lost her endowment, his children their inheritance and their political rights. Sulla not only proscribed his political opponents: he also had many wealthy Romans added to the lists for the sole purpose of enriching himself and his partisans. Proscribed persons were hunted down and assassinated, often in public places and in cruel ways. Sulla presided over public auctions in the forum, where he sold to his followers the estates of proscribed Romans far below their true value.⁵

Four thousand seven hundred Romans were killed during the proscriptions.⁶ However, many more fell victim to other acts of Sulla’s violence. Soon after the battle at the Colline Gate, Sulla gave his troops free rein to assassinate Roman citizens arbitrarily – supporters of the opposing party, personal enemies and uninvolved persons alike.⁷ Due to the sheer number of Sulla’s soldiers – 23 legions

1 Vell. Pat. 2.27.1.

2 Plin. *HN* 7.137.

3 Plin. *HN* 7.137.

4 The *Fasti Capitolini* record Sulla as dictator for the year 82 BCE; cf. Degraffi (1954) 74.

5 For the proscriptions see Hinard (1985); Linke (2005) 127–30; Heftner (2006a) and (2006b) 200–6; Thein (2013); Eckert (2014) and (2016).

6 Val. Max. 9.2.1.

7 Plut. *Sull.* 31; Flor. 2.9.24–5; Oros. 5.21. Heftner (2006a) argues that a period of arbitrary killings began shortly after 1 November 82 BC, but before the onset of the proscriptions.

in total⁸ – the death toll was substantial, and it is likely it even surpassed that of the proscriptions.⁹ Orosius counts nine thousand victims in Rome alone.¹⁰ Sulla's acts of violence also encompassed the mass executions in the Villa Publica and at the Italian town of Praeneste, where innocent civilians and soldiers of the enemy forces who had voluntarily surrendered after a promise of security were indiscriminately slaughtered.¹¹ Moreover, Sulla ordered the destruction of Sulmo and other Italian towns.¹² He deprived many Italian municipalities of their land and their inhabitants of Roman citizenship.¹³

This chapter investigates the strong feelings associated with memories of Sulla's acts of violence and their persuasive power in ancient literature from the late Roman Republic to the first century CE. It elaborates on Klaus R. Scherer's psychological 'process model of emotion'¹⁴ and Jeffrey C. Alexander's sociological concept of 'cultural trauma'¹⁵ to gain a better understanding of the relation between memories of past events and emotions. Drawing on the conceptual ideas of both scholars, this chapter will explore a variety of Latin texts from different genres to demonstrate that – and why – hatred and fear were the predominant emotional responses when Romans remembered the 'cultural trauma' of Sulla's violent deeds.¹⁶

A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION

According to Scherer, defining the term 'emotion' is a notoriously difficult problem for scholars in the social and behavioural sciences. He suggests solving this problem by viewing an individual's experience of emotions as the result of a multi-stage psychological process.¹⁷

8 For the vast number of soldiers in Sulla's forces, see Livy *Per.* 89 (23 legions) and App. *B Civ.* 1.104 (120,000 men under Sulla's command).

9 Although ancient testimonies on this matter are scarce, the death toll of Sulla's marauding soldiers must have been significant. The edict of 43 BC on the proscriptions of the Second Triumvirate explicitly mentions the bloodshed of Sulla's soldiers in a vain attempt of the Triumvirs to distinguish themselves from Sulla: see App. *B Civ.* 4.10.

10 Oros. 5.21.

11 For the Villa Publica see: Sall. *Ep.* 1.4.1–2; Strab. 5.4.11; Livy *Per.* 88; Val. Max. 9.2.1; Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.2, *Ben.* 5.16.3; Plut. *Sull.* 30; Flor. 2.9.24–5. For Praeneste see: Val. Max. 9.2.1; Plut. *Sull.* 32.1.

12 Cf. Flor 2.9.28 for Sulmo; Santangelo (2007) 78 suggests that the destruction of Sulmo was probably ordered, but never carried out or limited to the fortifications. However, Appian reports that Sulla razed many Italian towns to the ground; cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.96 and 1.103.

13 Cf. Cic. *Caecin.* 97 and 101–2, *Dom.* 79; App. *B Civ.* 1.96, 1.103.

14 Scherer (2005).

15 Alexander (2004).

16 See Sanders (2012) esp. 153, 170 for an appeal to utilize a range of genres for the study of emotions.

17 Scherer (2005) 696–7

The starting point for this process is a stimulus event. External stimulus events are 'natural phenomena like thunderstorms or behaviour of other people'.¹⁸ An internal stimulus may arise from memories of the past or even situations that are purely imagined. After having recognized a stimulus event, an individual will rapidly evaluate whether the event in question is beneficial or harmful for his or her wellbeing.¹⁹ Bodily needs, desires and goals, as well as social values, constitute the complex fabric of individual and social factors contributing to the evaluation stage.²⁰ Once the individual has determined the importance of the stimulus event, action tendencies and affective reactions ensue. Depending upon the nature of the emotional response, the individual will either seek or avoid experiencing such events again. Scherer proposes to use the singular noun 'emotion' to denote the psychological process, whereas the affective outcome of this process should be consistently named 'feeling' or 'feelings'.²¹ While in lay understanding 'emotion' and 'feeling' (and the respective plural forms) are often used synonymously, Scherer emphasizes that strictly distinguishing these two terms in scholarly debate will foster a deeper understanding of human affective behaviour.²²

CULTURAL TRAUMA AND FEELINGS

Remembering Sulla's atrocities against his fellow citizens could provoke an enormous emotional response among Romans. This becomes evident once the effects of recalling Sulla's deeds are assessed from the perspective of Jeffrey C. Alexander's sociological concept of 'cultural trauma'.

Alexander's model applies whenever members of a society are affected by a horrendous event inflicted on them by human beings. His concept describes the effects on individuals as well as the community at large. Alexander draws a clear line of distinction between persons being individually traumatized, and 'cultural trauma' experienced by a society as a whole. Individual trauma is a direct and often inevitable consequence of having personally been subjected to a horrendous

18 Scherer (2005) 700.

19 Scherer (2005) 700–1.

20 See Scherer (2005) 706 and his distinction between the categories of 'utilitarian emotion' and 'aesthetic emotion'. According to Scherer, a 'utilitarian emotion' and the resulting feelings (e.g. joy, anger, fear, hatred, disgust, sadness, shame and guilt) are influenced by an individual's social values. However, an 'aesthetic emotion', which encompasses the appreciation of the beauty of nature or a piece of art with ensuing feelings (like admiration, bliss, fascination), does not necessarily involve social values.

21 Scherer also uses the term 'feeling component of emotion' to distinguish between 'feeling' as the result of an affective process and 'emotion' understood as the process itself. See Scherer (2005) 721.

22 Scherer points out that lay understanding, which usually does not distinguish between emotion and feeling, cannot form the basis for a scholarly definition. He criticizes James (1884), entitled 'What is an emotion?' (which from Scherer's perspective should be titled 'What is a feeling?'), as being the cause of a continuing scholarly debate equating the two terms. Cf. Scherer (2005) 696–7.

event. 'Cultural trauma', however, is not a direct result of the horrendous event. Trauma at the level of a society may occur after members of a society have experienced different stages of a 'social process of cultural trauma'. The formation of 'carrier groups' by persons who recognize the importance of the horrendous event for both individuals and the community constitutes the first stage of this process. These groups aim at persuading a majority of the society to acknowledge the relevance of the horrendous event and to accept a shared responsibility to cope with its consequences. The complex pattern of social interaction arising while 'carrier groups' perform their lobbying is called 'social mediation'. According to Alexander, a decisive point is reached in the course of the 'socially mediated process of cultural trauma' once 'carrier groups' have successfully established a 'master narrative', i.e. a convincing and compelling description of the horrendous event. This narrative names the victims, depicts their suffering, outlines the consequences for the society at large and clearly attributes responsibility to the perpetrators for their violation of fundamental social values. Hence, the 'master narrative' illustrates the relevance of the event for individuals as well as the community. Once a majority of the members of a society acknowledges the 'master narrative', they will agree on the horrendous event's traumatic effect on individuals, as well as its devastating impact on the society as a whole. They will also accept a shared responsibility to overcome the immediate consequences of the horrendous event by a 'working through' in institutional arenas, e.g. the political and legal ones.²³ Finally, members of the society will establish 'cultural trauma' by utilizing institutionalized forms of remembering to integrate the 'master narrative' of the horrendous event into their cultural identity. Thus, reshaping community identity and remembering elements of the 'master narrative' are at the heart of 'cultural trauma'. These community efforts serve to reinforce social values and to prevent such a disastrous event from ever occurring again.²⁴

Scherer's and Alexander's concepts complement each other. Following Scherer, both the experience and the memory of a horrendous event can serve as a stimulus event and instil strong negative feelings in an individual. According to Alexander, members of a society who have been exposed to a horrendous event in varying degrees and different ways will largely agree on how to evaluate and commemorate it once 'cultural trauma' has been established. Thus, contemporary witnesses and later generations will react with widely coherent negative feelings like disgust or hatred when confronted with memories of the horrendous event.²⁵

23 'Working through' can be understood as a community's effort to deal openly with the immediate consequences of a horrendous event. Mitigating the hardship of the victims and prosecuting the perpetrators constitute main elements of the 'working through'.

24 Cf. Alexander (2004) 22 for the relation between 're-remembering' and changing the 'group identity' of a society. Alexander's phase of social mediation within a society resembles Scherer's evaluation of a stimulus event for individuals. See Alexander (2004) 23 for the role of 'monuments, museums and historical artefacts'.

25 The depictions of the role of feelings as the result of the social process of cultural trauma for a society at large in Alexander (2004) 1 and Smelser (2004) 36, 44, bear close similarities to Scherer's thoughts on feelings as the individual's emotional response to a stimulus event.

CULTURAL TRAUMA APPLIED: THE 'WORKING THROUGH'
OF SULLA'S DEEDS

Due to the enormous death toll, the high visibility in Rome and Italy, as well as the grave effects on all strata of Roman society, a majority of Romans perceived Sulla's acts of violence as a 'horrendous event'. The social process of cultural trauma and the 'working through' in public arenas started as early as 80 BCE, when Sulla still held power.²⁶ Though Cicero avoided attacking Sulla directly, he openly addressed the countless victims of Sulla's atrocities in his famous forensic speech for Sextus Roscius of Ameria.²⁷ The orator depicted the permanent atmosphere of terror and fear through the arbitrary prolongation of Sulla's proscriptions beyond the official end date 1 June 81 BCE as a fundamental threat to Roman society.²⁸ About one year later, Cicero won another important case in the legal arena, when he successfully lobbied to restore Roman citizenship to a woman of the Italian municipality of Arretium.²⁹

The 'working through' not only sought to revoke the consequences of Sulla's deeds for the victims, but was also directed against the perpetrators. Only a few years after Sulla's death in 78 BCE, three of his more prominent partisans were accused of extortion in their provinces. While Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, the praetor of 81 BCE, was convicted and went into exile, his relative Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, the consul of 81 BCE, and Antonius Hybrida, Sulla's commander in Greece, were acquitted.³⁰ However, only a few years later, Antonius Hybrida was expelled from the Roman Senate.³¹ The second half of the seventies BCE also saw senatorial decrees declaring as illegal Sulla's decisions to reduce arbitrarily the amount of taxes his supporters had to pay. Consequently, they were forced to reimburse the money to the Roman state treasury.³² In the sixties BCE, the 'working through' of Sulla's acts of violence peaked. During this time, important decisions in the legal and political arena were achieved. Juries sentenced several of Sulla's bounty hunters to death for having assassinated proscribed Roman citizens, despite the immunity Sulla's *lex Cornelia de proscriptione* had granted them.³³ In 65 BCE, Publius Cornelius Sulla, a relative and partisan of Sulla, who had accumulated wealth during Sulla's rule, was convicted of bribery after he had won the consular election. He not only lost his high office, but was also expelled from the

26 For Sulla's deeds as a 'cultural trauma' and the process of 'working through', cf. Eckert (2014) and (2016).

27 Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 89–90.

28 Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 154. For the relevance of the *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino* see also Heftner (2013) 230–2.

29 Cf. Crawford (1984) 33–4; Cic. *Caecin.* 96–7.

30 Cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.41 for the conviction of the praetor of 81 BC; for the trial against Antonius Hybrida see Cicero, *Comment. Pet.* 2; Asconius 84 (Clark); Plut. *Caes.* 4.1–2. The trial and acquittal of the consul of 81 BC are referred to in Cic. *Brut.* 317 and Suet. *Iul.* 4.1.

31 Cf. Asconius 84 (Clark) and Cass. Dio 37.30.4.

32 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81–2.

33 Asconius 90–1 (Clark); Cass. Dio 37.10.2.

Roman Senate.³⁴ Two years later, in 63 BCE, unlawful land occupations of Sulla's partisans in many Italian municipalities became the focal point of a public debate. An assembly of the Roman people declined the agrarian law of Rullus as an attempt to legalize these appropriations in secret.³⁵ At the end of the same year, the Roman Senate decided to send military forces to end the Catilinarian conspiracy. Many former followers of Sulla and their leader Catilina – deemed the cruellest among them – perished.³⁶ Two years later, in 61 BCE, the praetor Octavius published an edict concerning deprivations under Sulla. He decreed that possessions forcefully removed from Roman citizens had to be returned to their lawful owners – a decision probably directed against the raids of Sulla's marauding soldiers.³⁷ In 49 BCE, Caesar restored the children of the proscribed to their full political rights, thus concluding the 'working through' of Sulla's deeds against his fellow citizens.³⁸

Ancient testimonies provide evidence that the 'working through' of Sulla's deeds involved widely coherent adverse feelings toward Sulla in Roman society that could be employed in potent strategies of persuasion, as I shall show in the next section.

CULTURAL TRAUMA AND EMOTIONAL RESPONSE IN ANCIENT TESTIMONIES

The year 70 BCE belonged to a period when the 'working through' of Sulla's atrocities in Roman society gained increased momentum. When the Sicilians decided to prosecute Sulla's prominent partisan Gaius Verres for extortion in the province in the very same year, they asked Cicero to represent them in court.³⁹ Cicero was highly respected in Sicily for his integrity and flawless administration of the province during his service as *quaestor* in 75 BCE.⁴⁰ The famous orator delivered a brilliant speech in the first hearing, presenting a plethora of evidence against Verres. Thereafter, the defendant voluntarily went into exile, so the five orations of the second hearing were never given in court.⁴¹ Yet, Cicero decided to publish them, both to convince his Roman audience of Verres' guilt by providing a comprehensive account of the defendant's crimes, and to demonstrate his

34 Sall. *Cat.* 18.2; Cass. Dio 36.44.3, 37.25.3.

35 Cf. Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.70.

36 See Cicero's speeches on the Catilinarian conspiracy and Sallust's work on that matter for detailed accounts.

37 Cic. *Q Fr.* 1.1.21.

38 Plut. *Caes.* 37.1–2; Suet. *Iul.* 41; Cass. Dio 41.18.2, 43.50.1–2, 44.47.4.

39 For Verres as Sulla's partisan see Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.37.

40 Cic. *Div. Caec.* 2.

41 Axer (1995) 58 follows the position of Stroh (1975) and Classen (1985), who convincingly argue for the reliability of the published version of Cicero's speeches due to their didactic ambition; cf. esp. Axer (1995) 62: '[...] one can [...] seek in Cicero's court speeches a reflection of the community originally addressed by the orator.'

rhetorical excellence.⁴² In the third speech of the second hearing, Cicero utilizes Verres' partisanship with Sulla to illustrate the defendant's outrageous crimes. He describes Sulla as the first and only man in Roman history to have acquired exceptional power. By dispossessing, disenfranchising and even executing many of his fellow citizens, Sulla had perverted his victory in the civil war. With the highly emotional exclamation 'May the immortal Gods grant there may never be another [Sulla]!' (*di immortales faxint, ne sit alter!*),⁴³ the famous orator voices the wish of a majority of the Romans never to experience such atrocious deeds again. Cicero recalls how Sulla had dared to declare in an assembly of the people that he was selling his booty (*se praedam suam vendere*) when auctioning the confiscated property of Roman citizens.⁴⁴ With these words, Sulla had expressed his desire to treat Romans like foreign enemies, thus ignoring a Roman citizen's fundamental right to defend himself in court.⁴⁵ Cicero utilizes key elements belonging to the 'master narrative' of Sulla's outrageous deeds to enhance the impact of his charges against Verres. In the midst of the 'working through' of Sulla's atrocities, the orator could safely assume that his succinct version of the 'master narrative' would evoke corresponding memories and a strong and widely coherent negative emotional response among his audience. These adverse feelings toward Sulla would greatly increase the persuasive power of his line of argument against Sulla's partisan Verres, who had peculated tax money in Sicily. Cicero points out that the Roman Senate had not even allowed Sulla to deprive the state of tax revenue. The senators had retracted Sulla's decrees on that matter after Sulla's death and had enforced reimbursement.⁴⁶ The conclusion is inevitable: in the midst of the 'working through', Sulla's follower Verres also had to be called to account.

Cicero's speeches against the agrarian law demonstrate that the feeling of hatred played a key role when the Romans remembered Sulla's deeds. Seven years after his success against Verres, Cicero once again evoked memories of Sulla selling the property of proscribed Romans, when he delivered his second and third speech against the agrarian law of Rullus in a *contio*, i.e. an assembly of the Roman people. Cicero recalls how Sulla had given orders to execute many of his fellow citizens, auctioned the property of citizens who had not been condemned by a Roman court (*bona indemnatorum civium*), and called those goods 'his booty' (*se praedam suam diceret vendere*).⁴⁷

Cicero advises that the Roman people should vote against the Rullan law. Otherwise, Sullan partisans would be financially compensated for the estates they had acquired far below their true value during Sulla's outrageous auctions, as well as for the large lots of adjacent land many of them had illegally occupied afterwards. He voices the profound feelings of hatred these estates caused among the

42 Steel (2001) 23.

43 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81.

44 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81.

45 For Sulla's *dictum* on selling his own booty, see Van der Blom (forthcoming).

46 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81.

47 Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.56. See also Jonkers (1963) 98–9.

Romans (*Sullanus ager [...] tantam habet invidiam*).⁴⁸ In the third speech on the agrarian law, Cicero even goes one step further. He names the Valerian law, which had formed the legal basis of Sulla's acts of violence and his empowerment as dictator, 'hateful' (*est invidiosa lex*) and 'most unjust' (*iniquissimam*).⁴⁹ This law was widely detested for having established Sulla as the tyrant of the republic (*hic rei publicae tyrannum lege constituit*).⁵⁰ Cicero could rely on prevalent negative feelings toward Sulla in his audience. Attendants at the *contio* might have even remembered how in 82 BCE an assembly of the Roman people was forced to ratify the Valerian law in the midst of the atmosphere of terror Sulla and his soldiers had created in Rome.⁵¹

Cicero's *De officiis*, written in 44 BCE,⁵² provides another perspective on hatred as the predominant feeling when Romans recalled Sulla's acts of violence. In this work, Cicero presents his thoughts on the relation between 'honourable deeds for the community' (*honestum*), and 'individual advantage' (*utile*). According to Cicero, these should be perceived as complementing, rather than conflicting, forces.⁵³ Cicero utilizes a verse of the Roman author Ennius to demonstrate the fatal consequences for the state once ruling men devote themselves to personal advantage only: 'Whom they fear, they hate; and whom one hates, one strives to kill' (*quem metuunt oderunt, quem quisque odit perisse expetit*).⁵⁴ Cicero elaborates that someone aiming for a long and peaceful rule should strive for appraisal and respect instead of being feared by his fellow citizens. Other than tyrants of the past, the Romans had followed a custom of just and respectful rule over foreign nations for many generations, but had abandoned this custom since the time of Sulla.⁵⁵ Cicero evokes elements of the 'master narrative' of Sulla's violent deeds by employing the symbol of the auctioneer's bloodstained spear and Sulla's *dictum* on his booty (*est enim ausus dicere hasta posita [...] praedam se suam vendere*) to refer to the high death toll of the civil war and the Sullan auctions of the property of the proscribed.⁵⁶ Civil wars, he argues, would not cease as long as commanders like Sulla were willing to kill fellow citizens and sell their property to enrich themselves.⁵⁷

Valerius Maximus, who flourished under the reign of Emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE), composed a collection of 'Memorable Deeds and Sayings' providing

48 Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.70.

49 Cic. *Leg. agr.* 3.5.

50 Cic. *Leg. agr.* 3.5.

51 App. *B Civ* 1.98–9 illustrates how the Roman people ratified the Valerian law under compulsion.

52 Cf. Dyck (1998) 1–2.

53 See Cic. *Off.* 1.4 and 2.1, 3.110 on *honestum* and *utile* respectively. Cic. *Off.* 2.10 depicts the relation between these two principles.

54 Ennius F163 (Manuwald) in: Cic. *Off.* 2.23.

55 Cic. *Off.* 2.26–7.

56 Cic. *Off.* 2.27. In Rome it was customary to put up a spear to mark the place of an auction.

57 Cic. *Off.* 2.27–9 not only attacks Sulla. Cicero also blames Caesar for waging civil war and 'auctioning provinces' for his personal profit; cf. Dyck (1998) 402–6 for Cicero's criticism of Caesar.

moral guidance by depicting human virtues and vices.⁵⁸ His introductory paragraph on cruelty (*crudelitas*) contains a telling description of the nature of this vice and the ensuing emotional response: ‘In sum, if it is her [i.e. cruelty’s] prerogative to be feared, let it be ours to hate’ (*ad summam, cum penes illam sit timeri, penes nos sit odisse*).⁵⁹ According to Valerius, experiencing and remembering deeds of excessive violence will provoke hatred. He then presents Sulla as a prime example to illustrate his statement.⁶⁰ Valerius’s account is a brief, but concise, collection of elements of the ‘master narrative’. He outlines the enormous death toll among Sulla’s fellow citizens in Rome and Italy, depicts the massacre at the Villa Publica and the assassination of the inhabitants of Praeneste, and provides many details concerning Sulla’s proscriptions and the suffering of his victims. Valerius leaves no doubt that Sulla proscribed innocent Romans for the sole purpose of confiscating their property. What is more, Sulla had the severed heads of his victims brought to him for his own delight and for public display. He even ordered that women be executed and gave his partisans free hand to assassinate proscribed persons under the cruellest circumstances. Consequently, the Romans had every reason to hate Sulla.⁶¹

More than a decade after Valerius Maximus, the philosopher Seneca wrote his famous treatise on anger (*De ira*).⁶² Following Stoic ideas, Seneca regards anger as the most violent feeling and the one most closely resembling short periods of insanity. Whereas Aristotle and his Peripatetic followers saw some value in anger as long it remained restrained, Seneca, in line with Stoic thought, considers this feeling despicable and to be avoided at all costs. Hence, great men should abandon anger.⁶³ Seneca demonstrates that men possessing power lack greatness (*magnitudo*) if they refer to the verse ‘*oderint, dum metuant*’ (Let them hate as long as they fear) to justify their anger and their rule of terror. By adhering to these words, they pretend to ignore the hatred of their subjects as long as they can enforce their rule by fear. Seneca points out that powerful men behaving angrily and violently exhibit monstrosity (*immanitas*) instead of greatness to conceal their own fear of being cursed, attacked and finally overthrown by their subjects.⁶⁴ When discussing these matters, Seneca obviously had Sulla’s behaviour in mind.⁶⁵ Unlike Cicero in *De officiis*, Seneca does not name the author of ‘*oderint, dum metuant*’, the tragedian Accius.⁶⁶ Instead, he comments that this verse seems to

58 On moral guidance and Valerius Maximus’s work, see esp. Skidmore (1996) 53–8.

59 Val. Max. 9.2.

60 Val. Max. 9.2.1

61 Val. Max. 9.2.1.

62 The *terminus post quem* for *De ira* is Caligula’s death in January 41 AD. Suet. *Claud.* 38.1 refers to an edict of Emperor Claudius on controlling his temper. This may be accepted as evidence that Seneca wrote his treatise on anger during Claudius’s reign; cf. Monteleone (2014) 127.

63 Sen. *De ira* 1.2; cf. Monteleone (2014) 127–8.

64 Sen. *De ira* 1.20.4–5.

65 Cf. Thein (2006) 244.

66 Accius *trag.* 203–4 (Ribbeck) in: Cic. *Off.* 1.97; cf. Dyck (1998) 255–6; Sen. *De ira* 1.20.4.

have originated in the time of Sulla (*Sullano scias saeculo scriptam*), thus alluding to Sulla's numerous acts of violence and the ensuing hatred of the Romans.⁶⁷

A passage in Seneca's *De clementia* provides some insight into the psychological patterns provoking the intense feelings of hatred toward Sulla. Seneca's treatise on clemency, composed between 55 and 56 CE, is a mixture of genres, partly panegyric and partly philosophical. In this work, Seneca addresses the young Emperor Nero in an attempt to explain the reasons for exercising clemency and to persuade him to refrain from cruel behaviour.⁶⁸ Seneca argues that clemency guarantees a long rule and safety, whereas the power of cruel tyrants is accursed (*exsecrabilis*) and short-lived (*brevis*).⁶⁹ Clement behaviour and not the official name of a ruler should be the key criterion to distinguish between a king and a tyrant. Kings will give orders to kill one of their subjects if, and only if, there is an unavoidable necessity for the state. Tyrants, however, find pleasure in having their subjects arbitrarily assassinated. Consequently, the elder Dionysius – tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367 BCE – should not be called a tyrant, but a king. Sulla, the dictator, however, is rightly called a tyrant, as only the lack of enemies put an end to his killings (*occidendi finem fecit inopia hostium*).⁷⁰ The philosopher then recalls elements of the 'master narrative' of Sulla's cruel acts by describing how the victorious general ordered the execution of 7000 Roman citizens in the Villa Publica, while he conducted an assembly of the Roman Senate in the nearby temple of Bellona. Seneca focuses the attention of his readers on the outrageous nature of Sulla's deed by contrasting the victims' shrieks of agony and the ensuing horror of the senators with Sulla's emotional coldness. While his soldiers killed the many thousands, Sulla addressed the senators with the following words: 'Let us continue with our proceedings, Fathers of the Senate. We are just witnessing a few insurgents being executed on my orders.'⁷¹ Seneca comments on Sulla's *dictum* with the telling remark: 'He was not lying about this – to Sulla it did seem a few'.⁷² With this brief statement, the philosopher alludes to the fact that the overall death toll of Sulla's acts of violence in Rome and Italy

67 Sen. *De ira* 1.20.4. In a similar way Plutarch refers to hatred and fear at the time of Sulla. He asserts that the young Cato asked why nobody had killed Sulla. His teacher Sarpedon is said to have answered: 'Because, my boy, they fear him more than they hate him'; cf. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 3.2–4 and Thein (2006) 244. Manuwald (2011) 223 discusses Seneca's comment on the origin of '*oderint, dum metuant*' in the time of Sulla as a possible hint to date Accius's corresponding tragedy to the eighties BCE. In this case, Accius's tragedy would be a reaction to 'contemporary politics'. This conclusion, however, contradicts Gellius *NA* 13.2, who states that the young Accius read the tragedy to Pacuvius, who died about 130 BCE. Therefore, Manuwald concludes that the dating of Accius's play remains uncertain. However, if Seneca's *Sullano* [...] *saeculo* was meant to depict Sulla's lifetime (138–78 BCE), it could well have been that Gellius is correct and Accius read his tragedy to Pacuvius shortly before 130 BCE.

68 Cf. Braund (2009) 16–17, 23.

69 Sen. *Clem.* 1.11.4.

70 Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.1.

71 Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.2.

72 Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.2.

exceeded the number of victims in the Villa Publica by far.⁷³ Seneca continues his line of argument by outlining the spiral of ever-intensifying feelings that will finally overcome even the most powerful tyrant. The tyrant’s fear and violence and his subjects’ fear and hatred are the driving forces of this spiral. The tyrant, acting according to the verse ‘*oderint dum metuant*’, will resort to a rule of terror and violence out of fear of being overthrown.⁷⁴ His cruel deeds will first provoke fear, but will then turn into intense feelings of hatred among his subjects. Hatred will result in attempts at tyrannicide, thus incurring more fear and violence on the part of the tyrant. Ultimately, hatred will increase beyond limit and motivate even the most discouraged persons to kill the tyrant.⁷⁵

Seneca’s thoughts can be related to recent findings in psychology. Scherer’s studies have shown that one of the most important criteria to classify feelings empirically is to ask whether they are associated with notions of being in control of a given situation. Whereas fear bears one of the strongest notions of being helpless, hatred is associated with an exceptionally strong sensation of being in control.⁷⁶

CONCLUSION

In the speeches against Verres, Cicero exclaimed that the immortal gods should grant that there would never be another Sulla.⁷⁷ At that time, the social process of cultural trauma was in the midst of its ‘working through’. Carrier groups had persuaded a vast majority of the Romans to acknowledge Sulla’s cruel rule as a ‘horrendous event’ with grave consequences for Roman society. Hence, the Romans associated strong negative feelings of hatred with Sulla’s atrocities. In the first century CE, Pliny the Elder even stated: ‘there is no one who does not hate Sulla’ (*Sullam nemo non oderit*).⁷⁸

The Romans integrated the ‘master narrative’ of Sulla’s bloodshed into their community identity to remember it for generations to come. Accius’s verse ‘*od-*

73 Dion. Hal. 5.77.5 states that Sulla’s dictatorship was indeed a tyranny. He reports that 40,000 Romans were killed on Sulla’s orders after they had surrendered to him. This figure probably included not only the victims in the Villa Publica, but also those of Sulla’s marauding soldiers, the massacre at Praeneste and the proscriptions. The testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus indicates that Seneca’s comment on Sulla’s *dictum* in the temple of Bellona was not exaggerated.

74 Seneca refers to ‘*oderint dum metuant*’ again in Sen. *Clem.* 2.2.2 to illustrate the opposite of clemency.

75 Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.4. According to Suetonius, Emperor Gaius Caesar Caligula, who acted as a tyrant, often cited Accius’s verse to provoke his subjects; cf. Suet. *Calig.* 30.1. Consequently, his rule ended through tyrannicide. Probably Seneca also had Caligula in mind when he stated in Sen. *Clem.* 1.12.4: ‘he [the tyrant] will refer to that detested verse that has overthrown many: They can hate me as long as they fear me’ ([...] *et illo execrabili uersu qui multos praecipites debet utitur: oderint, dum metuant*). However, the philosopher deemed it wiser not to mention Emperor Caligula explicitly; cf. Braund (2009) 302.

76 See esp. Scherer (2005) 720 figure 1 and 723 figure 2.

77 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81.

78 Plin. *HN* 7.137.

erint, dum metuant’ (Let them hate as long as they fear) served a special purpose in this context. These words represented a certain tradition in Roman literature dating back to Ennius’s slightly more elaborated words ‘*quem metuunt oderunt, quem quisque odit perisse expetit*’ (Whom they fear, they hate; and whom one hates, one strives to kill).⁷⁹ With some likelihood, Valerius Maximus’s lines ‘*ad summam, cum penes illam sit timeri, penes nos sit odisse*’ (In sum, if it is her [i.e. cruelty’s] prerogative to be feared, let it be ours to hate) also reflect this tradition.⁸⁰ Cicero, Valerius Maximus and Seneca used succinct verses depicting hatred as the emotional response to a tyrant’s rule of terror to refer to Sulla and the ‘master narrative’ of Sulla’s acts of violence. Presumably due to its brevity, ‘*oderint, dum metuant*’ became a literary symbol for remembering both the cultural trauma of Sulla’s deeds and the strongest weapon Roman society could wield to prevent another Sulla: widely coherent feelings of hatred.

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79 Cic. *Off.* 2.23. There are a number of similarities between Ennius and Accius with respect to verses and titles of dramas; cf. Manuwald (2011) 218–19.

80 Val. Max. 9.2.

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GREATER THAN *LOGOS*? KINAESTHETIC EMPATHY AND MASS PERSUASION IN THE CHORUSES OF PLATO'S *LAWS*

Lucy Jackson

INTRODUCTION

When considering the concept of persuasion through emotion, our first instinct may be to think of verbal persuasion. This chapter concerns a medium for persuasion through emotion that relies primarily on a non-verbal activity – participating in and watching the performances of a Classical Greek chorus. Time and time again, ancient sources point clearly towards the all-important visual, aural and, broadly, experiential effects of choral performance (*choreia*), beyond the dense imagery and ideas described in the choral text. However, the text is frequently the only source we have for choral performance, and we must work hard to factor in the inevitable impact of music and movement.

Scholarship, particularly since the late 1970s, has recognized the important role played by the singing and dancing chorus in the social, cultural and religious lives of cities and communities in the Classical Greek world.¹ Plato's extended theorization and discussion of the chorus's sociological function, found predominantly in books II and VII of his last work, the *Laws*, has been crucial for our understanding of this important role. But only very recently has Plato's presentation of choral culture been subjected to significant critical analysis.² Supported by a wave of on-going interest in the *Laws* as a rich (as well as difficult) work, together with a continuing fascination with choral performance (both in and out of tragedy),³ it is now possible to look afresh at Plato's contribution to our understanding of Classical Greek choral practice. While much of the impact of ancient choral performance is all but lost to us in the modern world – or at least lost in any obvious sense – it is still possible to gain a better grasp of the traction choral performance would have had in ancient Greek communities, and to clarify a

- 1 Calame (1977) is recognized as seminal for studies of the Classical Greek chorus, and since then see Herington (1985), Nagy (1990), Henrichs (1994/5), (Wilson 2000), Kowalzig (2007), Kurke (2007) and most recently two edited volumes: Gagné and Hopman (2013) and Billings, Budelmann and Macintosh (2013).
- 2 See Scolnicov and Brisson (2003), Laks (2005) and (2007), Bobonich (2010), Prauscello (2011), (2013) and (2014), Peponi (2013a) and (2013b), and Folch (2015).
- 3 Both Peponi (2013a) 212–39 and Prauscello (2011) 133–58 have rightly highlighted that Plato's choruses map most exactly onto the non-dramatic, civic chorus, e.g. the circular or 'dithyrambic' chorus.

picture that is necessarily obscured by partial and incomplete sources. Furthermore, the fact that Plato's *Laws* contains a comprehensive (if, at times, confusing) theory for mass persuasion that uses emotion and choral performance, makes it an exemplary subject for an enquiry in the context of a volume such as this.

A particularly interesting, and before now unrecognized, aspect of Plato's presentation of choral performance in the famous 'second best city' of the *Laws* is his description of a phenomenon, 'kinaesthetic empathy', that has only just begun to be articulated by theorists of cognitive behaviour and performance in the last hundred years.⁴ This process, whereby a spectator experiences a powerful emotive connection to a performer based on previous experience of what is being performed, is described with surprising clarity in book II of the *Laws* (657d1–6).⁵

Now while our young men are fitted for actually dancing themselves, we elders regard ourselves as suitably employed in looking on at them, and enjoying their sport and merry-making, now that our former nimbleness is leaving us; and it is our yearning regret for this that causes us to propose such contests for those who can best arouse in us through recollection [μνήμη ἐπεγείρειν] the dormant emotions of youth.⁶

What makes the use of this modern concept for analysing an ancient performance culture excitingly appropriate is that this phenomenon works by being contextualized and situated in a shifting landscape of historical, social and cultural factors. In a recent article in the *Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism*, Strukus writes that 'cultural and historic factors are shaped and reshaped by embodied experience, and that the unconscious, neural foundations of kinaesthetic empathy exist in a dynamic and influential relationship to these other forces'.⁷ Such a construction of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy allows us to see it in action in diverse locations and times – in fourth-century Athens or in an abstract and theoretical 'second best city' – and provides a framework for exploring the specific impact of choral performance in ancient Greek communities.

That we hear a convincing account of kinaesthetic empathy in an ancient text is interesting in and of itself. But that we find such an account in the writings of Plato is perhaps surprising if we, as many do, regard this author as constructing a subtly but significantly idiosyncratic picture of Classical Greek choral culture.⁸

4 Fundamental work was done by the philosophers Henri Bergson (1913/1889) and Theodor Lipps (1900). Greater interest has been fostered across disciplines since the so-called 'corporeal turn', for which see Sheets-Johnstone (2009). Of particular interest for kinaesthetic empathy in cultural practice is Reynolds and Reason (2012).

5 I use lower case letters when the page references are followed by specific line numbers, capitals when I refer to the whole section.

6 All translations are from Bury (1927).

7 Strukus (2011) 89.

8 See Peponi (2013b) 16–23. On the relationship of Plato's *Laws* to contemporary historical and social conditions, and to contemporary Crete and Sparta in particular, see Morrow (1960) 5–10 and 17–92. Kowalzig (2013) 175–6 rightly foregrounds the false distinction often made between the philosophical and the pragmatic with respect to Plato's *Laws*. Useful also is a comparison to what Aristotle states in book VIII of his *Politics*, on which see Peponi (2013a) 227–9.

The fact that the same process is described both in Plato's text and in contemporary studies of performance and cognition is both intriguing and suggestive. With this second theoretical underpinning, the possibility for persuasion through emotion in choral dance becomes less the brainchild of a brilliant but individual thinker, and more a common conception of a process well-known and recognized throughout the Classical Greek world. Using and understanding the modern concept of kinaesthetic empathy allows us to see more clearly what Plato is referring to, and perhaps encourages us to apply the theory behind this performative phenomenon to choral performance in the classical world more broadly.⁹

The concept of kinaesthetic empathy and Plato's construction of the persuasive, emotional chorus might be brought closer together by adducing a further strand of research conducted in a related area. Both Kowalzig and Kurke have shown how choral performance in particular was used in the fifth century to shape mythical narratives and affect the communities – past, present and future – that attached themselves to those narratives.¹⁰ The potential for choral performance to persuade fifth-century communities in this way is thoroughly in tune with the choral theories set out by Plato. We can also point to later examples of choral performance being used in similar ways. The lyric hymns of Philodamus and Isyllus, written respectively in the late fourth and early third centuries BCE, provide new mythological narratives that interact with the politics of the time. In doing so, these hymns offer further examples of choral performance being used to persuade whole communities.

That these later lyric texts seem both to exemplify Plato's choral theory *and* to provide examples of performances that are enriched by an understanding of kinaesthetic empathy prompts a bolder hypothesis. We might justifiably use Plato's choral theory in the *Laws* as indicative of an already existing understanding of (and already existing attitudes towards) the potency of choral performance. What is more, this non-verbal medium for persuasion may have been viewed, in terms of reach and impact, as the most powerful way to persuade in the ancient world.

This essay, then, seeks to elucidate three things. First, to demonstrate how in Plato's *Laws* the primary means of persuasion a) occurs through choral performance and b) relies *entirely* on the arousal of emotion through participating in and watching these choral performances. Second, to show how Plato seems to describe the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy in his theorization of the chorus. Third, to point to two texts from the Classical and early Hellenistic periods which might be read as supporting this picture of the chorus as the persuasive medium *par excellence*.

9 Space does not allow for a full exploration of the concept of kinaesthetic empathy in relation to ancient performance here. This essay will, it is hoped, act as a productive provocation for further study I plan to pursue in this area.

10 Kowalzig (2007) and Kurke (2007). See also Budelmann (2013) 81–98 on choral performance as both aesthetic object and ritually productive act.

THE PERSUASIVE CHORUS IN PLATO: AN INHERENTLY EMOTIONAL STATE

It is worth clarifying at the outset what the goal is for the persuasive endeavours of the main speaker (referred to only as ‘the Athenian’) in the *Laws*. In this work we have a relatively clear agenda set out, although it takes some time for it – and hence the goals of the vitally important *choreia* – to emerge. A Spartan, a Cretan and an Athenian are taking a long walk from Cnossos to Mount Ida and, after three books of conversation, they light upon a concrete task and subject for discussion, to ‘build up by arguments the framework of a State, as though we were erecting it from the foundation’ (702D). The state in question will be a new colony in Crete for which the Cretan, Cleinias, has been chosen (along with ten other Cnossians) to set up. Under the broad umbrella of discussing laws and government, the question of the citizens’ education (*paideia*) has already re-occurred a number of times.

It is always helpful to remember that when *paideia* (first mentioned at 641B) is talked about in the *Laws* it is, in general, a very different concept to what we understand by the term ‘education’ (the most common translation of the Greek word). Indeed it is very different to the kind of education set out for the Guardians, described in the *Republic*.¹¹ *Paideia* in the *Laws*, the goal towards which the Athenian’s persuasive efforts are aimed, is defined early on in book I and repeated at the beginning of book II.

The education [παιδεία] we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term ‘education’. (643e3–644a2)

With this particular kind of *paideia* in mind, what emerges from the rich but meandering discussion in book II is that the medium for the training and educating of all citizens should be choral song and dance. Both by watching and participating in choral dance, the citizens are to be persuaded to believe that the just life is, indeed, the best life and hence to achieve the goal of education as defined in books I and II.

The very particular end towards which the discussion is aiming should be factored into how we read the Athenian’s picture of choral culture; rather than adhering to tradition or purely honouring the gods, participation in choral culture is set up from the very beginning to be primarily for the correct education of the citizens. The ‘paideutic’ aspect of choral culture outside Plato’s presentation of it in the *Laws* is certainly likely.¹² However, its prominence in the choral culture of Plato’s work is nothing like what we can identify from other sources. Caution is advisable and it may be that we should understand this particular, prominent aim

11 For the difference in theories of ‘education’ in *Republic* and the *Laws*, see Mouze (2000) 57–69, Jouet-Pastré (2000) and (2006).

12 See Peponi (2007) 351–62.

of choral performance (i.e. that it is primarily for the sake of the *paideia* of the citizens) as, if not unique to Plato, certainly closely tied to his own particular aims and agenda in the dialogue.¹³

It is surprising how obliquely the chorus is first introduced into the discussion, considering the key role it will play in the new Cretan colony. An examination of the usefulness of institutional drinking parties is in progress, and the Athenian has suggested that there are serious benefits to be had in such drinking-parties, particularly with the aim of *paideia* in mind. He states that the safekeeping of correct *paideia* is dependent on the correct establishment of the institution that is to provide this *paideia*. We then, somewhat abruptly, turn to the following sketch of the cultural and sociological background to the institution of the Greek festival:

Ath: Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, grow slack [χαλᾶται] and weakened [διαφθείρεται] to a great extent in the course of men's lives; but the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as companions in their feasts [ξυνεορτασταί] the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline [ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται τὰς γε τροφάς] by associating in their feasts with gods. We must consider, then, whether the account that is harped on nowadays is true to nature? What it says is that, almost without exception, every young creature [τὸ νέον] is incapable of keeping either its body or its tongue quiet, and is always striving to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games, and uttering, also, noises of every description. Now, whereas all other creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to us men the very gods, who were given, as we said, to be our fellows in the dance [ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἶπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι], have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choruses, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the chorus [χορός] they have given its name from the 'cheer' [χάρις] implanted therein. Shall we accept this account to begin with, and postulate that education owes its origin to Apollo and the Muses?

Clein: Yes.

Ath: Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without chorus-training, and the educated man fully chorus-trained?

Clein: Certainly. (653c7–654b2)

The passage on the surface appears somewhat disorganized.¹⁴ In the first half there is no mention of choral dance, only the 'training' (τροφή) that children receive and the discipline that may be regained at festivals. Only after the natural state of the young (τὸ νέος) is described as one of perpetual movement and making noise does the description of the gods shift from 'companions in the feast' (ξυνεορτασταί) to 'companions in choral dance' (συγχορευταί); this is the first explicit mention of choral dance in book II and only the second mention of the

13 For the ways Plato's broader agenda in the *Laws* impacts the presentation of choral culture, see Prauscello (2014).

14 Kurke (2013) 130–2, who gives the fullest analysis of the text, calls this a 'sneaky' passage. Kowalzig (2013) 174 and Prauscello (2013) 262 construe this passage as primarily addressing the divine aspects of *choreia*.

chorus in the entire work. The perception of rhythm and harmony (which, we presume, facilitates a kind of training of the movements of the young) is linked to mankind's desire to set up (and, peculiarly, to lead) choruses, and this in turn is meant to explain how the relevant gods – the Muses, Apollo and Dionysus – might be described as responsible for *paideia*.¹⁵ What we get from this passage, however, is the assertion that *choreia* educates and improves those who are present at these festivals.

What is also hinted at in this passage, and made more explicit throughout books II and VII is the idea that, when engaged in choral activity, the choreut is particularly susceptible to emotional responses and is, accordingly, in a more malleable state of mind and more ready to be persuaded. The role of pleasure in inspiring the setting up of choral dancers is therefore understandably prominent in the initial sketch of the sociological origins of *choreia* and is made explicit soon after:

Now then, take a man whose opinion about what is good is correct (it really *is* good), and likewise in the case of the bad (it really *is* bad), and follows this judgment in practice. He may be able to represent [in the choral dance], by word and gesture, and with invariable success, his intellectual conception of what is good, **even though he gets no pleasure from it and feels no hatred for what is bad**. Another man may not be very good at keeping on the right lines when he uses his body and his voice to represent the good, or at trying to form some intellectual conception of it; but he may be very much on the right lines in his feelings of pleasure and pain, because he welcomes what is good and loathes what is bad. (654c3–d3)

Here it is made clear that the emotional engagement of the individual within a choral performance is not just inevitable, but vital for the best kind of *paideia*. Pleasure and pain are used as the key markers for an individual's prime motivation to act.¹⁶ The potential is recognized for a choreut to sing and dance perfectly well and yet not feel the necessary emotions of pleasure and pain at what he is enacting. This is shown to be of less value (for the Athenian) than someone who may be less physically or vocally skilled, yet responds emotionally to the things that he should feel pleasure and pain towards. This is not to say that outward appearance and inward emotion are entirely separate in Plato's conception of the choral experience. A little later, the Athenian points us towards the connection between a cowardly soul and the postures attached to that state of being, or a courageous soul and its concomitant postures (654e9–655b6; 815e4–816a3). Nevertheless, the emotional response to the choral song and dance is clearly of central importance in this presentation of the chorus. The Athenian therefore sees the ideal choral performance as being useful for *paideia* primarily via the stirring up of correct emotion in the performer. Within the choral per-

15 Prauscello (2013) 258 describes the training alluded to here (2.653c7–654a5, 2.664e2–665a6) as 'the experience of a "correct" physiology of pleasure and pain'.

16 The tension between reason and the emotions of pleasure and pain is illustrated beautifully in a much-discussed passage in book I (644d7–645c1), see Kurke (2013) 123–70.

formance, pleasure and pain are not to be inevitable by-products of a particular state of mind, but are rather utilized to shape the individual choreut.¹⁷

This highly emotional, reasonless state of the choreut is made clear throughout the work and returned to a number of times. Through allusion, or tellingly revealing but unconscious slippages, the Athenian presents a picture of the choral experience that is underpinned by two analogic states of being: childhood, and the state of ritual frenzy or drunkenness. Through repeatedly associating the choral experience with these two states of mind, Plato presents the choreut as without rational thought and entirely dependent on the sensations of pleasure and pain.¹⁸

The tracing of associations between childhood and choral dance begins with that initial adumbration of the sociological origin and function of the chorus (653c7–654b2, quoted in full above) where the impulse of the young to move and make noise is harnessed and utilized in the song and dance of the chorus. It is likely that Plato is able to sketch this rough aetiology of the chorus in the way he does because he is drawing together things (festival, *paideia*, choral dance and divine companionship at festival) that were already familiar and closely associated in the minds of his audience. But even if Plato's audience did not have as much difficulty as we do in tracing how the logic of the passage proceeds, this should not obscure the fact that the associations made between childhood (the inability to cease from moving and making noise) and choral dance, and the apparent return to childhood inherent in festival celebrations, have an important role in the Athenian's presentation of the choral experience. Further passages confirm that this association between childhood and choral dance is essential for the construction of choral culture in the ideal city of the *Laws*. Indeed this association acts as one of a number of associations that encourage our impression of a particularly receptive choral body.

We find a fusion of the emotional states of childhood and *choreia*, in addition to further associations with Bacchic frenzy and a lack of reason, in the conclusion to the long argument for the social and educational benefit of drinking parties.

There is a little-known current of story and tradition which says that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by stimulating us to Bacchic frenzies and all the mad dancing [ἡ μανικὴ χορεία] that results; and this was precisely the reason why he made us a present of wine. This sort of story, however, I leave to those who see no danger in speaking of the gods in such terms. But I am quite certain of this: no animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, or at any rate with it fully developed. During the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of intelligence, it is completely mad [πᾶν μαινεται]: it bawls uncontrollably, and as soon as it can get on its feet it jumps about with equal abandon. Let's think back: we said that this situation gave rise to music and gymnastics. (672b3–c6)

17 See Peponi (2013a) 212–39 for the emphasis on pleasure in Plato's description of *choreia* in the *Laws*.

18 This touches on the larger debate concerning the existence of 'rational persuasion' in the *Laws* – see e.g. Bobonich (1991) 365–88, Powell (1994) 273–321, Laks (2007) 130–52. My own view (at present a minority one) is that as far as choral performance goes there is no reason or *logos*, only emotion and habituation, see further below on *Laws* 670b8–c2.

The importance of the myth is highlighted by the Athenian's professed ignorance of its truth (if he thought the myth irrelevant, why include it?). It is in this myth of Dionysus's vengeance that we find the connection between Bacchic frenzy (possibly inspired by wine) and the loss of one's rational capacities. We can infer this from the fact that the rites are introduced as appropriate vengeance for Hera's robbing Dionysus of his own soul's judgment. The gift of wine, Bacchic rites and *choreia* are all linked in this initial myth. The Athenian then goes on to strengthen those connections, first between the state of childhood and lack of reason ('no animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, or at any rate with it fully developed') and then between this reasonless state of childhood and the frenzy and physical movement found in Bacchic rites ('During the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of intelligence, it is completely mad'). The final reminder of the previous discussion of the origins of music and gymnastics carries the echo of the association established there too of childhood and *choreia* (653d7–654a5).¹⁹

Although not specifically tied to *choreia* we see elsewhere the effect of wine described as making one feel younger and at the same time making the drinker more malleable: 'when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers turn softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too; whence they become ductile, just as when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and ability to train and mould them' (671b8–c2).²⁰ Wine then simulates in the old what comes naturally to those who are young, namely, a kind of malleability. This ductile quality may be added to the analogous states that touch on or are introduced around the presentation of choral performance.

Later in book VII we find a similar description of these analogous states of being in the early stages of the Athenian's prescriptions for childcare.

Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms; and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise; and thus they literally cast a spell upon [καταλοῦσι] the children (like the victims of Bacchic frenzy) by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy. (790d5–e4)

Once more, the Athenian blends the state of childhood (here very young children) and Bacchic frenzy, and shows how *choreia* might act as a medium to affect their agitated, emotional state. It is significant that we are reminded in this way (at the beginning of book VII where the systematic programme for choral training and *paideia* is to be set out) of the potential vulnerability of those in states of mind analogous to that of choral performance.

By adducing these analogous states in the initial description of choral culture in an ideal city, and firmly associating that choral state with a highly emotional state, the receptivity and malleability of the choral body is emphasized. Reason and logic, then, have little to do with the response and effect of choral dance. As

19 For a slightly different reading of this and the next passage, see Prauscello (2013) 266–70.

20 See also 666b2–c2.

already mentioned above, most people are shown to use pleasure as their prime motivator for calling anything (choral or otherwise) good or bad (667B–671A), but this is shown to be deficient, and the Athenian points to the example of the theatres in Sicily and Italy as evidence of this (659B–C). Instead, the Athenian entrusts knowledge of what makes a good or bad choral dance to those in the ideal society with the most experience, and hence wisdom, on the subject (657D–659D, 664E–665D, 668D–671A). Indeed, the Athenian flatly denies that expertise in the matters of good and bad choral dances may be found in more than a few members of society.²¹ In no uncertain terms, the choral dancers are said to be acting in utter ignorance:

The belief of the general public, that they can form an adequate judgment of merit and demerit in matters of harmony and rhythm, is laughable [γελοῖος]: they have only been drilled [διδασκασμένοι] into singing to the pipes and marching in step, and they never stop to think that they do all this without the smallest understanding of it [δρῶσιν τὰυτὰ ἀγνοοῦντες]. (670b8–c2)

To dance in the chorus is to return to childhood, to lose one's sense, to enter an initiation and to give oneself up to emotion. The highly emotional and reasonless state of mind of the choral dancer seems to deny the ability of the choral dancer to reason for herself or gain any agency within choral performances in the ideal city.

THE PERSUASIVE CHORUS IN PLATO: PERSUASION THROUGH *MIMÊSIS*

We have seen how engaging in choral performance puts the participant into a particularly emotional and malleable state of mind, ready for persuading towards civic virtue (whatever that may mean). What is specific to choral performance (as opposed to being in one of those similarly emotional states of childhood or frenzy) is that the inherently mimetic nature of *choreia* allows the participant to take in and be shaped by what is being sung and danced, at the direction of, ultimately, the lawgivers of the second-best city. The potential for *mimêsis* to impact the one who imitates is already well attested and much discussed, particularly with reference to Plato's *Republic*.²² In that work, *mimêsis* was deemed wholly dangerous. In the *Laws*, however, it has a place and is relied on in many ways to allow the citizens almost to persuade themselves.

There is an important proviso that follows the well-known sound bite – ‘the man who is unpractised in choruses is an uneducated man’. As the Athenian goes on to say a little later ‘Our words are, “he sings well and dances well”’: ought we,

21 Prauscello (2013) 264 does not read the work as having this ‘anti-rational attitude’, though she does not engage directly with the passage quoted here.

22 See Stalley (1983) 127–9 for a summary of the various kinds of *mimêsis* referred to in *Republic* and what bearing they have on the mimetic aspect of choral performance as described in the *Laws*. For a judicious untangling of Aristotelian *mimêsis*, see Halliwell (1990) 487–510.

or ought we not, to add, “provided that he sings good songs and dances good dances”?’ If the content is not, in fact, good, the performer will suffer a kind of incorrect training, since the mimetic nature of choral performance serves to assimilate the performer with what is performed. The Athenian convinces his interlocutors of this by means of a comparison to a man living with the bad habits of wicked men. There, even if a man is aware that he should be ashamed to be associated with such habits, by a process of assimilation after time, he will grow to approve of them.

Is it not probable or rather inevitable that the result here will be exactly the same as what takes place when a man who is living amongst the bad habits of wicked men, though he does not really abhor but rather accepts and delights in those habits, yet censures them casually, as though dimly aware of his own turpitude? In such a case it is, to be sure, inevitable that the man thus delighted **becomes assimilated to those habits** [τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι], good or bad, in which he delights, even though he is ashamed to praise them. **Yet what blessing could we name, or what curse, greater than that of assimilation that befalls us so inevitably?** [καὶ τοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φαίμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι;] (656b1–7)

The Athenian points us towards the connection between a cowardly soul and the postures attached to that state of being, or a courageous soul and its concomitant postures (654e9–655b6, 815e4–816a3). We see the power of choral performance to shape the opinion of the performer once more, summed up in riddling style when the Athenian identifies the advantage of choral performance in the following way: ‘we rejoice (χαίρωμεν) whenever we think we are prospering, and, conversely, whenever we rejoice we think we are prospering’ (657c5–6). The relationship between action and the effect on the person performing the action is seen as mutually reinforcing. We might also recall the warnings concerning *mimēsis* expressed in the *Republic*, where imitation of unworthy objects was also deemed to be damaging to the soul of the imitator.

The potential of choral performance, by virtue of its mimetic quality, to *improve* the performer (and audience too) is shown later in books VIII and XII, where we see how this choral capability for positively reinforcing attitudes through action is used for the benefit of society with regards to training for war (e.g. 830c–831a and 942d2–e1). By allowing for the positive impact of *mimēsis* within the choral body, the Athenian mobilizes a powerful tool for acts of mass persuasion.

KINAESTHETIC EMPATHY IN THE *LAWS*

And yet, the power of *choreia* not only has an effect on those actually participating in any given choral performance.²³ Through the process of kinaesthetic

23 Peponi (2013a) 225–6 has seen in the *Laws* a strategy to ‘de-aestheticize’ *choreia*; the repeated emphasis on the pleasure of the performer herself means that the choral performance as an aesthetic object no longer exists. And yet by reading into Plato’s text a notion of kinaes-

empathy the persuasion of choral performance can have an impact on both participant and spectator.²⁴ Given the universal participation in festivals in this ideal city, the inclusion of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy in the sketch of choral culture allows the persuasion to reach every single member of the city in one single performance.

As already stated, then, the Athenian recognizes that what makes the chorus all the more powerful as a tool for persuasion is the fact that it is not just the choral performer who is persuaded; those who watch the choral performers are also affected by the same kinds of emotion as felt by the choreut. The 'Watching Dance' project, acknowledged as one of the most important research centres for examining kinaesthetic empathy in the modern world, notes this phenomenon with reference to dance in particular. 'Spectators of dance experience kinaesthetic empathy when, even while sitting still, they feel they are participating in the movements they observe, and experience related feelings and ideas'.²⁵

The Athenian in the *Laws* alludes to just this experience when describing how the elder members of the city no longer dance themselves but instead watch the choreia of others and, in watching, remember their own choral experience (657d1–6, quoted above). We see this again hinted at in a passage, already discussed above, describing the aetiology of the festival: '... and they have granted them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may set right again their modes of discipline by associating in their feasts with gods' (654c7–d5). Here the idea is clear that associating with those who are, as Prauscello has put it, examples of 'embodied morality',²⁶ will have an effect on everyone present, whether they're performers or spectators. More generally throughout book II, the discussion focuses variously on the participant and the observer of choral performance, strongly suggesting that, in Plato's eyes, there was no great distance between the two experiences. Peponi discusses a passage (655D–656A) that highlights the intriguing slippage between internal and external spectator (i.e. performer and spectator), an example of the way that performer and spectator are often assimilated in the *Laws*.²⁷ Such a slippage may be deliberate on the part of the author. Alternatively we might infer from such assimilations of a performer and a spectator's experience that this was already a commonly held attitude in Plato's contemporary world.

thetic empathy, those who watch the choral performance and those who perform it need not necessarily be as rigidly separated as Peponi suggests. The repeated blurring of boundaries between spectator and performer, identified by Peponi herself, seems to indicate the connection between the two is so close as to be inseparable.

24 Prauscello (2013) 259 formulates this in terms of *mimēsis* – '[In the *Laws* *mimēsis*] is active at both a representational (*mimēsis qua* representation) and performative level (*mimēsis qua* enactment)'.
 25 http://www.watchingdance.org/research/kinesthetic_empathy/index.php accessed 30th March 2015.

26 Prauscello (2013) 259.

27 Prauscello (2013) 218–20.

The power of using choral performance as a medium for persuasion will, therefore, work on two levels. First, it is an activity that places the performer in an emotional and particularly receptive state. Second, the familiarity of all citizens with the content of choral dance enables those attitudes to be reinforced through kinaesthetic empathy on an almost daily basis, according to the calendar described later on in the *Laws*. As with so much in the *Laws*, this idea is not clearly stated (although it is certainly alluded to, see above). However, it seems reasonable to see the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy as very much part of the Athenian's justification for the central importance of choral culture in the construction of the ideal city in the *Laws*.

THE CHORUS IN CLASSICAL GREECE: A WEAPON OF MASS PERSUASION

Is the model that Plato outlines in the *Laws* a plausible example of an alternative medium for persuasion in Classical Greece? What I would like to do in the final part of this chapter is suggest how this kind of persuasion (that is, persuasion through participating in and watching choral performance) might be recognized in the wider world of Classical Greece. That choral performance acted both to reinforce and to reinvent social and cultural attitudes in the Classical period is no longer in question. Recent work has moved forward the discussion of the intersection between choral poetry and history considerably.²⁸ While for Plato the power of choral performance lies in the harmony of movement and music and the pleasurable acculturation of certain values, Kowalzig has argued that the power of choral performance lies in its unifying myth and ritual, elements that in themselves work to unite past and present.

It is through choral performance that myth and ritual become socially effective, for it offers a medium for myth and ritual to come together.... [Choral performances] emerge as a creative means for the delineation of worshipping communities by allowing for a constant reconfiguration of mythical pasts and ritual presents. Religious song, performances of myth and ritual, turn out to be a productive activity with a full and dynamic share in historical processes and social change, above all through the way it opens up new social realities formulated through the myth-ritual interface.²⁹

Might we compare the 'productive activity' Kowalzig identifies in choral lyric with the persuasive power accorded to choral performance in Plato? There are certainly some suggestive comparisons to be made with Struck's recognition that 'cultural and historic factors are shaped and reshaped by embodied experience', with respect to kinaesthetic empathy.³⁰ In Athens, if not all over Greece, the level of participation in civic choruses was such that we can justifiably imagine both

28 Again Kowalzig (2007) and Kurke (2007) are fundamental here.

29 Kowalzig (2007) 393.

30 See note 7 above.

performer and spectator as being familiar with at least a certain level of choral choreography and language.³¹ With this neuro-physiological language set alongside texts that lend themselves well to the kind of process outlined by both Plato and modern performance theorists like Strukus, the case for the persuasive power of *choreia* becomes more credible.

Added to this we might also briefly point to two hymns, written in the late fourth and early third centuries BCE respectively, that have a comparable socio-political agenda to the texts analysed by Kowalzig and Kurke. A paean written by Isyllus and inscribed at Epidaurus around the very beginning of the third century, gives the god Asclepius a thoroughly Epidaurian aetiology.³² It seems that, in doing so, the choral performance of the hymn provided the means of persuasion to all those who saw the chorus perform, or read the inscribed hymn thereafter. The story they were being persuaded to believe was that, contrary to any other tales of Asclepius's heritage, this story that he belonged and had always belonged in Epidaurus held the greatest authority. A similar kind of story could be told of Philodamus's paean to Dionysus.³³ In that fragmentary inscription dated to 340/39 BCE, the gods Apollo and Dionysus are brought close together,³⁴ a move that seems to have been rooted in some kind of actual change at Delphi (where the hymn was found) and the possible acceptance of Dionysus into the cult of Apollo simultaneous with the rebuilding of his temple. These hymns were then inscribed on stone for future visitors to see and be persuaded of their authoritative content, namely, the 'rebranding' of Dionysus as majestic and lordly as opposed to the ecstasy and frenzy so frequently associated with the god.³⁵ The potential for a reader to relive the experience of viewing or performing in that choral performance fits nicely with the blurred conception of spectator/performer prompted by the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy.

CONCLUSION

In the fifth, fourth and third centuries BCE, both before and after the time when Plato was writing, there are sources – literary and epigraphic – testifying to or hinting at the power of choral performance to persuade and shape the attitudes both of those citizens who take part in the performance and the spectators who make up the broader community. Taken on their own we might be less inclined to

31 Around 10% of the male population (citizens and non-citizens) of Athens were required to participate in the choruses each year (not only of the Great Dionysia but also all the other festivals that included choral performances: the Lenaia, Rural Dionysia, Thargelia, the Little and Great Panathenaia and, possibly, the Promethia and Hephaistia).

32 For full discussion of this poem and its political agenda, see Kolde (2003).

33 See most recently Bouchon, Brillet-Dubois and Le Meur-Weissman (2012) and Calame (2009) on this hymn.

34 A kind of 'religious syncretism', Rutherford (2001) 132. Furley and Bremer (2001) 73 argue against the term 'syncretism' as the identities of the two gods are maintained.

35 Furley and Bremer (2001) 67.

award these poems and performances any serious persuasive power. Yet in light of the presentation of the power of choral performance in Plato's *Laws*, and strengthened by an understanding of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy, we may be more justified in crediting *choreia*, at least in Classical Greece, with a persuasive power that outweighed the persuasions of *logos*.

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PART III:

PERSUASIVE STRATEGIES IN UNEQUAL
POWER RELATIONSHIPS

INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE: EMOTIONS IN XENOPHON'S *HIPPARCHICUS* AND *ANABASIS**

Jennifer Winter

Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* is a didactic work, which contains directions relating to all aspects of commanding cavalry.¹ Included amongst these instructions is Xenophon's advice on how to evoke, dispel and manipulate the emotions.² I shall argue that in this area of interest we see links with Xenophon's *Anabasis*.³ This work offers the exempla, particularly in speeches, that illustrate the instructions regarding emotions from the *Hipparchicus*.⁴ From this, I argue that the speeches in the *Anabasis* are also didactic and that, in both works, Xenophon is interested in the handling of the emotions as an important aspect of leadership.

That the *Hipparchicus* does not contain examples to illustrate its instructions is contrary to the expectations of its genre as a *technê*, as I shall demonstrate in the first section of this chapter. In the second part, I shall examine two ways in which Xenophon displays an interest in rhetorical matters. I conclude that Xenophon is clearly interested in certain issues that were being discussed in contemporary rhetorical treatises and that the speeches in the *Anabasis* provide didactic exempla. Having identified Xenophon's interests and established the need to look elsewhere for examples to accompany his instructions, I then discuss how the *Hipparchicus* and the *Anabasis* correspond in their discussion of emotional persuasion. For each emotion that Xenophon recommends verbally arousing, allaying and manipulating in the *Hipparchicus*, I shall discuss a passage from the *Anabasis* that illustrates this advice.⁵

* I would like to thank the editors for organizing a stimulating colloquium and for their comments on this chapter, as well as those who gave feedback at the event.

1 Since I use the Hellenized title *Hipparchicus* throughout this chapter, I abbreviate it *Hipp.* to avoid confusion (rather than *Eq. mag.*, as per the *OCD* abbreviations followed elsewhere in this volume).

2 The relevant guidance is spread across the work at 1.8, 1.11, 1.13–15, 1.21–3, 1.26, 2.5, 2.8–9, 4.11–12, 4.17–19, 5.3, 5.8, 6.1–6, 7.6–7, 8.19–20, 9.3 and 9.6–7. These little-known passages are a useful Classical-period foil to Aristotle's instructions at *Rh.* 2.2–11, 1378a30–88b30 and Anaximenes' in *Rh. Al.* 34, 1440a26–b5 and 36, 1443b15–22 /1444b36–45a27 (see also 7.5, 1428a39–b2). On these, see further Sanders (this volume) 57–60.

3 The genre of the *Anabasis* is disputed, but it is often classed as historiography. See Sanders (this volume) 66–70 and Fragoulaki (this volume) for emotions in Thucydides' historiographical work. See also Hagen (this volume) 204–11 for emotions in Roman historiography.

4 Other instructions from the *Hipparchicus* that are illustrated in the *Anabasis* are not my concern in this chapter.

5 Xenophon also recommends evoking emotions through action and exploiting situations to evoke emotions, but I will only investigate verbal persuasion in this chapter. For these other

The *Hipparchicus* is a largely neglected work, although there has been recent interest in it.⁶ The importance for leaders of being able to persuade others is often stated,⁷ but the instructions regarding emotions in this work have not been investigated, nor has the overlap in this area with the *Anabasis*. Whereas the speeches in the *Hellenica* have been examined by Gray in particular,⁸ those in the *Anabasis* have received less attention and there has been little interest in the emotional appeals within them. Xenophon's interest in emotions is beginning to be investigated, however; Tamiolaki, for example, has examined how Xenophon innovates in his use of emotions in the *Hellenica*.⁹ She is interested mainly in emotions as facilitating historical explanation, however, whereas my approach is broader. It is my aim that the following investigation gives further insights into Xenophon's interest in rhetoric, emotions and leadership theory, and helps to suggest a didactic, as well as historiographic, purpose for the speeches in the *Anabasis*.

THE *HIPPARCHICUS* AND OTHER TREATISES

The *Hipparchicus* is frequently compared to Aeneas Tacticus's *Poliorcetica* because they both pioneer the genre of the military treatise and because they share some similarities in approach, content and language.¹⁰ The works are contemporary and Whitehead even suggests that the two authors discussed ideas about their works.¹¹ Although we cannot prove this, if indeed the works did influence each other or if there was collaboration, we may have expected the two authors to use examples in a similar way. In fact, they differ completely.

For Aeneas, examples are integral to his work. He uses them repeatedly to accompany his advice, and they often detail events from recent history. Most frequently, Aeneas uses them to demonstrate the necessity for his advice by showing that what he is warning against has happened previously.¹² On other occasions, they describe a person or group of people who did as Aeneas is recommending

passages, see *Hipp.* 4.11–12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6–7 and 8.19–20 (fear) and 4.17–19, 5.3 and 5.8 (confidence). These instructions are reflected in certain episodes in the *Anabasis*: see 1.7.14–20, 2.6.10, 5.2.28–31 and 7.3.35 (fear), and 4.3.27–32 and 5.4.16–17 (confidence).

6 See Althoff (2005), Stoll (2010) and (2012), Toalster (2011) and Blaineau (2014).

7 See e.g. Stevenson (2000), Stoll (2010) 54–8 and 70–3, and Wood (1964) 52–4.

8 See Gray (1981) and (1989).

9 Tamiolaki (2013).

10 See Whitehead (2001) 35–6 and Burliga (2008) 96. See Vela Tajeda (2004) for the development of this genre.

11 Whitehead (2001) 35–7.

12 *Aen. Tact.* 4.1–5, 11.2, 11.3–6, 11.7–10, 11.10a–11, 11.12, 11.13, 12.3, 12.4–5, 17.2–4, 18.3–7, 18.8–11, 18.12, 18.13–19, 18.20–1, 18.22, 23.3–5, 23.7–11, 28.5, 29.3–10, 29.11, 31.2–5, 31.6, 31.7, 31.8, 31.9a, 31.10–23, 31.24, 31.25–7, 31.28–9, 31.30–1, 31.31 (two), 31.32, 31.33, 31.34 and 31.35.

and who succeeded because of this,¹³ or demonstrate what happens when people do not do what Aeneas is recommending.¹⁴ Finally, on four occasions, they are relevant to the general topic of the section but do not illustrate the particular instruction he is giving at the time.¹⁵ Thus, Aeneas's examples encourage the reader to follow his instructions.¹⁶

Examples are also prevalent in the nearest extant rhetorical treatises to Xenophon's time: the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, now usually assigned to Anaximenes, and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. We shall see below that Xenophon appears highly interested in the content of such works. It would be strange, then, if he was not also influenced by their form when writing within the same technical genre.

Anaximenes' work provides practical instructions for the composition of speeches, and he uses examples regularly throughout. He once refers to a passage in another work, Euripides' *Philoctetes*, to exemplify a point (18.15, 1433b10–14), but on all other occasions, he invents his own examples, mostly of what one could say in a speech that illustrates how to follow his instructions. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* demonstrates that rhetorical theory is an area that interested philosophers. Although it is more exposition than instruction, Aristotle again uses examples regularly. This can be illustrated by examining his section on emotions, which is representative of his method in the rest of the work. Like Aeneas, Aristotle also uses examples from historical events to explain his ideas.¹⁷ Aristotle also quotes Homer and his characters and refers to plot lines in Homer's works,¹⁸ as well as referencing the events in a play.¹⁹ Finally, Aristotle refers to proverbs in order to use his analysis to explain them.²⁰ All these examples reinforce the correctness of his arguments by drawing on familiar cases.

Although the number of extant works within the genre of the treatise is small, the ones we have examined all use examples in some way.²¹ We can hypothesize, then, that providing extensive exempla is an accepted convention within the genre. In this case, it is surprising that Xenophon does not use them within the *Hipparchicus*.²² From the range of Xenophon's own corpus, it seems clear that he would have been familiar with technical works in various fields and with philo-

13 Aen. Tact. 2.2, 2.3–6, 5.2, 10.21–2, 16.14, 17.5–6, 20.4–5, 22.20, 24.16, 24.18, 27.7–10, 27.11, 28.6, 37.6–7 and 40.2–3.

14 Aen. Tact. 4.7–11, 15.8–10, 24.3–14 and 29.12.

15 Aen. Tact. 25.2–4, 37.4, 39.6 and 40.4–5.

16 For more on Aeneas's examples, see Hunter & Handford (1927).

17 Arist. *Rh.* 2.3, 1380b8–13 (two); 2.6, 1384b15–16; 2.6, 1384b32–5; 2.6, 1385a10–13; 2.6, 1385a27–8; 2.8, 1386a14; 2.8, 1386a20–2.

18 Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378b4–10; 2.2, 1378b30–5 (two); 2.2, 1379a5–7 (two); 2.3, 1380b22–5; 2.3, 1380b27–30; 2.9, 1387a31–3. See further Knudsen (2014) 147–50.

19 Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1379b14–17.

20 Arist. *Rh.* 2.4, 1381b15; 2.6, 1383b23–4; 2.6, 1384a34; 2.10, 1388a16–17.

21 The case studies used in medical treatises may also have led to examples becoming fixed within technical writing – see e.g. Hippoc. *Epid.*

22 Xenophon does use brief comparisons: 1.26, 2.3, 2.7, 4.16–20, 5.9–10, 8.3, 8.5–6 and 8.8, and gives two very small examples 7.4 and 9.4.

sophical texts, including their frequent use of examples.²³ If we accept that Xenophon would have felt it necessary to provide accompanying examples, we will need to look elsewhere in his corpus. The *Anabasis* was written before the *Hipparchicus* and yet contains corresponding illustrations, as I shall demonstrate. I argue that when writing the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon expected readers to be familiar with his earlier work and believed that he had already provided the relevant examples, particularly in the *Anabasis*.

XENOPHON'S INTEREST IN RHETORICAL THEORY

Showing that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory will give credence to my argument that Xenophon wanted to include examples of verbal emotional persuasion in the *Anabasis*. This interest can be demonstrated by examining Xenophon's use of technical vocabulary and the range of emotions that he discusses.

I begin with Xenophon's use of the term *enthymēma*. Aristotle and Anaximenes define enthymemes very differently. Aristotle describes them as rhetorical syllogisms (*Rh.* 1.1, 1355a2–8), while Anaximenes calls them contraries in word, action and all other ways (10.1–3, 1430a23–40). Because there seems to have been at least these two definitions slightly after Xenophon's time, we must assume that Xenophon could have known more still. Xenophon certainly recognizes a meaning for 'enthymeme' not connected with rhetoric,²⁴ but on two occasions his usage indicates that he is aware that it is also a specialized term connected with persuasion and rhetorical theory. At *Anabasis* 6.1.21, the narrator uses the term to refer to arguments that make Xenophon want to take the role of sole commander.²⁵ These specifically 'induce'/'persuade', and work by creating desire. Although Xenophon is here referring to internal thoughts and not part of a speech, the usage here seems to suggest his awareness that enthymemes are part of the world of arguments and persuasion.²⁶ At *Cynegeticus* 13.9.3, Xenophon mentions that philosophers use *enthymēmata*. Xenophon does not say 'rhetoricians' here, but he may have considered that rhetorical theory primarily belonged in the domain of philosophy. He at least seems to appreciate that the term has a technical meaning associated with those who are concerned with argumentation.

23 Althoff (2005) 237 note 9, 239 and 251 even sees similarities between the ways Xenophon, Aristotle and some of the Hippocratic texts move between sections and discusses the similarity of the pious opening of the *Hipparchicus* with some of the openings in the Hippocratic corpus.

24 *An.* 3.5.12, *Hell.* 5.4.51 and 4.5.4, *Oec.* 20.24.4 and *Cyn.* 13.13.4.

25 In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon is both narrator and character. Because Xenophon the narrator speaks about Xenophon the character in the third person throughout, it is not immediately apparent that Xenophon is the narrator, however.

26 See Grimaldi (1972) 71 who also argues that this reference is different to the basic meaning found elsewhere.

These two uses do not prove that Xenophon had specialized knowledge. However, the majority of authors who use this term before or contemporary with Xenophon are orators, professional rhetoricians and philosophers.²⁷ These authors connect enthymemes to giving or writing speeches, and with the kinds of techniques and reasoning that speakers or philosophers use. Xenophon's similar usages suggest that he is among a small group of writers who have sufficient knowledge of rhetoric and persuasion to employ the term in its technical capacity.

There is further evidence to suggest that Xenophon was familiar with the theory in rhetorical treatises: the emotions mentioned by Xenophon in the *Hipparchicus* overlap significantly with those listed by Anaximenes and Aristotle. Although Xenophon would be unaware of their particular discussions, all three writers seem to be reflecting on a pre-existing and on-going discussion of emotions, which presumably mostly occurred in rhetorical treatises. The emotions that Xenophon instructs the commander to evoke and exploit are given in table 1 in the Appendix to this chapter. Anaximenes refers to five of the same emotions as Xenophon, as can be seen in table 2. The other emotions that Anaximenes mentions are given in table 3. There is an even clearer overlap with the list of emotions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.²⁸ Table 4 shows the eight emotions referred to by both. Table 5 indicates the other emotions that Aristotle mentions.

Even though the terms used by the three authors sometimes differ, I shall demonstrate below that what Xenophon refers to corresponds with Aristotle's definitions of the various emotions. When assessing the convergence, we must remember that neither Anaximenes nor Xenophon were aiming to produce a comprehensive list of emotions like Aristotle,²⁹ but were referring to them when they became relevant. Of the emotions mentioned by Anaximenes and Aristotle that Xenophon does not mention, it is perhaps difficult to envisage how or why he would recommend that a cavalry commander arouse or manipulate some of them – such as envy, shamelessness and ingratitude – in his daily role.

Xenophon's interest in contemporary rhetorical theory and persuasion, and the seemingly intentional overlap with the instructions on good leadership in the

27 Isoc. *Panathenaicus* 2.4, *Antidosis* 47.2, *In sophistas* 16.10, *Evagoras* 10.3 and 10.7; Aeschin. *On the Embassy* 109.10; Alcidas *On the Sophists* 3–4, 18–20, 24–5 and 33; Demetrius of Phaleron *On Style* 30, 32–3 and 109; Nausiphanes fr. 2.48; [Hippoc.] *De decete habitu* 3. There are two anomalies. Athenaeus 5.65.19–24 quotes the comic poet Anaxandrides as using the term, although it is possible that he has not copied his exact words. Indeed, as his is a philosophical work, Athenaeus might be using philosophical words where they were not originally used. However, the meaning of the term assigned to Anaxandrides seems to accord more with Xenophon's non-technical meaning of the term anyway, as a kind of scheme or craft, rather than with rhetoric or philosophy. Sophocles uses the form *tanthumēmata* at *OC* 292 and 1199.

28 Cf. Sanders (this volume) 57–60 for more on this work.

29 Aristotle's comment at 2.11, 1388b29–30 that he has finished describing the emotions (*ta pathē*) that are related to *pisteis* suggests that he has discussed them all, although he then mentions desire three lines later. (He says that he has already discussed this, however – probably in a different work.)

Hipparchicus (see below), suggests that the *Anabasis* speeches could be didactic exempla from which aspiring leaders could draw lessons for their own speeches.

INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE

I turn now to the passages in the *Hipparchicus* where Xenophon gives instructions on verbally fostering or allaying emotions as a way of influencing actions and morale, and the corresponding passages from the *Anabasis* that illustrate the same concept, taking the emotions he discusses one by one.

I begin with **fear**. At *Hipp.* 1.8, Xenophon writes that a commander should have speakers in the Council whose speeches may frighten the troops. Cavalrymen, he says, do better under the influence of fear (*phobos*). This passage indicates that fear does not always have to be engendered by the commander himself. He is said to *have* (*echein*) these speakers, however, which suggests that he has influence over what they say and that they work together as a team to get the best out of the troops. Xenophon may here be recommending that the speakers engender fear about the Council punishing the soldiers. Having the troops fear punishment by the Council may indeed be preferable to having them fear punishment by the day-to-day commander. Fear of the commander may breed further emotions, such as anger, which may cause the soldiers to feel and act negatively towards him. Anger may grow into resentment and hatred, and cause such problems as disobedience and disloyalty. Fear of a commander can, of course, also be effective. In the *Anabasis*, for example, Clearchus relies upon making his soldiers fear him. While he does get military success from this, it later fails him too. In Clearchus's obituary, the narrator tells us that in wartime, fear of Clearchus's punishments kept his soldiers disciplined. When they were no longer compelled to stay with him, however, they left because he was always harsh and rough (2.6.12–14). That the fear centres so much on Clearchus is not always positive, then. Arguably, if the fear is focused on a person or a body of people that the soldiers do not come into contact with and take orders from daily, negative feelings may have less effect on their obedience and loyalty.

A second – more likely – possibility is suggested by the *Anabasis*. Here, in contrast to Clearchus, when Xenophon the character creates fear, it is often about others; for example, in his first speech, he arouses fear of the Persian King (3.1.17–18). To some extent, Xenophon has to create fear about himself, but he makes it clear that he only uses punishment as a last resort, in extreme conditions, for the soldiers' own good, and against people who react only to such treatment (5.8.2–26). Xenophon the character's success makes it seem likely that in the *Hipparchicus* Xenophon is envisaging the Council evoking fear about an enemy.³⁰

The *Hipparchicus* passage has highlighted the strong impact fear can have and the importance of a leader having other people to raise it, and has hinted at the

30 Speakers frequently do the same in Thucydides. See Sanders (this volume) 66–70 *re* deliberative speeches, but the same also happens in speeches to armies.

different effects it can have when fear is focused on different sources. In looking for a corresponding passage in the *Anabasis*, it must be admitted that there is no exact equivalent to the Council in this work. Nussbaum aligns the captains in the *Anabasis* with the Athenian *Boulê* because of their 'intermediate' position between soldiers and general.³¹ Several speakers act as intermediaries between the general and the soldiers at a meeting arranged by Clearchus (1.3.13–19), although the narrator does not indicate that they are captains. Clearchus has pre-arranged for these men to create fear in the soldiers who wish to desert Cyrus, their current paymaster. These speakers appear to the other audience members to be raising concerns on their behalf to the general and to each other, while they are actually working in tandem with Clearchus. The essence of teamwork between the commander and Council members that is hinted at in the *Hipparchicus* is explicitly played out in this passage.

To make the soldiers fear, one speaker argues that even if Cyrus seems to be helping them leave to go home, he will, in fact, be arranging to attack them. This is because they will have ruined his plans to fight the king. The speaker also highlights that there is no way for the Greeks to leave without Cyrus knowing. The speaker mentions what Cyrus is likely to do to them if they try to leave him, and the fear he creates complements and enhances the fear that Clearchus had been trying to arouse when he spoke about Cyrus being a fearsome enemy in his previous speech (1.3.12). The speaker also specifically mentions his own feelings of fear concerning Cyrus's possible actions in order to encourage fear in the others. Once he has created fear about their chances of success, he recommends asking Cyrus what use he wants to make of them. He makes it clear that this is the only safe option.

This passage in fact demonstrates both the creation of fear about someone other than the day-to-day commander who has the power to punish the army, and also of an enemy punishing them, because Cyrus is envisaged as becoming their enemy. Aristotle's discussion of fear suggests why the speech is successful; he describes fear as being a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain, in particular, a fatal misfortune (2.5, 1382a21–2, b29–30). He also highlights that men particularly fear being injured by others, including those who think they have been wronged (2.5, 1382b9–12 and 1382a30–5). Indeed, Clearchus has previously deliberately represented Cyrus as feeling wronged by the Greeks (1.3.10), even though this is untrue.

The speech has the desired effect of making the soldiers agree with the suggestion to send representatives to ask what use Cyrus wants to make of them (1.3.20). Clearchus is able to exploit the fear created by someone else for his own aims. The importance of Xenophon's instructions about using others to create fear can be seen in the fact that Clearchus has tried several other methods to persuade the soldiers himself but it has culminated in arranging for other speakers to evoke it. The instruction in the *Hipparchicus* is brought to life by having it played out in the *Anabasis*. The fundamental message to draw from the passages examined in

31 Nussbaum (1967) 38.

both works is the same, but the *Anabasis* provides a case study of when the instruction was used successfully, and indicates why it was necessary. The *Anabasis* has far more room to develop the usefulness and pitfalls of arousing fear, yet we can see that Xenophon has successfully condensed a key message from the *Anabasis* into a couple of lines in the *Hipparchicus*.³²

I now turn to **confidence**. At *Hipparchicus* 2.5, Xenophon advises that the leader in the rear of each file has the important task of awakening the confidence of his soldiers when they need to drive out the enemy. Aristotle's analysis of *tharsos* can help us to elaborate on why such an exhortation would be successful (*Rh.* 2.5, 1383a31–2): the soldiers become confident when they see that the enemy does not inspire fear in their commander. If the soldiers feel confidence in their leader after such a speech, it may also encourage them to feel friendly feelings (*philein*) towards him, because, if Aristotle's argument at 2.4, 1381b32–3 is correct, confidence (*tharreîn*) and friendly feelings (*philein*) are linked (see below). Speeches of this kind, then, may increase the bond between leader and soldiers.

On a larger scale than file leader, Xenophon the character is the commander of the rear-guard in the *Anabasis* and is represented as giving speeches urging on the confidence of the soldiers before they are about to face the enemy – for example, at 3.4.46. He first cheers the troops by telling them to believe that they are striving for Greece and their families. This gives the soldiers a reason to fight and also works on the emotion of desire (see below). Next, he alleges that they will only have to put in a little work to overcome this enemy and to achieve their return. This gives the soldiers confidence that there is no real danger or difficulty to this battle, perhaps also evoking contempt of the enemy. This could be dangerous and make the soldiers underestimate the enemy but it also encourages them to have confidence that they will be successful. Xenophon also makes the soldiers confident by saying that they will return home without further opposition after this battle. Xenophon has nothing on which to base this assurance, which reveals it as a tactic to encourage confidence in the soldiers rather than a statement of fact.

The speech is successful because Xenophon seems assured about the accuracy of his words, which gives them authority. As we saw, and as Aristotle recommends, Xenophon shows that *he* does not fear, evokes the benefits they will get from their efforts, and indicates that there will be nothing further to fear in the future. While the passage in the *Anabasis* does not develop further any points from the *Hipparchicus* passage, it does give an example of the tactics a leader could adopt to instil confidence in his soldiers.

Xenophon also writes about the emotion of **calmness** or **mildness** (using *katapraunô*) in the *Hipparchicus*. At 1.8, Xenophon mentions the importance of having speakers who can appease the Council if its members become unduly angry. Here he is suggesting that a good commander will sometimes need to manage those who are involved alongside him in the management of the cavalry,

32 Xenophon also recommends threats that the Council can make to the soldiers to encourage them to act better in the future at *Hipp.* 1.13–15. A word for fear is not used in this passage but the threats seem to be related to the creation of fear we saw at 1.8. For a parallel, see *An.* 1.5.15–16. See Appendix table 1 for the terms used for fear in the *Hipparchicus*.

in order to stop rash decisions being made or punishments being given in anger. A leader who can successfully demonstrate that on previous occasions there was no need to get angry with him may reduce the likelihood of the same people becoming angry with him again in the future.

An example of this instruction occurs in the *Anabasis* when Xenophon the character has to appease Cheirisophus and the eldest generals, a group of men that the leaders have to answer to. At 3.3.11, they have found fault with Xenophon for leaving the main body of the army to pursue the enemy and for then being unable to do the enemy any harm. Cheirisophus and the elders are not specifically described as being angry, but it is clear that they have to be pacified by Xenophon. In the speech following their rebuke of Xenophon (3.3.12–19), we see him using several techniques to calm them down. Xenophon begins evoking mildness in them by telling them that they are right, and repeats this assertion again later. Xenophon also admits that he was responsible for what happened. Aristotle also particularly posits humbling oneself and not contradicting one's audience in order to calm it. Xenophon then goes on to explain his actions, starting with the argument that he had no other choice. He perhaps engenders sympathy too when he argues that he was motivated by the thought that the Greeks were suffering badly. He also represents the events as being something that they should all be thankful for, because the army's shortcomings might have been revealed at a more catastrophic time. Xenophon then reveals his chief argument: his actions actually allowed him to discover that the army could be arranged better. He also confirms that little damage was actually done. He concludes by providing a solution to the problem that was revealed. There is no discussion after this speech, but the proposals Xenophon makes are adopted (3.3.20). From this, it can be assumed that Xenophon succeeded in calming down Cheirisophus and the elders, after they heard his point of view. This episode demonstrates the kind of issue that may anger a body to which the leaders must answer. It also shows an array of tactics that can be used to calm such a body down. It does not add further information to the *Hipparchicus* passage, but it shows a scenario where the advice given might be necessary and demonstrates how the instruction can be carried out.

A fourth emotion that interests Xenophon is **desire**. At *Hipparchicus* 1.10, Xenophon advises that the commander get soldiers to enrol in the cavalry either by court order or by persuasion. At 1.11, he gives details for how to persuade them. He recommends speaking about the brilliance of horsemanship to encourage young men to feel desire (*epithumia*) to be in the cavalry and to overcome the resistance of their guardians. Xenophon advises the commander to say that the young men will be made by someone to keep horses anyway, but under his leadership their extravagance will be ended and they will be made into good riders. This seems designed to appeal to the guardians' financial concerns and their desire for their charges to be successful, rather than being about horsemanship *per se*. The young men may be reluctant to join the cavalry due to fear for their safety or contempt for the cavalry, yet an appeal to desire may overcome these feelings.

How this could work is made clearer in the *Anabasis*. An exact parallel cannot be found, because the men have already enrolled in the army and mostly are not

horsemen. However, we can see various attempts to encourage people to undertake something by appealing to the desirable things or benefits that they may get out of it. There is also no exact parallel of the appeal to the guardians, but the instruction can be illustrated by speeches that use arguments to overcome opposition to undertaking something, again by appealing to desirable benefits. We see both of these illustrated in a speech by Menon to his soldiers at 1.4.14–16. When the mercenaries refuse to go on, Cyrus promises them more money to continue. Before it is clear whether the other soldiers will agree to follow Cyrus or not, Menon calls his soldiers together and tries to persuade them to follow him, based on what they can get out of it.

His intimation that the soldiers would be honoured by Cyrus over and above the other troops, without danger or toil, appeals to a pre-existing desire to obtain rewards from him; the narrator later states that many of the soldiers had come on the mission because they were aware that Cyrus gave out benefits (6.4.8). Presumably, Menon's troops are such men. The ease and safety of the undertaking is also desirable, while the appeal to the soldiers being regarded more highly than the other troops may also be effective in terms of their rivalry with others. Menon says that Cyrus will be grateful to them even if the other contingents go on because they started the crossing, and, he says, Cyrus knows how to return a favour if any man does. This hint that Cyrus is extremely generous is again designed to work on the desire and perhaps even greed of Menon's soldiers. If the others do not go on, Cyrus will still think that only Menon's soldiers were obedient to him and will give them leadership roles and whatever else they may want. Here Menon is encouraging his soldiers to consider what else they might desire from Cyrus. The promise of promotions also appeals to their desire for honour. Following Menon's instructions will lead to a 'win-win' situation for his soldiers, and they are persuaded. Menon's argument is solely based on thoughts of gain, and does not take into account whether it is right for them to follow Cyrus or how the other soldiers may react to them being the only ones to go on. All this suggests that desire is a powerful motivator.³³ Although this speech differs slightly in context from the *Hipparchicus* recommendation, it still provides an example that demonstrates how such instruction works in practice, and why it works.

33 For other passages regarding desire, compare *Hipp.* 1.8 with *An.* 3.1.39–42. See also *Hipp.* 1.22–3, although I have been unable to find a convincing parallel to this one. At *Hipparchicus* 1.26, Xenophon recommends that if prizes are offered to the regiments for the things that the men are expected to do in the public cavalry spectacle, it will encourage the Athenians to feel *philonikia*. It is unclear whether this refers to the Athenians in the crowd, in which case we could translate this as emulation, along with Marchant, and see a further overlap with the emotions mentioned by Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.11 on *zēlos*). Because this comes in a section regarding how to make the soldiers and chief-officers perform well, it seems more likely that it refers to feelings the soldiers already have, and therefore to rivalry or ambition. In this case, we can link this to the emotion of desire, because the men want victory, prizes and honour, as well as shame, because they want to avoid performing poorly. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon promotes rivalry at 4.8.25–8 and 4.3.29, and encourages Proxenus's captains to emulate and surpass the generals at 3.1.24. See also *Hipp.* 9.3, 9.6 and 1.21 for *philotimia* (love of honour) which is linked to desire.

Xenophon mentions a strong emotion at *Hipparchicus* 9.7. He states that the most effective infantrymen are those who are 'most opposing' (superlative of *enantios*) towards the enemy (or 'very bitter' as Marchant translates). This clearly represents a strong feeling, which a commander can harness and deploy in a way useful to the army. This emotion seems most like Aristotle's definition of **enmity/hatred** (*echthra/misos*, 2.4, 1382a1–19). Hatred, Aristotle says, is directed indiscriminately at classes of people, without any personal injury necessarily causing it. The person who hates wants the destruction of the object of his hatred, and this can be directed in a way useful to the army. The *Hipparchicus* passage does not suggest whether a leader should continue to foster hatred once he has enlisted soldiers who hate the enemy. A passage in the *Anabasis* suggests that he should, however. As part of a pre-battle exhortation, we see Xenophon the character fostering strong opposition by urging the soldiers to eat the enemy raw (4.8.14). The likely emotion being encouraged here is hatred. The enemy are the Colchians, a class of people, rather than individuals. They have caused the army no personal outrage, but instead are simply an obstacle in the way of their reaching home, as Xenophon tells the soldiers. They need to be overcome with no pity or any consideration of individual Colchians. The metaphor of eating the Colchians raw does not aim at just hurting the Colchians but absolutely destroying them, until there is no trace of them left, not even their flesh. Xenophon is not literally suggesting they eat the Colchians; instead, it is symbolic of the strong feeling that he is trying to arouse, and the dehumanization of the opposition. The speech appeals to an irrational action and may be designed to whip the soldiers into a frenzy. This creation of hatred may be strong enough to overcome any fears the soldiers may have.

Finally, Xenophon discusses at *Hipp.* 6.1–6 the emotions of **friendly** or **loving feelings** (*philikôs/eunoikôs echein*) and **contempt** (*kataphronein*), specifically directed at a leader.³⁴ He advises that no one can get soldiers to do anything, unless they regard a leader with friendly feelings. This indicates the importance he assigned to arousing this emotion, and avoiding its opposite. The passage contains a list of things that a leader should do to evoke friendly feelings in his soldiers and to avoid contempt. These seem to be straightforward responsibilities that any leader should carry out simply for the survival of his army, and they perhaps first engender feelings of confidence in the soldiers for the leader. Aristotle's analysis helps us to understand Xenophon here. He argues that we *like* people who do important service for us (2.4, 1381a11–13) and that we *like* those in whom we have confidence rather than those we fear (2.4, 1381b32–3).³⁵ We may think again of

34 Xenophon also mentions **shame** at *Hipp.* 2.8–9, although he uses the noun *aischros*, which means something that causes shame, rather than the emotion of shame itself. He advises that soldiers know that certain actions are shameful and that this is useful to the army. I shall not discuss this passage because Xenophon is not explicitly recommending verbally evoking shame, although he may believe it needs reinforcing from time to time. See *An.* 6.5.23, for Xenophon verbally evoking shame in his soldiers.

35 On character traits and actions that arouse *philia* and *eunoia* in forensic speeches, and the relationship between these two emotions, see Sanders (forthcoming).

Clearchus who created so much fear of himself that, Xenophon says, no one followed him out of friendship or goodwill (2.6.13).

It is unclear whether Xenophon is recommending that friendly feelings be aroused by action or words. Examples of both can be seen in the *Anabasis*, but I shall provide references below to speeches as far as possible. Many of the examples that correspond to Xenophon's list of instructions in the *Hipparchicus* passage are straightforward, demonstrating no more than that Xenophon is concerned by the things that are recommended in the *Hipparchicus*. As they require little comment, I shall quote the *Hipparchicus* passage in full and indicate in footnotes where each recommendation can be illustrated in the *Anabasis*. After the passage, I shall discuss one example in more detail to demonstrate the convergence.

'However, no man can mould anything to his mind unless the stuff in which he proposes to work lies ready to obey the artist's will. No more can you make anything of men, unless, by God's help, they are ready to regard their commander with friendly feelings (*philikôs echein*) and to think him wiser than themselves in the conduct of operations against the enemy. Now the feeling of friendliness (*eunoikôs echein*) will naturally be fostered when the commander is kind to his men,³⁶ and obviously takes care that they have victuals,³⁷ and that they are safe in retreat,³⁸ and well protected when at rest.³⁹ In the garrisons he must show an interest in fodder, tents, water, firewood and all other supplies;⁴⁰ he must show that he thinks ahead,⁴¹ and keeps his eyes open for the sake of his men.⁴² And when he is doing well the chief's best policy is to give them a share in his good things.⁴³ To put it shortly, a commander is least likely to incur the contempt (*kataphronoien*) of his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing whatever he requires of them.⁴⁴ He must therefore practise every detail of horsemanship – mounting and the rest – that they may see their commander able to take a ditch without a spill, clear a wall, leap down from a bank and throw a javelin skilfully. For all these feats are so many stepping stones to their respect (*mê kataphroneisthai*).⁴⁵ If they know him also to be a master of tactics,⁴⁶ and able to put them in the way of getting the better of the enemy,⁴⁷ and if besides, they are certain that he will never lead them against an enemy reck-

36 This will be discussed below.

37 Cf. *An.* 5.1.6.

38 Cf. *An.* 4.7.7.

39 Cf. *An.* 5.1.9.

40 Cf. *An.* 5.6.30.

41 Cf. *An.* 6.5.9.

42 Cf. *An.* 7.6.36 if this means the leader suffers sleepless nights for the soldiers; *An.* 7.4.12 if it means he is watchful for them.

43 Cf. *An.* 7.5.3–4.

44 Cf. *An.* 6.6.14–16.

45 There is no equivalent passage showing a leader practicing the skills of horsemanship, but we see Xenophon performing actions demonstrating that he can do the task that he is asking of the soldiers, for example, *An.* 7.3.45–6.

46 Cf. *An.* 4.7.3–7.

47 Cf. *An.* 4.8.12–13.

lessly,⁴⁸ or without the gods' approval or in defiance of the sacrifices,⁴⁹ all these conditions increase the men's readiness to obey their commander'.⁵⁰

The first instruction, that a commander should be kind to his soldiers, can be illustrated at *An.* 7.4.7–9. Here, Xenophon has been begged by one of the soldiers, who is a lover of boys, to rescue a handsome young man from being killed. Xenophon has no particular reason to fulfil this wish, except that, as he himself tells Seuthes, this man previously performed bravely. This passage indicates that Xenophon rewards good behaviour and takes the time to remember what people within the army have achieved. Both will engender friendly feelings towards him.

None of the examples I provided explicitly show the soldiers *reacting* with friendly feelings. It is clear from other passages in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon has won the affection of the soldiers (see 3.4.47–9, 4.2.20–1, 7.6.4 and 7.6.38) but it is difficult to find them responding to a speech in this way. There is at least one example, though. During a speech at 5.8.12–26, Xenophon explains that he only beats soldiers when it is for their own good and the good of the army. He ends by saying that he is surprised that people remember such incidents but not the good things he has done for them. He lists helping soldiers in the cold, warding off the enemy, providing for the sick or needy, praising soldiers for good deeds and honouring the brave as examples. As a response, soldiers stand up and reminisce about particular positive incidents. This episode suggests that the soldiers were able to remember many occasions when Xenophon had done something for them, which may well have made them feel friendly towards him. Overall, the *Anabasis* is a masterclass from Xenophon in fulfilling the instructions regarding friendly feelings in the *Hipparchicus*, despite the criticism he sometimes faced.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory and, in particular, the discussion of emotions. He clearly thought that being able to persuade others, and make use of emotions to do so, was vital for any leader and could determine success or failure – which is why arousing emotions through words and actions, and making use of emotions created by situations, feature in both the *Hipparchicus* and *Anabasis*. By examining other technical works, we ascertained that Xenophon might have been expected to include examples to illustrate his instructions regarding arousing emotions in the *Hipparchicus*. It is my contention that when Xenophon was writing this work, he specifically considered that he had provided examples to illustrate and even develop his instructions elsewhere, particularly in the numerous speeches in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon's interest in rhetoric, his conviction in its importance for leaders, and the role he seems to have assigned to the speeches as didactic exempla, seem to offer an explanation as

48 Cf. *An.* 6.5.14.

49 Cf. *An.* 6.5.21.

50 Xen. *Hipp.* 6.1–6; trans. Marchant (1968), slightly amended.

to why there are so many speeches in the *Anabasis*. Indeed, the *Anabasis* also includes speeches acting as negative exempla, demonstrating how *not* to manipulate the emotions. Thus, the narrator illustrates both competent and incompetent leaders from whom readers can learn.

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APPENDIX: EMOTIONS REFERRED TO IN XENOPHON'S
HIPPARCHICUS, THE *RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER*,
 AND ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

Table 1: Emotions referred to by Xenophon in the *Hipparchicus*

Emotion	Greek	References
fear (and panic)	<i>phobos</i> / <i>phobeô</i> / <i>phoberos</i> (and <i>ekplêssô</i>)	1.8, 1.13–15, 4.11–12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6–7, 8.19–20
confidence	<i>tharsos</i> / <i>tharseô</i> / <i>rômên</i>	2.5, 4.17–19, 5.3, 5.8
calmness / mildness	<i>katapraunô</i>	1.8
shame	<i>aischros</i>	2.8–9
desire	<i>epithumia</i> / <i>epithumeô</i> (see also <i>philonikia</i> / <i>philotimos</i> / <i>philotimeomai</i>)	1.8, 1.11, 1.22–3 (1.21, 1.26, 9.3, 9.6)
opposition (hatred / enmity)	<i>enantios</i>	9.7
love / friendship	<i>philikos</i> / <i>eunoikos</i>	6.1–4
contempt	<i>kataphroneô</i>	6.4–6

Table 2: Emotions corresponding to Xenophon's referred to in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

Emotion	Greek	References
fear	<i>deidô</i>	7.5, 1428a40
desire	<i>epithumeô</i> (see also <i>philotimia</i> , here classed amongst <i>ta pathê</i>)	7.5, 1428b1–2 (7.14, 1429a19)
hatred / enmity	<i>misos</i> / <i>miseô</i> / <i>echthra</i>	34.12–13, 1440a26–32; 34.16, 1440a39–b5; 36.29, 1443b15–22; 36.49, 1445a13–19
friendship	<i>philia</i>	34.12, 1440a26–9; 34.16, 1440a39–40b5; 36.29, 1443b15–22
contempt	<i>kataphroneô</i>	7.5, 1428a39

Table 3: Other emotions referred to in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

Emotion	Greek	References
anger	<i>orgê</i>	7.14, 1429a18; 34.12, 1440a26–9; 34.14, 1440a32–4; 34.16, 1440a39–40b5; 36.29, 1443b15–22; 36.49, 1445a13–19
gratitude	<i>charis</i>	34.16, 1440a39–b5; 36.29, 1443b15–22; 36.47, 1444b36–1445a4
pity	<i>eleos</i>	34.16, 1440a39–b5; 36.29, 1443b15–22; 36.47–8, 1444b36–45a13
envy	<i>phthonos</i> / <i>phthoneô</i>	34.12, 1440a26–9; 34.15–16, 1440a34–b5; 36.29, 1443b16–22; 36.49–50, 1445a13–27
feeling pleasure	<i>êdomai</i>	7.5, 1428b1
feeling pain	<i>lupeô</i>	7.5, 1428b1
sexual passion / desire	<i>erôs</i>	7.14, 1429a18
drunkenness	<i>methê</i>	7.14, 1429a18

Table 4: Emotions corresponding to Xenophon's referred to in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

Emotion	Greek	References
fear	<i>phobos</i> / <i>phobeô</i>	2.5, 1382a20–83a12
confidence	<i>tharsos</i> / <i>tharseô</i> / <i>tharsaleos</i>	2.5, 1383a13–b10
calmness / mildness	<i>praotês</i> / <i>praos</i> / <i>praunô</i>	2.3, 1380a6–b34
shame	<i>aischunê</i> / <i>aischunô</i>	2.6, 1383b11–85a15
enmity / hatred	<i>echthra</i> / <i>echthros</i> / <i>misos</i> / <i>miseô</i>	2.4, 1382a1–19
friendly / loving feeling	<i>philia</i> / <i>phileô</i>	2.4, 1380b35–81b37
contempt	<i>kataphronêsis</i> / <i>kataphroneô</i> / <i>kataphronêtikos</i>	2.11, 1388b22–8
desire	<i>epithumia</i>	2.12, 1388b33

Table 5: Other emotions referred to by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*

Emotion	Greek	References
anger	<i>orgê / orgizô</i>	2.2, 1378a30–80a5
pity	<i>eleos / eleeô</i>	2.8, 1385b11–86b7
indignation	<i>nemesis / nemesaô / nemesêtikos</i>	2.9, 1386b8–87b19
emulation	<i>zêlos / zêloô / zêlôtikos</i>	2.11, 1388a31–b22
envy	<i>phthonos / phthoneros / phthoneô</i>	2.10, 1387b22–88a30
shamelessness	<i>anaischuntia / anaischunteô</i>	2.6, 1383b11; 2.6, 1385a14–15
gratitude	<i>charis / charizô</i>	2.7, 1385a16–29
ingratitude	<i>acharistos / acharisteô</i>	2.7, 1385a33–b10

ANGER AS A MECHANISM FOR SOCIAL CONTROL IN IMPERIAL ROME

Jayne Knight

Anger is often taken for granted as a universally understood emotion. Emotion theorists, both ancient and modern, frequently include anger in lists of ‘basic emotions,’ which implies that there is something about anger that is fundamental to human psychology and physiology.¹ This has given rise to the assumption that because we all feel anger, we know anger when we see it, and we understand what it signifies. Now that scholars in diverse fields have begun to study anger through the lens of their disciplines, the sense that anger is uncomplicated persists, even though it has been observed that the ‘rules’ for anger differ significantly across cultures.² In recent years Classicists have launched studies that explore various aspects of ancient emotional culture, but the majority skirt the issue of anger even when an understanding of the emotion is essential to their thesis; for example, studies on regret and forgiveness in the ancient world depend upon the assumption that anger in ancient cultures is already thoroughly understood.³ I propose that

- 1 Ortony and Turner (1990) summarize and challenge the concept of ‘basic emotions’ – one can note the frequent occurrence of anger and rage in their selected lists of basic emotions (316, Table 1). See Ekman (1992) for a counter argument supporting the concept. Among ancient theorists, Aristotle includes anger in lists of emotions in several places, e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 2.5, 1105b21 ff.; *De an.* 1.1, 403a16–17; *Rh.* 2.1, 1378a20–3. Aristotle *Rh.* 2.2 focuses on the persuasive power of anger. On the Roman side, Cicero acknowledges the importance of select emotions to an orator’s work in *De orat.* 2.206 and defines the arousal of audience emotions as the greatest power of an orator at 1.53 (anger occurs first in this list). There are several treatises devoted to anger, e.g. Philodemus’s *De ira* (*On Anger*), Seneca the Younger’s essay of the same title, and Plutarch’s entry *De cohibenda ira* (*On the Control of Anger*) in his *Moralia*.
- 2 Psychologists use the term ‘display rules’ to refer to societal norms that dictate how, when, where and to whom emotions should be displayed. Scholars of ancient emotion must rely on textual evidence and material culture to make conjectures about display rules in social groups of the past. Literary studies produce information about *discourses* of emotion in ancient cultures, and from these we can make inferences about the actual emotional cultures of ancient societies. Douglas Cairns’s work on emotions exemplifies this approach; e.g. his book on *aidōs* (1993), and his chapter on Iliadic anger (2004). See the introductory chapters of, for example, Konstan (2001), Kaster (2005) and Chaniotis (2012) for the difficulty of reading emotions through ancient texts.
- 3 The studies to which I refer are Konstan (2010a) and Fulkerson (2013). These works are by no means ignorant of problems surrounding our understanding of ancient emotion; they have specific focal points and do not have space to address all underlying issues fully. Konstan (2006) 41–76, however, devotes a chapter to exploring unique aspects of ancient Greek anger.

Classicists and other humanities scholars still have much to gain from studying anger more closely, and I offer as evidence of this the present chapter on the use of anger as a persuasive tool in Roman imperial leadership.⁴

Romans of the classical period maintained a unique relationship with anger (*ira* in Latin) that set them apart from other societies, even the ancient Greeks, whose culture undoubtedly influenced Roman philosophical thought on emotion. The stories Romans told about the primordial moments of their civilization connected anger with pragmatism and leadership. In many versions of Rome's foundational narrative, the founder and first king of the city murders his twin brother in anger and suffers no negative consequences from the act.⁵ In fact, Romulus uses the moment to communicate his intent to rule, and he is rewarded with a long and prosperous reign. Romulus's performance of anger persuaded those around him that his authority would not be challenged. Still, it is easy to disqualify anger as a negative, destructive force which is deleterious to society and the individual. If one only reads select philosophical sources, this is the conception that dominates. Negative Greek and Roman attitudes toward anger have been thoroughly explored by William Harris in his monograph *Restraining Rage*.⁶ The significant disparity in the amount of material Harris presents between Greek and Roman sources seems to imply that we can learn almost everything we need to know about Roman anger from studying Greek anger, but anger in Roman thought and practice was not merely derivative.⁷ Konstan's landmark study persuasively argues that the emotions of the ancient Greeks were 'attuned to the demands' of their society,⁸ and the same can be said about Roman emotions. Although the Greeks and Romans shared much in common, we should not assume that emotions were understood in a uniform way in both societies.⁹

4 Ancient anger has received dedicated treatment from Harris (2001), Braund and Most (2004) and Kalimtzis (2012). Roman emotions in general receive attention in Braund and Gill (1997). Braund has published on anger in satire, e.g. her book *Beyond Anger* (1988) and her chapter in Braund and Gill (1997). Kaster (2005) is a groundbreaking study of the relationship between emotion and Roman ethics and behaviour, but its focus on emotions that encourage restraint (e.g. shame and regret) leaves room for a study on anger and other more aggressive emotions in Roman contexts. Many scholars have written on anger in Virgil's *Aeneid* – e.g. Galinsky (1988), Wright (1997), Gill (2004) and Konstan (2010b).

5 Livy 1.7. Remus mockingly jumps over his brother's freshly raised walls on the Palatine and is immediately killed by an angry Romulus (*ab irato Romulo*). Romulus then declares, 'So it shall be from now on, for whoever else jumps over my walls.' Livy notes that this is the more common (*volgatior*) version of the story, although other variations exist. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

6 Harris (2001).

7 Within Harris's large and comprehensive work (418 pages), he offers a single chapter entitled 'The Roman Version' (201–8) to address specifically the status of anger control in Roman society. On p. 202 he asks, 'Is there anything to discuss in this chapter, one may wonder, other than the Hellenization of the Romans?' It is not surprising that Harris's study found much more material on anger control in Greek contexts; Romans were more interested in the *use* of anger than its restraint.

8 Konstan (2006) 259.

9 Konstan (2006) 261.

A unique discourse of pragmatic anger emerged at Rome.¹⁰ The ideal Roman leader was an expert *performer* of anger, but not necessarily a feeler of it. There are examples from literature wherein anger is essentially ‘faked’ in order to achieve certain sociopolitical goals (e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 51; Plin. *Ep.* 9.21). While it is possible to feel genuine anger and still successfully manage it (whether that means expressing it or managing it internally), the use of feigned anger is safe to the individual because it lacks negative internal effects and can yield positive external results. Additionally, if anger is performed rather than felt, it increases the chances that it will be effectively communicated; the externality of Roman culture meant that anger was evaluated according to the way it looked and sounded as well as the circumstances predicating it.¹¹ The ideal Roman leader possessed the ability to harness what was useful about anger and restrict its undesirable attributes.¹² This attitude mirrors the Roman agenda on a larger scale: Romans were skilled at incorporating the best of what their military conquests had to offer into their own culture while working to curtail what they considered harmful. Roman men likewise strove to conquer the self through isolation and employment of the most effective tools in the arsenal of human emotions.¹³ A ‘pick and choose’ approach to ethics is what allowed anger to become a mainstay of Roman leadership.¹⁴

Romans appear to have recognized the persuasive power of anger in the hands of a competent leader, and by instilling Romulus with this power, they made pragmatic anger a part of their identity. My framework of imperial anger proposes

10 It is notable for what follows that the Greek general Xenophon does not include anger in the many emotions he uses to persuade his men – see Winter (this volume). I should also note that Aristotle treats anger as a pragmatic emotion in *Rhetoric* 2.2.

11 Suet. *Claud.* 30 describes the disgusting appearance of Claudius’s anger. According to Suetonius, the emperor foamed at the mouth and had a runny nose when he got angry. This appearance coupled with his stammer made his anger seem ridiculous to his subjects.

12 This ability may have been truly in the realm of the ideal, as modern psychologists have noted the extreme difficulty of managing anger – cf. Tice and Baumeister (1993). The answer as to why the Romans appear to value a nearly impossible skill lies in their special interest in the performative value of emotion.

13 I refer to Roman men here because the discourse of pragmatic anger was conducted by and only relevant to elite male Romans. See Harris’s chapters on women’s anger (2001) 264–82 and (2004) 121–43. See Seneca’s comments in *De ira* 2.34.1 about the importance of status to displays of anger (keeping in mind that *De ira* is an anti-anger treatise). See also Konstan (2006) 73–6 for the relationship between anger and social status in Greek society.

14 Traditional Roman ethics were largely situational, as they drew from practical examples (*exempla*) rather than theoretical or technical lessons (*praecepta*). Quint. *Inst.* 12.2.29–30 argues that providing Roman *exempla* of moral performance is more effective than the *praecepta* of Greek philosophy. Sen. *Ep.* 6.5 proposes that *exempla* are superior to *praecepta* because they achieve results faster. See Langlands (2011) for the importance of situational variability to Roman ethics. Winter (this volume) argues that Xenophon’s *Anabasis* supplies *exempla* for his technical treatment of emotions in the *Hipparchicus*, noting that many Greek rhetorical treatises include examples (but Xenophon’s oddly does not). Although Quintilian saw a difference between Greek and Roman pedagogical strategies, it is clear that there was some overlap between them.

that a dichotomy between ‘rational’ and ‘emotional’ did not exist in Roman emotional culture, and that anger could be a part of a ‘rational’ decision making process.¹⁵ The idea that anger was considered useful in Roman society is not far-fetched. More than any other emotion, anger was dynamic: it could be the socio-political glue that maintained the status quo or the catalyst that inspired revolution. Roman leaders were primarily interested in the former function of anger as they worked to achieve and maintain social control through the use of anger to persuade subjects of their authority.

The establishment of the Roman Principate produced an authority figure whose emotions (as well as values and opinions) held enormous sociopolitical sway.¹⁶ The emperor was at once a living, emotional person and a dehumanized symbol of the state, and the tension between these two ideas is apparent in writings that address imperial anger. Philosophically minded sources such as Seneca the Younger advise that emperors should shun their emotional impulses altogether, because open displays of emotion, and especially displays of anger, are inappropriate and even unsafe for rulers, who are held to a different, much stricter behavioural standard than other members of Roman society.¹⁷ On the other hand, historical sources suggest that emperors held on to their human capacity to feel, and even used their emotions as persuasive mechanisms to achieve and maintain social control.¹⁸ This was not without risk, however. Few emperors possessed the ‘emotional intelligence’ required to use anger successfully in this way, and inappropriate relationships with anger led to assassinations and fuelled historians’ negative portraits of imperial reigns (see, for example, Tacitus’s portrayals of Tiberius, Claudius and Nero in the *Annals*, and Suetonius’s biographies of Caligula and Domitian).

Imperial emotions gained compliance through persuasion: if used successfully, they convinced subjects of an emperor’s legitimacy as a ruler. The emperor’s authority, when properly established, had the ability to make unfair circumstances seem fair, which in turn decreased subjects’ potential for anger. Legitimacy encourages people to accept unfair circumstances without becoming angry, because they view these circumstances as legitimate. Carol Tavis succinctly states that ‘legitimacy is death to anger.’¹⁹ In imperial Rome, legitimacy was indeed the end of subjects’ right to anger, and the birth of the emperor’s anger (*ira Caesaris*) as a force that defined and imposed the values of a newly built autocracy.

15 My view that anger served a practical purpose in Roman society is supported by Konstan’s conclusions about the role of anger in ancient Greek life – (2006) 75–6.

16 It is important to remember that Roman society and politics did not operate by what we might consider a ‘rational’ bureaucracy. Social concerns were far more important and emotions were valid means of navigating sociopolitical scenarios. See Millar (1977), Saller (1982), Lendon (1997) and Roller (2001) for background on the dynamics of Roman political culture under the empire.

17 Seneca tackles this issue in his treatise *De clementia* (*On Mercy*), written for Nero upon his accession.

18 By historical sources I primarily mean historiography, oratory and letters.

19 Tavis (1982) 227.

Because there are relatively few first-person accounts of anger written by emperors,²⁰ I draw my case studies from sources written by imperial subjects responding to, anticipating and reflecting upon emperors' anger: Ovid, Seneca and Suetonius, respectively. By considering material drawn from three genres – elegiac poetry, philosophy and historiography – I aim to provide a snapshot of the persuasive functions of imperial anger. Because the emperors who are the subject of the case studies in this chapter were among the first, their status as absolute rulers whose emotions evinced absolute authority was arguably under more scrutiny than it would be at later stages of imperial rule in Rome.²¹ This scrutiny produced the discourse of imperial emotions that we see in sources that document this period. It is my view that early emperors were aware of the potential persuasive power that their emotions, and especially their anger, held in such an elevated sociopolitical position, and they let this understanding inform their choices concerning their use of anger in their governments, with varied levels of success.

THE ANGER OF AUGUSTUS IN OVID'S *EPISTULAE EX PONTO*

Augustus's long and well-documented reign offers a wealth of information about the construction of the identity and emotional persona of the Roman *princeps*. Augustus's interest in anger is evidenced by his promotion of literary works that theorize the value of anger in sociopolitical contexts and historiographers' accounts of his behaviour.²² Ovid's exile poetry provides another exciting window into the possible emotional relationships between emperor and subject.²³ Because these poems are the only surviving evidence of Ovid's exile, attempts to use them to reconstruct historical events must use appropriate caution. The emotional realities of poet and emperor are, of course, also impossible to determine – as is the case when using any form of ancient evidence to learn about emotions – but the

- 20 Claudius's *Letter to the Alexandrians* is one fantastic example of a first-person account of imperial anger. Claudius threatens the population of Alexandria with his anger, proclaiming, 'I declare once and for all that unless you put a stop to this destructive and insolent anger against each other (ὀλέθριον ὀργὴν ταύτην κατ' ἀλλήλων αὐθάδιον), I shall be forced to show what a benevolent prince is when turned to righteous anger (ὀργὴν δίκαιαν)!' This quotation contrasts the destructive anger of the populace with the constructive anger of the emperor, demonstrating that Romans understood that there were different kinds of anger, and that the power of a person's emotions in Roman society was directly correlated with their sociopolitical status.
- 21 Because of their longstanding cultural distaste for the idea of monarchy, Roman kingship theory took less obvious forms. Modes of kingship theory experienced a significant boom in response to the establishment of the Principate.
- 22 For example, both Livy's history and Virgil's *Aeneid* contain themes of anger and its use and abuse. Suetonius's *Life of Augustus* and Dio's history provide anecdotes featuring Augustus's use of anger.
- 23 There are many issues surrounding the historicity of the information provided by these works, but for my purposes here, I take the view that the historical person Ovid was exiled by Augustus, and that he is the subject of these poems. See Claassen (1987) for a thorough discussion of the relationship between Ovid and Augustus and its bearing on the exile poetry.

poems can be considered part of the discourse of Roman imperial anger during Augustus's reign.²⁴ In his *Tristia* and *Epistulae Ex Ponto*, Ovid exclusively attributes his exile to Augustus's anger with him. Anger would have been justification enough for an absolute ruler to punish a perceived offense with severity according to the motives and practice of imperial emotions that I previously described.

Most scholars of Ovid, including Gaertner in his commentary on the *Epistulae*, read the poet's treatment of Augustus's anger as an implicit attack on the emperor, noting that kingship theory criticizes anger as an especially undesirable trait in a ruler.²⁵ Some point out the epic connotations of anger; for instance, McGowan translates *ira* as 'wrath' to support his argument that Ovid invites a comparison of Augustus's *ira* with Achilles' *mēnis*.²⁶ The choice of 'wrath' as a translation for *ira* makes sense given the divine scale with which Ovid sometimes endows Augustus's power, but if Augustus's *ira* really were on the scale of Jupiter's anger, Ovid would have had no hope of appeasing it through his poetry or through the intercession of his friends, which he often professes to be his hope.

I will present selected passages from the *Epistulae ex Ponto* to reveal how Ovid represents Augustus's imperial anger as a persuasive mechanism for social control. I have chosen to present passages from the *Epistulae* for this purpose because they are ostensibly composed as letters that serve a pragmatic purpose of securing Ovid's return through the intervention of his powerful social connections. Ovid paints a picture of an emperor who has acted in an elevated emotional state to enforce the policies of his sociopolitical agenda. Contrary to calling his treatment unjust and Augustus's anger illegitimate, Ovid acknowledges the justice of his punishment and appears to understand the emperor's governing process of balancing mercy and severity.²⁷ Ovid's approach was probably also informed by the established practice of appealing to *clementia Caesaris* (the mercy of Caesar),²⁸ which would have been a much safer option for him than open criticism of *ira Caesaris*.

Pont. 2.2.113–20 describes Augustus as a ruler who makes informed decisions guided by his healthy emotional compass:

24 For Ovid's negative view of imperial anger in the *Metamorphoses*, see Johncock (this volume).

25 Gaertner (2005) 290; cf. Millar (1993): Ovid was not subversive, but he was an active participant in the Augustan literary programme. Fulkerson (2012) 339–66 and (2013) 133–46 also reads Ovid's use of anger as an insult against the emperor. Fulkerson (2012) 353 argues that representing Augustus as angry 'not only undermines any pretensions the emperor might have to self-control, it removes the exile of Ovid from the realm of rational explanation.' Syme (1978) 223–24 describes Ovid's focus on *ira* as the poet's most important weapon against the emperor.

26 McGowan (2009) 192. See Harris (2001) 50–70 for a discussion of the Greek and Latin terminology of anger.

27 Cf. Braund (2011).

28 Cf., for example, Cicero's Caesarian speeches.

Besides it's no Polyphemus in his vast Sicilian
 cavern, no cannibal king who's to receive
 this petition of yours, but a calm, compliant father,
 quick to forgive, whose thunder often lacks
 a lightning charge, who's made sad by his own harsh decisions,
 for whom to punish others is to punish himself.
 Yet his clemency was conquered by my offence, his anger
 came perforce to its full strength.²⁹

Ovid attempts a panegyric strategy here to acquire mercy: he calls Augustus merciful in hopes that it will make him so. This technique is reminiscent of Cicero's handling of Caesar in the Caesarian speeches and Seneca's later engagement with Nero in the *De clementia*. Ovid refers to Augustus's practice of warning before he strikes; this is the pragmatic face of anger as a form of 'human hiss' that communicates a message of displeasure with someone else's behaviour.³⁰ The emperor's 'thunder' is designed to warn a transgressor that punishment will follow if he continues his criminal activity. Here Augustus's anger is not the unrestrained *mēnis* of Achilles or even the momentary *furor* of Aeneas – it is the practical reaction of a sympathetic ruler. By contrasting Augustus's behaviour with violent, foreign monsters, Ovid describes Augustus's anger as a civilized tool to enforce his power and persuade his subjects to obey his will. It is worthwhile to note that while Augustus's anger is not described in pejorative terms (unless one reads a divine description as negative),³¹ Ovid uses the negative term *furor* to describe his own frenzied emotional state (*Pont.* 2.1.11; 2.3.46).

The theme of Augustus using thunder instead of lightning to encourage his subjects toward good behaviour is also present here in *Pont.* 1.7.43–50:

But he himself, Caesar, saw – who sees through all things –
 that folly was the word for my 'crimes',
 and as far as I or the matter allowed, he spared me,
 using his fiery bolt with mild restraint.
 Neither life nor wealth he took from me, nor the chance of
 reversion – if his anger were conquered by your prayers.
 Yet mine was a heavy fall. Small wonder if one smitten
 by Jove suffers no slight wound.

29 Translations of *Epistulae ex Ponto* are by Green (1994).

30 Tavis (1982) 45 uses the phrase 'human hiss' to describe the communicative function of anger. She offers examples of the messages anger can convey: 'Pay attention to me. I don't like what you are doing. Restore my pride. You're in my way. Danger. Give me justice.'

31 See Johncock (this volume) for a negative reading of divine comparisons in the *Metamorphoses*. I believe that Ovid's approach toward *ira Caesaris* changes after he is exiled. His rejection of the power of divine anger is clear in the epilogue to the *Metamorphoses* in which he dismisses Jupiter's anger as capable of destroying his *opus*. Johncock observes that Ovid's depiction of Jupiter's anger is negative elsewhere in the poem, e.g. it causes the god to inflict excessive punishment on Lycaon in *Met.* 1. When Ovid himself becomes the victim of excessive (in his opinion) punishment, he must change his strategy and appeal for mercy. I argue that part of his appeal to Augustus's *clementia* involves acknowledgment of the emperor's *ira*.

Augustus's anger comes from a place of wisdom and Ovid appears to respect his choices even if he does not enjoy their consequences. This passage shows Augustus weighing the significance of Ovid's offence and deciding what degree of punishment the poet deserved, all while angry. Augustus's faculty of reason and his anger are intimately connected; one does not cloud the other in his decision making process. It seems as if Ovid took the view that emotions were not at odds with reasoning, but rather a necessary component of it.³² Anger does not invalidate Augustus's decision to exile Ovid, it justifies it. Ovid exhibited stupidity by not taking shelter when he heard the thunder. Augustus's initial attempts to persuade Ovid to good behaviour were unsuccessful, and so he was compelled to use the full force of *ira Caesaris* to control the situation.

These two passages highlight Ovid's representation of Augustus as a powerful ruler who employed his anger in a restrained way to encourage and maintain social order and in a severe way when the initial warning failed to convince. Throughout the *Epistulae*, Ovid wades through his own emotional turmoil, alternating between being hopeful about the possibility of receiving clemency (1.6.41–6; 2.8.75–6)³³ and feeling despondent at the possibility that the emperor's anger is too strong to be pacified (1.8.69–72). The exile poetry can easily be read as the experience of a subject who has been persuaded toward obedience by imperial anger.³⁴ While he could have chosen to express indignation over the power of imperial anger, Ovid joins other authors in elevating the emperor to divine status.³⁵ At *Pont.* 1.1.49–50 he exclaims:

And because I have earned, and felt, the Prince's anger,
think not that he'd refuse my worship!

On a basic level, we learn from these poems how an emperor's anger was perceived, accepted and responded to by a subject. We can also see how this anger was meant as a persuasive mechanism to communicate, maintain and enforce the values of the Augustan regime, and my reading of these poems suggests that Augustus was successful in his efforts to use anger to this effect.

32 This has some similarity with an Aristotelian view of the role of rationality in emotion, but was somewhat out of sync with the Stoic philosophy that was increasingly prevalent in the Rome of Ovid's time. Konstan (2001) suggests that the Aristotelian account of the emotions reflected the standard view in the ancient world.

33 In the latter example Ovid calls Augustus's *ira* just (*iusta*), reinforcing the idea that he is not using anger as an insult against the emperor.

34 The question of whether Ovid's suppliant attitude in these poems is genuine or not is best left unanswered. Recently, scholars have favoured an ironic reading of the exile poetry; cf. Claassen (2008) 31–3. My point is that Ovid intended his strategy to be successful at securing his recall, which would require sensitive treatment of the emperor's emotions.

35 Cf., for example, Horace *Odes* 1.2. Ovid modifies his approach from the end of *Met.* 15 where he states that Augustus will rise to heaven as a god.

SENECA'S *DE IRA* AND *DE CLEMENTIA* AND THE PROBLEM OF EMOTIONS IN AN AUTOCRACY

Another way in which Roman emperors attempted social control was by managing the anger of their subjects, which was likewise achieved through the use of their own anger and its consequences as a threat. Seneca advises in *De ira* that in order to survive at court, one must avoid acting on anger or even acknowledging an offence, because an attempt at revenge against a more powerful person would most likely fail: 'Often it's so inexpedient to avenge a wrong that it's not even expedient to acknowledge it' (2.33.2).³⁶ To illustrate this truth, he offers an anecdote about a Roman father whose son angered the emperor Caligula with his 'refined grooming and exceptionally well-tended head of hair.'³⁷ The father intercedes on behalf of his son, asking the emperor to spare his life. The emperor responds by sentencing the son to death, and in a further show of cruelty, invites the father to a celebratory dinner before the execution. Seneca describes how the father dines (apparently) happily, accepting unfiltered wine, garlands and large amounts of food in a successful attempt to completely conceal his anger at the emperor's actions. Seneca explains that this was a wise decision, because the father had another son who would have also been doomed if the emperor had been offended. Seneca points to Priam at 2.33.5 as an exemplum of this pragmatic behaviour: 'What of great Priam? Did he not hide his anger, clasp the king's knees, kiss the hand smeared with his son's clotted blood, share a dinner?' The power of *ira Caesaris* obligated the Roman father in this story, like Priam, to conceal his own anger.

This narrative demonstrates how an emperor can exert power by forcing emotional restraint upon his subjects while he himself is able to justify rulings based on his anger alone. In this case, Seneca is complicit in this method of imperial social control, as he advises that it is best for subjects not to react when an injury has been done them, and warns that showing anger toward a superior is madness (2.33.2; 2.34.1). Seneca does not explicitly condemn the emperor's use of anger in this scenario, but instead emphasizes the necessity of the father's concealment of his own feelings of anger and grief. Potentially angry autocrats were a reality for a person living in the early empire, and by taking priority over the emotions of all others, *ira Caesaris* served as a persuasive mechanism of obedience.

Seneca also addresses imperial anger at length in his essay *De clementia*, although from a different perspective. *De ira* was written for the advisement of subjects in the orbit of the emperor, while *De clementia* was written for the emperor himself. In these two essays Seneca attacks the problem of emotions in an autocracy from both sides: subjects must work hard to avoid experiencing and

36 Translations of *De ira* are by Kaster in Kaster and Nussbaum (2010). At 2.33.1 Seneca writes '...it's often better to pretend not to notice than to get revenge. When more powerful people wrong us, we must bear it not just patiently but with a smile: they'll do it again if they believe they've succeeded.'

37 2.33.3. Suet. *Calig.* 50 remarks upon Caligula's lack of hair and his sensitivity about his baldness.

expressing anger since the anger of the emperor in response will ruin them, while emperors must work hard to be merciful when they are angry, because a policy of clemency will shield them against the anger of the populace. Both of these essays seek to mold behaviour to a certain Stoic standard, which could suggest that what was actually going on between emperors and subjects at the time was quite different from what Seneca advises. In any case, we can say with certainty that the new office of emperor created a figure whose anger had more sociopolitical import than ever before, and this reality prompted Seneca to examine anger and attempt to regulate it through philosophical persuasion.

Part of Seneca's argument for clemency is that it is rare, especially among rulers. Why wouldn't someone in possession of so much power use that power to satisfy his anger with politically sanctioned revenge? He asks at 1.5.4:

After all, is there anything more remarkable than this: that the person who has an anger that meets no obstacle, who can pass a rather severe sentence that even its victims themselves assent to, whom no one will appeal to or even plead with if he is especially fiercely incensed, should take hold of himself and deploy his power for better and more peaceful ends with this very thought: 'To kill in defiance of the law is open to anyone. To preserve life is open to no one except for me'?³⁸

Where Ovid acknowledges Augustus's human propensity and rationale for anger, Seneca appears to construct a new definition of emperor as someone who should forswear the normal spectrum of human emotions and reactions. There are many possible reasons for this difference in approach to imperial anger. Augustus's anger has already secured Ovid's punishment, whereas Seneca attempts to prevent Nero's future use of anger against his subjects.³⁹ Seneca is also actively participating in the tradition of kingship theory in this essay. It is remarkable that both Ovid and Seneca describe the emperor as a god who wields thunder and lightning as weapons, although Seneca does not acknowledge the practicality of thunder as much as the desirability of a clear sky (1.7.2).

Although Seneca's goal in *De clementia* is to discourage Nero from using anger, his description of the effects of the emotion is compatible with my explanation of the functions of imperial anger. Here at 1.8.5 he describes the impact of an emperor's anger:

You cannot get angry without everything trembling, because you cannot strike anyone without everything around him shaking. Just as the fall of thunderbolts is dangerous to a few but terrifying to everyone, so the punishments imposed by mighty powers cause more widespread fear than damage, and not without reason. The concern about a person of absolute power is not the extent of his past actions but the extent of his potential actions.

38 Translations of *De clementia* are by Braund (2009).

39 Seneca does not mention Augustus's angry relegation of Ovid in either of his two treatises that treat imperial anger. He refers to Augustus's use of *clementia* in both works, although he admits that Augustus acted in anger when he was young at *De clem.* 1.11.1: *in adulescentia caluit, arsit ira, multa fecit.*

This passage outlines the scope of imperial anger as a mechanism for social control. Although Seneca did not believe that engendering fear was the best way to rule an empire, or that anger was a morally valid component of conflict resolution, he acknowledged that rulers have the ability to manage their subjects with anger and that some have achieved it in the past. Later accounts of Nero's reign suggest that Seneca's argument that performing anger is not 'appropriate to a king's grandeur' (1.7.4) did not successfully persuade the emperor to shun the emotion. Seneca himself became a victim of Nero's anger when he was ordered to commit suicide in 65 CE.

LOOKING BACK ON ANGER IN SUETONIUS'S *DE VITA CAESARUM*

The source material for the final section of this chapter comes from Suetonius's biographies of the twelve Caesars. The perspectives on anger provided by this text are quite different from those of Ovid's exile poetry or Seneca's philosophical treatises because the subjects of the narratives were long dead at the time of publication, and thus the threat of their anger was safely in the past. The text has no motivation to mitigate, inspire or direct imperial anger; it only serves to describe the personalities and inclinations of past emperors while providing light commentary on the pros and cons of certain imperial characteristics and behaviours. It offers us a relatively straightforward description of popular notions of how past emperors employed anger during their reigns.

In his biography of Augustus, Suetonius describes the emperor's friendships, remarking that while Augustus did not make very many friends, he kept the ones he did have very close (*Aug.* 66). Suetonius notes that only two of Augustus's friends fell into disgrace after committing offenses against him, and were afterwards justly executed by order of the Senate. While Augustus was grateful for the Senate's loyalty to him, he was distressed that such severe measures had to be taken against friends who had wronged him. Suetonius describes Augustus's reaction to his predicament: '[he] shed tears and bemoaned his lot, that he alone had not the power to decide how far he wished to take his anger (*quatenus vellet irasci*) toward his friends.'⁴⁰ Private citizens were permitted to manage conflicts by simply expressing anger, but because Augustus was emperor, his mere anger (with no further action) would not be seen as an adequate response to a personal offence. This example somewhat contradicts the vision of Augustus's anger offered by Ovid and Seneca, as they emphasized his ability and propensity to thunder without striking, but here Suetonius describes Augustus as obligated to strike by his office. This narrative gives the impression that even if emperors did not personally wish to satisfy their anger with capital punishment, the Senate could demand it. In early imperial Rome, then, the Senate was complicit in using the threat and significance of an emperor's anger to achieve social control.

40 Translations of *De vita Caesarum* are by Edwards (2000).

Suetonius's biography of Tiberius provides an example of the unsuccessful use of anger by an emperor. Suetonius describes Tiberius's gradual descent into decadence and cruelty during his reign, noting at *Tib.* 61 the severity and indiscriminate nature of his punishments:

To go through his cruel deeds one by one would take a long time. It will suffice to recount, by way of example, the different types of savagery in which he engaged. No day, however holy or sacred, was free from human punishment; some he put to death on New Year's Day. Many were accused and condemned with their children – and some by their own children. Relatives were forbidden to grieve for those condemned to death. Splendid rewards were decreed for accusers and sometimes even for witnesses. Never was the word of an informer doubted. Every crime was treated as a capital offense, even when it was just a matter of a few simple words.

Tiberius's angry disposition causes him to engage in acts of cruelty. His anger is different from that of emperors who receive an insult and respond appropriately with imperial anger. He is represented as emotionally unhinged, unable to assess accurately what amounts to an appropriate trigger for anger, and his subjects are keenly aware of his defect. Suetonius recounts that the people hated Tiberius, insulting him while he lived, and rejoicing at his death (*Tib.* 75). We can conclude from Suetonius's narrative that Tiberius's anger did not endow him with any genuine authority or ability to maintain order because his reactions did not make sense to his subjects.⁴¹ Tiberius failed to gain the level of emotional legitimacy that Augustus achieved. In order to acquire the authority and hence the legitimacy that granted imperial anger persuasive power, an emperor's anger had to be in line with the Roman cultural understanding of what behaviours merited anger.

Caligula suffered from the same broken emotional apparatus as Tiberius, according to Suetonius's account. While both emperors are unable to perform anger in an appropriate manner, the specific problems that they have with the emotion differ. While Caligula is characterized by cruelty, extreme punishments and inappropriate anger, Suetonius notes that unlike Tiberius, Caligula was *too* clear when expressing his feelings (especially his anger): 'When he was angry, words and concepts came easily to him and his voice and enunciation were strong. Such was his enthusiasm that he could not keep still and even those standing far away could hear him' (*Calig.* 53). He too was ultimately unsuccessful at using anger to strengthen his authority, often cruelly torturing and executing his subjects without just cause (*Calig.* 26–8). The majority of the emperors following Caligula are noted by Suetonius for their cruelty and immoderate enjoyment of severe punishments, with the exception of Vespasian.⁴² Suetonius remarks that Vespasian limited his anger to measured verbal expression when someone offended him:

41 In the *Annals* Tacitus represents Tiberius as a poor communicator of emotions. In addition to overreacting to personal slights and ordering undue punishments, Tiberius is unable to express emotions in a way that is not confusing to his subjects. Tac. *Ann.* 3.22 reports that at a certain trial Tiberius's emotions were impossible to read because he had 'mixed up the signals of anger and clemency' to such an extent.

42 Suetonius's biographies of Nero and Domitian offer particularly strong examples of this behaviour.

‘When this man later asked for forgiveness, Vespasian attacked him merely with words, using about the same number and to the same purpose’ (*Vesp.* 14). Vespasian did not exhibit the full force of his anger until a subject had crossed a certain line, and even then he experienced appropriate sympathy for the wrongdoer, as seen here at *Vesp.* 15:

Helvidius Priscus was the only man to greet him on his return from Syria by the private name of ‘Vespasian’ and, when praetor, made no honorable mention of him in any of his edicts, yet he showed no anger against him until through the abusiveness of his retorts, Helvidius had virtually reduced him to the status of an ordinary citizen. Moreover, while he gave orders, first that he be relegated and then that he be killed, Vespasian was so keen to save him that he sent messengers to recall the executioners and indeed would have saved him if he had not been falsely informed that the man was already dead. For he never took pleasure in anyone’s death and would even shed tears over and lament well-deserved punishments.

This anecdote supports the notion that an emperor could successfully maintain social control through displays of anger as long as they were considered reasonable by his subjects. Suetonius’s biographies stress the undesirability of an emperor who appears to relish punishing his subjects; an angry emperor is more persuasive if he appears to bemoan his obligation to kill.

CONCLUSION

Although the majority of the persuasive work of establishing the Roman Principate was achieved by the sword, emotions were an essential part of managing the aftermath. The judicial use of anger as a persuasive mechanism allowed Augustus to err on the side of clemency in the later stages of his reign, reducing bloodshed in a society that had already been bled to the point of exhaustion. Ovid’s exile poetry depicts a relationship between emperor and subject that was highly sensitive to emotions and their meanings and uses in leadership. In the end, the poet was a victim of the emperor’s anger, but not a victim of execution. Seneca failed to acknowledge the practicality of anger in governing, although his approach may have been informed by a presentiment that Nero would not possess the ‘emotional intelligence’ to wield anger successfully.⁴³ Suetonius provides further evidence that early emperors attempted and often failed to persuade subjects toward obedience by means of their anger. Some appear to have failed because of possible psychological illness (e.g. Caligula) or a personality that collapsed under the weight of power. All of these sources reflect the integral role that emotions played in forming the idea of the *princeps* as a person and a symbol, as well as the status of anger as a powerful persuasive tool in the process of governing an empire.

43 Suet. *Ner.* 7 claims that after he accepted Nero as a student at age 11, Seneca had a dream that he was teaching Caligula instead.

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EMOTIONS IN ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY: THE RHETORICAL USE OF TEARS AS A MEANS OF PERSUASION

Judith Hagen

Tears are undoubtedly an intense emotional expression. In contrast to anger, pity, fear, hatred, love, happiness, etc., crying is not *per se* an emotion but a way of externalizing a great variety of the feelings a human being is capable of.¹ Because of their expressive nature, tears can function as a gesture which conveys a specific emotion to other people.² Which emotion is represented by the tears shed in a particular situation and which sentiment the person shedding them arouses in others depend on the context. It is, however, obvious that tears are a means of communication and serve as a mediating instrument for interpersonal interaction. Emotions are extremely important for communication in general and play a significant role in the process of decision-making, hence they often are and were used intentionally to influence an audience.³ This leads to the following questions: how were tears used in communicative contexts? And what kind of information do the literary, especially the historiographical, sources provide in this context?⁴

In order to answer these questions, I will first take into account Cicero's theoretical deliberations on emotions and their relevance in court, concentrating on tears as an expression of emotions. Based on these statements, I will analyse to what extent emotions were strategically used in the communication between emperor or power elite (and also among them) and inferiors, and to what extent Cicero's remarks on tears in court can be transferred to Roman historiography.⁵

- 1 Vingerhoets, Bylsma and Rottenberg (2009) 440 point out that the existence of tears as an emotional expression in non-human animals is rather unlikely.
- 2 Emotions are not externalized directly but rather they become evident through mediating forms of expression, cf. Rosenwein (2006) 27: 'Emotions are always delivered "secondhand" ...: via gestures, bodily changes, words, exclamations, tears. None of these things *are* the emotion; they are symptoms that must be interpreted – both by the person feeling them and by observers.'
- 3 As there are factors that facilitate or aggravate crying in a particular situation, a person can, to a certain degree, take influence on their proclivity to tears – see Vingerhoets, Bylsma and Rottenberg (2009) 452–5.
- 4 Although tears have been taken into consideration in the constantly growing number of publications on emotions in antiquity, only three articles focusing on tears in ancient historiography have been published so far: Lateiner (2009), De Libero (2009) and Rossi (2000).
- 5 The relationship between oratory and historiography is discussed in Cic. *De orat.* 2.12.51–15.64. Cf. MacMullen (2003) 25 in regard to Cic. *De orat.* 2.47.194–5: 'The impression conveyed by such passages as these few is indeed affecting. In that fact it fairly illustrates the flow of feeling into oratory as that art reached Rome from Greece. But it had in Greek hands long flowed into history as well. In Cicero's dialogue, Antonius indeed assumes that history is

To achieve this, I will illustrate the rhetorical use of tears in several situations described in Roman historiography.

CICERO ON THE USE OF TEARS IN COURT

Cicero chose the dialogue form for his treatise *De oratore*, enabling him to present different aspects of the ideal orator shaped by the personalities of different people. Completed in 55 BCE, the three books describe events that had happened in 91 BCE; the two most important characters are the well-respected Republican politicians, Marcus Antonius, grandfather of the later triumvir, and Lucius Licinius Crassus. They provide theoretical knowledge and practical advice for orators in order to enable them to be successful in court.

In book two, which mostly reflects on the *inventio* (the devising of arguments), Antonius is the main speaker and comments on the prominent role of *êthos* (character arguments) and *pathos* (emotional arguments).⁶ He argues that just like rational reasoning, emotional argumentation aims to persuade the judge and the audience, but on an irrational level: they are to be made benevolent towards the orator (*ut faveat oratori is, qui audiet*). Moreover, they ought to be moved by their own emotions to such an extent that they no longer let themselves be guided by rational thinking.⁷ In order to gain sympathy,⁸ the advocate's speech has to put emphasis on his own and his client's 'merit, achievements or reputable life' (*dignitas hominis, res gestae, existimatio vitae*),⁹ which is easy to do if they are real. The part of the speech in which *êthos* is portrayed should be 'mild and gentle' (*lenis atque summissa*), the one in which the *pathê* are expressed should be 'spirited and emotional' (*intenta ac vehemens*).¹⁰

a branch of oratory, an art in which is included the power to arouse the entire range of responses in the audience; and the same power, as is plain although not specified, must be exercised likewise in historical narration; for the audience must be given the plan infusing an action (or at least those great actions which deserve to be recalled) and the manner in which they are carried through, along with the characterization of the actor.'

6 *Êthos* and *pathos* are discussed in 2.42.178–53.216. Antonius presents the three decisive factors of persuasion (*probare-conciliare-commovere*, in other words, *logos-êthos-pathos*) in 2.27.114–15 – see Leeman, Pinkster and Rabbie (1989) 119.

7 Cic. *De orat.* 2.42.178: *nihil est enim in dicendo ... maius, quam ut foveat oratori is, qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur*. The following sentence stresses that, in Antonius's opinion, emotional argumentation outranks rational reasoning: *plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudici formula aut legibus*.

8 Cf. the verb *conciliare* in 2.27.115 and 2.42.182.

9 Cic. *De orat.* 2.43.182, trans. Sutton and Rackham (1948) 327. Unless otherwise stated (as here), all translations are my own.

10 Cic. *De orat.* 2.52.211, trans. Sutton and Rackham (1948) 355.

If applied skilfully,¹¹ the latter style of speaking (*ratio orationis*) makes it possible to put the judges into almost any imaginable mood.¹² In order to attain this goal it is, however, indispensable for the orator to be deeply moved by the emotions that he aims to arouse in his listeners just as he truly has to possess the *pathos* he is conveying to the audience. Evoking sympathy for his cause from the tribunal – Cicero uses the term *incendere iudicem* (‘inflaming the arbitrator’) – requires that the speech be delivered with fervour: the orator has to be ‘on fire himself’ (*ipse ardere*) in order to set the audience on fire.¹³ These considerations are followed by an extensive illustration of how the orator can deliberately excite emotions in others by genuinely feeling them himself. In the passage 2.45.189–47.196, Cicero refers to tears and how to rouse them in the audience several times. Paragraph 189 starts as follows:

It is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill-will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion [*ad fletum misericordiamque*], unless all those emotions [*motus*], which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator [*adhibere volet iudici*], are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself.¹⁴

The phrase *impressi atque inusti* (‘stamped and branded’) unmistakably points out that authenticity in regard to the speaker’s feelings is an essential requirement in order to induce sympathy, to evoke true feelings in others.¹⁵

One particular sentiment that regularly needs to be aroused in court is compassion (*miser cordia*). In order to make the tribunal compassionate, the advocate has to express his grief through tokens such as words, meaningful sentences, tone

- 11 It is important to note that Quintilian explicitly warns the orator to be careful when trying to elicit tears from an audience: they may be the most powerful instrument for an orator, but if he is not skilled enough for his task, he will achieve the opposite and generate laughter, Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.44–5.
- 12 Cic. *De orat.* 2.44.185: *mentis iudicum permovet impellitque* (sc. *illa ratio orationis*), *ut aut oderint aut diligant aut invidiant aut saluum velint aut metuant aut sperent aut cupiant aut abhorreant aut laetentur aut maereant aut misereantur aut poenire velint aut ad eos motus deducantur, si qui finitimi sunt [et de propinquis ac] talibus animi permotionibus*. It is imperative for the orator to assess the tribunal’s initial mood, cf. 2.44.186–7.
- 13 Cic. *De orat.* 2.45.188, trans. Sutton and Rackham (1948) 333. The metaphorical use of *incendere-ardere* refers to Crassus’s demeanour in court to which Antonius pays tribute in this passage: *tantum est flumen gravissimorum optimorumque verborum, tam integrae sententiae, tam verae, tam novae, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere videaris*. This metaphor is also used in 2.45.190: *ut enim nulla materies tam facilis ad exardescendum est, quae nisi admoto igni ignem concipere possit, sic nulla mens est tam ad comprehendendam vim oratoris parata, quae possit incendi, nisi ipse inflammatus ad eam et ardens accesserit*.
- 14 Cic. *De orat.* 2.40.189, trans. Sutton and Rackham (1948) 333.
- 15 Shortly afterwards, Antonius affirms his integrity concerning that matter, *ibid.*: *non mehercule unquam apud iudices, aut dolorem, aut misericordiam aut invidiam aut odium dicendo excitare volui, quin ipse in commovendis iudicibus eis ipsis sensibus, ad quos illos adducere vellem permoverer*.

of voice, facial expression and by bursting into tears (*conlacrimatio*).¹⁶ The ability to let himself get carried away by his emotions even if he appears in court so frequently and, moreover, as a representative of other people's affairs, is due to 'the power of those reflections and commonplaces, discussed and handled in a speech'. Therefore, no form of pretence and deceit (*simulatio et fallacia*) is required – the nature of the speech itself, which is meant to move others (*quae suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos*), puts the orator foremost of all those present into the mood he intends to create (*oratorem ipsum permovet*).¹⁷ Furthermore his loyalty (*fides*), sense of duty (*officium*) and diligence (*diligentia*) enable the advocate to identify with his client – even if he is a complete stranger.¹⁸

After comparing the orator with an actor and a poet,¹⁹ Antonius describes his actions when defending Manius Aquilius in front of the tribunal in 98 BCE, and how he used tears as the most powerful rhetorical instrument to gain their consent. In order to arouse compassion for the former military leader in himself, Antonius recalled the honours which were bestowed upon his client by the senate (especially his *ovatio*, a lower form of the triumph, in 100 BCE) to build a sharp contrast to the humiliated and weak person in front of him. Having put himself in such a frame of mind, he accomplished his task to move the tribunal as well (*moveri iudices*) by having Aquilius, an old man mourning internally (*maestus*) and externally (through his dirty clothes, *sordidatus*), rise before the tribunal and tear open his tunic to expose his scars (*ut discinderem tunicam, ut cicatrices ostenderem*). Antonius explicitly says that he acted not by means of technical skills (*arte*) but under great emotional agitation and pain (*motu magno animi ac dolore*) and thus contrasts his emotion based actions with those based on rational consideration.²⁰

His performance, which unmistakably targets the listeners' emotions, becomes even more powerful when Gaius Marius, a legal advisor on the side of the accused Aquilius, supports him and reinforces the sadness inherent in the speech through his tears (*cum C. Marius maerorem orationis meae praesens ac sedens multum lacrimis suis adiuvaret...*). Antonius for his part, addresses Marius repeatedly, commends Aquilius to him, and asks him to speak in support of his cause. His poignant declamation (*miseratio*) along with the imploration to the gods, mankind, citizens and allies is, of course, not complete without his tears and a feeling of great pain (*non sine meis lacrimis, non sine dolore magno*),²¹ both of which are integral parts of the orator's repertoire and are decisive for achieving the intended

16 Cic. *De orat.* 2.45.190: *neque ad misericordiam adducetur (sc. iudex), nisi tu ei signa doloris tui verbis, sententiis, voce, vultu, conlacrimatione denique ostenderis*. The noun *conlacrimatio* is extremely rare, occurring only here in Cicero, cf. Leeman, Pinkster and Rabbie (1989) 147; the prefix *con-* indicates the orator's intention to share his tears with the audience.

17 Cic. *De orat.* 2.46.191, trans. (previous sentence) Sutton and Rackham (1948) 335.

18 Cic. *De orat.* 2.46.192.

19 Cic. *De orat.* 2.46.193–4.

20 Cic. *De orat.* 2.47.195.

21 The noun *dolor* might denote 'a tone or quality of speech calculated to rouse sad emotions, pathos' in the given context (*OLD* s.v. *dolor* 4).

result, i.e. engendering *misericordia* in the audience. The tears can be seen as a symbol for the orator's highest possible emotional turmoil. If Antonius himself had not been capable of feeling the sorrow he wanted to create in others, his speech would have failed; hence his advice to the participants of the fictitious Ciceronian dialogue is to develop the skills to be wrathful (*irasci*), to feel sorrow (*dolere*), and to cry (*flere*) when delivering a speech. Tears are considered to be the most intense way of expressing one's emotions and can be of utmost importance in court.²²

The subsequent chapters (2.47.197–2.50.204) recount the trial of Gaius Norbanus, who was defended by Antonius, in order to illustrate further the roles of *êthos* and *pathos*; at the end of his report Antonius stresses that he was able to win this case by emotional rather than by rational argumentation (*ita magis affectis animis iudicum quam doctis, tua, Sulpici, est a nobis tum accusatio victa*, 2.49.201). He continues with additional advice on how to utilize *êthos* and *pathos*, based on his own experiences (2.50.204–2.52.211),²³ and finally he reflects on the relationship between *êthos* and *pathos* (2.52.211–2.53.216). By the end of the passage, Antonius clearly states the intended purpose of targeting the listeners' emotions by choosing this manner of speech: the audience is not supposed to gain factual knowledge (*cognitionem*) but their frame of mind should be disturbed; they should fall into emotional turmoil (*perturbationem*).²⁴

By this point it has become obvious that the deliberate display of tears is repeatedly and insistently recommended to any orator who wants to be successful and that Cicero amply comments on this. He is well aware of the problem that tears may be perceived as artificial, which is the reason why he emphasizes that the orator has to feel the emotions himself in order to convey them to the audience. Emotions, especially *misericordia*, play an important part in court, and if the orator feels compassion and aims at arousing this feeling in his listeners, the best possible way to achieve this goal is through crying. In this regard, tears can be interpreted as one of, if not the most powerful, means of persuasion. Their use in court is intentional, as is the use of other *argumenta* with which the orator wants to win over the tribunal to his side.

This theoretical background provides a basis for further deliberations concerning the rhetorical use of tears. They are deployed intentionally in court and elsewhere; Cicero's statements can be applied to a large number of situations in which people have to be persuaded. The following examples will deal with such situations as portrayed in Roman historiography. I will present several pertinent cases and discuss some of them in detail.

22 Cic. *De orat.* 2.47.196.

23 *Amor*, *odium*, *iracundia*, *invidia*, *misericordia*, *spes*, *laetitia*, *timor* and *molestia* are listed as the most common emotions in 2.51.206.

24 Cic. *De orat.* 2.53.214.

TEARS ENHANCING VERBAL UTTERANCES IN ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

At the beginning of his *Annals*, book 11, Tacitus recounts an incident that happened in 47 CE, and illustrates several aspects of the use of tears during a legal procedure. The episode begins in the middle of a sentence, stating that a certain Valerius Asiaticus had been – according to the Emperor Claudius’s wife Messalina, as can be deduced from the next chapter – the lover of Poppaea Sabina; in addition, Messalina is avid (*inhians*) for the Gardens of Lucullus that were known for their extraordinary beauty. Motivated by envy, she persuades Publius Suillius Rufus, a man of influence who was hungry for power, to indict Asiaticus (and Poppaea as well). In addition, Sosibius, tutor of the imperial couple’s son Britannicus,²⁵ denounces the man in question to Claudius by telling him that Asiaticus is wealthy and popular and therefore has to be considered a danger to imperial authority, especially since he was the driving force in the conspiracy to murder Caligula. Having been convinced that Asiaticus may incite a revolt, Claudius has him arrested and brought to Rome (*vinculisque inditis in urbem raptus*) without further investigations.²⁶

Legal standards are similarly disregarded in the trial against the accused, for it does not take place in the Roman Curia but in one of the imperial private rooms, where Messalina, Claudius and Suillius are present. The latter accuses Asiaticus of having corrupted his soldiers (*corruptionem militum*), having committed adultery with Poppaea (*adulterium Poppaeae*), and for his ‘bodily softness’ (*mollitiam corporis*), which in this context implies that he participated in homosexual intercourse as a passive partner.²⁷ After hearing this latter imputation, Asiaticus can no longer contain himself (*victo silentio*) and exclaims: *interroga, Suilli, filios tuos: virum esse me fatebuntur* (‘Just ask your sons, Suillius: They will admit that I am a man’). Tacitus highlights the importance of this outburst by quoting it in direct speech and subsequently only mentions the accused’s delivery of his actual speech of defence, the content of which is completely omitted; however, it must have contained valid counter-arguments. The decisive factor is: Asiaticus manages, in this seemingly desperate situation, to put Claudius into emotional perturbation (*commoto maiorem in modum Claudio*) and even elicit tears from his wife (*Messalinae quoque lacrimas excivit*).²⁸

Messalina dries her tears (*quibus abluendis*), though, and leaves the room – in order to admonish Vitellius, grandfather of the future emperor of the same name, that he should not let Asiaticus escape unpunished; in addition, she makes sure

25 The main participants in the events described in 11.1–3 are briefly presented in the annotations to the respective paragraphs by Koestermann (1967).

26 Tac. *Ann.* 11.1.

27 OLD s.v. *mollitia*, 7b provides this meaning of *mollitia corporis* for the passage cited. On adultery and homosexual relations with freeborn males as subsets of *stuprum* – see Williams (2010) 103–36. On the different aspects of *mollitia* – see Edwards (1993) 63–97.

28 Tac. *Ann.* 11.2.1.

that Poppaea is eliminated.²⁹ The irony of this passage cannot be overlooked: it was Messalina herself who had set the unjustified accusation in motion, and now she lets herself get carried away by her feelings and openly exposes her sympathy for Asiaticus through her tears. Her behaviour seems absurd when, despite this, she stubbornly holds to the execution of her plan.³⁰

Since Asiaticus's performance before the tribunal was convincing – in regard to his manner of speaking and to the content of his speech, for the charges were obviously far-fetched – Claudius is almost determined to acquit him. But then events take an unexpected turn: the emperor's mind is once again changed, this time through the use of tears on the part of a (feigned) advocate for Asiaticus. Vitellius carries out Messalina's orders by stepping in front of the emperor and crying wholeheartedly, pointing out his friendship to Asiaticus, their shared esteem for the emperor's mother, Antonia Minor, the accused's merits for the state, and other issues that are supposed to induce compassion. Finally, Vitellius proposes that Asiaticus should be allowed to choose his own mode of death (*liberum mortis arbitrium*). Claudius embraces this assessment and exercises clemency (*secuta sunt Claudii verba in eandem clementiam*), as Tacitus ironically observes.³¹ Shortly afterwards, Asiaticus opens his arteries and goes to his death equanimously.³²

The episode as a whole is interspersed with irony, since the emperor is repeatedly characterized as highly manipulable and, consequently, as a man without critical judgment; accordingly, Suillius and Vitellius are presented as the main decision-makers. The deployment of rhetorical means has the intended effect; nevertheless it does not lead to a just verdict. The true reason for the charges against Asiaticus is mentioned in 11.1 (Messalina wants to take possession of the Gardens of Lucullus), so that the prosecutors' bias and the lack of impartiality is made clear from the beginning.

Therefore, it is surprising that Asiaticus's speech of defence and the (obviously involuntary) tears he elicits from Messalina are at first successful; it is once again surprising that another sudden change of mood occurs not long afterwards, when Vitellius prevents Claudius from acquitting the defendant. The arguments he brings forward ostensibly in favour of the accused (i.e. he presents himself as pleading in mitigation) are entirely appropriate for commending Asiaticus to the emperor; his performance gains intensity through skilfully applied tears, which evoke Claudius's compassion. But in this case, the crying is motivated by factitiousness and is merely a feigned attempt to gain *misericordia*;

29 Tac. *Ann.* 11.2.2. Here, Claudius's naivety and total ignorance of what is going on around him is shown once again; it had already been stressed at the beginning of this episode, when he did not question Asiaticus's guilt and the need to arrest him.

30 Koestermann (1967) 30. It is safe to assume that Messalina's tears, which are elicited by Asiaticus's speech, are meant to be understood as genuine, which is the reason why her cruel behaviour towards him, which follows immediately after, builds an even sharper contrast – Hausmann (2009) 158–9.

31 Tac. *Ann.* 11.3.1.

32 Tac. *Ann.* 11.3.2.

in truth, the advocate's mischievousness becomes evident.³³ That the trial is not conducted according to standard legal procedures is finally reflected in the fact that the resulting verdict is associated with imperial *clementia*.³⁴ Asiaticus's speech of defence that was set in motion by the sentence he uttered on impulse, entails Messalina's inadvertent tears; Vitellius is successful with his strategy as well: his compassion is authenticated by his tears, which induce the emperor's compassion in turn.

This multifaceted example clearly illustrates that crying as a means of persuasion in court or in court-like situations was part of the procedure of decision-making, and well established in real life. In particular, the tears shed by Vitellius show that the manner, not only of presenting facts, but also of speaking could be highly manipulative. In more general terms, these observations suggest that tears could be helpful in a large number of situations, as I have indicated in the above example from Tacitus which, technically speaking, covers 'crying in court', but is, due to the extraordinary circumstances, in itself a special case.³⁵

Indeed, in addition to instances similar to the one discussed here, there are many cases in Roman historiography where crying is the means of choice for the protagonists to get their way, or at least to attempt to do so. In the majority of cases, tears accompany verbal utterances and are used to externalize the speaker's feelings in order to convey them to his audience. I shall provide four examples which illustrate the diversity of situations and demonstrate how effective tears can be. The first case in point, however, will deal with unsuccessful crying.

Cassius Dio describes the events after the battle of Actium and Mark Antony's death in late summer 30 BCE: Cleopatra has been seized and brought to her palace; there she speaks in front of Octavian in order to impress him and to gain his interest. She reads to him from his father Caesar's letters to her, remarking that it would have been best if she had died with him. Her speech is accompanied by her weeping (ἐκλαε, ἀνακλαύσασα), but even though Octavian is not insensitive to her performance, he does not grant her wish to die and be buried beside Mark Antony, nor does he alleviate her fear of being exhibited in his triumph.³⁶

33 Cass. Dio 61.29.4–6 gives a more precise explanation for Vitellius's behaviour: he wanted to do Messalina a favour and proclaimed in front of Claudius that the accused had asked him to be allowed to choose the form of his death himself.

34 Koestermann (1967) 32 points out a similar phrase in the *Annals*. Tacitus illustrates the perversion of legal standards even on a linguistic level, for *in eandem clementiam* most probably made the ancient reader think of *in eandem sententiam*, the formulaic phrase of approval in the Roman senate – Hausmann (2009) 164.

35 Another example from the *Annals* where crying in court is of great importance is Tac. *Ann.* 16.31.1–2 (the tears of Servilia, daughter of Barea Soranus, are aimed at helping her father's case). Emotional manipulation through crying is a rather characteristic element in Tacitus – see De Libero (2009) 223.

36 Cass. Dio 51.12.1–13.2. When Cleopatra realizes she cannot achieve her goal through this strategy, she feigns cooperation, which leads her overseers to loosen her restrictions, so that she is able to kill herself in the end, as Dio describes at 51.13.3–5. Another noblewoman who tries to achieve her aims by underlining her speech with tears is Poppaea Sabina the Younger; she urges Nero to get divorced from Octavia and to marry her instead in 59 CE, according to

Tears and prayer are strongly connected, at least after the rise of Christianity – i.e. they are united to persuade God.³⁷ Of the numerous pertinent examples, I would like to mention the depiction of the events on the eve of the Alexandrian presbyter Arius's death. After being declared a heretic and being exiled, he was summoned by the emperor to Constantinople in 335 CE and was due to be received back into the communion of the Church. Bishop Alexander, on the other hand, held a deeply hostile attitude towards Arius, so that the idea of rehabilitating the heretic strained him considerably. According to the Church historians Rufinus and Socrates, his restlessness drove him to spend the night before the planned readmission praying and weeping in the Church of Hagia Eirene (*in oratione et lacrimis totam noctem pervigilem ducens*; ἡϋχετο δακρύων).³⁸ In this desperate situation, the cleric laid the course of events into the hands of God, and his appeal, which was made so emphatically, was heard: Arius died unexpectedly on the following day before he could reach Hagia Eirene.

A second example concerns the events of the night before the battle against Eugenius in 394 CE: the Emperor Theodosius is sleepless; Orosius tells us that he spends the night in constant prayer, and as evidence for that, he leaves pools of tears (*lacrimarum lacunas*) – which are the price he has to pay for celestial aid (*praesidii caelestis*).³⁹

The last example is once again from Cassius Dio (70.1.2) and is set in 121 CE. After Hadrian's death, the Senate refuses to grant Hadrian divine honours, which makes the new emperor, Antoninus Pius, exhort them to do so, stating that he does not want to govern them any longer otherwise. His speech is accompanied by tears and lamentations (δακρύων καὶ ὀδυρόμενος), which unmistakably illustrate how important his demands are, and the Senate does as the emperor wishes.

These instances of crying noblemen described by Roman authors demonstrate that even if tears are usually shed involuntarily, they fit into a wider persuasive strategy and are, under certain circumstances, an integral part of communication. They can be one of several means of persuasion in situations in which rhetorical knowledge and its practical use is decisive, or they can intensify a prayer. In each case, tears serve as a gesture that emphasizes and reinforces the content of a speech by targeting the listener's emotions.

Tac. *Ann.* 14.1 with many words and crying (nevertheless, she had to wait until 62 CE to get what she wanted).

37 On attempted persuasion of gods, see also Salvo and Johncock (this volume).

38 According to Socr. *Hist. Eccl.* 1.37, Alexander spent several nights in the church; the episode is narrated in Rufin. *Hist.* 10.13–14 and Socr. *Hist. Eccl.* 1.37–8.

39 Oros. 7.35.15: *dehinc postquam insomnem noctem precum continuatione transegit et testes propemodum quas in pretium praesidii caelestis adpenderat lacrimarum lacunas reliquit, fiducialiter arma corripuit solus, sciens se esse non solum. signo crucis signum proelio dedit ac se in bellum, etiamsi nemo sequeretur, uictor futurus, inmisit.*

TEARS AS A REPLACEMENT FOR VERBAL UTTERANCES IN ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

There are far fewer examples of tears replacing verbal utterances, than of tears in support of speaking. The rarity of passages in which tears are used as an exclusive or one of several nonverbal means of communication without being accompanied by words leads to a special interest when they occur.⁴⁰ In the following, three particular cases will be discussed.

Probably in March 68 CE, Gaius Iulius Vindex, who was governor in the province of Gallia Lugdunensis, revolted against Nero; shortly after, Servius Sulpicius Galba, governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, defected from the emperor too.⁴¹ Suetonius recounts that at the beginning of the uprising, Nero planned many atrocities (*multa et inmania*), which were quite consistent with his character (*non abhorrentia a natura sua*). He intended to eliminate all commanders of the armies and the governors of the provinces on the grounds of conspiracy, massacre all exiled persons in the Roman Empire and all Gallic men in the city, let Gaul be plundered by the troops, kill the Senate and set the whole city on fire.⁴²

It is not the feeling of guilt (*paenitentia*), but the slight chance of success (*perficiendi desperatio*) that causes Nero to change his plans. He deposes the two *consules ordinarii* and makes himself successor to both of them, claiming that fate foretold that only a (single) consul would be able to subdue Gaul. Having taken his office, he declares in front of his friends (while leaving them after dining together) how he intends to make the renegade troops compliant as soon as he reaches the province: 'he would go before the soldiers unarmed and do nothing but weep; and having thus led the rebels to change their purpose, he would next day rejoice among his rejoicing subjects and sing paeanes of victory, which he

40 As long ago as 1916, Paul Wendland noted that an idea is not necessarily expressed through words; his article on symbolic actions as replacement or supportive means of speech can still be recommended. It should be taken into consideration that there are many cases in ancient historiography in which the actual speech is not narrated even though it was in fact delivered, as is the case in the example from the *Annals* given above. They should, however, be distinguished from examples which portray people's wordless performances.

41 Suetonius describes these events, *Nero* 40.1 and 42.1.

42 Suet. *Nero* 43.1: *Initio statim tumultus multa et inmania, uerum non abhorrentia a natura sua creditur destinasse: successores percussoresque summittere exercitus et prouincias regentibus, quasi conspiratis idemque et unum sentientibus; quidquid ubique exulum, quidquid in urbe hominum Gallicanorum esset contrucidare, illos ne desciscentibus adgregarentur, hos ut consocios popularium suorum atque fautores; Gallias exercitibus diripiendas permittere; senatum uniuersum ueneno per conuiuia necare; urbem incendere feris in populum immissis, quo difficilium defenderentur.* Bradley (1978) 258 states, regarding the historicity and credibility of this plan: 'The rumours represent what Nero was thought to be capable of doing, not what he actually did. The outrageousness of the proposals readily shows this.'

ought at that very moment to be composing'.⁴³ Yet, Nero does not get a chance to carry out his plan, for the other armies defect from him as well.⁴⁴

Although he normally ascribes high importance to his rhetorical qualities and his voice, it is Nero's intention to step in front of the revolting soldiers in Gaul, present himself as a suppliant, and rely solely on the effect of crying. As was the case with his first plan (his brutal measures against all probable enemies), his planned behaviour here seems to be an absurd and ill-conceived reaction to the present crisis.⁴⁵ He is completely convinced that his authority carries enough weight with his soldiers in the province to allow him to appeal to their loyalty and persuade them to end their insurrection by stepping in front of them and weeping – he obviously thinks that he can achieve the greatest effect with such a performance and evoke a feeling of remorse (*paenitentia*) in them.

Particularly because this episode describes crying that is planned but not actually performed, it becomes clear that Nero knew about the effect of such ritualized acting.⁴⁶ Purposefully shedding tears in a crisis like this one could be the means of choice for regaining the soldiers' favour – provided that there was a common emotional consensus between the soldiers and their leader (the emperor or another commander-in-chief), i.e. that their relationship was based on mutual loyalty. The military leader could remind them of and re-establish this emotional consensus by ostentatiously showing closeness. The most intense means of achieving this in a situation of crisis is by crying. This expressive gesture would be effective if the soldiers themselves felt a sense of loyalty and closeness towards their leader, but it could not have any effect if the troops were in doubt about whether this closeness actually existed.⁴⁷

In Nero's case, these feelings of loyalty certainly did not exist; he had done nothing to ensure the commitment and loyalty of the Roman army. At any rate, his bond with the troops was not strong enough to end the revolt through his planned performance, and so it seems absurd that Nero in particular believed that he could succeed with his strategy. The example undoubtedly illustrates the author's intention to deny the emperor the qualities of a military leader and to draw a potent caricature of his planned supplicatory gesture. Tears are the most powerful means of regaining the loyalty of revolting soldiers, and so they can be highly effective; but if they are deployed by someone who does not stand on a solid basis with their troops, crying is the most ineffective and ridiculous plan.⁴⁸

43 Suet. *Nero* 43.2: *inermem se in conspectum exercituum proditurum nec quicquam aliud quam fleturum, reuocatisque ad paenitentiam defectoribus insequenti die laetum inter laetos cantaturum epinicia, quae iam nunc sibi componi oporteret*; trans. Rolfe (1914) 167.

44 Cf. Suet. *Nero* 47.1.

45 Bradley (1978) 264. Nero's failure to assess the situation properly is also pointed out by Rolfe (1914) 164.

46 Flaig (2004) 110–15 provides further examples and a paradigm for the cases in which a commander-in-chief cries in front of his revolting soldiers, which I take as a basis for my analysis.

47 *ibid.* 114.

48 Further examples of passages in which political or military leaders cry in front of their soldiers and in which those tears are (at least eventually) successful are: Suet. *Iul.* 33; Plut.

The second example that I want to discuss is set in a Christian context. In his *Life of Constantine*, Eusebius presents a letter which the emperor wrote to Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, and the presbyter Arius in Alexandria in 324 CE.⁴⁹ Therein, Constantine elaborately expresses his concerns and worries about the controversy that broke out among them and urges them to reunite. By the end of the letter, he advises them to reconcile and behave as friends towards each other (ἐπανέλθετε δὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων φιλίαν τε καὶ χάριν and ὑμεῖς αὐτοὶ καθάπερ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς ἐκκαθήραντες αὐθις ἀλλήλους ἐπίγνωτε),⁵⁰ so that he may regain his peace of mind. If they should not do as he wishes, he ‘must weep and constantly break down in tears (στένειν ἀνάγκη καὶ δακρύοις δι’ ὅλου συγγεῖσθαι), and not even face the rest of my life with equanimity.’⁵¹

Certainly, the two clerics and their followers do not feel impelled to comply with the emperor’s command on account of his announcement that he is going to cry if they do not come to an agreement about questions of faith. But Constantine is aware of his position of power – which includes his supremacy in all religious matters – which he highlights throughout the whole letter; that his authority was indeed decisive, even among clerics, can be seen only a few months later at the Council of Nicaea (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 3.6–23). His threat is therefore the most serious sign he is able to give them to express his indignation and discontent with their actions. The episode can be seen as a Christian counterpart to the preceding example, for both Nero and Constantine choose tears as a possible means of persuasion in front of an institution that is important for their legitimation. The difference between the two cases lies in their prospects of success in stressing the emperor’s authority: Although each of them is facing a serious situation, Nero’s attempt at regaining his soldiers’ loyalty is obviously (at least to the reader) ridiculous, whereas Constantine’s endeavours to re-establish unity among the Alexandrian clerics are based on solid ground.

The last example in this section shows effective supplicatory oratory at its best: in the case of the Emperor Theodosius, tears were one of several nonverbal means which made his plea successful. After his excommunication in 390 CE, he

Pomp. 3, 13; *Plut. Oth.* 3; *App. B Civ* 1.8. An example in which crying does not have the intended effect on the addressee is described in *Plut. Luc.* 35 – see Flaig (2004) 110–15.

49 Eusebius quotes the letter at *Vit. Const.* 2.64–72.

50 Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 2.71.8.

51 Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 2.72.1: Ἀπόδοτε οὖν μοι γαληνὰς μὲν ἡμέρας νύκτας δ’ ἀμερίμνους, ἵνα κάμοι τις ἡδονὴ καθαροῦ φωτὸς καὶ βίου λουπὸν ἡσύχου εὐφροσύνη σφύζηται· εἰ δὲ μή, στένειν ἀνάγκη καὶ δακρύοις δι’ ὅλου συγγεῖσθαι καὶ μηδὲ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν αἰῶνα πρῶως ὑφίστασθαι. τῶν γάρ τοι τοῦ θεοῦ λαῶν, τῶν συνθεραπόντων λέγω τῶν ἐμῶν, οὕτως ἀδίκῳ καὶ βλαβερᾷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονεικία κεχωρισμένων, ἐμὲ πῶς ἐγχορεῖ τῷ λογισμῷ συνεστάναι λουπὸν; trans. Cameron and Hall (1999) 119 (the literal translation of στένειν ‘to sigh, to moan’ might be a better choice here as tears are explicitly mentioned alongside the sighing). The latter sentence gives an explanation for Constantine’s inability to live equanimously if there is no unity among the Christians under his rule: ‘If the peoples of God, my own fellow-servants I mean, are so divided by wicked and damaging strife between themselves, how can my thoughts any longer be collected?’; trans. Cameron and Hall (1999) 119.

was forced to show penitence and did so in the most convincing way: he shed tears without cease. Theodoret gives an exceedingly vivid account of these events in his *Ecclesiastical History* (5.18). According to him, Theodosius came to Milan but bishop Ambrosius refused him entry to the church; thereupon the emperor returned to his palace in tears and continued weeping and wailing there. Several months later Theodosius was able to reconcile with Ambrosius in Milan and repented publicly; he prostrated himself in church (πρηνῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ δαπέδου κείμενος), tore his hair, hit his forehead and moistened the floor with his tears (ταῖς χερσὶν ἀποτίλλων τὰς τρίχας καὶ τὸ μέτωπον τύπτων καὶ ταῖς τῶν δακρύων σταγόσι τοῦδαφος καταπραίνων). Accordingly, Ambrosius, Bishop of Milan, had to accept him back into church. It can be safely assumed that such conduct was required, and Ambrosius's letter *extra collectionem* 11.11 provides evidence for that, as he writes to the emperor that his misdemeanour can only be eliminated through tears and penitence (*peccatum non tollitur nisi lacrimis et poenitentia*). Theodoret's account of these events is perfectly suited to conclude the line of thoughts presented in this article. For him, prostrating, tearing one's hair and weeping (all being nonverbal means of expression) are obviously more impressive and also more important than the words which accompany them – Theodosius made use of his voice but his words seem to have been formulaic.⁵²

EMOTIONS AS BASIS FOR DECISION-MAKING

I conclude my approach to tears in Roman historiography with a few final thoughts on the relevance of emotions for historical events and for communicative interaction in general. In the examples presented in this article, the actual or planned use of crying as a means of persuasion had decisive influence on the outcome of events, or at least on the way the protagonists are characterized. Emperors, clerics and other noblemen used tears as a means to express their emotions, but they were well aware that in doing so, they stirred an emotional reaction in others. Thus they tried to manipulate their opinions, and in many cases they were successful.

The power to persuade is, however, not only a quality inherent in tears; rather emotions in general have an effect on our decisions and the actions resulting from them. The emotions that are (implicitly or explicitly) described in ancient texts may or may not actually have been expressed through tears in a particular case – yet they still constituted the real forces behind the decisions that were made by the men in charge and described in literature. Emotions had and still have decisive influence on historical events and our assessment of them.⁵³

52 Theod. *Hist. eccl.* 5.18.19 mentions *Psalms* 118.25 and the begging for forgiveness (συνγνώμης ἡντιβόλει τυχεῖν).

53 Macmullen (2009) discusses the complex interaction between emotions of author, protagonist and reader (who is supposed to identify with, or rather, feel sympathy or antipathy towards the protagonist) and illustrates it with various examples. Marincola (2009) 22 states that the emotional engagement of historians in Graeco-Roman antiquity 'had a twofold purpose, both

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mimetic and paideutic: to give the audience the sense of what it was like to be there, and to make the lessons of history a more intense experience. Naturally, there were limits: the historian needed to exercise care both that the incidents treated were worthy of serious emotion, and that he raised the appropriate emotions. But provided that he did that, the attempt to engage the reader emotionally was legitimate, necessary and appropriate to history's functions.' Laird (2009) gives a broad and enlightening perspective on the rhetoric of Roman historiography and puts emphasis on the concept of truth in it.

'HE WAS MOVED, BUT...': FAILED APPEALS TO THE EMOTIONS IN OVID'S *METAMORPHOSES*

Matthew Johncock

Rhetoric and persuasion are a preoccupation of Ovid's work, from the *suasoriae* of the *Heroides* to the appeals for pity and pardon in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*.¹ The *Metamorphoses* is also of particular interest with regard to the portrayal of rhetoric and persuasion, firstly owing to its breadth of presentation, in terms of speech length, tone, context and the relationships between speakers and addressees; and secondly because, while the individual speeches offer various strategies of persuasion in different contexts with a range of outcomes, as a whole they contribute to an overall moral tone in the epic, which constitutes an attempt to persuade the reader. Scholarship on rhetoric in the *Metamorphoses* reflects the first of these points (*variatio*), interpreting certain speeches as, among other things, dramatized rhetorical exercises,² legal parodies,³ and humorous sketches.⁴ Another contributing factor to the *variatio* of these persuasive speeches is their notable failure rate,⁵ which this chapter will consider. Richard Tarrant has noted the prevalence of failed persuasion to love in the *Amores*, concluding that Ovid's approach to rhetoric reveals scepticism of its potential to succeed, and that Ovid employs 'procedures of formal argument to produce carefully directed effects',⁶ often presented with typically Ovidian irony. By applying these interpretations to the *Metamorphoses*, we shall be able to define and clarify Ovid's scepticism of persuasion further, and outline an overall strategy in his presentation of persuasive speeches. To this end, particular emphasis will be placed on why emotional appeals fail so frequently, the effects created by their impotence, and the reader's role in interpreting them.

Among the factors to be taken into account when considering the reasons an emotional appeal might fail, particularly important is the relationship between speaker and addressee. In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid has chosen to depict the mythical world, incongruously, as though it replicated the power structures and status distinctions of Roman society, which was propped up by the peculiarly

1 On the latter, see Knight (this volume) 187–90.

2 E.g. Bömer (1982) and Hopkinson (2000) on the Judgment of Arms.

3 E.g. VerSteeg & Barclay (2003) on Orpheus's speech to Dis and Proserpina. For Ovid's rhetorical education, and textual evidence for this, see Kenney (1969).

4 E.g. Gross (1979) on Apollo's speech to Daphne.

5 Failed persuasion is also prominent in the *Heroides*, in which the reader infers failure from his or her knowledge of myth. The *Tristia*, meanwhile, fail to persuade Augustus to end Ovid's exile.

6 Tarrant (1995) 64.

Roman client/patron system,⁷ and in which an individual's status dictated his or her rights and privileges, and ability to gain certain offices. Within these structures, we find a preoccupation with bridging gaps in status and circumstances, as a means of progressing in society⁸ and forming relationships with those of higher status.⁹ At the top of the Roman hierarchy, the emperor's status was elevated further by imperial cults, and the potential for apotheosis, which in turn created divine ancestries, like Augustus's from Julius Caesar. Such elements are reflected in the *Metamorphoses* by interactions between, in particular, subjects and kings, and mortals and gods.

In these interactions, status also shapes the techniques employed, especially owing to prejudgment by addressees, which is partly shaped by status and their relationship with the speaker.¹⁰ These techniques echo our understanding of strategies of emotional persuasion. When seeking to persuade someone of superior status, one might either acknowledge their power and seek to exploit it by appealing to clemency (usually by engendering pity), or attempt to narrow the status gap by appealing to the addressee's emotional experience of circumstances similar to the speaker's own. Emotional appeals to those of inferior status frequently involve fear, whether seeking to calm or rouse it,¹¹ or admiration for one's own deeds. Appeals to equals, meanwhile, often involve highlighting similarities shared between speaker and addressee, or even asking the addressee to share in one's emotional state (this is especially true of close family relations).¹²

In the *Metamorphoses* the success of an emotional appeal frequently relies on equality of status between speaker and addressee. When this does not obtain, persuasive techniques like those above are employed to exploit or bridge the status gap. Sometimes other prevailing factors must be overcome, which might alter or invert the statuses of speaker and addressee, including: additional powers, such as magic; predispositions to certain actions, such as militant virginity; circumstances affecting judgment, such as conflicting loyalties or madness; and extrinsic constraints, such as moral law and fate. Such obstacles reduce the success rate of emotional persuasion, and frequently engender the reader's emotions as a result. The reader's reaction is enhanced by whether the eventual outcomes of emotional persuasion, even when successful, are morally deserved. Outcomes are frequently dictated not by the effects of persuasion, but by one character's power, especially

7 Juvenal provides a broad, and persistently negative, sweep of this system. For a summary, see Braund (1996) 32–4 and notes therein.

8 Cf., e.g., Cicero's assertion of the enmity shown towards 'new men' such as himself in *Verr.* 2.5.180–2.

9 Horace's works provide many examples, as he manages his relationship with his patron Maecenas. We might contrast *Sat.* 1.6, in which, despite being a freedman's son, Horace successfully enters Maecenas's circle, and *Carm.* 1.20, in which he asks Maecenas to lower his status and join him in a night of drinking inferior wine. Gowers (2012) 214–9 provides a considered exploration of status in *Sat.* 1.6.

10 For a summary of theories regarding judgment (or 'appraisal') in the emotions, see Robinson (2005) 5–14; and also Palencik (2008) 261.

11 For which, see Winter and Iurescia (this volume).

12 Konstan (2001) 50–1, after Arist. *Rh.* 1386a18–23.

divine power. Pursuing the analogy with Roman society, we might infer that, for Ovid, persuasion fails in the face of imperial absolute power. Again this is directed at engendering emotional responses and resultant judgments in the reader, which are frequently formed by narrative directions alongside the contents of the speeches themselves.

By analysing the emotional appeals of the *Metamorphoses* and the contexts in which they sit, patterns emerge highlighting a strong prevalence of unjust outcomes favouring the powerful and harming the innocent.¹³ This adds to the prevailing moral tone, which seeks to persuade the reader. Furthermore, frequently the reader's reactions to emotional persuasion may differ from the addressees', particularly when an appeal fails, bringing consequences for the reader's engagement with the text. These considerations, when taken together, have wider implications for our reading of the *Metamorphoses*. As discussed, Ovid maps the various Roman realities of status, relationships and emotional persuasion onto the world of myth. In turn, the reader, seeing resonances with real life in the interactions between Ovid's characters in their various relationships, maps them back onto Roman reality. By considering this process, tentative conclusions will be drawn regarding Ovid's negative opinions of justice within hierarchies, his relationship with the Augustan order,¹⁴ and the effects these have on his reader.

APPEALS TO EQUALS AND FAMILY MEMBERS

Several emotional appeals are made to socio-political equals. Within this group, we shall also take family members, since the usual prevailing power factors, such as gender, age or divinity, are tempered in these relationships (where a woman might struggle to persuade a man, we should expect a wife to be more likely to succeed in persuading her husband, or a sister her brother), and similar emotional and judgmental bias can be seen in equals and those of the same kin. Appeals by gods to other gods are slightly more complex, since occasionally hierarchical power prevails (for example Jupiter's appeals to the other Olympians) – and such instances will be considered later – while at other times familial connections are emphasized in the persuasion (for example Venus's appeals to Jupiter), in which case they are included in this group. Familial connections are especially powerful, causing objective judgments to be overcome by partiality rooted in familial loyalty and shared emotions, and usually lead the addressee to meet the speaker's desired outcome.

Tables 1a and 1b in the Appendix to this chapter outline appeals to the emotions of family members and equals in the *Metamorphoses*. It is notable from

13 Anderson (1989) argues for the failure of metamorphosis in securing just outcomes.

14 Proponents of Ovid's anti-Augustanism include: Buchheit (1966); Segal (1969); Curran (1972); Moulton (1973); Lundström (1980); Schmitzer (1990); and, in a more tempered fashion, Miller (2004). Galinsky (1975) 210–61 denies that Augustus and politics are central to the *Metamorphoses*, on account of Ovid's perceived aversion to sustained seriousness, and his epic's predominantly literary character.

these tables that, contrary to expected partiality, there are several unsuccessful appeals within these groups (at a rate of just under 50%). These can be attributed to various intrinsic and extrinsic factors. In family relations, impetuous and unwise children (as we might expect) seem resistant to emotional arousal by their parents. Icarus (8.183–259), too young to heed his father's appeal to fear,¹⁵ flies too close to the sun and dies, rousing the reader's pity. Phaëthon's story (1.747–2.328) meanwhile provides an interesting contrast of reactions by family members. Phaëthon expresses his anger (*ira*) and shame (*pudor*) to his mother Clymene (1.755), who is 'moved' (*mota*, 1.766) and grants his request to visit his father Apollo to seek proof of his paternity.¹⁶ Apollo is persuaded to grant Phaëthon a wish as proof of his birth, and, having sworn, cannot refuse his son's misguided request to drive his chariot. Nevertheless, 'dissuasion is possible' (*dissuadere licet*, 2.53). Apollo appeals to fear, describing the wish as unsafe (2.53), listing the many dangers involved (2.63–87; 2.126–140), and asking Phaëthon to share in his own fear (*timor*, *metus*) (2.90–94). Phaëthon, steadfast in his desire for proof, unwisely disregards the imminent dangers, and is unmoved.¹⁷ In this story, because Apollo and Clymene share Phaëthon's unfortunate circumstances and their attendant emotions, they are easily persuaded. Phaëthon, however, being impetuous and unreasoning, resists his father's emotional appeal. These contrasting reactions rouse pity in the reader, who bemoans the parents' openness, and the child's resistance, to persuasion – a reaction aided by foreshadowing techniques, which explicitly state Apollo's worries and warn the reader of impending doom, while Phaëthon remains blissfully unaware.

Special circumstances explain the other cases of unsuccessful appeals to relatives. Pentheus, while being destroyed by bacchants (3.708–33), appeals directly to his aunt's shared familial grief for her son Actaeon's death (3.719–20). Her expected emotional response is negated by her Bacchic frenzy (3.721–2) and she proceeds to tear him apart. In the story of Proserpina (5.346–571), Ceres appeals to Jupiter's shared emotions for their daughter ('let the daughter move (*moveat*) the father', 5.516) to let her return to earth, while Jupiter attempts to calm Ceres' anger, with the consolations that Dis loves Proserpina and comes from good stock (5.524–9). Neither yields, however, owing to divided loyalties – Ceres' balanced towards Proserpina, and Jupiter's split between Ceres and Dis (5.564–5). A different example is Byblis's amorous letter to her brother Caunus. The letter is laden with emotional appeals to pity (9.535–6, 544, 561) and fear (for her potential suicide, 9.563), but not an appeal to shared grief (as one would expect of an appeal to a family member), since Byblis wishes to suppress the familial tie between

15 Icarus does not speak in the episode, but plays with the feathers and wax, disrupting his father's work (8.197–200) as a young child would.

16 An authorial aside reveals it is unclear whether Phaëthon's entreaties or Clymene's 'anger at the insult to herself' (*ira* / ... *sibi criminis*, 1.765–6) persuade her. The tone suggests Clymene's self-interest, and foreshadows the line between mortals and divinities, which becomes apparent when Phaëthon struggles to drive Apollo's chariot.

17 Apollo's persuasive strategy may contribute to this, since he disregards Phaëthon's doubt in his birth when he argues, 'your lot is mortal, and what you ask for is not mortal' (2.56).

them. Her carefully-chosen appeals embody the impossibility of successful persuasion, prevented by the taboo of incestuous love.¹⁸ In these cases, the expected success of emotional appeals to relations heightens the pathos or futility when they fail, thus arousing the reader's pity further.

Extraneous factors also cause the failure of five emotional appeals to equals not related by blood. Acmon's failure to persuade Diomedes's other companions to scorn Venus (14.483–93) can be attributed to their piety and loyalty to Diomedes. In a king-to-king appeal, Minos's attempted persuasion of Aeacus to join in war against Athens fails owing to Aeacus's close treaty with Athens (7.484–6). Other cases have a stronger emotional impact on the reader. Hippolytus's attempted consolation of Egeria (15.493–546) fails owing to her extreme grief after her husband Numa's death – enhancing the reader's pity for her. Pandion, bestowing his daughter Philomela to Tereus's care, seeks to arouse pity (6.471, 500–1) and a sense of duty to protect her 'with fatherly love (*patrio [...] amore*)' (6.499).¹⁹ Pandion attempts to elevate Tereus's relationship with Philomela artificially from brother-in-law to father, with all the responsibility that entails, while simultaneously aligning Tereus more strongly with himself, as Philomela's real father. Tereus's subsequent disgraceful acts, caused by his lust for Philomela (6.455–66, 478–82, 490–3), shatter this artificial paternal bond, thus heightening the reader's disgust and anger.

Finally, and of particular interest, is the case of Ajax in the Judgment of Arms (11.1–398). In the contest there must be one loser, and Ulysses' superior persuasive ability wins, as expressed in a narrator's aside ('the group of leaders was moved (*mota*), and their judgment made clear what eloquence could do', 13.382–3). However, the judgment follows an uneven and inappropriate contest, as the narrator concludes: 'the eloquent man took the brave man's arms' (13.383).²⁰ The prize is portrayed as more appropriate for Ajax, strongest of the Greeks. This criticism echoes the preceding speeches, in which Ovid seems to take Ajax's side.²¹ In contrast to Ajax's frankness of emotion, Ulysses wipes away fake tears (13.132–3)²² and claims Achilles' deeds as his own (13.162–80). He speaks unrepentantly

18 Alcione's speech to Ceyx contains similar emotional appeals, to pity (11.425–6) and fear (11.426–38), as well as love (11.421–4). Her appeal fails because Ceyx, 'disturbed' (*turbatus*) and 'anxious in heart' (*anxia [...] pectora*, 11.411), after his brother's metamorphosis into a bird, and the subsequent slaughter of Peleus's cattle by an ominous wolf (11.365–75), has resolved to sail to the oracle at Claros (11.412–3) and cannot be dissuaded.

19 The phrase also emphasizes the depravity of Tereus's subsequent crime, enhancing the tragedy of the episode.

20 Ajax's suggestion that the arms be scattered among the enemy, so the bravest Greeks could recover and win them (13.119–22), seems more appropriate. Contrarily, Stanford (1954) 139 states that the conclusion proves Ovid's preference for Ulysses.

21 Contrary to Wilkinson (1955) 230–5; Otis (1966) 284–5; Coleman (1971) 475; and Curran (1972) 85, who sees a comparison between Ajax and Augustus (men of deeds), and Ulysses and Ovid (men of artistry). Hopkinson (2000) 17 suggests Ovid takes neither side.

22 Admittedly a legitimate tactic in forensic oratory, as used in Cic. *Mil.* 105. However, in 13.712, Ulysses is labelled (in an especially negative translation of his positive attribute *polu-mêtis*) as 'deceitful' (*fallax*) – recalling the duplicity of this speech. Elsewhere, Tereus's tears

of his immoral deeds (his treatment of Palamedes, 13.308–12, and Philoctetes, 13.313–34; persuading Agamemnon to sacrifice Iphigenia, 13.181–93; stealing the Palladium, 13.337–49), which Ajax dismisses as dishonourable and unimpressive ('nothing done in the light, nothing without Diomedes close by', 13.100). Ovid's portrayal of this famous episode most closely recalls Pind. *Nem.* 7.20–30, which argues that Ajax would not have committed suicide, had Ulysses' lies been uncovered. For Ovid, Ulysses may be well-versed in rhetorical performance (13.123–7, 132–3), but Ajax morally deserves the arms. This support for the underdog arouses the reader's emotions (principally indignation), persuading them to believe the outcome unjust.

Within this combined group two important patterns emerge. First, the marginally higher success rate of emotional appeals to equals indicates that predispositions of familial and socio-political bias partially govern the addressees' judgment. In appeals to equals, the success of an emotional appeal is governed more by the predispositions (whether positive or negative) entailed in close relationships than by rhetorical techniques and delivery, or whether it deserves to succeed. In such cases, justice may be unfulfilled, and this – portrayed with Ovid's narrative skill – rouses emotional responses in the reader. Furthermore, in cases where such appeals fail, additional factors such as divided loyalties, moral law or dispositions brought on by contingent circumstances may be responsible. Since such appeals would otherwise be expected to succeed, their failure engenders the reader's emotions in various ways.

Second, among this group of equals and family members, failed appeals by gods number just three (Circe to Jupiter and vice versa, and Apollo to Phaëthon) – and the reasons for these failures have been discussed above – while mortals fail more regularly (nine cases in all). Furthermore, when a mortal fails in an appeal to a god, a supplementary appeal by another god might bring success. Peleus (11.221–409) does not persuade Psamathe to prevent the slaughter of his cattle by a monstrous wolf, but her sister Thetis's appeal for clemency succeeds on his behalf (11.399–401) – again highlighting the predisposition of gods to help their equals.

These emerging patterns cannot be explained by a disparity in rhetorical skill between gods and mortals. There is frequently no discernible difference in technique between two given speeches, and gods are equally susceptible to making misplaced arguments as mortals are.²³ Instead we might infer that a strong predisposition to aid equals, by a kind of group-preservation mentality, transcends justice or the usual effects of persuasion in forming judgments. Gods are held by fewer moral restrictions than mortals (suggested in Byblis's letter to Caunus: 'we

in his appeal to Pandion embody his scheming persona. As Tarrant (1995) 72 summarizes: 'Ulysses' success shows how dishonest rhetoric can extort an unjust victory'. On the use of tears for emotional persuasion, see Hagen (this volume).

23 E.g. Apollo's appeals to Phaëthon, as we have seen, and to Daphne; see e.g. Gross (1979) 305–8.

follow the example of the great gods', 9.555), and are not restricted by piety and divine awe. In addition, divine powers, such as the ability of prophecy (which Jupiter employs to console Venus's grief for Caesar's murder, 15.819–39), usually grant the gods greater chances of success in emotional appeals – unless the fates or an oath intervene²⁴ – giving the appeal greater weight in turn. Again the issue of justice arises, with partiality potentially ruling judgment.

Most notably for our considerations of justice in emotional appeals to equals, four successful appeals bring dire consequences for a third party. In each instance, the appeal either seeks to engender shared emotions or to highlight shared circumstances, whether present or envisaged.²⁵ Both methods exploit the addressee's predisposition to be moved – increasing the likelihood of instant assent. Three of the appeals are to family members, and from these shared emotions arise. Venus, seeking to persuade her son Cupid to use his arrow to make Dis fall in love with Proserpina, appeals to pride (5.365–6, 369–70), but more crucially shared greed (5.371–2) and anger (5.372–7). These shared emotions are emphasized by inclusive language ('your mother's power and yours', 5.371–2; 'we are scorned', 5.374; 'if we suffer', 5.377; 'for our shared kingdom', 5.378). The appeal succeeds instantly, bringing grim consequences for Proserpina's mother Ceres and (depending on interpretation) Proserpina herself. Similarly, Latona urges her children Apollo and Diana to punish Niobe for scorning her, and the appeal to shared pain (*dolor*, 6.210) brings instant assent: 'stop! A long complaint delays punishment!' (6.215). Neptune's appeal to Apollo to instigate Achilles' death departs slightly from this pattern. Since their relationship (uncle and nephew) is more removed, Neptune creates a stronger connection in two ways: he elevates Apollo to the position of favourite nephew (12.585); and refers to their joint enterprise in building Troy (12.587). This twofold *captatio benevolentiae* strengthens the subsequent appeal to the shared emotions of grief (*dolor*) (12.588–90), pity for Hector (12.590) and anger at Achilles (12.592–3). The agreement is instant and tacit (12.597), bringing Achilles' demise. In the final example Achilles' ghost successfully persuades the Greek army to sacrifice Polyxena by appealing to the 'heroic code' they once shared. He arouses gratitude, guilt for not previously being grateful (13.445–7), and shame at the dishonour to his tomb (13.447) – bringing instant tacit assent (13.449), with dire consequences for the innocent girl. In each case, the predisposition of family members and equals to be persuaded, particularly by appeals to shared circumstances and/or emotions, facilitates successful persuasion. In turn, an innocent party suffers or, as in Niobe's case, a guilty party suffers disproportionately. As a result, the reader should experience anger at the judgment, and pity for the sufferer.

24 E.g. Venus's appeal to the gods (15.765–82); Apollo regrets he cannot overturn his oath to grant Phaëthon's wish to drive his chariot, so tries persuasion instead (2.50–3).

25 According to Konstan (2001) 49, this is a condition of feeling pity for someone.

APPEALS TO INFERIORS

Emotional appeals between those who are not equal display strikingly different patterns to those between equals, and provide initially surprising results. First I shall consider appeals to inferiors. These fail more often than they succeed (at a ratio of 15:7), as seen in Appendix table 2. Here our expectations – that the speaker's status or power will persuade the addressee by arousing fear (explicitly or not) – are frequently subverted. However, further examination of the failures yields interesting observations. Of the failures, eleven involve deities addressing lesser deities or mortals. Following ten of these the scorned senior deity employs force or gives chase, leading, either directly or indirectly, to metamorphosis – and since failure to persuade is a *sine qua non* of the metamorphosis, this by itself justifies several instances of failed persuasion in the epic.²⁶ Nine of these instances occur in an erotic context,²⁷ with a deity pursuing a lesser deity or mortal. In the speeches of Jupiter to Io (1.588–600), and Boreas to Orithyia (6.681–710), when verbal persuasion fails, the desired outcome is achieved by rape: Jupiter 'snatched her shame' (*rapuitque pudorem*, 1.600); Boreas is described as *raptor* (6.710) – 'abductor', or rather 'rapist'. In each case the victim's resistance to emotional persuasion is futile. Even when the speaker does not resort to rape, other force is employed. Glaucus, for example, attempts to persuade Circe to use force (i.e. magic) on his behalf when his appeal to Scylla fails (14.12–24). His approach backfires drastically as Circe, having been rebuffed in turn by Glaucus, turns the innocent Scylla into her famous, monstrous form. Finally, Apollo, having been rebuffed in his amorous appeal to Leucothoe, does not resort to physical force, but secures his desired outcome by the power of his revealed divine form (4.233)²⁸ – bringing a grim end for Leucothoe, who is buried alive by her father as a punishment (4.234–55). In each case, the addressee resists an emotional appeal, but is unfairly overcome by force regardless.

Across these speeches the speakers seek to engender various stock emotions appropriate for persuading a love interest, namely: calming of fear (Apollo to

26 We also note the exceptional case of Perseus's failed appeal to Atlas's admiration (4.639–42). Although Perseus is of lower status and power, he uses the head of Medusa (in a temporary inversion of status) to turn Atlas to stone.

27 The other – Latona's appeal to the Lycian farmers (6.349–59) – is strikingly comic, with its anachronistic legal vocabulary ('the use of water is a common right (*communis*)' (6.349); 'I have come to a public facility (*publica munera*)' (6.351), and her children stretching out their arms in supplication, like those brought into a courtroom to seek pity. The episode, including the farmers' resulting metamorphosis, is somewhat light-hearted following the Niobe episode, and seems designed to rouse not the reader's pity, but his or her humour. Hercules' appeal to the centaur Nessus's fear and shame, before transfixing him with an arrow (9.120–6), recalls epic battle formulae. Neither Nessus nor the reader has much time to react to the appeal.

28 Vertumnus employs the same tactic on the wood-nymph Pomona – a divinity on an apparently equal level, although previously disposed against erotic advances (14.634). After his appeal fails, he reveals his true form, reported in a pointed narratorial interjection: 'he got ready to use force: but force was not needed, and the nymph was captured by the god's form and felt a mutual pang' (14.770–1).

Daphne, Jupiter to Io);²⁹ admiration for deeds or birth (Apollo to Daphne, Jupiter to Io, Glaucus to Scylla);³⁰ pity for the pain of love (Apollo to Daphne, Glaucus to Scylla);³¹ and pride for being chosen (Jupiter to Io, Salmacis to Hermaphroditus).³² In four appeals (Pan to Syrinx; Neptune to Corone; Glaucus to Scylla; and Boreas to Orithyia) the specific words are just summarized. Boreas even chastises himself for originally opting for verbal persuasion ('why have I given up my weapons – fierceness and force and rage (*iram*) and threatening moods – and been moved over to prayers (*preces*)?', 6.687–9). The reader can flesh out these reported erotic appeals with the content of those given in direct speech, thus becoming closely involved in the creation of emotional appeals.³³ In these cases, by drawing attention to the failure of emotional persuasion, Ovid emphasizes the unfair outcome for the lesser deity or mortal.³⁴ their emotions are disregarded and they are conquered by force – in short, they are 'damned if they do, and damned if they don't'. In turn a sense of unfairness, and thus pity and support for the underdog is aroused in the reader in such cases.³⁵

There are three failed appeals by superior mortals to inferiors, and one (Circe to Glaucus, 14.28–36) by a nymph to a god. The latter would normally constitute an appeal to a superior, but Circe's special magic powers, and Glaucus's supplication to her for this reason (noted above), inverts the relationship. When Circe's appeal to Glaucus's love fails, she punishes Scylla rather than Glaucus by her magic power – perhaps fearing divine retribution, perhaps guided by her love for the god. Again a failed erotic appeal leads to an innocent victim suffering dire consequences. Here a third party, rather than the object of desire, is punished, but the expected power-dominated hierarchy is reasserted regardless. Furthermore, when Picus later scorns Circe's amorous advances, because he is mortal she punishes him directly, rather than the object of his affections (14.378–81). Retribution is applied according to power relations, contravening moral justice. The combination of these emotional appeals and their eventual outcomes excites the reader's pity for the underdog. With this in mind, when the Theban subjects of

29 Cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1.17, 1.23.

30 Boasting of deeds was not apparently an advisable approach; cf., e.g., Thraso in Ter. *Eun.* Lineage, meanwhile, although often mentioned to seek admiration (e.g. Ov. *Her.* 16.89–92), is also often considered an irrelevance (e.g. Ov. *Her.* 4.156–64). Apollo's failure to persuade Daphne might in part be caused by these and other misguided arguments; see Gross (1979) 305–8.

31 A persistent theme of the *Heroides* and the elegists; cf. also Catull. 51, 99. The tradition extends back to Sappho (131 *GL*).

32 Among Oenone's arguments to Paris in Ov. *Her.* 5, and Paris's to Helen in *Her.* 16.

33 For other ways in which the reader is involved in the narrative of the *Metamorphoses*, see Wheeler (1999) 151–61.

34 Daphne's metamorphosis is perhaps an exception, since she preserves her virginity as the laurel ('nevertheless the wood fled from his kiss' – 1.556). However, the laurel's apparent consent to be Apollo's chosen plant perhaps rather depicts the god's wilful interpretation: 'the laurel nodded with its newly made branches, and seemed to move its head [in assent]' (1.566–7).

35 The episodes form part of a wider negative portrayal of the gods in the epic, which Lundström (1980) 19–42 considers in relation to Ovid's disapproval of Augustus's politics.

Pentheus and Niobe reject their appeals to stop worshipping Bacchus and Latona respectively (3.564–5; 6.202–3), their judgment might be guided most strongly by fear rather than piety – and rightly so, as the gods bring severe (and perhaps excessive) punishments on their rulers. The power hierarchy is maintained, with the weak fearing the judgments of the powerful, proportionate to their places in the hierarchy.

Even when emotional appeals to inferiors succeed, further observations suggest a tendency to stir the reader's pity for the underdog. Among this group, Juno flaunts her power as queen of the gods in appealing successfully to the empathy, anger and pity of Tethys and Oceanus, that they might debar Callisto and Arcas from the sea (2.512–30) – a punishment stemming more from divine rage and power than moral justice. Medea's appeal to Pelias's daughters' filial duty (*pietas*, 7.336; *officium*, 7.337), encouraging them to kill their father so she might rejuvenate him, succeeds – although perhaps more by the visual evidence of her powers, displayed by her rejuvenation of Aeson (7.332–3), than by verbal persuasion. In both cases third parties suffer as a result of emotional persuasion that exploits superior power.

As with Juno above, successful emotional appeals to inferiors are most frequently made by gods. Of particular interest are Jupiter's appeals to the gods, including those made in an expressly familial context (listed in Appendix table 1a), since all except the one to Ceres succeed. This pattern suggests obedience towards an ultimate ruler, which the reader might map onto contemporary Roman politics. Particularly striking among these appeals is Jupiter's description to the Olympian council of the crimes and metamorphosis of Lycaon. Expecting the gods' predisposition to empathize with crimes against their kind, Jupiter successfully rouses their fear for the immediate situation, which he describes as more dangerous than the war with the giants (1.182–6); their pity for lesser gods and divinities (1.192–8); and their anger at Lycaon's savagery (1.185, 198). He then outlines Lycaon's crimes, and the penalty already paid for them (1.209–43) – in context a divine analogy for an emperor acting without *senatus consultum ultimum*.³⁶ Lycaon's outrageous reported deeds against Jupiter, and the anger and fear they produce, are implicitly transferred to other terrestrial crimes ('savagery rules', 1.241) without further explanation. By omitting details Ovid surreptitiously suggests that the extent of the crimes is exaggerated.³⁷ Nevertheless, the gods, affected by the same emotions, unanimously agree to exact a universal punishment: the flooding of the earth. No crime elsewhere is punished so ruthlessly and disproportionately,³⁸ and in fact, judging by the future crimes catalogued in the epic, the punishment fails as a preventative measure. Here, potentially innocent

36 This is a senatorial decree urging the consuls to protect Rome from harm; *OCD* s. v. *senatus consultum ultimum*.

37 Anderson (1989) 94–6.

38 Indeed, as Feldherr (2002) 171–2 points out, other portrayals of the Lycaon myth do not mention such a punishment.

victims suffer following an unduly harsh sentence passed by authoritarian rulers,³⁹ creating shock and pity in the reader. The episode indicates the portrayal of power-structures and justice in the remainder of the epic, and also Jupiter's wrathful disposition ('he conceived anger (*iras*) worthy of Jove', 1.166). Furthermore, unavoidable parallels with the Roman Senate⁴⁰ may constitute an implicit criticism of decision-making and justice in Roman politics – with retributive Jupiter analogous to Augustus⁴¹ – and introduce an anti-authoritarian tone in the epic.

APPEALS TO SUPERIORS

Unjust or excessive punishments are, as we might expect, also found frequently after appeals to superiors, and particularly by mortals to divinities. Such appeals are more frequently successful than unsuccessful (a ratio of 19:15, see Appendix table 3), surprisingly yielding a higher success rate than those to inferiors. Among the positive outcomes following failed appeals, three are instigated by a third-party deity. One of these (Peleus to Psamathe) we have discussed above. Of the other cases, Inachus's speech to Io, although failing to engender pity in Argus nearby, does gain pity from Jupiter as a tertiary audience. Similarly, Hercules' appeal to Juno to pity his suffering, after he has donned the tunic soaked in Nessus's poisonous blood ('or if I deserve to be pitied (*miserandus*) even by my enemy ...', 9.178), succeeds in moving Jupiter, who helps to create Hercules' pyre (9.229–31), and the other Olympians (9.248–9). In each case a god answers the speaker's pleas as a secondary (or tertiary) audience and averts suffering. The differing judgments of the various divine audiences emphasize the arbitrary nature of divine justice. In addition, the gods' role as secondary (or tertiary) audience is analogous to the reader's as external observer. The reader, guided by the narrative, forms emotional judgments relative to, and often shared with, those of the in-text audiences in these episodes.

Of the fifteen unsuccessful emotional appeals, eleven bring negative outcomes for the speaker or a third party. This sequence, in the mould of Greek tragedy, creates strong pathos towards the affected party, and therefore pity in the audience

39 Also, as Anderson (1989) 97–8 points out, the true criminal, Lycaon, evades the deserved punishment of execution by thunderbolt.

40 For which, see Buchheit (1966); Anderson (1989) 93–4; Miller (2004) 171–3 and (2009) 334–8.

41 A comparison argued especially by Buchheit (1966), and also Schmitzer (1990) 52–60, who sees this scene as the introduction of a persistent political allegory in the whole epic (a belief that Miller (2004) tempers). The conjecture of Habinek (2002) 51 that Jupiter's judgment depicts Roman foreign policy does not convincingly rule out Ovid's disagreement with the policy. For other negative analogous references to Augustus in Ovid, see Lundström (1980) and Miller (2004) and (2009) 338–55 (Apollo); Hinds (1992) (Romulus), supporting Curran (1972) 85–6 (Augustus as Romulus; Ovid as Numa); and Miller (2009) 334–8 (Jupiter). It should be noted that Miller considers Ovid's portrayal of Apollo and Jupiter (and their relevance to Augustus) to be often ambiguous.

(in this case, the reader).⁴² The direction of the reader towards a certain emotional response is especially evident in the story of Niobe (6.146–312), which counters a common ancient perception that only those whose misfortune is not self-inflicted deserve pity.⁴³ Niobe errs greatly in boasting of her fertility and rejecting Latona, especially in her blind proclamations of her fortune and safety (6.193–4). Nevertheless, her punishment seems excessive,⁴⁴ as her seven sons are killed by Apollo and Diana. The Thebans' grief (*dolor*, 6.267) is recounted, and Niobe's change of circumstances is emphatically summarized: 'how much this Niobe differed from that Niobe' (6.273);⁴⁵ she was 'enviable (*invidiosa*) to her own; but now deserves pity (*miseranda*) even from an enemy' (6.276). The reader's pity is also engendered, and more so by her subsequent lamentation (6.280–5) – especially the opening words, stilted in the Latin (*pascere, crudelis, nostro, Latona, dolore, / pascere*, 6.280–1). But when Niobe's bravado returns ('I, miserable (*miseræ*), have more than you, who are happy; after so many deaths, I still win!', 6.284–5) it is difficult to pity her when Apollo and Diana turn on her daughters. Yet the reader's pity is roused again as Niobe prays for her last daughter to be saved ("save one and the littlest! From many the littlest I ask for, and her alone," she shouts. And as she asks, the one for whom she asks dies', 6.299–300).⁴⁶ This is followed by the starkly emphatic phrase 'she sat down, childless' (*orba resedit*, 6.301),⁴⁷ succinctly summarizing her fate. Niobe's continued grief after her metamorphosis ('even now the marble pours forth tears', 6.312) fittingly concludes the tale, leaving pity as the reader's predominant emotion. Throughout this episode, Ovid artfully directs the reader's emotions on an ebbing and flowing tide of pathos reminiscent of Greek tragedy.⁴⁸ Pity predominates in the end because the punishment far out-

42 Munteanu (2012) considers the role of pity and fear in tragedy, both within the text and for the audience.

43 Konstan (2001) 49, which quotes Cic. *Tusc.* 4.18 ('Pity [*miseriordia*] is distress [*aegritudo*] arising out of the wretchedness [*miseria*] of another who is suffering undeservedly' – Konstan's translation, my brackets).

44 Munteanu (2012) 181–207 considers this in relation to Sophocles' Ajax, for whom, despite his *hubris* and crimes, pity is still felt for his reversal of fortunes.

45 Reversals of fortune were a standard cause of pity in the ancient world, as in Arist. *Rh.* 1386a10–11; Konstan (2001) 132. The difference is expressed by a striking juxtaposition in the Latin: *quantum haec Niobe Niobe distabat ab illa*.

46 The chiasmus and repetition of the Latin emphasizes her dire situation and the desperation of her plea: *unam minimamque relinque! / de multis minimam posco* 'clamavit' *'et unam.'* / *dumque rogat, pro qua rogat, occidit*. The same effect is created by the triplet 'sons and daughters and husband' (6.302), expressing the horror of her loss.

47 The words form the last two feet of the hexameter after a strong sense break, a relatively common occurrence in Ovid. A quick survey of Book Six finds fifteen instances in 720 lines (6.38, 174, 191, 197, 295, 299, 301, 352, 447, 483, 544, 574, 579, 609, 655), each designed to emphasize the words in these feet, sometimes for focalization or irony, or as iconic imagery. Such lines are especially prevalent in the stories of Niobe (six) and Philomela (seven), the most pathos-laden episodes in the book.

48 In particular Soph. *Ant.*, in which the reader's pity shifts between Antigone to Creon (especially at the *dénouement* as Creon realizes the tragedy of his judgment). Ovid creates the same emotional rollercoaster for the reader, albeit in relation to just one character.

weighs the crime.⁴⁹ Indeed, while other portrayals of the myth (Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.5; Hyg. *Fab.* 11) spare the seventh daughter, Ovid chooses the maximum punishment, rousing maximum pity in the reader.⁵⁰ Our example shows that even one deserving of punishment may be pitied if the punishment is excessive, and, since the punishment is here governed by those superior in power, pity for the underdog is again aroused.

By certain narrative techniques, pity can be engendered in the reader for an innocent party whose appeal succeeds. When Niobe's son Ilioneus appeals to the gods to be saved (6.262), he successfully rouses pity in his aggressor Apollo, but his fate is sealed regardless: 'the archer was moved (*motus*), but the arrow could not now be recalled' (6.264–5). With typically Ovidian black humour, the youth dies anyway, but 'with the slightest wound' (6.265–6), emphasizing the futility of his appeal. Perhaps Apollo's reaction – the only pity shown by Latona and her children in this episode – betrays doubt that the punishment is just, echoing and informing the reader's reaction. This reading is strengthened by the Coronis episode (2.542–632). Apollo, having been informed of his beloved Coronis's adultery, shoots her in anger (*ira*, 2.602) with an arrow. Having been struck, Coronis appeals to Apollo's pity for her unborn child (2.608–9), and then dies. Apollo's reaction is emphatically described: his immediate repentance ('Ah, he grieves (*paenitet*)!', 2.612) is too late (2.612, 617), and in vain (2.618, 619); and his 'groans' (*gemitus*, 2.621) are compared to a cow's when her calf is sacrificed (2.623–5).⁵¹ It is only then revealed that Coronis's unborn child, which Apollo saves from the pyre, is the god's own son (2.628–9). The delay in this revelation sharpens the pathos of the preceding description of Apollo's grief, and gives extra meaning to his repentance. The dire consequences are caused directly by the overwhelming emotion of anger, which Apollo deeply regrets ('he hates himself, because he believed the story, because he burned up with anger (*exarserit*) in this way', 2.613). The suggestion here, and by association in the Niobe episode, is that clemency (usually Latin *clementia*, a tendency towards feeling pity)⁵² might prevent unfortunate or disproportionately unjust outcomes. Clemency itself was considered a desirable virtue of emperors, and Augustus was considered a

49 Cairns (2004) 61–2, in response to Konstan (2001), states that pity can be roused for the victim of a deserved, but disproportionately harsh, punishment. Regarding emotional reappraisals of an episode, Palencik (2008) 262 – after Robinson (2005) 195–228 – argues that emotional engagement with a developing story is 'structurally continuous, entailing appraisals and reappraisals as our understanding of a situation becomes better known'. For more on appraisal processing in emotions, see Scherer *et al.* (2001).

50 Palencik (2008) 269–71 suggests that unexpected emotional responses are stronger than expected ones.

51 Recalling Lucr. 2.352–66, told with similar pathos.

52 Clemency is explored by Konstan (2001) 96–104, in particular 101, in which it is described as a disposition towards pity, which itself is 'spontaneous and normally short-lived, and liable to be displaced by contrary passions'; see also Konstan (2010). Braund (2012) 89 notes, in reference to Seneca's *De Clementia*, that Roman *clementia* is 'inextricably associated with absolute power', and is thus the preserve of emperors (and the gods).

paradigm.⁵³ With this, and Augustus's cultivated link with Apollo, in mind,⁵⁴ Ovid may be urging clemency (which was perhaps, in Ovid's view, lacking) in Augustus's rule.⁵⁵ He may even, if this part was written before his exile, be warning Augustus of future remorse if his displeasure with Ovid's poetry leads to rash action (such as Ovid's banishment, imminent at the time).⁵⁶

Finally, within this group, successful emotional appeals occasionally bring grim consequences for the speaker or a third party. Of particular interest are those of Pierus's daughters to the Muses, and of Procne to Tereus.⁵⁷ In the latter case, Procne successfully persuades Tereus, through an appeal to love, to let her see her sister Philomela (6.440–1), bringing appalling, unforeseen consequences, as Tereus lusts after Philomela, rapes her and cuts off her tongue. The reader's emotional reaction, enhanced by Philomela's failed appeal to Tereus's shame and pity (6.532–41), is undeniably of pity for the innocent victim.⁵⁸ Pierus's daughters challenge the Muses to engage in a singing contest, appealing to their pride and shame by mockery (5.308–9) and goading: 'if you have any self-confidence (*fiducia*)...' (5.309–10). Their appeal is successful, as the Muse narrating this story reveals ('it was shameful (*turpe*) to compete, but to yield seemed more shameful (*turpius*)', 5.315–6). The Pierides' complaints upon losing, coupled with their pride, make their punishment seem deserved to the reader. However, taken alongside the story of Arachne, which follows directly after, the reader's emotional judgment of the Pierides might alter. Arachne appeals to Minerva to compete at weaving, first indirectly (6.25), and then unwittingly, as Minerva appears dressed as an old woman (6.37–42). The reader is prepared for another defeat, and the inevitable consequences. However, narrative hints suggest that Arachne's weaving

53 In e.g. Sen. *Dial.* 3.23.4–8 and *Clem.* 1.9, as noted by Braund (2012) 84. The *Res gestae* of Augustus reports his award of a shield inscribed with the four virtues of *virtus*, *pietas*, *iustitia* and *clementia*. For *clementia* as a divine quality, occasionally sought and revered by emperors, balanced with severity, see Várhelyi (2012) 116–21.

54 Apollo was Augustus's patron deity, and statues of Augustus frequently portrayed him in the guise of Apollo – a connection emphasized in Augustan poetry; Miller (2009). For theories that Apollo represents Augustus in the *Metamorphoses*, see Miller (2004) and (2009) 332–73 (who argues the comparison holds only in certain clear instances).

55 For the opposite view, that Ovid felt his exile just, see Knight (this volume).

56 The *Metamorphoses* was finished shortly before Ovid's banishment in 8 CE and Augustus may have been aware of its content. Regardless, it is certainly likely that Augustus had previously expressed displeasure with Ovid's other poetry. It has even been posited that the *Metamorphoses*, rather than the *Ars amatoria*, was the *carmen* ultimately responsible for Ovid's exile (for a summary of exponents of this theory, see Lundström (1980) 10–11; Schmitzer (1990) 6–10). Nevertheless, the subtlety of this kind of appeal to clemency should urge caution in our reading. For Apollo's regret elsewhere in the *Metamorphoses*, compare his accidental killing of Hyacinthus (10.162–219). On remorse, see Fulkerson (2013).

57 The speech of Orpheus to Proserpina and Dis is less clear, as the appeal succeeds, but the resulting condition that Orpheus must not look back at Eurydice on their way from the underworld leads to disaster. Pity in the reader for this result is engendered in advance by Orpheus's pleading, and subsequently by his grief; Segal (1972) 483–7.

58 Curran (1978) argues that the narrator shows pity for the rape victims of the *Metamorphoses*, which is transferred onto the reader. For the opposing view, see Richlin (1991).

is better.⁵⁹ She incorporates stories of mortals wronged by gods (mirroring the content of the *Metamorphoses*) in such realistic detail that, in her depiction of the story of Europa, 'you would think the bull real, the waves real' (6.104),⁶⁰ and she 'seems ... to draw back her feet, timid of the leaping water' (6.105–7) – realism not attributed to Minerva's effort. The narrator reveals the true winner: 'not even Pallas, not even Envy (*Livor*) could pick at her work: the golden-haired *virago* grieved (*doluit*) at her success and ripped up the picture' (6.129–31). In her anger, Minerva strikes Arachne, before, 'having been roused to pity (*miserata*)' (6.135), turning her into a spider – perhaps, like Apollo above, regretting her wrath. With this in mind, and since the Muse narrating the Pierides episode is not impartial, perhaps the reader's pity for the Pierides is retrospectively engendered, as they are also mortals strong enough to compete with deities in art, but not power.⁶¹ Furthermore, the Niobe episode, which also rouses pity for one punished for scorning a goddess, and which follows after Arachne's story, strengthens the reader's alternative emotional judgment of the Pierides.⁶²

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of emotional appeals in the *Metamorphoses* has yielded some interesting patterns. Notably, there is less of a disparity in success rate between appeals to equals and appeals to superiors or inferiors than we might expect. In the case of appeals to equals, the success rate is reduced by other factors – such as the youth of the addressee, or the restrictive powers of fate – which frequently dictate the outcome. Where such appeals succeed, this can commonly be attributed to partiality on behalf of the addressee. These observations suggest that persuasion itself (and the persuasive approaches used) may for Ovid be inconsequential in gaining desired outcomes. The same is true of Ovid's portrayal of appeals to superiors or inferiors, in which – regardless of whether the appeal succeeds – the end result following the appeal is more often than not dictated by the relative superiority in power or status between speaker and addressee. After failed appeals to inferiors, the speakers regularly use their power to gain a desired outcome, unfairly overriding the addressees' emotional responses (or lack of them). Meanwhile, failed appeals by speakers inferior in power or status tend to bring dire consequences (sometimes for an innocent third party) from a more

59 Curran (1972) 83–4 argues that Ovid stops short of saying Arachne's is better, but notes the similarities in composition between Arachne's weaving and Ovid's epic, which itself suggests partiality to Arachne's effort.

60 The second person singular *putares* is a direct address that involves the reader in the action (as argued by Wheeler (1999) 154 and 160 (on this passage) and 142–3 (in general)). Ovid invites the reader to judge between the two works, while the narrative directs him or her to side with Arachne.

61 The reader's emotional response to the Pierides is shaped by their response to Arachne; for emotional appraisals based on recurrent, familiar schemata, see Palencik (2008) 266–71.

62 Rashness engenders pity elsewhere in the stories of Icarus and Phaëthon, even though the latter's death might be warranted by the effect his enterprise has on the Earth.

powerful addressee. In the *Metamorphoses*, predisposition and power are greater factors than emotional persuasion (or persuasion in general) in whether an emotional appeal gains a desired outcome.

With this in mind, we might assess Ovid's reasons for including so many emotional appeals – especially failed ones – in the epic. A prominent rationale is the creation of pathos, which, as we have seen, is supported by several narrative techniques within and outside speeches. Emotional appeals situate emotions at the forefront of the narrative, both within individual episodes, and externally for the reader. The various ways in which emotional appeals and their contexts are portrayed creates a complex web of correspondences, through which the reader can compare and contrast similar and different episodes. Additionally, when emotional appeals and judgments are only reported, the reader can fill the gaps with the content of speeches in comparable episodes. Thus, with the aid of this existing narrative, the reader is involved in the creation of new narrative. By noting Ovid's approach and responding accordingly, new readings of certain episodes can be made.

Most important – and linked to this reader participation – emotional appeals, and the episodes in which they sit, seek the reader's emotional judgment. We have seen this is often contingent on the relationship between speaker and addressee, with the reader guided towards siding with the underdog in the vast majority of cases. In cases where undesired dire consequences follow, either for the speaker or a third party, the reader's emotions are engendered more strongly. Such outcomes are common in the *Metamorphoses* and, alongside various narrative, rhetorical and linguistic techniques, guide the reader towards prevailing feelings of pity for the underdog, and anger towards the powerful, throughout the epic. These feelings are enhanced by the uneven clemency of the gods, who display marked partiality towards their own kind in the epic. In some cases where clemency is not shown to a mortal or lesser deity, the gods subsequently regret their actions, simultaneously engendering the reader's pity for the injured party, and suggesting that a tendency towards clemency might prevent catastrophe. Emotional appeals in the *Metamorphoses* guide the reader towards displeasure with power hierarchies, and a preference for clemency in the powerful. Awareness of this enhances our understanding of the *Metamorphoses* and its purpose.⁶³

With these conclusions in mind, we find several instances of Ovidian subversion in the epic. For example, several episodes guide the reader towards certain emotional responses contrary to contemporary custom, including feeling pity for those deserving punishment. Furthermore, there is a prevailing discomfort with the behaviour of those in power, which may reveal Ovid's own feelings about the Roman ruling classes, and hence the emperor – a certain anti-establishmentism that may have led in part to his exile. Similarly, if the epic was completed shortly after his exile, it would be unsurprising to find it tinged with distaste for the imperial regime. Finally, from here it is no great stretch – if we are to take Ovid's

63 Robinson (2005) 105–35 argues that the reader's emotional involvement in certain novels is critical to their understanding.

Apollo and/or Jupiter as partial representations of Augustus – to conclude that, since these gods fail in clemency in the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid is subtly highlighting a lack of clemency in the emperor.

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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF APPEALS IN OVID'S *METAMORPHOSES*

Table 1a: Appeals to family members

Line Ref.	Speech	Emotions aroused	Relationship	Success?	Outcome
1.545–7	Daphne to Peneus	Shared fear	Daughter to father	Yes	Probably Positive
1.757–61	Phaëthon to Clymene (questioning lineage)	Pity; shared anger and shame	Son to mother	Yes	<u>Negative</u>
2.50–102	Apollo to Phaëthon	Fear; shared fear	Father to son; god to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
2.126–49	Apollo to Phaëthon	Fear	Father to son; god to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
3.719–20	Pentheus to Autonoe	Empathy; love (for dead Actaeon)	Nephew to aunt (not <i>compos mentis</i>)	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
5.13–29	Cepheus to Phineus	Guilt; love (for Andromeda)	Brother to brother	Yes	<u>Negative for Phineus</u>
5.365–79	Venus to Cupid	Pride; shared greed and anger	Mother to son	Yes	<u>Negative</u>
5.415–522	Ceres to Jupiter	Shared grief; fatherly love	Mother to father of child	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
5.523–32	Jupiter to Ceres	Empathy (Dis loves Proserpina); admiration (of Dis)	Father to mother of child	Partial (Proserpina returns 6 months a year)	<u>Negative/Positive</u>
6.206–13	Leto to Apollo and Artemis	Shared anger	Mother to children	Yes	Positive for Leto / <u>Negative for Niobe</u>
8.203–8	Daedalus to Icarus	Fear	Father to son	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative (for both)</u>
9.530–63	Byblis to Caunus (via a letter)	Love; pity; fear	Sister to brother	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
14.586–91	Venus to Jupiter (and all the gods)	Pity (for Aeneas); love (for Aeneas)	Olympian to Olympians; daughter to father	Yes	Positive
15.807–42	Jupiter to Venus	Consolation of grief	Father to daughter	Yes	Positive

Table 1b: Appeals to equals

Line Ref.	Speech	Emotions aroused	Relationship	Success?	Outcome
1.735–7	Zeus to Juno ('save Io')	Curbing of fear	God to god	Yes	Positive(?)
4.532–8	Venus to Neptune	Pity; indebtedness	God to god	Yes	Positive
6.495–503	Pandion to Tereus	Faith; sympathy	King to king	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
7.482–3	Minos to Aeacus	Pity	King to king	<u>No</u> (Aeacus bound by treaty with Athens)	<u>Negative</u>
11.421–43	Alcyone to Ceyx	Pity; love; fear	Lover to lover	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
[11.448]	[Ceyx to Alcyone]	[Reported calming of fear]	Lover to lover	<u>No</u> (swearing by Apollo persuades her)	<u>Negative</u>
12.542–76	Nestor to Tlepolemus	Pity	Hero to hero	Yes	Positive

Table 1b cont. ...

12.586–96	Neptune to Apollo	Pity; anger	God to god	Yes	<u>Negative</u>
13.5–122	Ajax to Greek army	Anger; admiration (for himself); disdain (for Ulysses); pity; fear; gratitude	Hero to hero cohort	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
13.128–381	Ulysses to Greek army	Empathy; admiration (for himself); disdain (for Ajax); guilt; gratitude	Hero to hero cohort	Yes	Positive for Odysseus, <u>Negative for Ajax</u>
13.445–8	Achilles' ghost to Greek army	Gratitude; heroic code (pride, honour)	Hero to hero cohort	Yes	Positive for Achilles, <u>Negative for Polyxena</u>
14.486–93	Acmon to Diomedes' men	Anger (against Venus)	Soldier to fellow men	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
15.493–546	Hippolytus to Egeria	Consolation of grief	Lesser god to nymph	<u>No</u>	Positive? (She becomes a spring)
15.765–78	Venus to the gods	Pity (for her and Rome's suffering)	Olympian to fellow Olympians	Yes (gods moved, but cannot contradict fate)	<u>Negative</u>

Table 2: Appeals to inferiors

Line Ref.	Speech	Emotions aroused	Relationship	Success?	Outcome
1.182–98, 209–43	Jupiter to the Olympian Gods	Anger; empathy; compassion (for other creatures)	King of gods to gods	Yes	<u>Negative</u>
1.504–24	Apollo to Daphne	Curbing of fear; admiration; pity	God to nymph	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for both</u>
1.557–65	Apollo to Daphne	Pride	God to nymph	Yes	Probably Positive
1.589–97	Jupiter to Io	Pride; curbing of fear; admiration	God to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
[1.701]	[Pan to Syrinx]	[Reported prayers]	Semi-god to nymph	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Syrinx</u>
2.512–30	Juno to Tethys and Oceanus	Empathy; anger; pity	Queen of gods to lower gods	Yes	<u>Negative for Callisto and Arcas</u>
[2.574–6]	[Neptune to Corone]	[Reported prayers and coaxing words]	God to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Corone</u>
3.531–63	Pentheus to his men	Pride; shame	King to subjects	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Pentheus</u>
4.226–8	Apollo to Leucothoe	Admiration	God to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Leucothoe</u>
4.320–8	Salmacis to Hermaphroditus	Pride; love	Nymph to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Hermaphroditus</u>
6.170–202	Niobe to the women of Thebes	Admiration; fear; envy	Queen to subjects	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
6.349–60	Leto to the Lycian farmers	Pity	Goddess to mortals	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for the farmers</u>
[6.685]	[Boreas]	[Reported pleadings to Orythia]	God to mortal	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative for Orythia</u>
7.332–8	Medea to Pelias's daughters	Love; familial honour	Woman (with magic powers) to women	Yes	<u>Negative for Pelias and daughters</u>
9.120–6	Hercules to Nessus	Fear; shame	Hero to centaur	<u>No</u>	N/A

Table 2 cont. ...

9.243–58	Jupiter to the gods	Curbing of fear	King of gods to gods	Yes	Positive
9.428–38	Jupiter to the gods	(Shared) pity	King of gods to gods	Yes	Positive
[11.400–1]	[Thetis to Psamathe]	[As a suppliant, gains her husband's pardon]	Goddess to nymph	Yes	Positive
[13.907–8]	[Glaucus to Scylla]	[Reported words to stop her fleeing]	River god to mortal	No	Negative for Glaucus
13.918–65	Glaucus to Scylla	Admiration; pity	River god to mortal	No	Negative for Glaucus
14.28–36	Circe to Glaucus	Love; scorn (for Scylla)	Nymph (with magic powers) to river god	No	Negative (esp. for Scylla)
14.372–6	Circe to Picus	Love; pity	Nymph (with magic powers) to man	No	Negative (esp. for Picus)

Table 3: Appeals to superiors

Line Ref.	Speech	Emotions aroused	Relationship	Success?	Outcome
1.377–80	Deucalion & Pyrrha to Themis	Pity	Humans to goddess	Yes	Positive
1.653–63	Inachus to Argus (secondary audience)	Pity	Human to primordial giant	No	Negative
2.279–300	Earth to Zeus	Pity; gratitude	God to king of gods	Yes	Positive for Earth, Negative for Phaëthon
2.608–9	Coronis to Apollo	Pity (for unborn child)	Mortal to god	Yes	Positive for unborn child
4.148–61	Thisbe soliloquy (heard by parents and gods)	Pity; guilt	Mortal (to parents and gods)	Yes	Positive
5.216–22	Phineus to Perseus	Pity; empathy; pride	Hero to (superior) hero	No	Negative
5.308–14	9 daughters of Pierus to the Muses	Pride	Mortals to gods	Yes	Negative
5.489–508	Arethusa to Ceres	Pity	Nymph to goddess	Yes	Positive
6.262–4	Ilioneus to all the gods	Pity (invoked by gesture)	Mortal to gods	Yes	Negative (Apollo can't recall the arrow)
6.299–300	Niobe to Apollo & Artemis	Pity	Mortal to gods	No	Negative
6.440–4	Procne to Tereus	Empathy; love	Wife a suppliant to husband	Yes	Negative for Philomela
6.533–48	Philomela to Tereus	Shame; pity	Woman to man/king	No	Negative
7.164–8	Jason to Medea	Love; pity	Hero to woman (with magic powers)	Yes	Positive (also for Aeson)
7.615–8	Aeacus to Jupiter	Love; shame	Mortal to god	Yes	Positive
8.90–4	Scylla to Minos	Love	Subject to king	No	Negative
8.108–42	Scylla to Minos (or soliloquy)	Shame; love; pity	Subject to king	No	Negative

Table 3 cont. ...

8.433–6	Plexippus and Toxeus to Atalanta	Shame; doubt	Men to woman (a militant virgin)	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
8.595–610	Achelous to Neptune	Pride; pity	River god to Olympian	Yes	Positive
9.176–204	Hercules to Juno	Pity	Hero to goddess	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
9.773–81	Telethusa to Isis	Pity; loyalty	Mortal to goddess	Yes	Positive
10.17–39	Orpheus to Persephone and Dis	Pity; empathy	Mortal to gods	Yes	<u>Negative</u>
10.611–35	Atalanta to Gods	Fear; pride	Mortal to gods	<u>No</u>	(Hippomenes' appeal to Venus secures outcome)
10.639–41	Hippomenes to Venus	Compassion	Mortal to goddess	Yes	Positive
11.132–3	Midias to Bacchus	Pity	Mortal to god	Yes	Positive
11.352–78	Herdsmen to Peleus	Pity	Subject to hero	<u>No</u> (Peleus moved by his earlier crime)	Positive (but only by realizing the truth)
[11.397–400]	[Peleus to Psamathe]	[Calming wrath]	Mortal to nymph	<u>No</u>	Positive (after Thetis intervenes)
13.457–73	Polyxena to the Greeks	Pity	Defeated enemy to victorious enemy; woman to men	Yes	Positive (Hecuba allowed to bury her)
13.494–534	Hecuba to dead Polyxena (and aside to gods)	Pity	Woman to gods (indirectly)	<u>No</u>	Eventually positive (later undergoes metamorphosis)
13.587–99	Aurora to the gods	Pity; gratitude	Goddess to Olympians	Yes	Positive
13.789–869	Polyphemus soliloquy (heard by Galatea)	Admiration; pity; fear; pride; guilt	Giant to nymph (with other love interest)	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
14.12–24	Glaucus to Circe	Pity; pride	River god to nymph (with magic powers)	<u>No</u>	<u>Negative</u>
14.663–764	Vertumnus to Pomona	Pity; love; fear; admiration	Minor god to minor goddess (predisposed to virginity)	<u>No</u> (revealed form succeeds)	Positive
14.841–4	Hersilia to Iris	Pride	Mortal to goddess	Yes	Positive
15.39–40	Myscelus to Hercules (and gods as secondary audience)	Pity; guilt	Mortal to god	Yes	Positive

PART IV:
LINGUISTIC FORMULAE AND GENRE-SPECIFIC
PERSUASION

EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE AND FORMULAE OF PERSUASION IN GREEK PAPYRUS LETTERS*

Eleanor Dickey

INTRODUCTION

One of the most fundamental rules of English politeness is the importance of saying ‘please’ when making a request. Using a bare imperative without ‘please’ or a similar modifier, for example saying ‘Give me ten pounds’, is likely to cause anger and resentment as well as a refusal to comply with the request – unless, of course, the addressees are so much in the speaker’s power that they are not in a position to object. In fact the way English speakers make requests is subject to considerable variation depending on both the identity of the addressee and the magnitude of the request. Someone about to make a short train journey with a good friend, if he cannot make his bank card function in the ticket machine, might say something like ‘Bob, can you lend me 10 pounds?’ But if the speaker’s fellow-traveller is someone he does not know well, or someone with power over him, he would phrase the request rather differently. And if the amount needed is the price of an expensive long-distance ticket, even the request to a good friend would be phrased differently.

Linguists have been working on this phenomenon for a long time, so there are a number of different theoretical frameworks available for predicting and explaining how requests are made. The oldest and best-known of these is that of Brown and Levinson, who argue that there are two kinds of politeness, positive and negative.¹ To oversimplify grossly, positive politeness consists of being actively nice to one’s interlocutors and negative politeness consists of not inconveniencing or imposing on them. Which strategy is chosen depends on the relationship between

* This paper is based on a larger body of research carried out in 2006 and 2007 and orally presented in numerous places since then; responses from audiences at the University of Toronto, University of Manchester, Cornell University, and University College Dublin were particularly valuable in helping me build and refine the section of the research presented here. Some of my conclusions match those in the excellent recent book by Camille Denizot (2011); they were reached independently, and I hope this fact will aid the scholarly world in accepting them. I am grateful to Ed Sanders and Matthew Johncock for persuading me finally to publish this work, to Marina Terkourafi for introducing me to her theory, helping me understand it, and kindly checking a draft of this essay; and to Philomen Probert for constant help and encouragement; any mistakes that remain are my own.

¹ Brown and Levinson (1987); for some other theories see Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003), and for examples of the use of Brown and Levinson in work on ancient politeness see Hall (2009) and Lloyd (2004).

speaker and addressee and the magnitude of the request, but essentially negative politeness is, from the perspective of an English speaker, 'more polite' than positive politeness: positive politeness is used more for minor requests and to social inferiors, and negative politeness for major requests and to social superiors.

The extreme end of negative politeness, of course, consists of not asking for a favour at all, but this level of deference can be impractical if the speaker really needs the favour. The next level down consists of asking obliquely, in such a way that the utterance does not have to be taken as a request at all. For example the person in need of money for a train ticket might say, 'Oh dear, this machine isn't taking my card, and I haven't got any cash on me. What do you think I should do?' In those circumstances most friends will get the hint and offer the money, but if someone does not want to do so he is not faced with the awkwardness of refusing: he can simply not take the hint. This strategy too is useful for maintaining good relationships with one's superiors, but it can be impractical if the result is not getting something that one really needs.

The next level in the negative-politeness hierarchy consists in asking very, very nicely for whatever is needed, making it clear that the addressee is under no actual obligation to provide it. For example our hypothetical traveller might say, 'Oh dear, the machine isn't taking my card, and I haven't got any cash. I don't suppose there's any chance you could lend me £10, is there? I'm so sorry to ask you, but there isn't any other way that I'm going to be on that train with you otherwise.' Brown and Levinson's theory predicts that a traveller using this strategy is addressing someone who either is not a close friend or is so poor that £10 is a lot of money to ask him for.

Even further down the hierarchy come the phrases that one normally uses to make requests, such as 'Please could you lend me £10?', 'Can you lend me £10?', and 'Would you mind lending me £10?'. These phrases are very common and as a result have become highly conventionalized, so that their meaning is not the same as the sum of their parts. The utterance 'Can you read Greek?' is a question, and the addressee of such a question will probably answer 'yes' or 'no' rather than producing a copy of the *Iliad* and reading Greek. But the equivalently phrased utterance 'Can you lend me £10?' is a request, and it would be peculiar for the addressee to answer 'yes' without actually providing the money. The fact that this way of phrasing a request is considered more polite than the imperative 'Lend me £10' may have a historical basis: it is possible that at one time 'can you?' was not a direct request at all but an oblique one that did not actually ask for the money, but by now that etymological meaning has been superseded.

GREEK LITERATURE OF THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

Brown and Levinson claimed that their rules were universal and worked for all languages, and as we have just seen the rules seem to work for English, at least in

most situations. But they work much less well for Greek of the Classical period,² because throughout the literature of that period there is an overwhelming lack of markedly polite language in the making of requests. Regardless of the identity of the addressee or the magnitude of the request, speakers' normal tendency is to use the bare, unsoftened imperative,³ as illustrated in table A.⁴

	Hom.	Soph.	Eur.	Ar.	Men.	Hdt.	Pl.	Total	% of total
Bare imperative	95	171	158	320	197	228	77	1,246	65%
Other with similar meaning	37	86	55	97	31	89	37	432	23%
Markedly polite	14	44	40	41	50	29	16	234	12%
Total requests	146	301	253	458	278	346	130	1,912	100%
% markedly polite	11%	15%	16%	9%	18%	8%	12%	12%	

Table A: Linguistic forms used for requests in Greek of the Classical period

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the use of the imperative in Greek does not seem to be determined either by status or by the magnitude of the request; although some non-imperative request strategies can be explained using Brown and Levinson's theory,⁵ the unsoftened imperatives used even in situations that ought to call for considerable mitigation are not explicable using this model of politeness. See for example passages 1 and 2.

- 1) ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν οἰκότα εἶρηκας, σὺ μέντοι μὴ πάντα θυμῷ **χρέο** μηδὲ πόλιν ἀρχαίην **ἐξαναστήσης** (Herodotus 1.155.3, Croesus urging Cyrus not to destroy Sardis)

- 2 Throughout this paper I shall use 'Classical period' in a broad sense, to run from Homer (eighth/seventh century BCE) to Menander (who died at the beginning of the third century BCE).
- 3 This point has also been made by Denzot (2011) 488, on the basis of a corpus of 6,314 verb forms (and an unspecified number of requests made in ways that do not involve verb forms) taken principally from Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Lysias and Herodotus.
- 4 The figures in table A are based on a hand search of the following corpus of texts: Homer, *Odyssey* 1–4; Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, *Antigone*; Euripides, *Hippolytus*, *Medea*; Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, *Knights*; Menander, *Dyscolus*, *Aspis*, *Epitrepontes*; Herodotus (all); Plato, *Symposium*. It is not practical to include references to all the passages involved here, but the raw data (for this and all subsequent tables) are available on request. Under 'other with similar meaning' are included prohibitive subjunctives (aorist subjunctives used instead of aorist imperatives in the negative), infinitives for imperatives, and ὅπως + future indicative, all of which are clearly not polite in these texts. Under 'markedly polite' are included the strategies illustrated in examples 5–14 below and a few others. 'Requests' is used here (as a replacement for the linguistic technical term 'directives') to include all utterances in which the speaker tries to get the addressee to do something, whatever the linguistic form of the utterance.
- 5 See for example Lloyd (2004), but note Denzot's (2011: e.g. 483, 487) vigorous and well-founded arguments that questions and certain other indirect ways of phrasing requests are not necessarily polite in Greek.

‘O king, what you say is reasonable, but nevertheless **do not act** entirely on your anger, and **do not destroy** an ancient city . . .’⁶

- 2) τὴν παρ’ ἐμοῦ λαβὼν **ἴθι**. (Menander, *Dyscolus* 375, slave to free man)
‘Take this [mattock] from me and **go**.’

Of course, Greek literature from this period also contains examples of other ways of phrasing requests, but those are overwhelmingly in the minority compared to the use of the imperative alone, whereas in English the imperative by itself is used much less often than an imperative softened with ‘please’, ‘can you’, etc. For this reason many translators systematically replace bare, unmodified imperatives with more polite request formulae when translating Greek into English: see table B and passages 3 and 4.⁷

Work	Bare imperatives in Greek	Bare imperatives in English	English bare imperatives as % of Greek
Plato, <i>Symposium</i>	77	44	57%
Xenophon, <i>Symposium</i>	30	17	57%
Menander, <i>Dyscolus</i>	140	116	83%
Total	247	167	68%

Table B: Comparison of bare imperative usage in three Greek texts and their English translations

- 3) ἄλλος γάρ τις μοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηκοὺς Φοῖνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς λέγειν. σὺ οὖν μοι **διήγησαι**· δικαιοτάτος γὰρ εἶ τοὺς τοῦ ἐταίρου λόγους ἀπαγγέλλειν. (Plato, *Symposium* 172b)
‘I’ve already had a report from someone else (who’d been told about it by Phoenix the son of Philip), but his account wasn’t very clear. He did mention, though, that you knew about it as well. So **please will you tell** me? I mean, Socrates is your friend, so it’s perfectly appropriate for you to report what he says.’⁸
- 4) τῆς Ἀττικῆς **νομίζετ’** εἶναι τὸν τόπον,
Φυλὴν, τὸ νυμφαῖον δ’ ὅθεν προέρχομαι
Φυλασίων . . .
ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ κεφάλαια, τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ
[ὄψεσθ’] ἐὰν βούλησθε – **βουλήθητε** δέ. (Menander, *Dyscolus* 1–3, 45–6)
‘**Imagine, please**, that the scene is set in Attica, in fact at Phyle, and that the shrine I’m coming from is the one belonging to that village.... There, that’s the outline. Details you’ll see in due course, if you like – and **please do like**.’⁹

Fortunately, Brown and Levinson’s theory is not the only model of politeness, merely the best-known one; there are a large number of others, each of which has been claimed to replace Brown and Levinson’s model. Indeed Brown and Levinson’s theory ought to have been completely discredited by now, as for decades

6 Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

7 The figures in table B are based on translations by Waterfield (1994), Tredennick (1970) and Miller (1987).

8 Trans. Waterfield (1994) 3; note Waterfield’s addition of ‘please’.

9 Trans. Miller (1987) 23; note Miller’s addition of ‘please’.

studies refuting it have appeared regularly – but the fact that such studies are still produced at frequent intervals suggests that Brown and Levinson's theory still has enough adherents to be worth refuting. The reason it has adherents is that despite its flaws it is often useful, particularly in combination with other theories;¹⁰ therefore it must be kept in mind when looking at the Greek data, but at the same time another theory is needed to provide the main explanation of those data.

Space forbids a discussion of all the other politeness theories here, as they are numerous and complex; suffice it to say that in my opinion the most useful model for dealing with Greek is that of Terkourafi.¹¹ To oversimplify grossly again, Terkourafi argues that there is no simple relationship between the literal meaning of a phrase and how polite it is. Politeness depends entirely on what is usual in a given context, and this system works because people are consistent and formulaic about how they make requests. Therefore a researcher or language learner wanting to understand the politeness or impoliteness of a particular phrase needs to look not at its linguistic form or the literal meanings of the words involved, but at the phrases used in other examples of the same type of interaction. If the example being examined is typical, it is polite, regardless of its linguistic form; if unusual, it may be polite or impolite, and more interpretive work is needed to find out which.

Terkourafi's theory makes the Greek data easy to understand. The normal way to make requests was to use a bare, unsoftened imperative, and therefore that formulation of requests was polite. Within the culture concerned, it had the same force as our 'please', which is our normal way to ask for things; that is why a good translator often adds 'please' to an unsoftened imperative when rendering Greek into English. The small number of Greek passages in which a more elaborate polite request is used should be equated not with our 'please' but with what we would do in circumstances where 'please' or 'can you' is not enough.

For those circumstances there were no set expressions in the Greek of the Classical period, but rather a set of strategies that varied widely in their meaning and application. One is the strategy of making the request indirectly, as illustrated in passage 5. Here Socrates does not actually ask Diotima to explain what she means, but she takes the hint that he would like an explanation and agrees to provide one.

- 5) μαντείας . . . δεῖται ὃ τί ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ μανθάνω (Plato, *Symposium* 206b)
'Whatever you say requires divination, and I do not understand.'

10 I have argued this point at length in Dickey (2012b), where four different theories are tested on the same corpus of requests to establish their respective helpfulness.

11 See e.g. Terkourafi (2002), (2004), (2005), (2008) and (forthcoming). For a detailed argument that Terkourafi's theory works better for ancient evidence see Dickey (2012b).

Another polite strategy is the use of the optative with ἄν, such as in passages 6 and 7.¹²

- 6) καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, **πάνυ ἄν** ἠδέως, ὦ Συρακόσιε, **μάθοιμι** τὰ σχήματα παρὰ σοῦ. (Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.16)
 ‘And I for one, he said, **would very gladly learn** the figures from you, Syracusan.’
- 7) **ἄγοιτ’ ἄν** μάταιον ἄνδρ’ ἐκποδών . . . (Sophocles, *Antigone* 1339)
 ‘**Would you lead** me out of the way, a useless man . . .’

These two strategies are by their very natures not formulaic; in addition, Greek of this period has several strategies that could in theory be formulaic but in practice are not. One is the strategy of indicating that it would be good to do something, illustrated in passages 8 and 9. This strategy could be formulaic, and (as we shall see) in the Greek of some periods it actually is formulaic, but in the Classical period it is not, for this idea can be expressed with a wide variety of different words.

- 8) ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, **δίκαιος εἴ** ἢ παῦσαι με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἕως ἄν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι. (Plato, *Symposium* 185d)
 ‘Eryximachus, **you ought** either to stop my hiccups or to speak for me while I stop them.’
- 9) μέχρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεῖτε οὕτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν σχεδίην, πᾶσαν προθυμίην σωτηρίας τε καὶ φυλακῆς παρεχόμενοι. **ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῦντες ἐμοὶ μεγάλως χαριεῖσθε.** (Herodotus 4.98.3)
 ‘But until that time, since I have changed my mind, guard the bridge and show all possible care for its safety and protection. **If you do this you will greatly please me.**’

The same is true of the strategy illustrated in passage 10, that of softening a request with a phrase meaning ‘if you agree’. This is an obvious negative-politeness strategy, in Brown and Levinson’s terms, because it mitigates the force of the request by pointing out that the addressee does not have to comply and indicates deference to his opinion. We might expect it to be frequently used, but in fact it is very rare in Greek of the Classical period.

- 10) σὺ δ’ αὐτὸς αὐτὴν εἴσαγ’, εἰ **δοκεῖ**, δόμους. (Euripides, *Alcestis* 1112)
 ‘But you take her yourself into the house, **if it seems best to you.**’

Some of the most important strategies involve the expression of heightened emotion. When a Greek is really desperate, he sometimes uses a verb meaning ‘I beg’ or ‘I entreat’, and/or an indication of something by which the addressee could be entreated, such as the gods or his knees or beard. This strategy is fairly common in literature, but that frequency may not reflect real life. Entreaty is a

12 Denizot (2011) 455 found on the basis of a different set of data that the optative was not necessarily polite and could even be disrespectful; although in my data this disrespectful usage does not appear, it is worth keeping in mind that the possibility of such implications also existed.

high-risk strategy: by putting the addressee under pressure to grant the request it is excellent for getting what one needs but poor from the perspective of maintaining good relations with the addressee. Hence the entreaty strategy is normally reserved for situations in which the speaker is fairly desperate – but those situations occur not infrequently in some literary genres. This strategy is illustrated in passages 11–14.

- 11) ἐγὼ δὲ πείθομαι ἐκείνην εἶναι πασέων γυναικῶν καλλίστην, καὶ σεο **δέομαι** μὴ δέεσθαι ἀνόμων. (Herodotus 1.8.4)
‘I believe that she is the most beautiful of all women, and I **beg** you not to ask [me to do anything] inappropriate!’
- 12) ἀλλ’ **ἱκετεύω**, ... ὦ πάππε, δός μοι τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἄρξαι αὐτοῦ. (Xenophon, *Cyropedia* 1.3.11)
‘But I **entreat** you, grandfather, grant me to rule over him for three days!’
- 13) **δέομαι** δ’ ὑμῶν πάντων καὶ **ἀντιβολῶ** καὶ **ἱκετεύω** μετ’ εὐνοίας ἀποδέχεσθαι μου τοὺς λόγους. (Isaeus, *De Menecle* 2)
‘I **ask** you all, and **entreat** you, and **supplicate** you to receive my words with good will.’
- 14) μὴ, **πρὸς γενείου**, κρύπτε σύνδουλον σέθεν·
σιγὴν γάρ, εἰ χρὴ, τῶνδε θήσομαι πέρι. (Euripides, *Medea* 65–6)
‘**By your beard**, don’t hide it from your fellow-slave; if necessary I’ll keep silent about it.’

It is debatable whether this strategy should count as politeness.¹³ In Brown and Levinson’s theory entreaty is the exact opposite of negative politeness and would often not count as positive politeness either (though some examples do constitute positive politeness, depending on how they are phrased). Many linguists would argue that what the expressions in passages 11–14 convey is urgency, which is not a form of politeness. At the same time the emotional expressions have something in common with other request strategies that are clearly polite, because these expressions put the addressee in a position of superiority vis-a-vis the speaker. Saying ‘I beg you to lend me £10’ is very different from using the imperative and saying ‘Lend me £10’; the request has been elaborated with something designed to acknowledge and overcome the problem that the addressee might not want to comply. Although in one sense this issue of classification is irrelevant to our understanding of the effects achieved by these phrases, in another sense it matters, because the strategy of entreaty is very common in Greek literature of the Classical period: about half the requests classed as ‘markedly polite’ in table A belong in this category.

13 For the theoretical debate on whether such a strategy should be considered part of politeness see e.g. work on Latin request formulae, among which such expressions figure prominently. Risselada (1993) esp. 253–5 argues that *oro* and *obsecro* (meaning ‘I beg’) are not polite although related expressions such as *rogo* and *quaeso* (meaning ‘I ask’) are, but Hall (2009) and Dickey (2012a) and (2012b) esp. 323–5 argue that this entire group of Latin request formulae is polite.

HELLENISTIC PAPYRI

What happened to the Classical request system in later periods? To answer that question one cannot really look at literature from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, because the Greek literature of those periods was consciously Classicizing. In literature there appears to be no change in the way requests are made at any period of antiquity, just as there appears to be no change in Greek grammar or spelling, but it is unlikely that that situation reflects what happened in the ever-changing conversational language. The usual way to find out what really happened in post-Classical Greek is to look at papyrus documents, as these are far closer to everyday conversational language and so give us a chance to see various types of changes taking place. And in this case, papyrus documents show dramatic changes from their very beginnings, as illustrated in table C.¹⁴

Documents in sample	Bare imperative	Polite	Other	Total	% markedly polite
<i>P.Enteux</i> (body of petitions)	–	78	–	78	100%
<i>P.Enteux</i> (response of officials)	91	–	1	92	0%
<i>P.Cair.Zen.</i> I–III	208	212	21	441	48%
Total	299	290	22	611	47%

Table C: Linguistic forms used for requests in papyrus letters and petitions from the third century BCE

Already¹⁵ in the third century BCE papyrus documents reveal a very different type of request system from the one visible in earlier literature. Bare imperatives are still used, but much less often and only to social inferiors. When the recipient of a petition writes on the petition what his decision is, with instructions to officials about what to do in response to the petition, he almost invariably uses unsoftened imperatives. But the body of the petition never contains bare imperatives: petitioners in Hellenistic Egypt consistently use linguistic politeness strategies to make their requests. The same is true of papyrus letters from the third century BCE, which show strong internal consistency in the way requests are made, depending on the relative status of writer and addressee: for example, *P.Cair.Zen.* 1.59036 consists of a letter containing four requests, all bare imperatives, enclosing a copy of another letter to a different addressee, which has three requests, all using markedly polite language. Clearly, if a Greek-speaking writer in third-century Egypt wanted a superior to do something, he asked nicely using a markedly polite linguistic form – and if he wanted an inferior to do something, he used the bare imperative. That bare imperative was probably still not generally perceived as rude, as it would be in English; in situations where it was normal, it must

14 The figures in table C are based on a hand search of 113 petitions to the king (*P.Enteux*) and 531 assorted other documents (mostly letters but also including petitions to lower officials) from *P.Cair.Zen.* I–III. The passages concerned can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.

15 That the request system in documentary Greek texts from later periods differs from the Classical one has already been established – see e.g. Leiwo (2009).

have still been seen as polite. But in situations where the imperative was no longer used, it was no longer polite.

Moreover, as marked politeness became more common it also became more formulaic: third-century documents abound in polite request formulae. These formulae appear to be derived from the polite request strategies present during the Classical period. Of course, not all those Classical strategies resulted in Hellenistic request formulae; as already noted, some strategies, such as indirectness and the use of the optative, were by their very natures non-formulaic. But of the strategies that had the capacity to become formulaic, the majority made that transition.

For example, the most common request formula in third-century papyri is the phrase *καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς* + conditional participle ‘you would do well if’, derived from the strategy seen in passages 8 and 9 and illustrated below in passage 15. This optative formulation alternates with a variant using the future instead of the optative, *καλῶς ποιήσεις* + conditional participle ‘you will do well if’. The formulaic nature of these phrases is evident not only from the fact that these two linguistic forms are consistently used, but also from the fact that the request itself (which of course cannot be formulaic, as the exact action requested naturally varies from person to person) is regularly expressed with a conditional participle rather than via a subordinate clause introduced by *εἰ* ‘if’. Taking the optative and future variants together, this request formula is attested more than 140 times in letters and petitions from the third century BCE.

- 15) *καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς ἐπιστεῖλας ἡμῖν ὡς βούλει γενέσθαι, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτω καταχωρίσωμεν.* (*P.Cair.Zen.* 1.59036.15–16)
 ‘You would do well if you wrote to us about how you want it to be, so that we too can record it that way.’

Another Classical strategy to turn into a formula in the Hellenistic papyri is the one seen above in passage 10, the use of a phrase meaning ‘if you agree’. There are two different formulae for expressing this strategy in the Hellenistic period, as illustrated in passages 16 and 17: *εἰ δοκεῖ* and *ἐὰν φαίνεται* (both meaning literally ‘if it seems’, i.e. ‘if it seems best to you’). The former phrase is sometimes used in the Classical period, though not frequently, and the latter is not. The two are not completely equivalent in the third century: *ἐὰν φαίνεται* is more common, being attested more than 60 times in a wide variety of different contexts, while *εἰ δοκεῖ* is restricted almost entirely to petitions to the king. In these petitions it is always paired with the same verb, *δέομαι*, to make the formula *δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ*, which occurs more than 40 times on such petitions.

- 16) *ἐὰν τε φαίνηταί σοι, διαγράψης Μηδείῳ εἰς τὰ ἱατρικά, ἐὰν τε βούλῃ.* (*P.Cair.Zen.* 1.59036.13)
 ‘If it seems best to you, pay [the money] to Medeios into the medical tax fund, if you want.’ [The phrase *ἐὰν βούλῃ* is rare and was probably not formulaic at this period.]
- 17) *δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι Διοφάνει τῷ στρατηγῷ γράψαι[ι] Ἡφαιστίωνι τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ ἀποστεῖλαι Πετοβάστιν καὶ Ἰζρον τοὺς ἐγκε(κ)λημένους εἰς Κροκοδῶλων πόλιν, ὅπως διακριθῶ αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ Διοφάνους, καί, ἐὰν ἐνδείξωμαι αὐτοὺς*

κατακεκλυκότας μου τὸν σπόρον, ἐπαναγκαθῆναι αὐτοὺς τὸν ἐμὸν σπόρον ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ τάξασθαι αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐχφόρια, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτοῖ γεωργοῦσιν γῆς ἀντιδοθῆναι μοι τὸ ἴσον πλῆθος ἀνθ' ἧς κα[τ]ακεκλύκασιν. (*P. Enteux* 60.6–11)

‘So I ask you, king, if it seems best to you, to order Diophanes the strategos to write to Hephaestion the epistates [and tell him] to send Petobastis and Horus, the accused, to Crocodilopolis, so that a judgement may be made between them and me before Diophanes, and if I prove that they flooded my seeded field, [I ask] that they be compelled to take over my seeded field and pay the charges on it, and that an amount of land equivalent to that which they flooded be given to me in exchange from the land that they themselves work.’

The third major source of third-century polite request formulae is verbs with meanings such as ‘I beg’. In contrast to the large number of such verbs available for expressing entreaty in the Classical period, only one, *δέομαι*, went on to become a Hellenistic formula. *Δέομαι* is common in third-century papyri, especially in petitions to the king, where it is almost always found with the same other words, as in passage 17 above. It no longer gives the impression of conveying emotional force as in the Classical period (see passages 11 and 13 above, with preceding comments), and indeed it no longer seems to be used to put pressure on the addressee to fulfil the request, because it is systematically combined with *εἰ δοκεῖ* ‘if it seems best’, which as we have seen points out to the addressee that there is no obligation to comply with the request. As noted above, the use of *δέομαι* in the Classical period may not be classifiable as a politeness strategy at all; this element of doubt is gone by the third century, when it is clearly an element of formulaic politeness because it is the standard way of making certain requests.

The other Classical verbs with this same general meaning do not become Hellenistic formulae; for example *ἀντιβόλω*, seen in passage 13 above, is not used for requests at all in the third century. The position of *ἱκετεύω* is particularly interesting, because this verb is indeed used for requests, but it does not appear to become a formula. That is, *ἱκετεύω* is found only occasionally in the third century, and in later centuries it disappears altogether from papyrus documents, whereas the formulae already discussed all continue into the second century and usually well beyond that. Moreover *ἱκετεύω* seems to carry emotional force even in third-century petitions, as illustrated in passage 18 where the rest of the sentence shows the writer’s level of emotion and desperation.

- 18) *δέομαι οὖν σοῦ καὶ ἱκετεύω, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ*, μὴ περιδεῖν με καταφθειρόμενον ἀδίκως ἐν τῷ δεσποτηρίῳ. (*P. Cair. Zen.* III.59520.8–9)

‘So I ask and implore you, if it seems best to you as well, not to overlook me perishing unjustly in the prison.’

Another verb in this category, *ἄξιω*, is never used to make requests in the Classical period but nevertheless becomes a common request formula in the Hellenistic period, as illustrated in passage 19. The use of *ἄξιω* starts off slowly, for the verb is significantly less common than *δέομαι* for requests in documents of the third century, but it rapidly gains ground and is more common than *δέομαι* by the

second century. The use of ἀξιῶ is also more flexible than that of δέομαι, for ἀξιῶ is found in a wider range of documents and with a variety of different other words.

- 19) ἀξιῶ σε, εἰάν σοι φαίνεται, συντάξαι γράψαι Ἡρακλεῖ[δ]ῃ τῷ ἐν τῷ Ἡρ(ακλεο)πο(λίτῃ) ἀρχιφυ(λακίτῃ) διέσθαι αὐτούς, ὅπως γίνωνται πρὸς τῇ [χρ]εῖᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀργῇ τὰ πλοῖα. (*Chr. Wilck.* 166.2.9–10a)

I ask you, if it seems best to you, to order (someone) to write to Herakleides the archiphylakites in the Herakleopolite nome (and tell him) to release them, so that they may do what needs to be done and the ships may not lie idle.⁷

Thus our evidence suggests that between the Classical and early Hellenistic periods there was an abrupt and massive shift in the way Greek speakers made requests. They went from a system without any specific formulae for making polite requests to one with a set of different formulae specialized for use in different contexts. Why did this happen?

One possible answer is that the shift did not happen in practice but is an illusion arising from the changing nature of our evidence. The Hellenistic evidence used above is all documentary, taken from letters and petitions; this type of source simply does not survive to any significant extent from the earlier period. Our Classical evidence is all literary, and if one discounts post-Classical literature as not representative of conversational usage, there is by definition no literary evidence for Greek of the Hellenistic period. Is it possible that the polite request formulae seen in Hellenistic letters and petitions were already used as request formulae in earlier centuries and that our ignorance of that usage comes from the loss of the equivalent documents from the Classical period?

At first glance this objection seems unanswerable, but on closer inspection it can be shown to be incorrect. In the first place, if the Hellenistic request formulae had existed in the Classical period we should see more of them in literature of that period. Of course some literary genres actively avoided ordinary conversational language, and many good authors even in other genres made a point of varying their language to avoid formulaic repetition; such considerations would undoubtedly make formulae that were common in conversational language difficult to detect in the writings of authors like Aeschylus or Aristophanes. But other genres and authors were far more tolerant of formulae, repetition and conversational language: for example Xenophon and Menander are, with respect to other features of the Greek language, both repetitious and predictable. With use of various vocatives, for example, there were set rules in the Classical period that led to repeated use of the same formulae over and over again, and both Menander and Xenophon were happy to follow those rules in their works: vocative usage in both these authors is highly predictable.¹⁶ But in their phrasing of requests too polite to use the imperative the same two authors are entirely unpredictable and show no trace of formulaic usage. This fact strongly suggests that there were no fixed request for-

16 See Dickey (1995).

mulae in the conversational language of Xenophon's or Menander's day, i.e. the later Classical period.

The other reason to believe that the Hellenistic request formulae are genuine products of the Hellenistic period has to do with the use of verbs of emotional entreaty such as δέομαι. The Classical examples of such verbs nearly all occur in contexts where genuine emotion appears to be present, but the Hellenistic examples largely do not (with the exception of ἱκετεύω, which is notably different in other ways as well). When a term becomes formulaic it inevitably loses its emotional force in the contexts where the formulaic usage appears: thus 'dear' at the beginning of an English letter carries no emotional force, though the same word can be emotional in other contexts. Yet the use of δέομαι to make requests in Classical passages such as those seen in 11 and 13 above clearly does carry emotional weight (i.e. evoking pity). If the formulaic, non-emotional use of δέομαι seen in third-century documents had already existed in the Classical period, the word could not have been used by Classical writers in the way it was in fact used.

Therefore the shift in request strategies seen in our evidence must reflect a genuine change in the Greek language. Why would a language that for centuries had had not a single polite request formula suddenly develop an entire set of them, with firm conventions for their use? One possibility is massive influence from a foreign language, such as might take place if the writers of the third-century documents were non-native speakers of Greek – but that cannot be the answer here, for the writers clearly were native Greek speakers. Of course, Egyptian Greek documents sometimes show the influence of other languages even when written by native Greek speakers; at most periods there is occasional influence from the Egyptian language,¹⁷ and at a later period many documents show significant influence from Latin,¹⁸ but the usual markers of such influence are absent from these third-century documents. They are far too early for significant Latin influence,¹⁹ and they come from too high a social setting for significant Egyptian influence.²⁰

The unlikelihood of direct linguistic influence from another culture does not, however, rule out the possibility of cultural influence; indeed the abrupt shift in language usage seen between Classical Greece and Hellenistic Egypt must be connected to the equally sharp cultural transition between those two worlds. When the Greek language came to Egypt it was transplanted into a society with a radi-

17 Cf., e.g., Fewster (2002) and Muhs (2009).

18 There is a vast literature on Latinisms in the Greek papyri; see for example Cavaillat (1951) and (1952), Daris (1991), Cervenka-Ehrenstrasser (1996–), Dickey (2004), Filos (2009) and, most relevantly to the present investigation, Dickey (2009).

19 Latin influence on Egyptian Greek was, unsurprisingly, rare before the annexation of Egypt by Rome at the end of the first century BCE; even after the annexation it took some time for Latin influence to reach the level that would plausibly account for the type of shift investigated here. See Dickey (2003) and (2004).

20 Direct influence from the Macedonian language is unlikely, because most of the documents do not come from a high enough social level to have been written by speakers of Macedonian, but indirect influence cannot be completely ruled out, particularly given how little we know about linguistic politeness in Macedonian.

cally different social structure. The Classical Greek world was in many ways a fundamentally egalitarian one, particularly in democracies like Athens but also even in cities that were not officially democratic, like Sparta where kings ruled but not as autocrats. But Egyptians, like most of the peoples conquered by Alexander, had never been egalitarian; they had a highly stratified social structure, as did the Macedonians who took control of Egypt after the conquest. Even if all the writers and addressees of the requests in our third-century documents were native Greek speakers, they are unlikely to have been Greeks either in the sense of having grown up in Greece or (for most writers, at least) in the sense of having ancestors who had grown up in Greece (as opposed to Macedon).

The Greek speakers of Ptolemaic Egypt needed a request system that fitted their culture by reflecting the difference between asking a favour of a superior and giving an order to an inferior, and that naturally led them to restrict the use of the bare imperative to the latter type of request. But of course that restriction enormously increased the number of requests that did not use the bare imperative, necessitating the frequent use of strategies that Greeks of the Classical period had used much more sparingly in such circumstances. As long as those strategies were used rarely and in special circumstances such as heightened emotion, they naturally did not become formulaic, but as soon as they became common there was a natural tendency for them to turn into formulae. In doing so the Greek request formulae followed the same path as English expressions like ‘can you?’: just as ‘can you?’ has effectively ceased to be a question in English, so Greek *δέομαι* effectively ceased to be an entreaty once it turned into a request formula.

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APPENDIX: DATA ON HELLENISTIC REQUESTS

Note: passages consisting mainly and even entirely of supplements are recorded here for the sake of completeness if they occur in editions, but those where too little is left for the supplement to be reliable are not counted in the statistics used in the article. Requests counted for statistical purposes have an indication of their classification ('bare imperative', 'polite', 'other'); if there is no such indication they have not been counted. Each passage is considered a single request unless otherwise specified; where a passage contains two requests as restored but only one is really present on the papyrus, only the one securely attested on the papyrus has been counted. Expressions phrased as requests that do not really function as requests are excluded altogether from these data (i.e. the data are 'directives' in the speech-act theory sense); these excluded expressions are greeting formulae (e.g. χαίρειν 'greetings!'), farewell formulae (e.g. ἔρρωσο 'be well!') and expressions introducing information being conveyed (e.g. γίνωσκε 'know!').

P.Enteux. (body of petitions, 78 polite requests):

- 1.10–11 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, τὴν ἔντευξίν μου/ ἀποσταλῆναι (polite)
- 2.6–7 [δέ]ομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
- 3.6 [δέομαι οὖν] σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, συντάζει (polite)
- 4r.7 [δέομαι οὖν σου,] βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
- 5r.6–7 ἀζούμεν σε δεό[μενοι, βασιλεῦ] (polite)
- 6.4 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
- 7.3–4 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ,] εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, π[ροστάζει]
- 8.19–20 δέο[μαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει]
- 9.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
- 10.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλ[εῦ, προστάζει] (polite)

- 11.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ[τ] σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 12.5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 13.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξα[ι] (polite)
- 14.6 δέομα[ι] οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 15.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 16.3 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 17.5 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι]
- 18.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, [εἴ] σοι δοκεῖ, συντάξαι (polite)
- 20.6 [δέομαι] οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 21.6 δέομεθα οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 22.6 δέομαί σου, βασιλεῦ, πρ[ο]σ[τά]ξαι (polite)
- 23.7 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι]
- 24.5–6 [δέομαι οὖν σου,] βασιλεῦ, ἐπὶ σὲ τὴν κ[ατ]αφυγὴν ποιουμέ[νη, προστάξαι] (polite)
- 25.9–10 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 26.10 δέομαι οὖν [σου], βασιλεῦ, [μὴ] περιδεῖν με (polite)
- 27.13 δέομαί [οὖν] σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 28.8 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 29.12–13 δέομαι οὖν \σ/ου, βασιλεῦ, μὴ ὑπερ[ιδεῖν με] (polite)
- 30.8 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 31.5 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, π]ροστάξαι
- 32.9–10 δέομεθα οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 33.6–7 [δέομαι οὖν σ]ου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 34.10 δέομεθα οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, π[ρο]στάξαι (polite)
- 35.5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 36.3 δέομαι [οὖν σου, βα]σιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 37.6–7 δέο[μαι] οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι
- 38.7–8 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 40.5 δέομαι οὖν σου, [β]ασιλεῦ, ἀποστεῖλαι (polite)
- 41.5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 42.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 43.2 δέομα[ι] οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 44.4 [δε]όμεθα οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 45.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 46.4–5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 47.6 δέομαι σου, βασιλεῦ, μὴ περιδεῖν (polite)
- 48.7 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 49.5–6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, [εἴ] σοι δοκεῖ, συντάξαι (polite)
- 50.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 51.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ [σοι] δοκεῖ, ἐπειδὴ ο[ἱ]κέ[ι]ός ἐστιν ὁ Σά[τυρος τοῦ Θε]υγένους,
ὁ δὲ Θευγένης τετελεύτηκεν, προστάξαι (polite)
- 52.7 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, [προσ]τάξαι (polite)
- 53.6–7 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προσ]τάξαι
- 54.9 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 55.14 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 56.4 [. . . βα]σιλεῦ, προστάξαι
- 57.5 [δέομαι οὖν σο]ν, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 58.15 δέομαι οὐ[ν] σου, βασιλεῦ . . .] (polite)
- 59.8–9 δέομεθά σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 60.6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 61.7 [δέομαι οὐ]ν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 62.8–9 ἀξιώ οὐ[ν] . . . προστάξαι (polite)
- 64.10 [δέομαι σου, βασιλεῦ, προσ]τάξαι

- 65.12 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 66.6–7 δέομαι οὖν σο[υ], βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 67.3 [δέομαι σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δο]κεῖ, προστάξα[ι] (polite)
 68.12 [δέο]μαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξα[ι] (polite)
 69.4–5 δέομαι οὖν σοῦ, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 70.9–10 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασ[ι]λεῦ, εἴ σ]οι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 71.6 [δέο]μαι οὖν [σο]υ, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 72.6 δέομαι οὖν [σου], βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 73.9 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 74.13–14 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 75.10–11 δέομαι οὖν [σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει] (polite)
 76.5–6 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 77.4–5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δο[κεῖ, προσ]τάξα[ι] (polite)
 78.12 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, π]ροστάζει
 79.9 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, [μὴ περι]δεῖν (polite)
 81.20–21 ἀξίω σε, βασιλεῦ, δεομένη πρ[ο]στάζει (polite)
 82.6–7 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, ἱκέτις ἐπὶ σὲ καταπεφευγυῖα, μὴ περιδεῖν (polite)
 83.8 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλε[ῦ, πρ]οστάζει (polite)
 84.24 δέομαι οὖν σ[ου . . .] (polite)
 85.7–8 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ,] προστάζει
 86.10–11 ἀξίω [οὖν σε, βασιλεῦ, δεομέ]νη, ἵνα [μ]ὴ παρὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑ[στερ]ήσω τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀπολ[. . .] προστάζει (polite)
 87.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, [βασ]ιλεῦ, εἴ[τ] σοι δοκ[εῖ, προστάζει] (polite)
 88.4 [δέομαι ο]ὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 89.8–9 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 90.5 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασι[λεῦ], εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάζει (polite)
 91.12 δέομαι [ο]ὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, προστάζει (polite)
 92.9 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, ἀπο]στείλαι
 93.2 δέομαι οὖν σου, βασ[ι]λεῦ . . .] (polite)
 102.1 [δέομαι οὖν σου, βα]σι[λεῦ . . .]
 106.4 [δέ]ομαι [οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ,] προστάζει (polite)
 109.10–11 [δέομαι οὖν σου,] βασιλεῦ, προστά[ξει]
 112.3 [δέομ]αι οὖν σου, βασ[ι]λεῦ, προστάζει (polite)

P.Enteux. (response of officials, 91 bare imperatives and one other form):

- 4r.13 ἐπισκεψάμενος φρόντισον ὅπως τύχη τοῦ δικαίου (bare imperative)
 6.9–10 παραλαβὼν τὸν . . . ἐπιστάτην καὶ τὸν κω(μο)γράφ(αμματέα), ἐπί(σκειναι) καὶ, ἐὰν ἢ ἂ γράφει ἀληθῆ, ἔα[σ]ον καθελεῖν, ἐπιμ[ε]λὲς δέ σ]οι ἔστω ὅπ(ως) πάλιν ἀνοικοδομηθῇ (3 bare imperatives)
 8.24 ἀπό(στειλον) ὅπ(ως) κατὰ τοὺς νό(μους) τὸ δί(καιον) λάβωσιν (bare imperative)
 9.12 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(όστειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
 10.9 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς (bare imperative)
 11.7 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(όστειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
 12.9 παρᾶδειξον αὐτ[οῖς] τὰ μέρη κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα (bare imperative)
 13.10 μάλιστ[α] μὲν διάλυσον αὐτ[ο]ύς· εἰ δ[ὲ] μή,] πρὸς ἡμᾶ[ς] ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
 14.13 διασάφησον ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων (bare imperative)
 16.9 ἀπόστειλον πρὸς ἡμᾶς (bare imperative)
 18.10 [μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον] αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, πρ[ὸς] ἡμᾶς ἀπ(όστειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
 20.9–10 ἐπανάγκασον τὰ δίκαια ποιῆ[σαι . . . ἐὰ]ν δέ τι ἀντιλέγωσιν, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
 21.11 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(όστειλον) (2 bare imperatives)

- 22.14–15 εἴσελθε πρὸς τὴν \Νίκαιαν/ \ἄνθρωπον] καὶ ἐὰν [. . .] εἰὼν τὰς εἰκόνας διασάφῃσον ἡμῖν (2 bare imperatives)
- 24.11 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (bare imperative)
- 25.15–16 μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς σὺ διάλυσον τὸν πατέρα πρὸς τὸν Στρουθόν· ἐὰν δέ τι ἀντιλέγηι, ἀπό(στειλον) αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἄλλως ἔσται. (2 bare imperatives and 1 other)
- 28.12 [ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φρόν(τισον) ὅπως τ]ῶν δικαίων τύχηι
- 29.17 [μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον))]
- 31.8 [μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον))]
- 32.16 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 36.6 [φ]ρόντισον ὅπως τῶν δικαίων τύχηι (bare imperative)
- 37.12 μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἡμᾶς [ἀπ(ό(στειλον))]
- 38.14 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (2 bare imperatives)
- 41.8 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ [μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον) ὅπ(ως) . . .] (bare imperative)
- 42.7 ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φ(ρό)ν(τισον) ὅπ(ως) [τῶν δικ]αίων τύχ[ηι] (bare imperative)
- 43.8 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 44.9–10 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 45.14 [μάλ]ιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, [πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπ(ό(στειλον))]
- 46.10 ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φρ(όντισον) ὅπ(ως) τῶν δικ[αί]ων τύχηι (bare imperative)
- 47.11 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (2 bare imperatives)
- 48.12 ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φ(ρό)ν(τισον) ὅπ(ως) τ[ῶν δικαίω]ν [τύχηι] (bare imperative)
- 50.10 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 51v.1–2 ἀνακαλεσάμενος [τὸν Σάτυρον] σ[ύ]νταξ[ον . . .] . . . νος πέμψον πρ(ὸς) ἡ[μᾶς] (2 bare imperatives)
- 52.11 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, [ἀπ(ό(στειλον) πρ(ὸς) ἡμ(ᾶς)] (bare imperative)
- 53.11 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 54.14 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 56.7 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον) πρ(ὸς) ἡμ(ᾶς) (2 bare imperatives)
- 57.11 [μάλιστα] διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) πρὸς ἡμᾶς (bare imperative)
- 58.24 [μ]άλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, [πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπό(στειλον)] (bare imperative)
- 59v.1 μάλιστα μὲν δι[μάλ]υσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 60.13 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (2 bare imperatives)
- 62.14 διασάφῃσον ἡμῖν περὶ ὧν γρ(άφει)· [. . .] [μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς . . .] (2 bare imperatives)
- 64.14 [μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς]· εἰ δὲ μή, [ἀπό(στειλον)]
- 65.19–20 μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 66.13 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον) πρ(ὸς) ἡμ(ᾶς) (2 bare imperatives)
- 69.9 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) πρ(ὸς) ἡμ(ᾶς) (2 bare imperatives)
- 70.16 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) [αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον)] (bare imperative)
- 71.11 ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φ(ρ)όν(τισον) ὅπως τῶν δικαί[ων τ]ύχηι (bare imperative)
- 72.10 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) [αὐ(τούς)·] εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (2 bare imperatives)
- 73.12 μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐ(τούς)· εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπό(στειλον)] (bare imperative)
- 74.20 μά(λιστα) δι(άλυσον) αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 82.12 ἀπό(στειλον) τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον (bare imperative)
- 83.13 μά(λιστα) διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ [μή], ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)
- 85.11 διασάφῃσον ἡμῖν περὶ ὧν γρ(άφει) (bare imperative)
- 88.8 [. . . ἐπίσκ]εψαι [π]ερὶ τούτων (bare imperative)
- 89.12 ἐπι(σκεψάμενος) φ(ρό)ν(τισον) ὅπ(ως) τῶν δικαίων τύχηι (bare imperative)
- 91.16–17 μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (2 bare imperatives)
- 93.5–6 νό(μον) ἐπανάγκασον ὅπ(ως) τὰ δίκαια π[οιή]σωσιν . . . ἐὰν δέ τι ἀντιλέγ[ω]σ[ι], ἀπό(στειλον) αὐτούς πρὸς ἡμᾶς (2 bare imperatives)
- 95.13 [πρὸς] ἡμᾶς ἀπ(ό(στειλον)) (bare imperative)
- 97.1 μάλιστα μὲν διάλυσον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπό(στειλον) (2 bare imperatives)

- 98.1–2 φ(ρό)ν(τισον) ὅπ(ως) ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικηθ[. . .] ἐὰν δέ τινες ἀντιλέγωσιν, ἀπόστειλον αὐτοὺς πρ[ὸς ἡμᾶς] (2 bare imperatives)
 101.9 ἐπισκεψάμενος φρόντισον [ὅπως τύχη τοῦ δικαίου] (bare imperative)

P.Cair.Zen. 1 (47 bare imperatives, 59 polite forms and 7 other forms):

- 59002.2 σύστησον (bare imperative)
 59015v.6–7 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ποιησάμενος (polite)
 — 9–10 τοῦτο γὰρ ποιήσας εὐχαριστήσ[εις ἡμῖν] (polite)
 — 12 ἐπίστειλον/ [[γρ]άψον] (bare imperative)
 — 22 καλ[ῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς τὴν π]ᾶσαν σπουδὴν π[οιησάμενος] (polite)
 — 34–5 διὸ καὶ σὺ καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς ὑπομιμνήσκων τε αὐτὸν καὶ συνσπουδᾶς(ας) (polite)
 — 36–7 καὶ σὺ δὲ εὐχαριστήσῃς ἡμῖν γράφων (polite)
 — 43 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς σ[υ]ντάξας (polite)
 — 47 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς γράψας (polite)
 59016.2 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς δούς (polite)
 — 4 φρόντισον (bare imperative)
 — 6 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59019.7 γράψον (bare imperative)
 — 11 πειρῶ δέ μοι ὅτι τάχος γράφειν (bare imperative)
 59021.37–9 γέγραφα οὖν σοι ταῦτα ἵνα εἰδῇς καὶ ἐάν σοι φαίνεται [ἦ] τῷ βασιλεῖ γράψῃς περὶ τούτων (polite)
 — 49–50 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59023.1–5 καλῶς ἂν ποι(ήσῃς) . . . δοὺς Ἰατροκλεῖ (polite)
 59024.2 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
 59025.6–10 πρὸς Διδὸς οὖν καὶ θεῶν μὴ ὀκνήσῃς διελθὼν εἰς ἐμπόριον καὶ ἀγοράσας (other)
 — 14 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 — 19–21 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσῃς ἀποστέλλων (polite)
 — 24–5 ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἐν δυνάτῳ ἦι, ἀγόρασον (polite)
 59026.14–15 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς] μνησθεῖς (polite)
 59028.4 καλῶς ἂν οὖμ ποιήσῃς ἐπισκεψάμενος καὶ ἐμφάνισας (2 polite)
 — 5 ἐπίσκειναι (bare imperative)
 — 7–8 καλῶς ἂν οὖμ ποιήσῃς καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεψάμενος, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ (polite)
 59030.2 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς[ις] [. . .] (polite)
 59032.2 χαρίζοι(ο) δ' ἄμ μ[οι . . .] (polite)
 59034.21 \σὺ οὖν/ μὴ καταπληγῇς (other)
 59035.1 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς δούς (polite)
 59036.3 διάγραψον (bare imperative)
 — 6–7 διάπεμπον . . . ἐπιμελήθητι ὅπως διαγράψῃ (2 bare imperatives)
 — 12–14 ὅπως οὖν τοῦτο τε καὶ τὸ δοθὲν Ἑκατωνύμῳ εἰς τὴν (ἐννήρη) (δραχμᾶς) ὑξε (διώβολον) χ(αλκοῦς) β, ἐάν τε φαίνεται σοι, διαγράψῃς Μηδεῖῳ εἰς τὰ ἱατρικά, ἐάν τε βούλῃ[ι], γράψῃς Ἰκεσίῳ διορθώσασθαι (2 polite)
 — 15–16 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς ἐπιστείλας ἡμῖν (polite)
 — 16–18 ἐὰν δὲ φαίνεται σοι Χαρμίδει τῷ παρ' ἡμῶν τῷ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν σοι ἀποδεδωκότι διαγράψαι, διάγραψον (polite)
 — 22 ἄς δεῖ σε διορθώσασθαι Ἀπολλωνίῳ (other)
 — 22–3 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς συντάξ[α]ς διαγράψαι αὐτῷ (polite)
 59037.15 γράψον (bare imperative)
 — 16 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 59038.17–20 [ἐὰν οὖν] σοι φαίνεται, καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς . . . κομίσάμενος (polite)
 — 24–5 χαριεῖ μοι ὥς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα (polite)
 59039.6 χαριεῖ μοι ὥς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα (polite)
 59041.18–22 καλ[ῶς] ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς φιλοτιμηθεῖς, ὥσ[π]ερ ἐπίστη, ὅπως [[ἂν] παρὰ τοῦ

- Θεοδώρου λάβης τὰ ἐπιστ[όλια] καὶ ἀποστείλῃ[ις] ἡμῖν (2 polite)
- 59042.3–4 χαριεῖ οὐμ μοι συ[σ]πουδάσ[ας], εἰ ἔστιν ἐν δυνατῶι, ἀφεθῆναι αὐτόν (polite)
- 59043.3–4 [καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις γ]ράψας ἡμῖν
- 59044.5–6 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις ἐπισκεψάμενος (polite)
- 16–18 ἂν δὲ μὴ φαίν[η]ται ὑμῖν ἀποδοῦναι, Δημητρίου γε [ἐπ]ιμελόμενοι χαριεῖσθέ μοι (polite)
- 35–8 καλῶς δ' ἂν ποιῶις καὶ συγγνώμην ἡμῖν ἔχων (polite)
- 59045.3–4 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας, ὥς ἂν εὐκαιροῦντα λάβης Ἐπολλώνιον, / εἰσαγαγὼν αὐτόν (polite)
- 59046.8–9 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας δοὺς αὐτῶι (polite)
- 59047.2–3 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας [.] τ[ή]ν τε ἐπιστολὴν ἀποδοῦς (polite)
- 59048.1 μνησθῆναι (other)
- 59049.1 [ἀπόστειλ]όν
- 2 [ὑπόμνησ]ον
- 6 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιή[σας] μὴ ἀμελήσας ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ φροντίσας (2 polite)
- 59050.1 καλῶς ποιήσεις γινώσ[ας] (polite)
- 59052.3 ὅπως εἰδὼς ἀναφέρης (other)
- 59053.5 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας φροντίσας (polite)
- 9–11 ἀργύριον δὲ εἰς ταῦτα χαριεῖ ἡμῖν συντάξας ἐμ Μέρφει δοθῆναι (polite)
- 12–15 καὶ τὴν ταχίστην, ἵνα γενόμενα ὥς ἂν παραγένηι εἰς πόλιν καταγάγῃς ἡμῖν. (other)
- 59056.5 καλῶς δ' ἂν ποιήσας καὶ σὺ ἐκείνοις τε γ[ράψας] (polite)
- 59057.2–3 σὺ δὲ καλῶς ποιήσεις ἐκπονήσας (polite)
- 4 ἐπ[ίσ]τασο . . . προσάγαγε (2 bare imperatives)
- 5 πρόσθε (bare imperative)
- 6 μὴ οὖν ῥαθυμήσῃς . . . λαβὲ δέ (other, bare imperative)
- 7 καὶ ἐξάγαγέ μοι (bare imperative)
- 59060.7 ἀπ[ό]στεilon
- 59061.2 σπούδασον ἀποστεῖλαι τὸ στρωμάτιον (bare imperative)
- 59062b.3–12 καλ[ῶς] ἂν οὖν ποιήσας καὶ σὺ λαβὼν . . . ἀποδο[ῖς] εὐκαίρως καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συνσπεύσας . . . καὶ φαγερὸν αὐτῶι ποιήσας (4 polite)
- 59065.4 καλῶς οὖν ἂν ποιήσας συ[σ] (polite)
- 59071.3 ἀπόστειλο[v] (bare imperative)
- 59074.3 ἀπόδος (bare imperative)
- 59081.1–2 καλῶ[ς] ἂν ποιήσας . . .] λαβὼν (polite)
- 3 σπούδασον (bare imperative)
- 59084.7–8 [καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποι]ήσας γράψας (polite)
- 11 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59085.2 δός (bare imperative)
- 59086.2 δός (bare imperative)
- 59093.15–16 γέγραφα οὖν σοι ὅπως ἐντείλῃ τῶι Ἀπολλοφάνει μηθὲν εἰς τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἃ[λ]λ' εἴ σοι δοκεῖ χρήσιμον εἶναι (polite)
- 19 καλῶς δ' ἂν ποιῶις καὶ σὺ ἐπι[μ]ελόμεν[ος] σα[υτο]ῦ ὅπως ὑγιαίνῃς (polite)
- 59096.2–3 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας γράψας (polite)
- 59097.3 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 6 ζήτησον (bare imperative)
- 59098.8 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59101.3–4 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας, καθὼς ἂν σου χρείαν ἔχῃ, παραδ[ώ] . . .] (polite)
- 59105.1–3 τοῦ ἐρεβίνθου [κα]ὶ τῆς μήκωνος ὅσοι μὲν ἂν πλήθος εἰς σπέρμα κατὰ[χρ]ήσησθε, [τ]ὸ δὲ λοιπὸν διατηρεῖτε (bare imperative)
- 59106.2–4 σὺ δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομοῦ συναγόραζε καὶ εἰς τὸν Μεμφίτην ἀπόστειλον (2 bare imperatives)
- 6 συναγοράζετε (bare imperative)

- 59107.5 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59109.2 ἀποστείλ[ο]ν (bare imperative)
 59120.2–4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀπεστάλκαμεν τὰ σύμβολα, ἀποδοθήτω αὐτοῖς καὶ κόμισαι τὰ β[α]τιάκια παρὰ Διονυσιοδώρου (2 bare imperatives)
 — 5 δός (bare imperative)
 59124.4–5 σπούδασον οὖν τῆς τριμῆ[ινου ἀποστεῖλ]αι (bare imperative)
 — 6 [κ]αλῶς δὲ ποιήσεις καὶ αὐτὸς παραγενόμενος (polite)
 — 8 [ἀποστείλον]
 59129.8 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 — 20 ἀπόσπελλε (bare imperative)
 59130.4–5 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας γράψας (polite)
 — 18–20 τοὺς γεωργοὺς τοὺς ἐν Ταπτεῖα μὴ ἐνοχλεῖ[τε] περὶ τῆς ἀλικῆς (bare imperative)
 59132.8–9 ὥς ἂν οὖν σοι φαίνεται καὶ περὶ τ[ούτ]ων καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας ἐπιστείλας ἡμῖν τὴν ταχίστην (polite)
 59134.7–8 ὥς ἂν οὖν σοι φαίνεται, γράψον ἡμῖν (bare imperative)
 59135.3–5 χαρίζοιο ἂν οὐμ μοι καὶ ἐπιμελόμενος ἅμα σαυτοῦ ὅπως ὑγιαίνης καὶ ἡμῖν γράφων ὥς ἂν ἔχῃς (2 polite)
 59136.1 παράδος (bare imperative)
 — 2 δίδοτε . . . σύνταξον (2 bare imperatives)

***P.Cair.Zen.* II (70 bare imperatives, 47 polite forms and 6 other forms):**

- 59142.3 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 59145.11–13 δέομαι οὖν σου, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, ἐλεῆσάι με γράψας (polite)
 59146.4 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59147.1–3 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας, ἐὰν καὶ σοι φαίνεται, περιελών (polite)
 — 13 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59148.3–4 σὺ οὖν καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας πριάμενος ἱμάτιον καὶ ἄλλο θερινὸν/ [χιτῶνα] Πτολεμαῖω καὶ δούς τῷ παιδί (2 polite)
 59149.3–4 καλῶς ἂν [οὖν ποιήσας συ]ναναγκάσας (polite)
 59150.11 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας γράψας (polite)
 — 19 φρόντισον (bare imperative)
 59152.12 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59153.1–2 [καλῶς] π[οιή]σεις ἐπιμεληθεῖ[ς] (polite)
 59154.3 ἀπόσπελλον (bare imperative)
 59155.3 πότισον (bare imperative)
 — 4 πότιζε (bare imperative)
 — 4–5 μὴ πλείους δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σύσχης τὸ ὕδωρ (other)
 — 6 κατάσπειρε . . . γράψον (2 bare imperatives)
 59156.2 παρακόμισον (bare imperative)
 — 3 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 — 4 [κατα]φύτευσον (bare imperative)
 59157.1 φύτευσον (bare imperative)
 — 2–3 καὶ ὅπως μάλιστα μὲν ἡλείονα/ φυτά, εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ἐλάσσω τῶν τ καταφυτεύσεις (other)
 59158.2 [φρό]ντισον (bare imperative)
 59159.4 σύντα[σ]σε (bare imperative)
 59160.2 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας γράψας (polite)
 — 3–4 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας, ἐὰν σοι φαίνεται, ἀποστεύλας ἡμῖν (polite)
 — 11 γράψον (bare imperative)
 — 12 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 59169.7 ἐμφάνισον (bare imperative)
 59170.2 φρ[όντισον οὖν]
 — 3 [δός]

- 4 [γρά]ψον (bare imperative)
- 59171.3 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις παραγενόμενος (polite)
- 59177.1 ἀποστείλ[ό]ν (bare imperative)
- 59179.11 [κα]λῶς ποιήσεις συντάξας (polite)
- 17–18 [ἐπι]μελές σοι γενέσθω ὅπως τὰ γενήμα[τα συ]ναχθέντα διατηρηθῇ (bare imperative)
- 59181.1–2 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59184.2 λαβέ (bare imperative)
- 6 [κατ]ασημαίνου (bare imperative)
- 59188.2 συντάξαι (other)
- 7 συντάξαι (other)
- 59189.3–4 [δέομαι οὖν σου], εἴ σοι δοκεῖ . . .
- 59190.2 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
- 3 ἀπόστει[ύ]λον (bare imperative)
- 5 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 6 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59191.4–5 [συ]να[πόσ]τε[ι]λον (bare imperative)
- 15 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59192.5–6 καλῶς [οὖν ποι]ήσεις εὐ/χαριστήσας ἡμῖν (polite)
- 59193.6 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις συντάξας (polite)
- 59194.5 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις συμπέμ[ψας] (polite)
- 59195.4 παράδοτε (bare imperative)
- 59197.1 προσάγαγε (bare imperative)
- 59198.4–5 καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης (other)
- 59199.6 παράδος (bare imperative)
- 7 παρακατάστησον (bare imperative)
- 10 συνανάγκασον (bare imperative)
- 59200.1 οἰκοδόμησον (bare imperative)
- 59202.6 κατάστησον (bare imperative)
- 59203.10 [σ]υναντήσα[τε] (bare imperative)
- 59204.2 παρά[δε]ῖξον (bare imperative)
- 59212.2 [κα]λῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς σπουδάσας (polite)
- 4 γράφε (bare imperative)
- 59217.3–4 χαρίζοι ἄν οὖν ἡμῖν τό τε πλοιαῖριον χρήσας τὸ [. . .]μα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φροντίσας (2 polite)
- 5 σὺ δὲ καὶ τινι ἔντειλ[αι] τῶν παρὰ σαντοῦ συνεπιμεληθῆναι
- 59224.6–7 [καλῶς] οὖν ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- 59225.4–5 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς μάλιστα μὲν ἀγοράσας (polite)
- 7 χαριεῖ μοι γράψας τὴν ταχίστην (polite)
- 10 καὶ περὶ τούτων οὐμ μοι ἐπιστείλας καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς (polite)
- 59228.11 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59229.9 δότε (bare imperative)
- 59230.1 καλῶς ποιήσεις ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 3 προδιδείλασ/θε (bare imperative)
- 4 συμπέμψατε (bare imperative)
- 59233.2 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσ[εις ἀποστείλας] (polite)
- 3 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59234.10 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59236.4–5 δέομαι οὖν σου, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τούτων, καὶ . . . δοῦναί μοι πρόσταγμα (2 polite)
- 59237.2–3 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς ἀγοράσ(ας) (polite)
- 10 γράψομ μοι (bare imperative)
- 59238.8 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις συντάξας (polite)

- 59240.4–8 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς εἰ μὲν ἐπιμεμέλησαι, εἰ δὲ μή, φροντίσας ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς μετὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀποσταλῶσιν ὥς ὄντες Ἀπολλωνίου, ἵνα μή τι κατὰ τὰ τέλη ἐνοχληθῶσιν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν αὐτὸς παραγίνηι, εἰ δὲ μή, γράψας (3 polite)
- 59241.2 λαβέ . . . καὶ ἀπέγδος (2 bare imperatives)
- 5 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 6 πειράθητι (bare imperative)
- 59243.6–7 εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλ[θ]ῖν πρὸς μέ, εἶνα εὐφρανθῆς (polite)
- 15 λαβέτω (bare imperative)
- 59244.5 ἐπίσκεψαι (bare imperative)
- 7 γράψον . . . ἀπόστειλον (2 bare imperatives)
- 59247.4–5 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις ἀξιῶσας Ἡδύλον παραγενέσθαι (polite)
- 6 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59251.3–4 χαριεῖ οὐμ μοι σαυτοῦ τε ἐπιμελόμενος ἵνα ὑγιαίνης καὶ ἡμῖν γράφων ἐάν τί σοι βούληι γίνεσθαι ὃν ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα (2 polite)
- 4 καλῶς δ' ἄμ ποιήσῃς ἀγοράσας (polite)
- 8 πειρῶ ἐπισκοπεῖν (bare imperative)
- 9 καὶ τὰ γενημάτια δὲ ἵνα τρόποι τινὶ συγκομισθῇ ἐπιμελές σοι ἔστω (bare imperative)
- 9–10 καὶ ἐάν τι δέηι εἰς ἀνήλωμα τὸ ἀνγκαῖον δοῦναι, μὴ ὀκνήσης (other)
- 59254.3 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις καταλυμάτιόν μοι ἐτοιμάσας (polite)
- 59259.1 ἐπανάγκασον (bare imperative)
- 59262.3 καλῶς ποιήσεις ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59264.10 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 19 γράφε (bare imperative)
- 59270.8 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59271.5–6 σὺ οὖν ἀπόστειλόν μοι (bare imperative)
- 8–9 κατασκευασθήτω δὲ εἰς τὴν πίσσωσ[iv] τοῦ κεράμου κλιβάνους (bare imperative)
- 59272.3–4 καλῶς [ο]ῖν ποιήσεις ἐπιστείλας (polite)
- 5–6 τοῦτ[ο] μὲν οὖν ποιήσ[ας] ἔσει ἡμῖν βεβο[ι]ηθηκῶ[ς] εἰς τὰ μάλιστα (polite)
- 59273.3 σὺ οὖν προαπόστειλόν τινα (bare imperative)
- 5 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59275.12–14 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις ἐντυχὼν Ζήνωνι ὑπὲρ τοῦτ[ων] (polite)
- 59277.5 διάγραψον (bare imperative)
- 59279.5 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59283.4 [κ]αλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις σπουδάσας (polite)
- 59284.2–4 [καλῶς ἂν οἶ]μ ποιήσῃς, ὥς ἂν σοι ἀποδῶι τὴν ἐπιστολήν, γνωρι[μ]ώτερόν σε ποιήσας αὐτῷ καί, ἐάν τι[ν]ά σου χρεῖαν ἔχη, ποιῶν αὐτῷ ὅσα ἐστί[ν] σοι ἐν δυνατῷ (2 polite)
- 59285.2 δός (bare imperative)
- 59286.4 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59290.3 καλῶς οὖν π[ο]ιήσ[εις] ἀποστει[λ]ας (polite)
- 59291.6–8 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς ἐπισκεψάμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ μὴ περιειδεῖν παραπολλυμένους τῇ λειμῶι, ἀνακαλεσάμενος ὧρον διαλογίσεσθαι ἡμῖν (3 polite)

***P.Cair.Zen.* III (91 bare imperatives, 106 polite forms and 8 other forms):**

- 59298.1 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 3–4 γραψάτω (bare imperative)
- 6 σὺ οὖν ἔντυχε Ζήνωνι (bare imperative)
- 8 ἐπιμέλου δὲ καὶ σαυτοῦ ἵνα ὑγιαίνης (bare imperative)
- 59301.4 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς διέμενος (polite)
- 59303.5–6 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις μὴ παρέργως (polite)
- 59304.5–6 ἔτι οὖν καὶ νῦν καλῶς ποιήσ[εις], εἰ μὴ ἀπέσταλκας ἐπ' αὐτό, νῦν γε ἀπ[ο]στειλάς καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπ[ισ]τολήν [γ]ράψ[ας] (2 polite)
- 59305.3 χαρίζιο δ' ἄμ μοι στρώμα ἀποστείλας (polite)

- 59306.9–10 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- 59307.15–16 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις δούς (polite)
- 59308.5 σὺ οὖν σύνταξον (bare imperative)
- 59309.3–4 καὶ νῦν δὲ καλῶς ποιήσεις πρὸ τοῦ Διότιμον ἀναπλεῦσαι φροντίσας (polite)
- 6–7 καλῶς ἄν/ ποιήσας διαθέμενος (polite)
- 59310.4 καλῶς ἄν οὖν ποιήσας σπουδάσας (polite)
- 59311.4–5 καλῶς οὐδ' ποιήσεις, εἰ μήπω παρε[ί]ληφεν ὁ Πτολεμαῖος, ἐπιμελέ[ς] ποιησάμενος (polite)
- 59314.3 ποιήσον (bare imperative)
- 8 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59315.3–4 ἂν οὖν σοι δόξῃ, καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας ἐκ[εῖ]ν[ω]ι καὶ συναντ[ι]λαβόμενος ἡμῖν (2 polite)
- 6 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
- 59317.6 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσαι(ς) συντάξας (polite)
- 11–12 ὑπολόγησον (bare imperative)
- 12–13 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας καὶ τοῦτο ἐμοὶ δοῦναι (polite)
- 59322.6 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας φροντίσας (polite)
- 8 σὺ οὖν μὴ ἐπίτρεπε αὐτοῖς (bare imperative)
- 59324.5 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59329.2–3 καλ[ῶς] ἂν ποιήσας φρ[ο]ντ[ί]σας π[ε]ρὶ [ἡ]μ[ῶν] (polite)
- 59331.3 καλῶς ἄν οὖν ποιήσας γράψας μοι καὶ ἀποστείλας (2 polite)
- 10 σύνταξαι (bare imperative)
- 13 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 59332.9 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας ἐνθυμηθεῖς (polite)
- 59335.5–6 καλῶς ποιή[σας] ἐπιμελόμενος (polite)
- 59336.1–2 [καλῶς ἄν] ποιήσας σύμβολόν μοι λαβών (polite)
- 59341a.27–8 εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ, καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- b.3–4 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας μνησ[θ]εῖς Ζήνωνι (polite)
- b.12 μνήσθητι (bare imperative)
- c.7 [καλ]ῶς οὖν ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- 59343.5 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59344.1 καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- 6 [λ]αβέ (bare imperative)
- 59349.2 καλῶς ποιήσεις δούς (polite)
- 59351.3–4 δέομαι οὖν σου, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προστάξαι (polite)
- 59353.6–8 καλῶς οὖν/ ποιήσεις ἀξιώσας τὸν Ἑλενον ἀποδόσθαι (polite)
- 17 γράφε (bare imperative)
- 59355.107 [ἀ]ξιούμεν ὑμᾶς ἀνε]νέγκαι ἐπὶ Χ[ρύ]σερμον (polite)
- 113–14 ἀξ[ι]ούμεν ὑμᾶς [ἀνε]νέγκαι ἐπὶ/ [πρὸς] Χρύσερμον (polite)
- 59357.11–14 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις, ἐπαναγνοὺς καὶ ἀντιγραψάμενος, ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59358.8 γράψ[ο]ν (bare imperative)
- 59359.3–5 καλῶς ποιήσεις λαβὼν παρὰ Σωστράτου (polite)
- 59362r.35 ἀ[γό]ρασον (bare imperative)
- 37 δός (bare imperative)
- 59363.4–6 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 11 συναπόστειλον (bare imperative)
- 17–18 καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσας ἐν τάχει χαριεῖ μοι (polite)
- 59365.8–11 καλῶς ποιήσεις, ἂν τις παρὰ σοῦ παραγίνηται, ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59367.16–17 μὴ παρέργως αὐτὸ ποιήσας (probably with καλῶς ποιήσεις understood) (polite)
- 59368.5 πέμπετε (bare imperative)
- 10–11 σπουδάσον οὖν ὅπως τὰ δίκαια αὐτοῖς γένηται (bare imperative)
- 31–2 ἀξιούμεν οὖν σε, ἐπειδὴ οὐθ' ἡμῖν ἐκποεῖ ἀποδημεῖν οὐτ' ἐκείνῳ ἐνθάδε παραγενέσθαι,

- γράφαι (polite)
 59369.4–5 κα[λῶς οὖν] ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
 59371.11–14 ἂν οὖν εὐκαιρόν σοι ἦι, παραγενοῦ, ὅπως ὑποστώμεν καθὰ ἂν συγκρίνης (polite)
 59373.4 συνεχέσθω (bare imperative)
 — 5 ἐπίδος (bare imperative)
 59374.2 ἄφες (bare imperative)
 59375.8 φρόντισον (bare imperative)
 — 9 μὴ ἀμελήσης (other)
 — 14 ἐπίστει[λον] (bare imperative)
 59377.2–6 ἀξι[ο]ῦμέν σε, ἐπειδὴ . . . νῦν οὖν ἀξιούμέν σε ποιεῖν (polite)
 — 10 ἀπόφανον (bare imperative)
 59378.2–4 καλῶς ποιήσεις τὰ παιδάριά μοι ἀποδούς (polite)
 59379.7 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59383.3–4 τὰς ἐξαγωγούς δεῖ ἀνακαθᾶραι (other)
 — 11–12 καὶ [ὁ]χετοὺς δεῖ ἀγαγεῖν (other)
 — 16–18 δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς μυρίκας καὶ τὸν κάλαμον ἐπικό[ψαι] (other)
 59386.2 καλῶς ποιήσεις με[] (polite)
 — 5–6 μὴ οὖν ἄλλω[ς] σὺ πο[ί]ει· [ε]ῖ δὲ μή, ὀργιούμεθά σοι (bare imperative)
 59387.16 κατὰσπειρον (bare imperative)
 59388.5 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 — 7 γράψο[ν] (bare imperative)
 59389.2 ἀπόστειλ[ον] (bare imperative)
 59392.2–4 ἐπιμελὲς οὖν σοι γενέσθω ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐπικωλυθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς (bare imperative)
 59393.7 γράψον (bare imperative)
 59396.6 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 59397.3–4 χαριεῖ μοι ἀντιλαμβανόμενος (polite)
 59403.9 καλῶς οὖν [ποιήσεις . . .] (polite)
 59407.16 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
 59408.4–7 καλῶς ποιήσεις, περὶ ὧν σοι Εἰρηναῖος ἐνετείλατο, δούς (polite)
 59409.2–9 ἐπειδὴ μετεπέμψον με, ἀξιῶ, εἰ καὶ σοι φαίνεται καὶ χρέαν ἡμῶν ἔχεις, ἐμφανίσας μοι ἐν ᾗ ἔσομαι τάξει· εἰ δὲ μὴ χρέαν ἔχεις, ἵνα ἀποτρέχω εἰς τὸ τεταγμένον. (2 polite)
 59410.10–11 δεόμε[θα] οὖν σου, εἴ σοι] δοκεῖ, γράψον (polite)
 59413.9 ἐπίστειλον (bare imperative)
 59414.2 δός (bare imperative)
 59416.4–5 καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
 59419.4–5 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις δούς (polite)
 59421.1–7 [δέομαί σου καὶ ἵκετ]εῦώ, ἐνευχ[όμε]νός[ς] σοι τ[ο]ὺς πατρικ[ο]ὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὴν υἰότητα τῆ[ν] Ἀπολλωνίου, μὴ περιδεῖν με ἀδικούμενον, ἀλλ[ὰ] μά[λις]τα μὲν αὐτόν σε ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ ἐμοῦ, εἰ δὲ μή γε, Ἀρ[τε]μιδώρῳι [συ]ντ[ί]ξαι ἐγγύους λαβεῖν παρα[μονή]ς . . . εἰ δὲ [μ]ή γε, [σύντα]ξον (4 polite)
 59423.12 [καλῶς ἄ]ν [οὖν] ποιήσας . . .
 59424.4 κέλευε (bare imperative)
 59425.1 ἀξιούμέν σε . . . (polite)
 59426.5 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 59427.4 γρ[ά]ψον (bare imperative)
 59428.8–13 σὺ οὖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, . . . σὺ οὖν περὶ μου γράψον πρὸς αὐτόν (polite)
 59433.10–11 σὺ δὲ καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
 — 22–3 καλῶς δ[ὲ] ποιήσ[εις] καὶ τοὺς Ἀραβας ἐ[ῖ]ς π[ρά]ξας (polite)
 59438.2–4 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσας μεταπεψάμενος (polite)
 59439.3 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσας συναποστείλας (polite)
 59440.6 προσαξιῶ δ', εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προδοῦναί μοι (polite)

- 59442.12 δός (bare imperative)
 59443.13–14 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις μεταπεμψάμενος (polite)
 59446.5 μάθε (bare imperative)
 — 10 γράψον (bare imperative)
 — 15 ἐπίστειλο[ν] (bare imperative)
 59447.3 ἀζιῶ δέ σε, εἰ καὶ σοι φαίνομαι μέτρια λέγειν, τάξαι με (polite)
 — 8 ἔμοι δὲ καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς συντάξας (polite)
 59449.5 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσετε μισθωσάμενοι (polite)
 — 10 συντάξατε (bare imperative)
 59451.15–19 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσῃς, καθὰ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ διοικητὴς
 συντέταχεν, καὶ σὺ ἐπακολουθήσας ὡσαύτως (polite)
 59454r.9 ἐμὲ δὲ, ἐάνπερ δύνῃς, καὶ ὕβριζε καὶ ἀπάγε (2 bare imperatives)
 59455.12–15 [ἐάν δέ] σοι δόξη, διαλογισάσθων] ἡμῖν καὶ εἴ τι προσ[γί]νεται ἡμῖν ἀποδότω[σαν]
 (2 polite)
 59456.1–2 χαρεῖ οὔμ μοι στηθοδεσμίδας ποιήσας μαλακὰς λεπτὰς δύο καὶ ἀποστείλῃς (polite)
 59458.1 χαρὶ[ν] μοι [στ] ἀγοράσας (polite)
 59460.15–16 [ἐάν] οὖν σοι δόξη, καλῶς ἂν [ποιήσῃς συ]ντάξας (polite)
 59462.1 καλῶ[ς] ἂν ποι[ήσῃς] ἐπιστροφῇν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ποιησάμενος (polite)
 — 7–8 ἐνεύχομαι οὖν σου κατὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως οἰκονομήσαι τὰ περὶ ἐμέ (polite)
 — 10 σὺ οὖν πολυώρησον (bare imperative)
 59466.9–10 καλῶ[ς] ἂν οὔ[ν] ποιήσῃς οὔτω συντάξας (polite)
 59467.11–12 δεόμεθα οὖν σου, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, ἀποστείλαι (polite)
 59469.3 ἀ[γορ]άσαι (other)
 59470.5 πέμπε . . . πρόστ[α]ξον] (2 bare imperatives)
 — 6 γράψον (bare imperative)
 — 9 γράσομ μοι . . . ἐπίστευλον (2 bare imperatives)
 59471.1 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς . . .] (polite)
 59472.2 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, γράψας (polite)
 — 10 σύνταξον] (bare imperative)
 59474.2–4 ἐναρῶμαι οὐ[ν] σοι . . . μὴ περιδεῖν] (polite)
 59475.16–17 δέομαι οὖν σου, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, γράψαι (polite)
 59477.4 ἀζιῶ σε προχρήσαι ἡμῖν (polite)
 59478.8–9 σὺ οὖν καλῶς ποιήσεις σπαντοῦ τε ἐπιμελόμενος (polite)
 59482.2–6 ἐνεύχομαί σοι τὴν Ἀπολλωνίου σωτηρίαν, καθάπερ μοι ἐπηγγείλω, ἀφεῖς τὴν γυναῖκά
 μου (polite)
 — 19–20 ἐμὲ δεόμενόν σου ἐλέησον (polite)
 59483.2 εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, συντάξαι (polite)
 59488.2 ἀγόρασον (bare imperative)
 59489.8 σύνταξον (bare imperative)
 59490.2 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
 — 3 ἀποδότω (bare imperative)
 — 4 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσε[ις] ἵνα μηθεὶς αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ (polite)
 — 4–5 πρόντισον (bare imperative)
 59491.22–4 καλῶς ποιήσῃς μεταπεμψάμενος (polite)
 59492.4 ἀνάγγελλε (bare imperative)
 — 10 μὴ οὖν περιίδης (other)
 — 12–13 ἐξελοῦ με (bare imperative)
 59494.10 ἐργάζεσθε (bare imperative)
 — 18–19 εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ, δοθῇναί ἡμῖν μέρος τι τοῦ μισθοῦ (polite)
 59495.1–2 δεόμεθα οὖν σου, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς (polite)
 — 4 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 — 8–9 σὺ οὖν ἐπίσκεψαι εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀφεῖναι (bare imperative)

- 59496.6 σὺ οὖν καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς γράψαις (polite)
 — 7 γράψον (bare imperative)
- 59497.11 φρόντισον (bare imperative)
- 59498.2–4 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, συντάξας (polite)
 — 12–14 δέομαι οὖν σου, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, \συντάξας/ δοθῆναι (polite)
- 59499.32–3 εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, δότωσάν μοι (polite)
- 49–50 εἰ οὖν [σοι] δοκεῖ, ἀγοράσαι (polite)
- 58 ἐρώτεσον (bare imperative)
- 59500.8 κέλευσον (bare imperative)
- 59501.2–3 καλῶς ποιήσεις, ἔαν καὶ Ἀπολλωνίῳ ἀποστέλλῃς (polite)
- 59502.9 ἀπόσ[τειλον] (bare imperative)
 — 12 γρά[ψο]ν (bare imperative)
 — 14–15 καλῶς δὲ [ποιήσ]εις ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59507.14–18 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις τούτου τε [[ἑάν]] \τοῦ χρόνου ἑάν/ σοι φαίνεται ἀποδοθῆναι μοι καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν γράψον (polite)
 — 22–4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς μητρὸς, ἑάν σοι φαίνεται, φρόντισον (bare imperative)
 — 27–30 γράψαι δοῦναι [[μοι]] ἡμῖν τὸ Ἀπολλοδώρου τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ σιδήρου γενομένου οἰκημάτων, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ (other)
- 59508.4–5 καλῶς ἂν οὗ' ποιήσῃς προσε[νέγ]κας (polite)
 — 7 γράφε (bare imperative)
- 59509.3 μὴ ἀδικηθῶ ὑπὸ Ἑτεάρχου (other)
 — 5 [καλῶς ἂν οὗ]ν [ποιήσῃς γρά]ψας
 — 9 προσκατασκευάσον (bare imperative)
- 59513.2–3 καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
 — 6 προσπυθοῦ (bare imperative)
- 59514.3 δός (bare imperative)
 — 8 δός (bare imperative)
- 59516.9–10 ἀπόστυλον (bare imperative)
 — 24 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 — 26 κόμισαι (bare imperative)
 — 26–9 καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, ἀνακαλεσάμενός με περὶ τούτων ἐπερώτησον (bare imperative)
- 59519.5–6 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις ἀποστείλας (polite)
- 59520.8 δέομαι οὖν [σο]ν καὶ ἱκετεύω, εἰ καὶ σ[οι] δοκεῖ, μὴ περιμῆδῃν (polite)
- 59522.10 διατήρησον (bare imperative)
 — 15 λαβέ (bare imperative)
 — 17–18 ἀπόστειλον (bare imperative)
 — 20 δίδου (bare imperative)
 — 24–5 ἐπιμέλου αὐτοῦ (bare imperative)
- 59524.2–5 καλῶς ἂν ποιήσῃς τὰ λίνα τὰ δορκάδεια ἀποστείλας μοι (polite)
- 59525.3 [καλ]ῶς οὖν ποιήσεις γράψας (polite)
- 59526.3 καλῶς ἂν οὗν ποιήσῃς συντάξας (polite)
 — 4–5 γράφε . . . καὶ μὴ ἐπιλανθάνου ἡμῶν (2 bare imperatives)
- 59527.10–11 καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις δοὺς αὐτῷ (polite)
- 59528.5–6 [δέομαι οὖν] σου, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, γράψα[ι] (polite)
- 59531.2 μὴ προσπορεύει (bare imperative)

EMOTIONS, PERSUASION AND GENDER IN GREEK EROTIC CURSES*

Irene Salvo

INTRODUCTION

A flier in the railway station of Pescara, Italy, tries to persuade people in emotional distress to resort to the magical powers of the wizard Letterius, expert in love charms.¹ He claims to know ancient rituals of love magic, having studied in the Holy Land in the 1980s. His talismans can reunite separated lovers, solve marital crises and attract the chosen person. These matters are universal and cross-cultural, but certainly historically determined. They constitute the topic of this chapter, which focuses on the ritual techniques used by ancient Greek men and women in order to influence the loving feelings of their objects of desire. The sources here analysed are curses and spells aimed at eliciting desire and affection in the beloved person. Normally, these incantations were directed against an unwilling subject. They are preserved in papyri and on lead tablets that range from the fourth century BCE until the fifth century CE, and come from different Hellenized areas of the Mediterranean.² Most of the documents are dated to the Roman Imperial period. However, they can also be used as evidence of an earlier Greek tradition, since they were copied from older examples dating back to the Hellenistic period.³ Papyri and lead tablets have preserved magical handbooks with recipes used by professional *magoi*, as well as the actual ritual objects deposited chiefly in graves. Reading the text aloud, nailing it or moulding a statuette enhanced the efficacy of the curse.⁴ Men in pursuit of women wrote the majority of the existing erotic curses, but there are also texts written by women in pursuit of men, as well as male and female homoerotic curses.⁵ Contrary to what

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1 As seen in October 2014. Letterius also exploits emotional persuasion through advertisement signs on the streets, a phone line, a website and a YouTube channel.

2 Main collections of Greek documents: *DT*; *PGM*; *SGD*; *NGCT*; *SM*. The *defixiones amatoriae* could be aimed at separating lovers (*diakopoi*) or provoking reciprocal love (*agôgai*); on this terminology, see Faraone (1999) 18; Eidinow (2013) 211; Pachoumi (2013) 297–8. The present chapter will discuss mainly attraction curses (*agôgai*), since they are more relevant for an analysis of the persuasion strategies at work in the text.

3 See Brashear (1995) 3412–20; Faraone (1999) 30–40.

4 See Graf (1997) 134–51 on the ritual procedures of Greek cursing practices.

5 The data given in Gager (1992) 80 are wrong: they are taken from Winkler (1990) 229 note 32, but the curses authored by men have been confused with those authored by women (and

one may think, the principal emotions in our documents are not romantic love and tenderness, but instead resentment and malevolent feelings, as will be clear from reading some examples.

Further scholarly attention on Greek erotic curses is justified for several reasons. Theoretical and historical studies on ancient emotions have increased enormously within the last twenty years,⁶ and there has been a growing interest in how emotional evocation can influence attitudes and behaviour, having persuasive effects.⁷ Moreover, erotic persuasion might be better reassessed under a gender perspective. A curse deposited in a tomb or in a well was intended as a letter to be read by the summoned deity. But persuasion strategies are detectable on two levels: not only towards the gods and demons, but also towards the beloved person. Given the complex interconnections between arousal of emotions, gender and persuasion strategies, these texts need a multi-layered analysis. In my reading, I will first highlight how these documents illustrate the social construction of engendered emotions; secondly, I will explore the process of emotional persuasion towards the designated victim and, finally, towards the gods invoked in the curse.

ENGENDERED EMOTIONS? THE AROUSAL OF *ERÔS* AND *PHILIA*

Tackling emotions and persuasion in erotic curses, it is unavoidable to explore gender differences in intimate relationships: did Greek men and women have different emotional needs and expressive behaviour when using curse tablets? Did gender determine the final goal of the magic practitioner? According to the taxonomy outlined by Christopher Faraone, gender played a significant role in determining how curse tablets were used. He argues that, most commonly, men intended to persuade a woman to leave her father or spouse and feel erotic passion (*erôs*) for the author of the text; in this case, the attack was based on cursing techniques and was aimed at starting a new relationship. Women, instead, wished to consolidate or increase affection (*philia*) in less faithful men, or to calm their husband's anger; they performed healing magic, using potions, ointments or incantations over amulets. A household or an existing relationship constituted the social context of this second group. This categorization is open to exceptions and anomalies: in order to appease a person superior in hierarchy, socially inferior men could exploit the same methods employed by women.⁸ At the same time,

the page reference to Winkler's book given in Gager is imprecise). John Winkler's figures are in any case inaccurate, as Pachoumi (2013) 301 has noted. A revised count of the female-authored erotic curses is offered by Pachoumi (2013) 299–303: two spells between female homosexuals (*PGM XXXII*; *SM* 42), eleven spells in formularies or actual tablets whose user is female (*PGM XV*; *PGM XVI*; *PGM XIXb.1–3*; *PGM XXXIX*; *PGM LXVIII*; *DT* 10; *DT* 103; *DT* 270; *DT* 271; *DT* 299; *NGCT* 31).

6 See Chaniotis (2012), with previous bibliography.

7 See the introduction to this volume.

8 On emotional appeals to superiors or inferiors, see Johncock (this volume).

courtesans, prostitutes and autonomous women occasionally adopted a masculine behaviour, and cast spells on men for triggering *erôs*.⁹ In brief, arousal of sexual desire was typically male behaviour, while emotional connectedness was weighted more strongly in female behaviour.

This picture has the merit of revealing the main functions of ancient curses, but some scholars have rightly questioned the division between *erôs* magic and *philia* magic, and its engendered differentiation according to the user.¹⁰ It is not straightforward to identify the gender of the author of a spell, since the masculine grammatical gender of many cursing formulae (ὁ δεῖνα, 'Mr/Ms So-and-so') is a conventional feature that may indicate both sexes.¹¹ Furthermore, women's magic has been recently interpreted as a self-assertive action. Analysing the social context of magic and the ritual agency of women as cursers, it emerges that the whole process of depositing a curse tablet gave to the female performer 'a sense of efficacy, even power, in circumstances she could not otherwise influence or change', allowing her 'to express in action sentiments she could not properly or publicly articulate'.¹² In this view, women's economic uncertainties drove the impulse to secure a man's sexual interest and economic support.¹³ Rather than distinguishing *philia* and *erôs* spells, or underlining the differences between prostitutes and goodwives, it is important to stress that spells should be considered as social phenomena, 'not as proclivities of the individual or mysteries of the heart'.¹⁴

The challenge of the divisions between *erôs* magic and *philia* magic seems preferable. If exceptions prove the rule, it seems that in the case of ancient love magic exceptions were the rule, or, in other words, anomalies were not regarded as such. In many attraction spells, romantic love (*philia*) and physical lust (*erôs*) were paired together. In one of the few existing lesbian charms, a certain Sophia commanded a demon to force a woman called Gorgonia to feel both love and affection for her:

By means of this corpse-*daimon* burn the heart, the liver, the spirit of Gorgonia, whom Nilogenia bore, with love and affection (ἐπ' ἐρωτι καὶ φιλίᾳ) for Sophia, whom Isara bore. Constrain Gorgonia, whom Nilogenia bore, to cast herself into the bathing-house for the sake of Sophia, whom Isara bore; and you become a bathing-woman.¹⁵ Burn, set on fire, inflame her soul, heart, liver, spirit with love for Sophia, whom Isara bore.

9 See Faraone (1999) and (2002), both with references to previous articles.

10 Dickie (2000) 582–3 and Pachoumi (2013) 308–14 argue against the existence of the distinction between *erôs* and *philia* magic at all. Dickie and Pachoumi stress that female users were probably prostitutes economically interested in sexual unions. This reading, though, reduces the number of women potentially involved in erotic magic, and limits the use of spells in the realm of heterosexual relationships, as Eidinow (2013) 213 has rightly noted.

11 Dickie (2000) 567; Pachoumi (2013) 303.

12 Frankfurter (2014) 328.

13 Frankfurter (2014) 329.

14 Frankfurter (2014) 333.

15 *SM* 42.A11–20, Hermoupolis (Egypt), lead tablet, third/fourth century CE; translation from *SM*, slightly modified.

This is clearly an *agôge* spell, a spell that was believed to have the capacity to attract the victim to the practitioner. The demon should assume the shape of a bathing-woman in order to be closer to the victim and easily have access to her. In another tablet, *erôs* and *philia* have been similarly juxtaposed:

I adjure you, corpse-*daimon* [magical words], bend your bow towards the heart of Matrona, whom Tagene bore, whose substance you have, so that she will have love and affection (ἐπ' ἔρωτι καὶ φιλίᾳ) for Theodoros, whom Techosis bore.¹⁶

At this date, second/third century CE, the verb *philein*, originally 'to be affectionate', has developed to include the meaning 'to fondle' or 'to have sexual intercourse',¹⁷ and therefore in this text the difference between *erôs* and *philia* might be rather blurred. However, the request that Matrona should be in love with Theodoros 'for the entire time of her life' (ll. 4–5 ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς) seems to suggest that the practitioner sought an emotional tie stronger than a purely sexual fascination. The fact that erotic magic could be used to form a long-term relationship tends to undermine the necessity of a general classification of *erôs* magic and *philia* magic. Even more remarkable are those texts in which the magical ritual was aimed at inducing not only *erôs* in the beloved person, but also *storgê* (love, esp. between parents and children) or *agapê* (love, esp. between husband and wife; men and gods), whose semantic spheres are mostly away from that of sexual physicality.¹⁸

Although Faraone's taxonomy is flexible in socially constructing gender depending on the situation, the distinction between *erôs* magic and *philia* magic seems to reinforce the stereotyped opinion that men express powerful feelings such as anger and contempt, implying superiority and high power, while women express powerless feelings, associated with vulnerability and low power. This gender expectation has been explained by social psychologists with social role considerations. Taking as example anger displays, to recognize an outburst of

16 *SM* 49.B52–6, Oxyrhynchos (Egypt), lead tablet, second/third century CE: ὁρκίζω σε, [νεκυ]δαίμων, φορβοφορβοφορβα αρχισ[.] [νειχαρ]οπληξ· ἐντινόν σου τὸ τόξος εἰς τὴν καρ[δίαν] Ματ[ρ]ώνας, ἣν ἔτεκ[εν] Ταγένη, ἥς ἔχας τὴν οὐσ[ίαν], ἐπ' [ἐ]ρωτι καὶ φιλίᾳ Θεοδώρου, οὗ ἔτεκ[εν] Τεχ[ω]σίς; translation from *SM*.

17 Faraone (1999) 29 note 124. See Hesych. s.v. βαίνειν (walk, mount): φιλεῖν in the sense of sexual intercourse.

18 Cf. Pachoumi (2013): she thinks that the main purpose of using spells seems to be sexual union. See in particular Pachoumi (2013) 308–14, with the following examples: *PGM* IV.296–466, 1523, 1532, 1809–10; VII.887–8; X.1–23 (in my opinion, the tone of this spell can even be defined as romantic, since the victim should fall in love with the client as soon as she sees him; when he sees her, he must take three deep breaths, after which she smiles at him, and this is 'a sign of her love'); XIc; XIXa.52–4; *SM* 45.7, 30–1, 43; 47.27 (here the man asks not only that the woman can love him spiritually and physically, but also that she reveals to him her thoughts, 'what she has in mind'); *SGD* 32.3–4, 13–14. See also *P.Oxy* LXVIII 4672.6–7. In the Latin *defixiones* (binding curses), *amor* (love) and *desiderium* (desire) appear together here: *DT* 227, 230, 231, 265, 266, 270; Kropp (2008) 11.2.1/34, 35, 36.

anger as legitimate, the person has to be powerful.¹⁹ Male expressions of anger are socially acceptable because of their higher status.²⁰ This view, though, has been criticized, because the direct link between expression of emotions and demonstration of power does not correlate with gender differences. For example, anger can be perceived as an expression of powerlessness when the emotion is out of control. Likewise, powerless emotions can be powerfully expressed and displayed, as in the case of a man becoming teary-eyed, but not crying, in a sad circumstance.²¹

Even if gender, expression of emotions, and power have a complex relationship that needs to be explored with caution, the variable of power turns out to be a useful analytical tool. It is important to identify who is the agent of power, how power can be gained and used, and what its consequences are. In the context of Greek erotic magic, the belief in the effective and reality-altering abilities of magic was in itself a tool of power. Both men and women had access to the power of magical incantations and potions, and they both used it to get what they wanted. It should be stressed that the cognitive process behind the magical practice seems to be identical, without any gender difference: both women and men experienced magic as an opportunity to control, or act directly upon, their love problems. A husband that displayed a powerful emotion such as fury but in an immoderate way could be seen as expressing powerlessness: his wife was feeling empowered by magic, she knew how to render him calm and subordinate. Anomalies to Faraone's taxonomy seem to me more interesting than the taxonomy itself, because they show that gender is not something that one *has*, but it is something that one *does*.²² The differences between the use of magic by a noble wife or a prostitute could be more informative than the differences between men and women in eliciting sexual desire and romantic attachment.

In the analysis of Greek erotic curses, the category of power can be further exploited. The key for exerting power through the act of cursing was emotional persuasion, obtained choosing the right words for manipulating the reaction of the victim. The persuasive reasoning operated along two vectors: one contained within the human sphere (suitor/victim), and the other vector directed to the supernatural beings (practitioner/divine entities). In what follows, I will analyse the strategies of emotional persuasion operated in both cases, starting from the techniques employed towards the victim of the curse.

EMOTIVE PERSUASION I: STRATEGIES FOR MEN AND WOMEN

Intimate relationships between genders are indeed interwoven with strategies of persuasion. In *Lysistrata*, Aristophanes demonstrated the power of emotional manipulation and persuasion in gender interactions, staging women who were

19 See Eckert (this volume) p. 141.

20 Hess *et al.* (2010).

21 Shields *et al.* (2006) 70.

22 See Shields *et al.* (2006) 66, with further bibliography on 'doing gender'.

able to force their husbands to end the Peloponnesian war by exacerbating their sexual desire. Rhetorical arts could be useful at the beginning of a liaison, or in order to keep it alive. Greek and Roman literary works present suitors showing their own good character with the intent to demonstrate their worth as lovers.²³ For example, in the famous scene of Hera's seduction and deception of Zeus in Book 14 of Homer's *Iliad*, Zeus insists on the strength of his passion, and says to Hera that he has never loved a goddess or a woman as much as he loves her in that moment (Hom. *Il.* 14.159–353).

The papyrological and epigraphic evidence, instead, has long surprised scholars for the cruelty and spitefulness embedded in the courtship process. An extract of a formulaic erotic spell will give an idea of the language and expressions used:

If she is sitting, let her not keep sitting; if she is chatting with someone, let her not keep chatting; if she is gazing at someone, let her not keep gazing; if she is going to someone, let her not keep going; if she is strolling about, let her not keep strolling; if she is drinking, let her not keep drinking; if she is eating, let her not keep eating; if she is kissing someone, let her not keep kissing him; if she is enjoying some pleasure, let her not keep enjoying it; if she is sleeping, let her not keep sleeping. Rather, let her Ms So-and-So have me alone in her mind; let her long for me alone; let her love me alone; let her do all my wishes. Do not enter through her eyes or through her side or through her nails or even through her navel or through her frame, but rather through her 'soul'. And remain in her heart and burn her guts, her breast, her liver, her breath, her bones, her marrow, until she comes to me Mr So-and-So, feeling affection for me, and until she fulfils all my wishes, because I adjure you, Myrrh, by the three names [magical words], and by the more coercive and stronger names [magical words], so that you may carry out my orders, Myrrh. As I burn you up and you are potent, so burn the brain of her, Ms So-and-So, whom I love. Inflamm her and turn her guts inside out, suck out her blood drop by drop, until she comes to me, Ms So-and-So, whose mother is Ms So-and-So.²⁴

Insomnia, starvation, somatosensory pleasure deprivation, frenzy and oblivion to everyone else: these torments were typical temporary phenomena, lasting until the capitulation of the victim and her conceding to the user of the spell.²⁵ These

23 Gross (1985) 32, 58.

24 *PGM* IV.1510–47, Egypt, fourth century CE: εἰ κάθηται, μὴ καθήσθω, εἰ λαλεῖ πρὸς τινα, μὴ λαλεῖτω, εἰ ἐμβλεῖται τινί, μὴ ἐμβλεπέτω, εἰ προσέρχεται τινι, μὴ προσερχέσθω, εἰ περιπατεῖ, μὴ περιπατεῖτω, εἰ πίνει, μὴ πινέτω, εἰ ἐσθίει, μὴ ἐσθιέτω, εἰ καταφιλεῖ τινα, μὴ καταφιλείτω, εἰ τέρπεται τινι ἡδονῇ, μὴ τερπέσθω, εἰ κοιμᾶται, μὴ κοιμάσθω, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μόνον, τὸν δεῖνα, κατὰ νοῦν ἔχέτω, ἐμοῦ μόνου ἐπιθυμείτω, ἐμὲ μόνον στεργέτω, τὰ ἐμὰ θελήματα πάντα ποιεῖτω. μὴ εἰσέλθῃς αὐτῆς διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, μὴ διὰ τῶν πλευρῶν, μὴ διὰ τῶν ὀνύχων μηδὲ διὰ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ μηδὲ διὰ τῶν μελῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἔμμενον αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ καὶ καῦσον αὐτῆς τὰ σπλάγχνα, τὸ στήθος, τὸ ἥπαρ, τὸ πνεῦμα, τὰ ὀστά, τοὺς μυελούς, ἕως ἔλθῃ πρὸς ἐμέ, τὸν δεῖνα, φιλοῦσά με καὶ ποιήσῃ πάντα τὰ θελήματα μου, ὅτι ἐξορκίζω σε, Ζμύρνα, κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων Ἀνοχω, Ἀβρασάξ, Τρω καὶ τῶν ἐπακολουθοτέρων καὶ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων Κορμειῶθ, Ἰάω, Σαβᾶώθ, Ἀδωναί, ἵνα μοι τὰς ἐντολάς ἐπιτελέσῃς, Ζμύρνα: ὥς ἐγὼ σε κατακάω καὶ δυνατὴ εἶ, οὐτῶ ἥς φιλῶ, τῆς δεῖνα, κατακάουσον τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ἔκκαυσον καὶ ἐκστρεψον αὐτῆς τὰ σπλάγχνα, ἐκσταξον αὐτῆς τὸ αἷμα, ἕως ἔλθῃ πρὸς ἐμέ, τὸν δεῖνα τῆς δεῖνα. Translation from Betz (1986), slightly modified.

25 No drinking/eating: *PGM* IV.355; IV.1516–17; XIXa.53; LXI 17–19; *SM* 43.8; 45.45; 48.9, 23. Oblivion of family and friends: *PGM* IV.2753–60; XIXa.53; *SM* 45.47–8. Fear,

afflictions were clearly aimed at inducing the target to take action.²⁶ It has been underlined that the violent script of attraction curses was ‘due to the projected intensity of the performer’s own sense of victimization by a power he is helpless to control’;²⁷ in venting the wish of inflicting tortures on the desired person, the lovesick practitioner was cathartically healed. The cursing process has also been described as a reflection of the feelings of the lover: spells accurately reported the symptoms as they were observed and diagnosed by a physician.²⁸

However, the interpretations of the spell caster as lovesick and the tortures as symptoms of pathologies tell only half the story.²⁹ Attraction spells have been compared with mythical stories of abduction marriage, since in both cases the initial cruelty seems to aim at a steady relationship. The abduction of the bride-to-be in order to ensure her loyalty to her new family was part of a traditional *topos*, whose elements were violence, pain and conquest.³⁰ This line of thought can be stretched even further. All kinds of curses might contain formulae that aim to impede the everyday activities of a person, rendering the victim *atelês* (unable to accomplish things and purposes), while lists of body parts as well as of tortures and sufferings aimed at compelling the victim to take action are characteristics of erotic curses.³¹

How can we explain the tortures inflicted by the spell caster on the beloved victim? A possibility might be that the strategy of forceful persuasion was mutated from military doctrine. War as a metaphor for love was a recurring motif in Greek poetry as early as Archilochus (seventh century BCE): the man is like a city conquered by the woman (Archil. fr. 23 West). Recently, Sappho’s fragment 31, notoriously referring to the pathological symptoms of love, has been reinterpreted as describing physical sensations recalling the effects caused by terror on the

hallucinations, sleep deprivation (this last torture named in the magical handbooks the spells producing wakefulness as *agrupnêtika*): *PGM* IV.1519, VII.887, XXXVI.305–6; *SM* 43.9, 45.45, 48.9, 48.23; *P.Oxy* LXVIII 4672.1–9. Another limit imposed on the victim could be the interruption of communication with the divine: in *SEG* 47.871 (Akanthos, Macedonia, fourth/third century BCE), the victim may not be able to sacrifice and receive the goodwill of the gods before she satisfies Pausanias. On the impeding formulae in curses, see Martinez (1995). See similar formulae in the Latin erotic *defixiones* (binding curses): Kropp (2008) 11.2.1/5, 11.2.1/34, 35, 36; *DT* 230, 265, 266, 268; cf. the formulae of not being able to eat in the Oscan curse tablets: Crawford *et al.* (2011) vol. 1, Capua no. 34, Cumae no. 8. Sleep deprivation in spells aimed at provoking *amor* (love) and *desiderium* (desire) lasts through the medieval period, see for example the tenth-century Arabic magical handbook *Picatrix* (e.g. book III x 251, 253, 254 of the Latin translation).

26 See also Martinez (1995).

27 Winkler (1990) 73. See also Gager (1992) 82; Martinez (1995) 354; Frankfurter (2014) 328.

28 Pachoumi (2012) 75–80.

29 See also Versnel (1998) 254; Faraone (1999) 43–55, 84.

30 Faraone (1999) 94.

31 A long and detailed list of ineffectual activities is in *IG* XII.7, p. 1, side A (Arkesine, Amorgos, 200 BCE–second century CE?), quoted by Chaniotis (this volume) 93. See Versnel (1998) on lists of body parts in erotic curses and prayers for justice.

battlefield – loss of voice, cold sweat, trembling and pallor.³² Love afflictions and struggles can be compared to war pains. Similarly, in Sophocles' *Antigone*, Love is described as 'unconquered in battle' (Soph. *Ant.* 781).³³ The fight, then, might be imagined as between two lovers or against the god of love. This motif acquired popularity especially in the Hellenistic period, and reached its peak with Roman elegists: *militat omnis amans*, wrote Ovid, 'every lover is a soldier' (Ovid. *Am.* 1.9.1).³⁴ This perspective fits particularly well in the context of erotic curses, since the tortures inflicted on the victim can be interpreted as part of a strategy of attack. Food deprivation is the clearest example, having a long history as a weapon of war, and as a strategy for defeating the enemy. At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the famine and the starvation of the Athenian population contributed to their acceptance of the Spartan peace terms (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–23). Sleep deprivation is another trans-historical torture that has been used as a method of interrogation for convincing a detainee to speak. In the formulae of erotic magic, strategies of persuasion that imply sufferings might be compared to military stratagems. The victims were isolated and their cognitive abilities intentionally diminished. Having an impact on decision-making, somatosensory deprivations aimed at provoking physical and emotional frailty in their opponents in order to conquer them faster.

Greek ideology of the amatory conquest seems to be characterized by a rather violent attitude. Indeed, this picture is consistent with the mythological representation of Peitho, the daughter of Aphrodite and the personification of persuasion.³⁵ Peitho has a mythical and ritual role in the voluntary or forced abduction of a woman from her family to the new husband's home. The ambivalence of Peitho as aiding a coerced marital union distinctly emerges in the iconographic sources. For example, in a vessel portraying the rape of the daughters of Leukippos by the Dioskouroi,³⁶ Aphrodite witnesses the scene, while Peitho looks back from the bottom right. While some commentators have opposed Peitho's righteous indignation to Aphrodite's connivance, others have interpreted her figure as the romantic force that turns a 'rape into an elopement'.³⁷ The power of persuasion is more clearly associated with violence in the myth of Helen. In a wine jug where Menelaus attacks Helen with a sword, Peitho prefigures the consent of Helen to remarry him.³⁸ It can be stressed, then, that Peitho had a crucial role in the wedding ceremony, but she also facilitated adulterous relationships, and was highly influential in the violent conquest of an unwilling target. A tradition attested by

32 D'Angour (2013).

33 See also Hes. *Theog.* 122: Eros subdues, conquers the mind.

34 See also *Anth. Pal.* 12.81. On the *militia amoris* in Greek and Latin poetry, see Murgatroyd (1975).

35 On Peitho, see Buxton (1982); Pirenne-Delforge (1991); *LIMC* 7.244 s.v. Peitho; Stafford (2000); Redfield (2003) 66–72; Breitenberger (2007) 117–35.

36 Red-figured water vessel (*hydria*) by the Meidias painter, 420–400 BCE, British Museum, London, GR 1772.3–20.30 (in 2014 on display in Room 19, Greece, Athens).

37 Stafford (2000) 130–1. See also Redfield (2003) 68–9.

38 Red-figure wine jug (*oinochoe*), Heimarmene Painter, c. 425–20 BCE, Vulci. Vatican Museums, Beazley number 215554. See also drinking cup (*skuphos*) by Makron, c. 490–80 BCE, Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 13.186; cf. Gorgias fr. 82 (DK) 11.12.

the Suda and by the *scholia* at Pindar makes her, after a union with Pan, the mother of Iunx, the bird of love magic.³⁹ *Iunx* denotes also a rite of incantation for attracting a lover in which a wryneck bird is bound to a wheel. This confirms that, on the ritual level, the persuasion of a reluctant lover was often achieved through cruel tortures and threats.

The relationship between violence and persuasion can be similarly highlighted in visual representations of Eros. In magical gemstones, the god of love seems to have made more prisoners than sick persons. The soul suffers the attacks of love: Eros is often depicted burning a butterfly, symbol of Psyche, with a torch or trying to catch it.⁴⁰ In two gems, though, this more common situation is reversed: Eros is fastened to a post, and Psyche is aggressively threatening him with a torch. One inscription commented on the scene with the adverb 'rightly' (δικαίως),⁴¹ while in the second gem we find inscribed: 'Eros, as you (have done) to me, I (am doing) to you' (Ἐρως. ὥς σὺ ἐμέ. κἀγὼ σε).⁴² He is treated like a prisoner under torture, in the same way as he has treated the *psuchai* (souls) of his targets.

This portrayed violence can shed light on the emotional strategies of persuasion planned by Greek lovers and performed in erotic magic, although the link between violence and persuasion prompts further questions of definition. Can we consider these rhetorical techniques as strategies of emotive persuasion, or were they merely the traditional language of coercive magic? In other words, where does the limit between persuasion and coercion lie? The dividing line was indeed thin. But if we think on the ritual mechanism of curses we might find a plausible answer. The violent expressions can be considered persuasive strategies because erotic spells were working indirectly. The aggressive action was not made by the practitioner directly on his victim, but through the agency of the gods. The fact that the procedure was mediated by a third agent suggests that the magic discourse had primarily persuasive effects, since a persuasive discourse can be defined as *indirectly* coercive, while coercion works through *direct* means.⁴³ Furthermore, the text of these spells can appear to imply a coercive message, but the fact that the real-life outcome of the magic act was uncertain, suggests that cursing ritual can be better defined merely as an attempt to persuade a reluctant and fleeing person.

EMOTIVE PERSUASION II: STRATEGIES FOR GODS AND *DAIMONES*

Given the mechanisms of the ritual procedure, in order to effectively induce emotions in the desired person it was fundamental to persuade the divinity first.

39 Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.56. See Pirenne-Delforge (1991) 399 note 17; Redfield (2003) 68.

40 E.g. unpublished Tassie gemstone, Beazley number 2432. See more examples in Platt (2007).

41 Ann Arbor, Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, first to sixth centuries CE. On Eros just and unjust in Greek poetry, see Cavallini (2000) 147–51.

42 Paris, Cabinet des Médailles, Bibliothèque Nationale, Imperial period.

43 Miller (2002) 4; cf. Graf (1997) 181–2, 222–4; Aubriot-Sévin (2005) on the discussion about the coercive and persuasive aspects of ancient magic and prayer.

This crucial and necessary stage led to a great variety of persuasive strategies directed towards the gods. The most common techniques include the following scenarios: 1) the practitioner stressed that he was miserable and alone; 2) he said that he had suffered a wrong or an injustice; 3) he exalted the divinity; 4) he slandered the target victim; 5) he made a vow or threatened the divinity; 6) he said that he knew the divine secret names; 7) he identified himself with a god or a *daimon*.⁴⁴ An example of the first technique, the isolation strategy, is in a curse that a woman wrote in order to force a man into marriage:

Of Thetima and Dionysophon the ritual wedding and the marriage I bind by a written spell, as well as (the marriage) of all other women (to him), both widows and girls, but above all of Thetima; and I entrust (this spell) to Macron and to the *daimones*. And were I ever to unfold and read these words again after digging (the tablet) up, only then should Dionysophon marry, not before. May he indeed not take another woman than myself, but let me alone grow old by the side of Dionysophon and no one else. I beg you: have pity for [Phila], dear *daimones*, [for I am deprived] of all friends and lonely. But please keep this (piece of writing) for my sake so that these events do not happen and horrible Thetima perishes horribly. But let me become happy and blessed.⁴⁵

This interesting document goes beyond the formulaic phraseology of other erotic spells, and provides information on personal feelings. Following the advice of a professional magician, the author of the text herself, not a scribe, probably engraved it.⁴⁶ The exact name of the author of the text is lost; I follow the first editor in naming her Phila, a common Macedonian name that can fit the lacuna. Phila wanted to attract Dionysophon to herself and to separate him from other women, in particular from Thetima. The tablet is addressed to Macron, likely the dead person lying in the grave where the text was deposited. The tablet was found rolled up and lain alongside the right thigh-bone of the skeleton.⁴⁷ The fact that its author never unrolled it seems to indicate that Phila did not manage to marry Dionysophon and grow old with him.

The text is initially centred on the verb *katagraphein* (to bind, to devote), a quasi-legal term that indicates the action of preventing an undesirable act. Phila wishes to preclude the union of Dionysophon and Thetima, impeding them from

44 The masculine pronoun has been used in this list by convention.

45 SEG 43.434, Pella (Macedonia), lead tablet, first half of the fourth century BCE: [Θετί]μας καὶ Διονυσοφῶντος τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν γάμον καταγράφω καὶ τὰν ἀλλὰν πασὰν γυναικῶν καὶ χηρῶν καὶ παρθένων, μάλιστα δὲ Θετίμας, καὶ παρκαττίθεται Μάκρῳν καὶ [τοῖς] δαίμοσι· καὶ ὁπόκα ἐγὼ ταῦτα διελέξαιμι καὶ ἀναγνοίην πάλιν ἀνορόξασα[τόκα] γάμαι Διονυσοφῶντα, πρότερον δὲ μὴ· μὴ γὰρ λάβοι ἄλλαν γυναῖκα ἀλλ' ἢ ἐμέ, [ἐμὲ δὲ] συνκαταγεγράσαι Διονυσοφῶντι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἄλλαν· ἰκέτις ὑμῶ<v> γίνο[μαι· . . .]αν οἰκτίρετε δαίμονες φίλ[ο]ι, ΔΑΓΙΝΑΓΑΡΙΜΕ φίλων πάντων καὶ ἐρήμα· ἀλλὰ [ταῦτ]α φυλάσσετε ἐμὴν ὅπως μὴ γίνηται ταῦτα καὶ κακὰ κακῶς Θετίμα ἀπόληται· [. . .]. ΑΛ[— — —]. ΥΝΜ. . ΕΣΠΛΗΝ ἐμός, ἐμὲ δὲ εὐδαίμονα καὶ μακαρίαν γενέσται· [— — —]ΤΟ· [— — —]. . Ε.Ε.ΩΑ. . ΜΕΤΕ[— — —]. Translation from Voutiras (1998), slightly modified. On this text see also Versnel (2010) 317–19; Eidinow (2013), 218–19; Edmonds (2014); Frankfurter (2014) 327, 329, 330.

46 See Voutiras (1998) 58–67.

47 See Voutiras (1998) 1–4 on the archaeological context of the tablet.

any sexual intercourse (*gamos*) and from the possibility of performing a marriage rite (*telos*).⁴⁸ She made sure to include all the women eligible for marriage as well. The exact nature of the triangle between Phila, Dionysophon and Thetima is not clear: Phila might be the lawful wife of Dionysophon and afraid of being repudiated, or she might be a courtesan afraid of being replaced by Thetima. Phila's dream of a long and happy life with Dionysophon seems to suggest that he was a wealthy man who could assure her economic security. The expression of the desire to grow old with her beloved man allows a transition into a section which contains an explicit prayer to the spirits invoked. Before the supernatural powers the woman presented herself as a suppliant, and asked them to have mercy on her, because she had no friends or family and was all alone. This declaration of helplessness and social isolation constitutes a precise tactic for persuading the *daimones* to accomplish Phila's wedding plan. The interpretation of the persuasion strategies in this text would be enriched by solving the indecipherable sequence of letters ΔΑΓΙΝΑΓΑΡΙΜΕ, cautiously restored in square brackets in the translation above. Dubois and Versnel propose to read δαπ(ε)ινὰ γάρ ἴμε (I am miserable), equivalent to the Attic ταπεινὴ γάρ εἰμι (with the sonorization of the dental, a phonetic phenomenon known in Macedonian).⁴⁹ Voutiras rightly raises some doubts about adopting this restoration for paleographical and syntactical reasons.⁵⁰ While the expressions ταπεινὸς καὶ ἔρημος and ἔρημος φίλων have some attestations in Greek literature,⁵¹ in this tablet the position of καὶ before φίλων πάντων creates an unparalleled phrasing. It is true that we are not dealing with Demosthenic prose,⁵² but the syntactic structure of the phrase as inscribed on the tablet prevents me from accepting without hesitations the restoration ταπεινή. Here it probably concealed an unattested dialectal word or a misspelled one.⁵³ In any case, although I am not entirely convinced by the emendation δαπεινά, we should imagine something similar, another adjective that stressed Phila's condition of weakness and misery.

Comparable to this isolation strategy, the second persuasive method employed toward the gods consists of the author of the spell bemoaning that he has been

48 See Voutiras (1998) 112–22; cf. Eidinow (2013) 339 note 49: *telos* and *gamos* might possibly have been used in a hendiadys, 'separating out two elements that together here describe a marital rite'.

49 Dubois (1995); Versnel (2010) 318.

50 Voutiras (1998) 12 with note 19: the third letter of the incomprehensible sequence is a *gamma* that should be corrected to *pi*; and, above all, 'the adjective ταπεινή would have to be linked to the genitive φίλων πάντων in the same way as ἐρήμα, a construction for which there seem to be no parallels'.

51 *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* search, ταπεινὸς καὶ ἔρημος (or other grammatical cases) 5 instances; ἔρημος φίλων (or other grammatical cases) 32 instances; no occurrence in papyri and inscriptions.

52 As Henk Versnel pointed out; without succeeding in convincing him of my counterarguments, I discussed this textual problem with him at the workshop *The Study of Emotions in Greek Culture* (University of Oxford, May 2013; organized within the ERC project *The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm*).

53 Voutiras (1998) 12.

wronged. One of the best examples is the curse deposited by Vitruvius Felix, who justified his request by accusing his wife of having broken the marital faith first:

Grant (pl.) {—} Vitruvius Felix, whom Vitruvia Maximilla bore, whom Vitruvius Euelpistus begot, to enter into hatred and to have forgetfulness of his desires for Valeria Quadratilla, whom Valerius Mysticus begot, whom Valeria Eunoea bore. [—] Control (pl.) (sc. her), you [—], with remaining (?) punishments ... because she first broke faith with Vitruvius Felix her own husband.⁵⁴

This text demonstrates that love does take into account a wrong suffered. Asserting that the author suffered the first blow is a typical tactic of so-called prayers for justice, texts inscribed for invoking divine revenge for a suffered injustice.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Vitruvius Felix's curse is particularly interesting because he asked the gods to induce him to feel hate for the ex-wife. He was trying to persuade the gods to influence his own emotions. The cursing ritual included a prayer that reveals the author's hope of persuading himself that he could erase any loving feelings: an attempt at emotive self-persuasion through the mediation of a divine agent.

To impoverish the believer was the other pole of the exaltation of the divinity. Often working together with the second technique, the third persuasion strategy involves the acclamation of divine prerogatives, strength and sovereignty. Flattery was considered a persuasive and efficacious argument. The following example clearly shows how a strong bond with the supernatural beings was built through the glorification of the invoked deity, of its names and of its power:

I adjure you, corpse-*daimon* Antinoos, by the dreadful and frightful name of the one at the sound of whose name the earth will open, at the sound of whose name the *daimones* tremble fearfully, at the sound of whose name the rivers and the rocks break.⁵⁶

This lead tablet was found in a pot paired with a clay female figurine. The nude doll was pierced with thirteen needles, with hands and feet bound behind her

54 SEG 53.1075.30–40, Cumae, second/third century CE: δότε {εἰς μ[εῖ]σος} Βετρουβίῳ Φήλικι, ὃν ἔ[τεκ]ε Βετρουβία Μαξιμίλλα, ὃν ἔσπειρε Β[ετ]ρούβιος Εὐέλπιστος, εἰς μεῖσος ἐλθεῖν καὶ λήθην λαβεῖν τῶν πόθων Οὐαλερίας Κοδρ[α]τίλλης, ἣν ἔσπειρε Βα[λέριος] Μυστ[ικ]ός, ἣν ἔτεκεν Βαλερία [Εὐνοία c. 7]το. Κατέχετε ὑμεῖς [c. 11 τα]ῖς λοιπαῖς τειμωρίας [— c. 13 —] ας, ὅτι πρώτη ἠθέτησε [Βετρούβιον Φ]ήλικα τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἄνδρα. Text and translation from Jordan (2003). See Versnel (1998) 247 on this text: the experience of being betrayed and abandoned gave rise to hate and vindictiveness.

55 See Versnel (2010) on the categorization of prayers for justice and proper binding curses (*de-fixiones*).

56 SM 47.11–4, Middle Egypt, second/third century CE: ἐξορκίζω σε, νεκύδαιμον Ἀντίνοε, κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος [τοῦ] τρομεροῦ καὶ φοβεροῦ, οὗ ἡ γῆ ἀκούσασα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀνυγῆσεται, οὗ οἱ δαίμονες ἀκούσαντες τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐνφόβως φοβοῦνται, οὗ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ πέτραι ἀκούσαντες ῥήσ[οντα]ι. Translation from SM.

back.⁵⁷ The ritual performed on the figurine reinforced the goal of the practitioner, to be remembered by the woman, and cooperated with the supernatural entity in dragging her to him. The doll can be read as an auxiliary ritual tool that made the task of the *daimon* easier, and then more appealing. The piercing ceremony boosted the request to the spirit to exert his power: to increase the number of magical actions enhanced the likelihood of a successful persuasion.

A fourth effective persuasive pattern consists of resorting to *diabolê* (slander), a topos ritually used in Graeco-Egyptian curses from the Hellenistic period onwards.⁵⁸ The charm contained the story of wrongdoings apparently committed by the target victim, as in this example:

'I call upon you, the masters, great gods, who shine in the present hour, on this day, for the sake of her, the ungodly Ms So-and-So. For she has said: 'Iaô does not have ribs'. [She, Ms So-and-So, has said,] 'Adônai was cast out because of his violent anger'. ... She, Ms So-and-So, has said, 'Marmorouth was castrated'. ... She, Ms So-and-So, has said, 'Michael is by nature a hermaphrodite'. I am not the one who says such things, master, but she, the godless Ms So-and-So. Therefore fetch her for me, she being inflamed with passion, submissive. Let her not find sleep until she comes to me.' Recite seven times.⁵⁹

Through these formulae, the magical operator accused the victim of various offences against the divinity, while he protected himself specifying that he took no part in the impious acts. A total of seven mischiefs against seven deities were inscribed on the seven wicks of a lamp. The spell had to be repeated seven times. These repetitions are certainly characteristics of magical rites, but they were also reinforcing the strategy of slander. Numerous crimes produced a more convincing case. The manipulation of reality aimed to provoke anger in the divine interlocutor in order to convince him, rather than to constrain him, to intervene and to comply with the operator's wishes. Emotional arousal promoted heuristic decision making.⁶⁰

57 On piercing effigies see Faraone (1999) 41–2. See Riess (2012) 197–201 for an overview of the scholarly discussion on voodoo dolls deposited with curses and their interpretation according to the Frazerian definition of sympathetic magic.

58 On this ritual, see Eitrem (1924); Maltomini (1979) 273; Versnel (1998) 264 note 131; Kropp (2009) 140–1; Pachoumi (2012) 81–4.

59 PGM VII.601–12, Egypt, third or fourth CE: 'ἐπικαλοῦμαι ὑμᾶς, τοὺς δυνάστας, μεγάλους θεοὺς, τοὺς λαμπυρίζομένους ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὥρᾳ, ἐν τῇ σήμερον ἡμέρᾳ, χάριν τῆς ἀσεβοῦς δεῖνα. αὐτὴ γὰρ εἰρηκεν, ὅτι ὁ 'Ιάω πλευρὰς οὐκ ἔχει, <ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν,> ὅτι 'Αδωναὶ ἐπὶ χόλῳ βία ἐβλήθη. <ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν,> ὅτι Σαβαῶθ ἔβαλεν τὰς τρεῖς κραυγὰς. ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν ὅτι 'ὁ Παγουρη ἀρσενόθλις ἔφν'. ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν ὅτι 'ὁ Μαρμορουθ ἀπεκάπη'. ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν ὅτι 'ὁ 'Ιάεω οὐκ ἐπιστεύθη τὴν λάρνακα'. ἡ δεῖνα εἰρηκεν ὅτι 'ὁ Μιχαὴλ ἀρσενόθλις ἔφν'. οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ λέγων, δέσποτα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀσεβὴς δεῖνα. διὸ ἄξατέ μοι αὐτὴν φλεγομένην, ὑποτασσομένην, ὅπως μὴ τυχεῖν, μέχρις ἔλθῃ πρὸς ἐμέ'. λέγε ζ'. Translation from Betz (1986), slightly modified. A selective list of similar examples: PGM IV.1411–12 (the ungodly and unholy), 2574–2610; VI.2471–92; LXI.50–3; Eur. Hipp. 21–22.

60 See Nabi (2002) 299.

Contrary to the depictions of a miserable practitioner or a mischievous target victim, a fifth strategy of persuasion aimed to present the author of the spell as a powerful agent:

Fulfil, *daimon*, what is written here. And after you have performed it, I will pay you a sacrifice. But if you delay, I will inflict on you chastisements which you cannot endure.⁶¹

The practitioner presented himself as a person who promised the fulfilment of a vow and, at the same time, who could threaten the supernatural beings with harsh punishments if they did not obey. The threats of a powerful spell operator could involve the whole earth and the environment, disturbing natural processes and the order of the cosmos:

If you disobey and do not quickly fulfil what I tell you, the sun will not sink below the earth, and neither Hades nor the cosmos will exist.⁶²

In a sixth strategy, the magical operator proclaimed that he knew the secret and true names of the divinity in order to support his request. The name was often constituted by a sequence of magical words (*voces magicae*):

I invoke you, the great *daimon*, the ruler on the earth and in the heaven, frightful king. Would that I could pronounce your true name: *anoch êou sebana sapra . al phthamoth ps amoun thaabaôh sthôth . . . ephramous . tabaôth marethritiue Arbathiaôth*.⁶³

In a climax of boasting, the seventh strategy emphasized the authority of the practitioner, who identified himself with a great god, taking advantage of the formula ἐγώ εἰμι (I am):

For I am *Barbar Adônai* who hides the stars, who controls the brightly shining heaven, the lord of the world.⁶⁴

The last three techniques have in common the exaggeration of the information possessed by the spell caster. Knowledge about the laws of the universe and secret divine names was exploited in order to persuade the gods to act on the side of the unrequited lover. These strategies seem to recall the so-called *argumentum in terrorem*, or fear appeal, widely used in contemporary advertisements and political communication: the arousal of fear convinces the addressee of the message to

61 PGM IV.2095–7, Egypt, fourth century CE: τέλεσον, δαῖμον, τὰ ἐνθάδε γεγραμμένα. τελέσαντι δέ σοι θυσίαν ἀποδώσω, βραδύναντι δέ σοι κολάσεις ἐπενεγκῶ, ἅς οὐ δύνασαι ἐνεγκεῖν. Trans. Betz (1986). On this persuasive strategy see Kropp (2009) 138–40.

62 SM 45.9–15, Egypt, fifth century CE, translation from SM.

63 P.Oxy LXVIII 4674.2–8, Egypt, late fourth/early fifth century CE, translation by Franco Maltomini in the Oxyrhynchus volume; cf. P.Oxy LXV 4468 (I know your name and your shapes). See also Kropp (2009) 140.

64 PGM IV.385–7: ἐγώ γάρ εἰμι Βαρβαρ Ἀδωναί, ὁ τὰ ἄστρα κρύβων, ὁ λαμπροφειγῆς οὐρανοῦ κρατῶν, ὁ κύριος κόσμου; translation from Betz (1986). See Martinez (1991) 69–75, 92–9; Kropp (2009) 139–40.

direct his behaviour towards avoiding the threat.⁶⁵ This trans-historical commonality seems to indicate that formulaic expressions in curses imply a cognitive mechanism at work in interlocution between humans (*anthrôpoi*) and supernatural beings (*theoi* and *daimones*).

CONCLUSIONS

In the course of my analysis, I have explored on one hand the link between gender, emotions, power and social hierarchies, and on the other the rhetorical phraseology and the use of persuasion aimed at eliciting emotions in human and divine subjects. I have highlighted three main points. First, there are no significant gender differences in the modalities of inducing emotions of *erôs* and *philia* in the beloved person. Second, the tortures and somatosensory deprivations requested for the victim of the spell can be interpreted as persuasion strategies that contributed to the triggering of emotions, and they evoke military tactics. Third, a great variety of stratagems were employed toward supernatural beings, aimed at a) provoking emotions in them and b) persuading them to fulfil the request of the magical practitioner. On the second and third points, it should be noted that emotional persuasion was mainly exploited within the realm of the addressee. While on the human level strategies included daily and societal activities, towards the immortals the techniques handled the hidden code of nature and the cosmic sphere.

This chapter brought into sharper focus the emotional persuasion strategies in Greek erotic curses, asking how they were engendered and how they changed from the human to the supernatural levels. These two aspects seem to be crucial for a deeper historical understanding of the agency of male and female lovers, and of how intimate relationships were culturally embodied processes. Curses reveal the unbridled necessity of having control over the body, the mind, the feelings, the behaviour and the choices of the beloved person. The frustrated lover tried to influence what was beyond his or her power: magic was an illusory means for filling a sentimental need that was, in fact, hard to realize. Curses, then, constitute one of the finest techniques of persuasion and manipulation of the unpredictable will of others in the ancient world.

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65 A classic example is 'cigarettes and fatty food cause heart disease'. See Sanders and Fragoulaki (this volume) on persuasive fear arguments in political situations; Winter and Iurescia (this volume) on fear in other types of persuasion. On the fear appeal as an effective strategy of persuasion see also Szabo and Pfau (2002); Perloff (2010) 194–207.

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STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION IN PROVOKED QUARRELS IN PLAUTUS: A PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION: DELIBERATELY PROVOKED QUARRELS AND PLAUTUS

Persuasion aims to influence the listener's capacity to judge people and situations. It may be effected by a coherent argument, speaking mainly to the rationality of the addressee. Additionally, or alternatively, the goal may be achieved by appealing to the listener's emotions. This chapter focuses on emotive persuasion techniques which deal with negative emotions, such as anger and fear, exploited in ancient Rome to manipulate the person who experiences them.¹

Strategies of persuasion involving emotion arousal primarily involve emotions that are not present already (though they can also involve inflaming emotions that *are* already latently present). This was a recognized part of an orator's technique since Classical times,² and appears in rhetorical theory at least as far back as Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.³ The most important Latin works dealing with it are the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (pseudonymously attributed to Cicero) and, above all, the rhetorical works of Cicero (mainly *De inventione*, *De oratore*, *Orator*), and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. Since persuasion (*movere*) is one of the orator's three tasks, he has to be able to use every available means; arousing the emotions of the addressee is a powerful one. According to the settings of the communicative situation and the character of his or her addressee, the persuader can choose to persuade the addressee by eliciting a pleasant mood, for instance through flattery. Alternatively the persuader can decide to unbalance rational thought by inciting bad feelings, like those which come into play in a quarrel. It is this very example that I will address in this chapter, namely, that of deliberately provoked quarrels: it is a communicative situation of conflict used by the persuader in order to

1 I draw on the work of Kaster about emotions in ancient Rome, which addresses the problem of whether scripts are reliable evidence for understanding the emotions of other cultures. He takes into account the whole process of experiencing and evaluating emotion, and the response to it that a person enacts. Such a cognitive approach describes the processes of personal and societal emotion; it therefore offers fruitful insights for a chapter dealing with interaction from a pragmatic perspective. I focus on anger and fear as the most evident emotions occurring in quarrels as represented in Roman comedy, and I call them 'negative', broadly speaking, meaning that the experience of them is not welcome; see Kaster (2005) 154 note 9.

2 See Sanders (this volume) 13–17.

3 And probably further – Aristotle mentions how previous rhetorical theorists treat emotions at *Rh.* 1.1, 1354a11–18.

draw the speech partner's reactions towards achieving his or her (the persuader's) own aims.⁴

From this point of view, deliberately provoked quarrels reveal quite clearly how persuasive strategies relying on negative emotions work, and they offer, therefore, a good case study of the interplay between negative emotions and linguistic strategies of persuasion. In the corpus of Latin literary texts, such cases are most plainly to be found in the dramatic genre, namely in comedy, where plot development and comic effects very often lead to scenes involving a quarrel on stage. Due to the conventions of this literary genre, the characters explicitly state their intentions through asides and soliloquies. This kind of communication between the character and the audience, which is aimed at facilitating comprehension of the events happening on the stage, also makes comedy an ideal genre for analysing quarrel persuasion strategies, since it provides us with clear, unequivocal evidence of how the persuader manipulates his interlocutor's negative emotions.

It is Plautus who presents most of these quarrel scenes.⁵ In this chapter I will first present an excerpt from *Bacchides* as a specimen of successful persuasion effected by exploiting anger and arousing fear in the target person, focusing on the main linguistic elements involved. Then I will sketch out the main topics involved in this kind of persuasion strategy, addressing the variety of weak spots the persuaders play upon to increase negative emotions, specifically fear, using excerpts from *Amphitruo* and *Miles gloriosus*. In these three instances the persuader does not seem to experience the kind of emotions he recognizes in the target. In the fourth instance I will present, from *Casina*, the persuader does feel, by contrast, such an emotion – namely anger. Finally, in the last part of the chapter I will conclude by outlining the negative emotion persuasion patterns that have emerged from my examination of Plautine quarrels.

My analysis of these passages will borrow insights from the field of pragmatics, in order to foreground the conversational conventions and structures underlying the strategies of persuasion represented in these texts. Closer attention to conversational issues enables a focus on the linguistic techniques through

4 This is a working definition which singles out the basic feature of the function, i.e. the aim of the persuader in managing the conversation. In this respect, provoked quarrels are a very specific type of the more general communicative situation of the quarrel. Going bottom-up in order to define the elements we are dealing with, the main features distinguishing a quarrel from other kinds of communicative situations turn out to be verbal aggression and reciprocity; the quarrel could then be defined as a verbal conflict with the (at least two) speakers involved enacting mutually aggressive behaviour.

5 Plautus has seven instances of deliberately provoked quarrels out of twenty-one quarrel scenes in his twenty-one surviving comedies (data from my own as yet unpublished PhD research on quarrel scenes in Roman comedy). For the sake of comparison, Terence has two instances of provoked quarrels out of eight quarrel scenes in his six surviving comedies, both in *Phormio*. These two instances are parts of longer passages where the parasite argues with the two old brothers, embedding the quarrel in a trial-like scene. It is noteworthy that the persuader in *Phormio* exploits the same emotive persuasion techniques and linguistic strategies as the persuaders in comedies of Plautus do.

which the speakers arouse negative emotions – as a result elucidating the specific uses of language in emotional persuasion.

Applying the theoretical framework of pragmatics to Latin literary texts is a useful way of enhancing our understanding of them. In the first place, it can help to clarify the literal meaning of some passages. It may also be useful to elucidate the role of characterization in dramatic texts.⁶ Furthermore, dramatists exploit speech conventions underlying spontaneous communication in everyday life, and a pragmatic analysis of fabricated speech in plays may therefore improve our understanding of some patterns of specific communicative situations.

AN ANGRY MASTER: NICOBULUS (*BACCHIDES* 775–1066)

In the fourth act of the comedy, the plot seems to be at an impasse, but the slave will still be able to resolve it by deceiving his master. The *senex* (old man) Nicobulus is furious because he was going to be deceived over his money by his son Mnesilochus and his slave Chrysalus: the *adulescens* (young man) has just confessed (*Bacch.* 530–3). But the revelation was a mistake: in despair the *adulescens* returns to his slave and begs him to try to get money from Nicobulus again. The *servus* (slave) agrees. He will succeed in reversing the situation by the power of words through playing on his master's angry mood, as he clearly states: 'But now I need the old man in a savage and wild state (*truculento ... atque saevo*); it isn't any good for this trick if the old boy is at peace with me when he sees me. As truly as I live, I'll turn him over properly today' (763–6).⁷

As we can see, soliloquies elucidate the intentions of the speaker. Furthermore, the persuader shows through them, as well as through asides, that he is aware of the available means of psychological manipulation, and knows how and when to use them. After Nicobulus has explicitly stated his vexation, Chrysalus reveals that he recognizes the moment to start his action according to the mood of his target: 'NIC. It distresses me very much that Chrysalus got away with this today. CHRY. I'm saved, the old man's angry. Now is my time to approach him' (770–3).⁸

As we are going to deal with a sample of persuasion, it might be useful to describe the communicative situation on stage using rhetorical terminology:⁹ there is an agent, Chrysalus the slave, and an addressee, Nicobulus the old master, the

6 See Culpeper (2001), especially 235–62 on (im)politeness and characterization in dramatic texts.

7 All translations of Plautus are taken from the Loeb edition by De Melo (2011); all Plautus's excerpts are taken from the Oxford Classical Text by Lindsay (1904–5).

8 Note the similarities with Ter. *Ph.* 348–50: 'DEM. Have you ever heard of anyone insulted as outrageously as I have been here? Please give me your support. GET. He's furious (*iratus est*)' – cf. with 240: 'DEM. I'm so angry I can't get any thoughts together (*ita sum irritatus animum ut nequeam ad cogitandum instituere*). PHO. Just concentrate on this. I'm now going to stir him up (*iam ego hunc agitato*)'. The translation is taken from the Loeb edition by Barsby (2001); text from the Oxford Classical Text by Kauer and Lindsay (1902).

9 I rely on Knappe (2000), see esp. 16.

target of Chrysalus's manoeuvre. The agent's purpose is to persuade the target to hand over a sum of money; and the means he is going to use are psychological manipulation and forged evidence. A closer look at the verbal exchanges between the two speech partners will provide us with evidence of the linguistic expressions serving this purpose.

As soon as Nicobulus sees his slave, he shows his anger with him, as his manner of address proves (775–82). He uses a quite ordinary greeting formula (*bone serve, salve. quid fit?* 'Hello, my good slave. What's up?'),¹⁰ the underlying sarcasm of which becomes even more evident from the following rhetorical questions ('How soon shall I sail to Ephesus so as to take my money back home from Theotimus? You're silent?' 775–7), which display his anger. However, it is not only the content, but also the very use of rhetorical questions that provides a further hint of his mood, as they are often used to vent anger or indignation in contexts of protest.¹¹ He ends by uttering threats of punishment of a very common kind, as is usual in Roman comedy when slaves are involved in the interaction.¹²

Far from being frightened, Chrysalus pretends to be indignant at his master's accusations – i.e. he pretends to be in a resentful mood which, in all probability, he does not actually feel, as it was Chrysalus himself who prompted these accusations on purpose. He replies with a rhetorical question (consistent with his putative anger), and continues by pretending to plead guilty and insinuating upcoming dangers: 'Has he accused me? Excellent: *I am bad, I am wicked and evil. Just watch out. I won't utter a single word*' (*men crinatus? optumest: ego sum malus, / ego sum sacer, scelestus. specta rem modo; / ego verbum faciam <nul-lum>*, 783–5). The repetition of the linguistic markers of subjectivity (such as first person pronouns – not usually supplied in Latin alongside verbs, which already contain person-specific endings), is relevant since it is a rhetorical device serving to increase the force of the repeated speech act.¹³

This kind of (linguistic) behaviour on the part of the slave increases the anger of his master, as evident from Nicobulus's reply: 'Are you even threatening me, you thug?' (*etiam, carnufex, minitare?*, 785–6). We have several linguistic hints of the escalation that fit this interpretation: the term of abuse,¹⁴ the rhetorical question expressing a binding directive, and the presence of *etiam* as a device to increase the illocutionary force of the speech act.¹⁵

By uttering obscure insinuations of this kind, Chrysalus disregards the obedience a slave ought to grant his master. This kind of behaviour situates

10 See Dickey (2002) 146–7 on the derogatory use of *bone*; see Poccetti (2010) on the interactional conventions governing greetings.

11 I draw on the analysis of rhetorical questions in Orlandini (1980). See Orlandini (2001) 278, 295–306, on the use of interrogative-exclamative sentences.

12 See e.g. *Mil.* 215–6, 502–13; *Pseud.* 133–59, 196–201, 209–29, 496–501, 531–4.

13 See the remarks about the enclitic *-ne* (CHRY. *men crinatus?*, *Bacch.* 783) expressing indignation and polemic in Orlandini (2001) 300. I refer to linguistic devices serving as a booster in modifying the illocutionary force of speech act, as illustrated by Holmes (1984).

14 A typical one addressed to a slave: see Opelt (1965) 59.

15 See Risselada (1993) 187–231; cf. Kirk (1897).

Chrysalus in the role of *servus callidus* (scheming slave) aiming at deceiving his master. Furthermore, it is part of the emotional manipulation strategy, specifically directed towards increasing rage in the target person by not complying with the kind of behaviour expected within their master/slave relationship. At this very first stage of the quarrel, the strategy of persuasion relies on fuelling anger. He goes on with these tactics with further insinuations, through which he starts to arouse fear in his master for the safety of his son. This two-pronged attack is pursued mainly by avoiding the preferred move in the course of interaction.¹⁶ We have an obvious instance at lines 816–21:

NIC. Answer me: who's selling me?

CHRY. He whom the gods love dies young, while he has his strength, senses and wits. If any god loved this man here, he ought to have died more than ten, more than twenty years ago. He's now walking around as the scum of the earth, he doesn't have his wits or his senses any more, and he's worth as much as a rotten mushroom.

The master utters a binding request for information (*responde: quis me vendit?*): he requires a specific answer, but the slave does not provide it. Furthermore, he suddenly shifts from a direct and personal interaction to an impersonal one: although speaking of Nicobulus in front of him, Chrysalus acts as if his master was not there. In other words, he chooses non-interpellation, an illocutionary act which, according to studies on Latin pragmatics, may serve to convey offence.¹⁷

This linguistic strategy is successful as Nicobulus's verbal reactions show. The old master replies by uttering rhetorical questions which echo his interlocutor's words. This kind of reply is very common during a quarrel in Roman comedies, and it is acknowledged both by ancient grammarians and by modern scholars as a communicative technique expressing negative emotions ranging from indignation to anger.¹⁸

In response to the most explicit insinuation, actually a prediction ('And you'll beg me of your own accord to take it away when you find out what danger and what peril that accuser of mine is in', 826–7), the *senex* asks 'Tell me, you hardened criminal (*scelerum caput*), tell me, what danger is my son Mnesilochus in?' (829–30). The phrasing, through the insult and the repetition of the imperative

16 See Levinson (1983) 307–8 specifically on the notion of preference; see also 296–345 about conversational structure. For an example of a discursive approach to ancient texts, see Hammond (this volume).

17 See Orlandini and Poccetti (2010). It is also noteworthy that this kind of illocutionary act tends to appear in other (non-provoked) quarrel scenes in Roman comedies: see e.g. Plaut. *Mil.* 368–73; Ter. *Ad.* 96–100.

18 See Nicobulus's reply 'Are you calling me the scum of the earth?' in *Bacch.* 822, which echoes Chrysalus's previous statement 'He's now walking around as the scum of the earth' at line 820. The same pattern occurs at the next speech turn: 'CHRY. And yet you will give it to me in a moment. NIC. I will give it to you?' (824–5). The same pattern occurs in Terence's provoked quarrels as well: see e.g. Ter. *Ph.* 382, 388–9. For the emotional significance of echoing and of counter-questions see Donatus's remarks in *comm.* Ter. *Eun.* 818.2; id. *comm.* *Ad.* 84; cf. Roesch (2007); Orlandini (2001) 297.

form, clearly displays the rage and fear which have been driving the *senex* far from rational thought and action.

It is only now that Chrysalus complies with the action requested by his interlocutor and decides to answer his question. This is also still part of his persuasion strategy. He increases Nicobulus's fear for his son by showing him the boy in a compromising situation. Mnesilochus is sitting at a banquet with a girl whom Chrysalus sees, and Chrysalus points out that she is not a prostitute. Suddenly, a man comes in, threatening to beat Mnesilochus to death: he is a soldier claiming his girl. Pushed by this increasing fear, Nicobulus feels at an impasse, asking: 'What am I to do now?' (*quid nunc ego faciam?*, 857).¹⁹ The confused old man seeks help. Chrysalus is present and ready to offer his assistance. At this point of the manipulation strategy Nicobulus is patently confused: he does not know what to do, as he says. His phrasing displays linguistic hints which bolster this content through the interrogative sentence and the use of the verb *faciam*. Besides the linguistic evidence of his puzzlement and consternation – the frequency of questions which reveal his uncertainty, the self-description as *miser* (853) – there are also content hints of this mood. Nicobulus's behaviour in front of Cleomachus may be an example of this: he does not address the man who threatens his son, but instead entrusts the matter to Chrysalus.²⁰ It is noteworthy that his abrupt trust in the slave is really the result of the persuasion strategy. Once the danger has been ward off, he states that he does not in fact trust his slave: rather he trusts the letters, i.e. the evidence, which, unfortunately for the old man, is nothing more than another part of the deception (919–24).

The persuader's final move entails a new forged letter from Mnesilochus. Now, prey to sorrow and fearful for his son, Nicobulus once again asks Chrysalus for advice. Chrysalus demurs, and pretends not to influence his master's decision, but he actually gives advice and induces him to hand over the money. The slave pretends to distance himself and refuses to participate actively, playing on his master's irritation until his final surrender, which in fact turns out to be a victory for Chrysalus.²¹ The *servus callidus* achieves his goal: Nicobulus entrusts a sum of money to him, the very man he was being deceived by, and he even has to beg him to accept the money:²² the pragmatic efficiency of Chrysalus's strategy is evident.

This excerpt from *Bacchides* provides us with a sample of a successful persuasion strategy based on manipulation of the addressee's emotions. In this case, the persuader exploits the addressee's vexation as a preparatory step along the road to persuasion. He deliberately feeds this emotion by avoiding complying with the requests of his master. At the same time, he starts to arouse a father's fear

19 On this kind of phrasing and on the relation between tense and mood, and the expression of subjectivity and emotion in general, see Chahoud (forthcoming).

20 Part of the reason for such a behaviour is, most probably, also due to plot development.

21 'CHRY. Give it [sc. the money] to me if it can't be helped. NIC. Take care of it. I'll be back soon' (1066).

22 This is a paradoxical situation also exploited elsewhere in Roman comedies for the sake of laughter: see e.g. Plaut. *Ep.* 721–31.

for the safety of his son through his insinuations of danger. This two-pronged attack on two of Nicobulus's statuses, *erus* (master) and *pater* (father), drives him crazy. Once prey to a mixture of rage and fear, Nicobulus is no longer able to judge rationally. He is, therefore, more vulnerable. It is in this state of mind that he decides to entrust the money to his slave.

Chrysalus recognizes his target's mood and strikes the weak points of his status: in other words, it seems that it is the target who shapes the persuasion strategy of his persuader. In order to test this impression, it will be fruitful to look for cases of provoked quarrels where the addressees share the same status as each other. Plautus provides two such cases, where the addressees of the persuasion strategies are both slaves: Sosia in *Amphitruo*, and Sceledrus in the *Miles gloriosus*. Furthermore, both slaves share a common characteristic: they are both presented as timorous.

TIMOROUS SLAVES: SOSIA (*AMPHITRUO* 300–462) AND SCELEDRUS (*MILES GLORIOSUS* 272–595)

In the first act of *Amphitruo*, the god Mercury prevents Sosia from going into the house of his *familia* as his master Amphitruo had ordered him to do. This scene has been described as brainwashing by Martin, who points out the stages of psychological manipulation Sosia undergoes.²³ Stroh applies the same description to the treatment given to Sceledrus in the long scene where the *servus callidus*, Palaestrio, and his helpers prevent him from reporting what he saw (his master's mistress kissing an unknown man) to his master.²⁴ In both scenes the slaves turn out to be timorous, and it is precisely fear that has characterized them since their arrival on stage.²⁵ It is a fear which the persuaders acknowledge and deliberately play upon through threats of physical violence, which is the starting point for their strategies.

Let us see how this strategy unfolds in the *Amphitruo*. The slave Sosia is supposed to announce his master's victory against the Teloboians and his arrival home. When he sees a stranger standing in front of the house, his first reaction is fear. It is Mercury, who has the task of keeping people away, and who has taken the guise of Sosia himself. Following on from his recognition of Sosia's fear,²⁶ Mercury starts his persuasion strategy, saying at lines 300–1: 'I'll speak loudly in his direction so he can hear what I'm saying. Then he'll get still more frightened' (*igitur magi' modum maiorem in sese concipiet metum*). By threatening injuries –

23 Martin (1970) 171–3, who specifically stresses the role of fear.

24 Stroh (2000), who also highlights the central role of fear – see esp. 10–13.

25 For Sosia see *Amph.* 153–60, 292–9; for Sceledrus see *Mil.* 278–9.

26 See Mercury's asides: 'No one's as timid as him' (*Amph.* 293); 'He's scared; I'll fool him' (295). Note that the persuader acknowledges first a dispositional state, then an occurrent state of fear in his target person; after that follows the statement about deception: *timet homo: deludam ego illum* (295). See Kaster (2005) 16–17 on dispositional and occurrent states of emotion.

which he soon actually causes (370–80; 395)²⁷ – the god takes advantage of Sosia's fear of being beaten, an experience with which a slave is well acquainted. It is through brute force that Mercury starts preventing Sosia from going inside. Furthermore, he succeeds in puzzling the slave about his own identity. Widening the breach with rational thought which he has opened by taking on Sosia's image, the god adds threats and arguments and convinces the slave that he, Mercury, is the true Sosia.²⁸

Fear of being put to death is also a leitmotif for Sceledrus, the timorous (and foolish) slave, who is the target of a persuasion strategy in the *Miles gloriosus*.²⁹ He is the guard watching over his soldier's mistress when she has an affair with a young man living next door. When Sceledrus learns of it, he has to be persuaded that 'he didn't see what he did see' (149). The main author of this strategy is the sly slave Palaestrio. When Sceledrus meets Palaestrio, Sceledrus states he is afraid of punishment: the persuader, Palaestrio, then takes advantage of this weak spot by increasing his target's fears, and he succeeds. He warns Sceledrus to restrain his talking as he is very likely to face troubles whatever he does. When Palaestrio leaves Sceledrus alone, pretending to look for the mistress, Sceledrus repeats Palaestrio's account and displays fear and puzzlement: the appeal to emotion turns out to be effective.³⁰ Building on this fear, the persuasion strategy then appeals to arguments and visual evidences, which overwhelm the slave, who ends up in hiding in the house.³¹

These two examples suggest that, for a slave, the threat of being beaten seems to be the most vulnerable point at which to aim. All the more so when the slave turns out to be timorous and displays that he is currently already experiencing fear. It is, therefore, precisely on this that the persuaders repeatedly play. The next step in both these examples is providing forged evidence to underpin the deception: the addressee is led to reinterpret his reality by listening to false accounts of deeds, and through false visual evidence. Although they think they have experienced something real, the experience has actually been forged by their persuaders, who manipulate them through misrepresenting things that have happened and creating a false visual reality.

This overview of the strategy of persuasion used on timorous slaves in two different plays suggests a pattern. Negative emotion, namely fear, is the necessary condition for carrying out the persuasion. The strategy plays on increasing this fear, a permanently latent emotion in these timorous targets, through a weak point

27 Cf. Sosia's remarks in *Amph.* 606–7, 618.

28 Visual perception, emotion and rational thought turn out to be the three appeals of the god's persuasion strategy.

29 Fear is one of main features of Sceledrus's characterization; foolishness is the other, as we learn from Palaestrio, the *servus callidus*: *Mil.* 145–6.

30 See Sceledrus's soliloquy starting with *quid ego nunc faciam?*, *Mil.* 305–12. Cf. above note 19.

31 Besides emotion, rational thought and visual perception, the deception also appeals to the account of a dream as a further, strong piece of evidence: on its significance, see Guastella (2003).

linked to their social status: namely the risk of being beaten. In both cases the persuaders succeed in keeping their addressees from doing what they aimed to do: in Sosia's case, to get into the house; in that of Sceledrus, to report what he saw to his master. The social and psychological status of the target seems to shape the persuasion strategy, which, so formulated, turns out to be successful.

A QUARREL PROVOKED BY AN EXTERNAL PERSUADER: CLEOSTRATA (*CASINA* 531–620)

In the last two passages examined, the acknowledgment of negative emotion in the target led the persuader to exploit this weak point. The means of increasing such negative emotions turned out to be by provoking a quarrel between the persuader and the target. A more complicated case is where a persuader external to the quarrel provokes one between two other people, his targets, as happens in the *Casina*. This example of a deliberately provoked quarrel is the only case in Roman comedy of a quarrel between two people, namely two *senes*, Alcesimus and Lysidamus, which has been provoked by a third person, the *matrona* (married woman), Cleostrata, who is Lysidamus's wife. It is a very interesting case because the persuader is herself prey to a negative emotion: she is angry with her husband,³² and decides to stir up trouble for him in order to prevent him sleeping with the slave girl he is in love with. She succeeds in provoking a quarrel between the two *senes* by increasing anger in the one and fear in the other, which she facilitates by playing on the weak points inherent in the roles that the two men play in the affair.

Lysidamus is in love with the slave girl Casina and asks his friend and neighbour Alcesimus for help. Alcesimus allows Lysidamus to have sex with the girl in his house. To avoid this being detected, Alcesimus has to send his own wife over to Cleostrata (Lysidamus's wife). In the third act of the comedy Cleostrata learns of her husband's plans. Resentful at the way Lysidamus tried to cheat on her she states that she will not give free way to this plan. Her soliloquy (*Cas.* 531–8) displays linguistic hints of her vexation, e.g. *ecastor* ('By Castor!'), uttered twice within eight lines,³³ and *vetuli verveces* ('the old wethers') referring to the two old men,³⁴ as well as the sarcasm referring to her neighbour when she sees him walking along the street: at first she calls him a pillar of the senate, a guardian of the people. Yet it immediately becomes clear what she really means when she adds 'This creature wouldn't be cheap at the price of a peck of salt.'

In order to accomplish her purpose – namely to prevent their neighbour's house from becoming empty and available for the betrayal – she devises a ruse in two steps. At first she meets Alcesimus, who is surprised, since the situation is not consistent with the plan devised with Lysidamus: the latter was supposed to tell Cleostrata that she had to send for Alcesimus's wife in order to help with the wed-

32 On women's anger in comedy, see Dutsch and Konstan (2011).

33 See Adams (1984) 47–50.

34 See Lilja (1965) 68.

ding preparations, but no-one fetched her. Cleostrata plays on Alcesimus's annoyance at Lysidamus, who has apparently not honoured his word. In the short exchange between the *matrona* and the *senex*, Alcesimus promises his wife's help, as planned with Lysidamus, but Cleostrata frustrates their expectations and refuses the offer of help (541–8). Her phrasing shows a standard behaviour, according to the social conventions governing greetings and farewells.³⁵ Likewise, the excuses she finds (not wanting to be a nuisance: *sine eam: te nolo, si occupata est*, 544; *nil moror, molesta ei esse nolo*, 545; having already enough helpers: *sati' domist*, 547) attest to a formal adherence to the social conventions governing this kind of communicative situation, with no emphasis on the linguistic form expressing them.³⁶ Her firm intention is couched, in spite of her anger, in an unaggressive form. This serves the goal of her persuasion strategy: to incite a quarrel between the two *senes*.³⁷

This unexpected reply arouses in Alcesimus the feeling of being teased by his friend Lysidamus, as he states in his aside (549–57). The brief conversation with Cleostrata, in which she refuses the offers of help, increases his puzzlement.³⁸ Moreover, it elicits annoyance at his apparently untrustworthy partner-in-crime for having embarrassed him, as he perceives the events. The first step of Cleostrata's manoeuvre has succeeded, as she states in her aside (558–60), starting with 'Now I've made fun of him in a lovely way' (*iam hic est lepide ludificatus*). Next she announces her intentions to deceive her husband: 'I wish that useless, decrepit husband of mine would turn up now, so that I could make fun of him in turn, after I've had my fun with this other one'. Then she clearly expresses the goal of her strategy: 'I'm keen to create some argument between the two' (*nam ego aliquid contrahere cupio litigi inter eos duos*, 561).

Her next step is a dialogue between husband and wife, which Lysidamus opens in an irritated state of mind on account of a hindrance which he encountered on his way home (or rather to Casina). He is thus very careful to avoid any possible further trouble, of which the most probable source is his wife Cleostrata, who is standing in front of the house.

As a consequence, the greeting formula Lysidamus chooses to use is a very common one, followed by a form of address pretending to display that he is an affectionate husband (*quid agis, mea festivitas?* 577).³⁹ By contrast, Cleostrata's reply does not correspond at all to her husband's greeting (*te ecastor praestolabar*);⁴⁰ this lack of reciprocity, as well as the use of *ecastor*, are hints of vex-

35 See Poccetti (2010).

36 On ways to say no in Latin, see Ferri (2012), who analyses this kind of expression in terms of pragmatic variation of politeness.

37 See Alcesimus's remarks about Cleostrata's convincingly pretended behaviour: 'It would be odd if this neighbor of mine hasn't got wind of this already. But on the other hand I get the impression that if it were like that, she'd be having an argument with me.' (554–6).

38 *quid ego nunc faciam?* (549); cf. above notes 19 and 30.

39 See Poccetti (2010) 101–14 on the greeting; see Dickey (2002) 154–5 on the address expressing romantic endearment.

40 See Poccetti (2010) 122–4 on the need for reciprocity in greetings; cf. the analogous situation in Ter. *Ph.* 378–82.

ation. The reason that she gives for it is the unexpected behaviour of Alcesimus: she says that he forbids his wife to leave their house. To Lysidamus it means that his partner-in-crime has broken his word, resulting in the destruction of his own plan to have sex with Casina. His fear of being prevented from his affair and his anger with the man who was supposed to help him, but who has in fact failed to keep his word, are more than enough to make him keen to quarrel.

By means of her deception, Cleostrata pretends to be a wife who is obedient to her husband. At the same time she weakens the bond between the two *senes*, which leads to a quarrel between them. She is able to strike at one of the weakest spots of a husband who is trying to cheat on his wife: his fear of being found out before he can cheat. She is well aware of it, as she clearly states in her aside: 'Now I'll inject some fear (*iniciam metum*) into his heart. I'll give this lover-boy a very hard time' (589–90). By means of her dialogue with the two *senes* she arouses a mutual hostility between them. As a consequence, they start quarrelling as soon as they meet. The external persuader succeeds in provoking a quarrel between her two targets, although they are linked by friendship, neighbourly feeling and a relationship of complicity. Cleostrata succeeds in accomplishing her own end by increasing the negative emotions of concern and annoyance which the two *senes* experience. Her words result in anger for Alcesimus, and anger and fear for Lysidamus, as their next quarrel clearly displays (593–615).⁴¹

As we have seen, the features which we saw in the earlier, more basic, examples are also visible in this more complicated one: in order to increase the negative emotions involved, persuaders play on their targets' weaknesses, which generally stem from the characters' social and psychological statuses.⁴² In other words, it is the target's character, as well as his role in society, which is exploited to shape the persuasion strategy. The acknowledgment of his occurrent, as well as dispositional, emotions gives the persuader one of the keys to perform a successful persuasion.

The choice of weak spots linked to the target's social standing is the other main feature: persuaders in Plautine comedies shape their strategies of persuasion precisely to their targets. And they succeed: they exhibit a sort of pragmatic

41 The utterances of the two *senes*, as well as their ways of managing the conversation, clearly display their mutual anger. A thorough description of the linguistic strategies they enact in quarrelling is beyond the scope of this chapter, which concentrates instead on the linguistic techniques of persuasion involving negative emotions. Briefly, however, they involve the occurrence throughout their quarrel of some of the features displaying anger that we have already noticed, such as the use of rhetorical questions (both in initiating as well as in reactive moves) or insults.

42 This analysis of deliberately provoked quarrels points out that the persuaders in Plautine comedies share the same persuasion strategies, be they slaves, gods enacting slave roles, or wives. As far as the function of character type is concerned – I rely on Bettini's (1982) study of Plautine plots – it is the function enacted by the creator of tricks to be prominent here. See McCarthy (2004) 77–115 about Cleostrata's character, in comparison with the sly slave's ones regarding trickeries; the comparison is situated in the wider framework of mastery and slavery in the comedies of Plautus.

knowledge of how to manipulate their speech partner, and they make this explicit in soliloquies and asides.

Knowledge of a similar kind, or at least aiming to achieve the same effect, i.e. persuasion, is recommended by ancient authors of rhetorical treatises. The appeal to emotion is a powerful means of persuasion. A persuader able to exhibit this kind of competence has the best chance of succeeding in drawing the interlocutor's reaction towards his or her own aims. Among several passages in classical rhetorical treatises dealing with this theme, one of the prescriptions of Quintilian states clearly: 'the first thing is to know your witness. A timid witness can be terrorized, a fool deceived, the irascible provoked, the ambitious flattered, the long-winded encouraged in his prolixity' (Quint. *Inst.* 5.7.26).⁴³

As far as the pragmatic efficiency of their communication, persuaders in Plautine comedies are well equipped with the skills of oratory: *docere, delectare, movere*. Thus, we can suggest that Chrysalus rightly sings his own praise in the *Bacchides*: *optumu' sum orator* (981).

CONCLUSIONS

Deliberately provoked quarrels prove an excellent field to appreciate the interplay between negative emotions and linguistic strategies of persuasion. Anger and fear are the negative emotions that the persuaders primarily seek to enhance in order to drive those experiencing them far from thinking rationally, and induce a state of puzzlement in them. This perturbed mood makes the addressee more vulnerable, turning them into easier targets for persuasion, which when it is so performed is then successful.

Taking a pragmatic linguistic approach to these scenes has allowed us to point out some aspects of these literary texts, the most important of which turned out to be the central role of characterization, and the main features of the linguistic techniques exploited – the use of rhetorical questions, the act of non-interpellation, the lack of reciprocity in greetings – when performing a strategy of persuasion through negative emotions. These scenes are literary works of art embedded with plot constraints and with conventions of the literary genre which serve the comic effect. This is to say, altercations of this kind serve a specific dramatic function which requires them to exhibit a high degree of rhetorical stylization.

Do the linguistic techniques exploited here also recur in negative emotional interactions that do *not* have to accomplish the aim of persuasion? That is beyond the scope of this chapter, but non-provoked quarrel scenes may help provide an answer.⁴⁴

43 Trans. Russell (2001).

44 In fact the linguistic expressions venting anger that we saw in these examples of provoked quarrels, do indeed appear to be found in non-provoked quarrel scenes in Plautine and Terentian comedies as well.

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‘IT AIN’T NECESSARILY SO’: REINTERPRETING SOME POEMS OF CATULLUS FROM A DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW*

Kate Hammond

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

The interface between psychology and Classics has grown stronger over recent years.¹ At the same time, the discipline of psychology has continued to grow and diversify, and very different approaches and perspectives have come out of a series of introspective crises. Following the first ‘cognitive revolution’ in the 1960s, there was a return to studying the ‘black box’ of the mind, and the study of emotion – a subjective experience – became again a subject of enquiry.² The next major change in the 1990s, the ‘turn to language’, led to a broadening of focus to include studying how meaning is understood, and how language can play a part.

Discursive psychologists are a significant group who drove this second ‘revolution’.³ They have challenged the assumption that language is a neutral mechanism, transmitting meaning from one person to another, and rather emphasize how language is functional and performative, that we ‘do’ things through words.⁴ They argue that language can serve multiple purposes so that as we describe, we can also explain, account and justify.⁵ In everyday terms, an example is how an ap-

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1 For example, see Konstan (2006) and Kaster (2005) on emotions in, respectively, ancient Greece and Rome. For an example of a recent work on ancient emotions, which explicitly incorporates the findings of psychologists into its methodological approach, see Sanders (2014).

2 Brace and Byford (2014). The first ‘revolution’ reacted against the behaviourist standpoint, exemplified in the research of Skinner, that only observable behaviour was considered legitimate data. Skinner was himself reacting against Freud and psychoanalysis, where theories could not be tested empirically.

3 Potter and Wetherell (1987) is a key text in the ‘turn to language’.

4 Austin’s ‘speech act’ theory has been influential: Austin (1962) 139 argued how ‘stating is performing an act’, and one of his examples (1962) 5 was ‘I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*’. On ‘speech act’ theory, see further Searle (1969) and Levinson (1983). Skinner (2001) suggests that Catull. 101 might be considered in this way – that it is itself the *munus* (‘tribute’) of which it speaks.

5 Potter and Wetherell (1987).

parently evaluative statement, such as ‘It’s cold in here,’ can be heard as an indirect request to shut the window.⁶

In addition, discursive psychologists do not see reality as something that is ‘out there’, separate from people, but something that is created or constructed through the words and language people use.⁷ For discursive psychologists, if you want to know what is going on in people’s heads, the obvious place to look is in the language they use and the texts they create. Texts can include transcripts of interviews, but also advertisements, biographies, plays and literary texts. Accordingly, discursive psychologists are very much influenced by literary theory and how it informs their understanding of psychological topics, for example, personal identity and the emotions.⁸ Discursive psychologists can also take an historical approach, looking at discourse over time as well as space, and the role of power relations in discourse.⁹ Another key contribution here is the concept of ‘ventriloquation’, that is, the idea that we all speak through the words of others and how collective voices can become part of a personal, internal dialogue.¹⁰ All language, in other words, is dialogic and this dialogic quality of language is particularly apposite in the study of ancient literature.¹¹

For the study of emotions, there is growing acknowledgment of the importance of considering language in the way that discursive psychologists do, not least for the way it challenges the use of mild emotion-arousing stories (‘vignettes’) to study emotions.¹² Discursive psychologists focus on what emotions can

- 6 Fitch (2001). See Dickey (this volume) 237–8 on inferred politeness levels, depending on the relative hierarchical positions of speaker and addressee.
- 7 Wetherell (2001) provides a very good overview of how most discursive psychologists work within a ‘social constructionist’ framework, seeing language as ‘constitutive’, i.e. building worlds.
- 8 Wetherell (2001) outlines the key influences of Barthes, Foucault and Bakhtin on discursive psychology. Miller (2002) provides an interesting case study of how Foucault and Bakhtin can provide a theory-based way into understanding Catull. 11.
- 9 Foucault’s (1978) work on sexuality was influential in its investigation of power relations and hegemonic (i.e. dominant) discourse in sustaining societal norms and ideologies. Foucauldian discourse analysis can also be applied to the critical literature: Catullus for example has been subject to various critical discourses, such as ‘Catullus-the-Callimachean-poet’ and the ‘two Catulluses’. More recently, the performative nature of the poems and their social commentary has received more attention – e.g. Skinner (2001), Wray (2001).
- 10 Miller (2002) gives a good overview of Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the dialogic voice and its application to Catullus. Minkova (2002) 259, who also draws on Bakhtin, calls Catullus’s poems ‘deeply dialogical’, being full of explicit and implicit dialogues, both with others and with himself.
- 11 Verg. *Aen.* 6.460, for example, echoes Catull. 66, in turn a translation from Callimachus. Virgil’s use of Catullus may be unconscious given the incongruity of the triviality of 66 compared to the emotional intensity of Aeneas’s words to Dido. Miller (2002) also suggests that Bakhtin’s dialogism is particularly relevant for Catullus’s poetry, as he argues that the poems are meant to be read as a collection, and so in dialogue with each other.
- 12 Key here is the distinction between the ‘hot’ component of emotion (the manifestation of emotions itself) and the ‘cold’ component of emotion (the processing of emotional material) – see Yiend and Macintosh (2010). As a reader of Catullus, we are processing emotional mate-

‘do’ for people, how they are constituted through language, and how they are deployed socially rather than being solely an internal experience.¹³ Psychologists have therefore looked at how emotions can have functions beyond being an internal state.¹⁴ So an angry face can do the job of saying ‘Keep away from me’ as well as, or instead of, indicating some internal emotion.¹⁵ This attention to function is not dissimilar to some recent approaches in Classics.¹⁶ This chapter will therefore explore how a discursive psychology approach, such as the exploration of discourses, dialogism and functions can be illuminating in both how Catullus uses emotion in his poems and how he seeks to be persuasive to his audience.

In considering the methodology of this research, one particular focus on the performative, functional element of language is how people use language rhetorically in their everyday speech. The study of everyday rhetoric has only become possible in recent times with the use of audio-recording and through the work of conversational analysts who have found some robust patterns in everyday talk.¹⁷ This chapter will draw upon this work, looking at how in everyday speech people unconsciously draw upon rhetorical patterns such as ‘three-part lists’, which are familiar to Classicists as the tricolon structure.¹⁸ Conversation analysis is partic-

rial, a ‘cold’ process, but if we are persuaded to empathize and recall our own emotional experiences it becomes a ‘hot’ process. See Hagen (this volume) 201 on the necessity for orators to feel the emotions they draw upon to be persuasive.

- 13 Key studies include Edwards (1999) and Parkinson (2005). As Wetherell (2012) 73 explains: ‘Thinking and feeling are, in fact, social acts taking place through the manifold public and communal resources of language.’
- 14 As Wetherell (2012) 20 says: ‘it is the discursive that very frequently makes affect powerful, makes it radical and provides the means for affect to travel.’
- 15 Parkinson (2005). While there are some universally recognizable facial expressions, such as anger, fear, sadness, disgust and happiness (the ‘Big Five’ – see for example, Ekman (1973)), humans, unlike animals, can be dishonest in their emotional expressions as they have some control over the expression displayed. They are also subject to culturally specific ‘display rules’ – Yiend and Macintosh (2010). See Knight (this volume) 183 note 2 for further explanation of ‘display rules’ and the problems inherent in studying ancient display rules.
- 16 Habinek (1998) 9 for example argued that, ‘a study of the interestedness of particular utterances can lead to certain constructive claims about a function of a text, its historical and political dynamics and so on.’ See also Knight (this volume) on ‘pragmatic anger’ and Iurescia (this volume) on the use of feigned emotion to gain an objective.
- 17 Heritage (2001) describes the foundational work of Sacks, Goffman and Garfinkel, who contested the assumption that everyday talk is patternless and random in nature. Sacks (2001), for example, found acceptance of invitations and evaluations to have robust patterns (see below for further detail). He found evaluations were often followed by an upgrade, similar to what is found in Catull. 45.13–16, where Acme responds to Septimius with an even greater avowal of love. Gumperz (2001) also demonstrated how shared cultural practices can be highlighted by a lack of interactive synchrony in those who do not know the rules. I shall explore below how poem 10 might present a deliberate misinterpretation of language rules.
- 18 I would make a distinction, however, between the three-part list, which is a simple device of three items, often with the third part in a ‘catch-all’ format (e.g. ‘and so on’ as Habinek uses above) and the tricolon which can be more complex, for example, in its crescendo format.

ularly appropriate to the poems of Catullus which are conversational in style and where he makes use of silent interlocutors. I shall start by exploring these patterns of everyday talk in Catullus's poems and how we might then comment on their performative and persuasive nature.

A DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CATULLUS

The first pattern to be considered, 'adjacency pairing', allows us to start with the very first poem, which begins with Catullus asking to whom he should dedicate his poetry:

Cui dono lepidum novum libellum
arida modo pumice expoliturum?
Corneli, tibi; (1.1–3)¹⁹

To whom do I give this rather natty little book,
freshly polished with dry pumice stone?
Cornelius, to you.

Adjacency pairing is where one turn or utterance sets up what will follow, and works to manage 'turn-taking' as well as in part constructing what is acceptable and unacceptable in the next turn or slot. A basic example is question and answer, and we see this pairing in the first poem of Catullus. When we examine 'adjacency pairing' in conversation, such as invitations, we find that there are clear patterns depending on whether one responds with a 'preferred' (acceptance) or 'dispreferred' (refusal) response. The former, for example, would be expressed with no delay, and usually fluently. The latter normally is signalled by pauses, hesitations or hedges ('Well ...') or palliatives and often repair work, where someone starts, stops and starts again. The following examples illustrate such patterns:

A: We:ll, will you help me [ou:t.

B: [certainly wi:ll

X: We were wondering if you wanted to come over Saturday, f'r dinner.
(0.4)

Y: Well (.) .hh it'd be great but we promised Carole already.²⁰

19 All line numbers by indented texts refer to Catullus's poems. Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

20 Adapted from Kitzinger and Frith (2001). In discourse analysis, the following transcription symbols are used: colons indicate a syllable is stretched out; square brackets indicate the overlapping of words; brackets indicate pauses, with longer pauses timed; and a dot before an 'h' indicates an in-breath. Spelling reflects pronunciation.

As can be seen, there are no pauses between the turns of A and B; rather there is overlap, and there are no additional words or phrases beyond the acceptance. With X and Y, on the other hand, there is a pause between turns (0.4 seconds), a hedge ('Well'), another shorter pause, hesitation ('.hh' indicates an in-breath), a palliative ('it'd be great') and an account of why there must be a refusal.²¹

Drawing on the patterning described above, Catullus appears to signal that his decision is clear-cut as there is no hesitation or prevarication: Cornelius takes the first position in the line that is an immediate response to the initial question.²² Arguably, however, this means that Catullus had some 'stake management'²³ to do here as he is clearly accountable for this decision. Goffman's distinctions between the three positions in an utterance are relevant here as he distinguishes between the author who composes the words, the animator who says the words, and the principal who holds the attitude or viewpoint expressed.²⁴

In putting the question, Catullus the author is also the speaker of the words, and so the 'animator'. His reply, which presents him as the decision maker, the 'principal', therefore combines all three positions of author, animator and principal, which, following Goffman, serves to make him particularly accountable for the utterance. While such directness serves to enhance Cornelius's positive emotions as the dedicatee, by publishing or reciting his poem Catullus has clearly oriented his talk to a wider audience than Cornelius.²⁵ The issue is that his choice of Cornelius rules out other friends who might arguably have a claim upon him – such as Veranius, his best friend in poem 9, or Calvus in poem 50, and he needs therefore to manage his accountability for their emotions, for example, feeling envious or let down.

It is relevant that Catullus draws upon a 'standardized relational pair': that of dedicator and dedicatee.²⁶ This allows Catullus to play on social understanding

21 I explore below how poem 10 presents a dispreferred response and shows this pattern of signals.

22 Ancona (2006) 4 tells us: 'Note the succinct answer'.

23 'Stake management' is where a speaker recognizes that they might be seen by others as having a 'stake' in a particular position, a vested interest, and wishes to manage this pre-emptively so that their account is seen as a straightforward account of the 'facts' rather than biased – see Edwards and Potter (1992).

24 Goffman (1981). These have some similarity to Calame's (1995) discussion of author, performer/enunciator and narrator. In my discussion of poem 4 below, I examine where a speaker might not combine all three roles and with what effect. Hallett (2002) also explores how Lesbia's speech is often heard in the poems: at 7.1 (*quaeris*), Lesbia is the 'principal' of the question about how many kisses Catullus wants (cf. *dicebas*, 72.1; *proponis*, 109.1).

25 Skinner (2001) follows a recent trend in considering the performative aspect of the poems, given the likelihood of their aural transmission.

26 Sacks (2001) discusses how in conversations we draw on standardized relational pairs such as parent-child, doctor-patient or poet-audience. These provide for shortcuts as linked to such pairings are 'category-bound activities'. If we hear 'the X cried, the Y picked it up', we can insert 'child' and 'adult' as the activities define the protagonists.

and norms about who is suitable as a dedicatee.²⁷ What then happens is that we see how he works up his choice as inevitable through his rhetorical use of ‘extreme case’ formulations²⁸ in the particular version of his friend that he constructs: Cornelius is not just a literary friend who has produced good work.²⁹ Rather, he exalts Cornelius as he is ‘the one alone of the Italians’ (*unus Italorum*, 1.5), and in his work he captures the ‘whole age’ (*omne aevuum*, 1.6).³⁰ Catullus also implies that Cornelius took the trouble to read his poetry and appreciate its qualities even while working so hard on his own literary output. The ‘extreme case’ formulations also work to appeal to Cornelius’s pride, while the reciprocation of this gift for Cornelius’s earlier regard lessens any issue of obligation.³¹

In poem 4, we do not have recorded speech, but we do have reported speech, and another character showing something off: the narrator who tells us all about the proud ship.³²

Phaselus ille quem videtis, hospites,
ait fuisse navium celerrimus
neque ullius natantis impetum trabis
nequisse praeterire, sive palmulis
opus foret volare sive linteo.
et hoc ... (4.1–6)

The sailing-boat you see there, visitors,
Claims to have been the speediest of ships
And not to have been incapable of passing
Any swimming timber if need be
By flying with either little palms or canvas.
And he ...³³

- 27 McMaster (2014) points out that these opening lines position the poem in the context of elite gift exchange. He emphasizes Catullus’s apparent choice in this matter and the delicacy required.
- 28 ‘Extreme case’ formulations are where words such as ‘never’, ‘only’, ‘all’ or ‘none’ are used to persuasive ends, serving to take whatever is being said to its extreme limits – see Potter and Wetherell (1987).
- 29 Cornelius Nepos came from Cisalpine Gaul and was a friend of Cicero and Atticus. His *Chronica* has not survived.
- 30 See Rauk (1997) on how though this construction, Catullus’s poems become very much *nugae* (‘trivia’) besides Nepos’s exalted *Chronica*. Rauk also provides a useful overview of the debate about how to interpret Catullus’s meaning of *doctus* (‘learned’) and *laboriosus* (‘laborious’, ‘toilsome’) which have been argued to be either negative, conveying stolidity, or positive, in alluding to Callimachean aesthetics. My interpretation fits more with the latter view: When Catullus dislikes someone’s literary works or wishes to immortalize them for negative traits, he is usually very clear about it (cf. 95 where Cinna’s *Zmyrna* is brought forth after nine years (a ‘laborious’ task by implication) and is expected to last, unlike Volusius’s *Annals* which is expected to end up wrapping fish).
- 31 See above McMaster (2014).
- 32 Interestingly, while the ship is commonly described as garrulous and there is much personification, it is the anonymous narrator not the ship who tells its story – Young (2011).
- 33 Trans. Lee (1991).

Here the voice that the poet Catullus ‘animates’ appears not to be his own, but that of a tour-guide type character declaiming to visitors about a local sight. This could be seen as a ‘standardized relational pairing’ of guide and audience, and so sets up the appropriate ‘cultural scripts’, for example, the likelihood of hyperbole and the expectation of entertainment as well as facts. In this poem, we, the audience of the poem, are also invited to take part alongside the tour-guide’s expressed audience; we too are the ‘visitors’ addressed and invited to follow his gaze to the sailing ship before us and be persuaded to feel awe at its exploits.³⁴

If we take the speaker to be a narrator speaking to an audience rather than Catullus speaking directly to us,³⁵ this ‘standardized relational pairing’ distances Catullus the author from the animator and principal of the talk. We also see further ‘stake management’ going on. The tour guide also embeds the words of another throughout, and positions himself therefore not as the ‘principal’ of the talk; the ship itself is the ‘principal’ of the words.³⁶ Repeatedly he tells us that the ship is speaking, not him (*phaselus ... ait*, ‘the ships says’, 4.1–2; *ait phaselus*, 4.15; *dicit*, ‘it says’, 4.16). Accountability for veracity is therefore moved away from the speaker. At the same time, this device also allows the ship to boast indirectly and show its pride in its achievements.

There is a natural turn position at 4.5, signalled by the end of the evaluative comment that takes up the first 5 lines. At this point, the ship’s claim could be contested. As well as the standardized relational pairing working to restrain any dissenting voice of the onlookers, the speaker also pre-empts any move by the *et* in the next line, which clearly signals that the ‘conversational floor’ is not to be handed over yet.³⁷ In recitation this might also be signalled by the everyday policies of raising pitch and speeding up delivery to indicate a desire to retain the floor.

Another dialogic poem is poem 10, where Catullus presents himself getting caught out boasting by a girl he had tried to impress:

iam Bithynia, quo modo se haberet,
et quonam mihi profuisset aere.
respondi id quod erat, nihil neque ipsis
nunc praetoribus esse nec cohorti
[...]
‘at certe tamen’ inquit ‘quod illic
natum dicitur esse comparasti –
ad lecticam homines.’ (10.7–10, 14–16)

Bithynia – how were things there now
And had it made me any brass?
I answered straight – there was nothing now

34 For the reader’s involvement in narrative, cf. Johncock (this volume).

35 The address to ‘guests’ (*hospites*, 4.1) seems to indicate this.

36 We might compare with Xenophon suggesting that a commander of men draw on the voices of others when dealing with punishment – see Winter (this volume) 170.

37 Conversation analysis focuses on the management of turn-taking – e.g. Wetherell (2001).

For praetors themselves or their staff,
 [...]
 'But surely' they said 'you collected
 What's said to be the local product –
 Bearers?',³⁸

In answer to the question of whether he had made any money, Catullus's answer is blunt and bitter (*id quod erat*, 10.9). To reflect his bitterness, he exaggerates with an 'extreme case' formulation (nothing for anyone, 10.4) and by using aggressive sexual terminology for his praetor (*irrumator*, 'oral rapist', 4.12).³⁹ He is pressed further, however, with the words 'but surely indeed' (*at certe tamen*, 10.14), implying that his response and bitterness were not a 'desired' response. He then complies with a more positive response, and, encouraged by his protagonist, he takes up the opportunity to impress her by seeming to be 'one of the luckier ones' (*beatior*, 10.17), having picked up eight bearers. It is as if she had set a linguistic trap by encouraging a more boastful response, as she then asks to borrow the bearers.

'mane,' inquit puellae
 'istud quod modo dixeram me habere,
 fugit me ratio; meus sodalist –
 Cinna est Gaius – is sibi paravit. (10.27–30)

'Wait,' I replied to the girl,
 'What I said just now I had, I
 Wasn't thinking. It's my messmate
 Cinna – Gaius, you know – they're his.'⁴⁰

As discussed above, a refusal tends to be a 'dispreferred' response.⁴¹ So it is presented here, as his answering turn is full of perturbation: there are hedges and hesitations, 'wait' (followed by a hiatus), 'what I just said just now' and an apparent repair⁴² 'my friend, Cinna – Gaius you know'. His angry attack on her is then a charge of trapping him into this mistake by her first encouraging him and then taking him at his word. She has shown either social ineptitude or deliberate provocation in how she used her language.

Another feature that seems present in these poems is 'code-switching', that is a change of register in speech, marking a difference in the speaker-addressee relationship and the emotional tone of the poem.⁴³ At the end of poem 1, Catullus

38 Trans. Lee (1991).

39 Cf. Catull. 28.

40 Trans. Lee (1991), slightly modified.

41 I provide an example of the 'dispreferred' pattern in the discussion of poem 1. See also Ferri (2012).

42 A repair is where a speaker has to redo a section of speech. Here we have the added detail of the name of his friend and inversion of the name.

43 On 'code-switching', see Gumperz (1982). He explains code-switching as being indicated by changes in sentence speed, rhythm or other cues, such as a change from dialect to a standard

turns to his patron muse, and at the end of 4, it is Castor and Pollux who are addressed.⁴⁴ In poem 10, it is arguable that the speech marks should come after line 32 rather than at the end of line 34 as that appears to be the end of the reported episode:

‘verum utrum illius an mei quid ad me?
utor tam bene quam mihi pararim.’
sed tu insula male et molesta vivis
per quam non licet esse neglentem. (10.31–4)

‘But what’s it matter whose they are?
I use them as if they were mine.’
But you’re damned tactless – a living nuisance
Who won’t allow one to speak loosely.⁴⁵

The last two lines would then be the poet’s thoughts or words addressed towards, but not to, the girl: ‘But you’ (*sed tu*, 10.33) would then signal this code switch as do the words ‘But that’ (*sed haec*, 4. 25) in poem 4 and ‘But in fact I had no-one’ (*at mi nullus erat*, 10.21) earlier in poem 10, where he reveals the dishonesty of the answer he has just given in a type of ‘voiceover’. It also compares with the change of focus indicated by the words ‘At this point, she said...’ (*hic illa... inquit*, 10.24–5), where he presents the female protagonist in the third rather than second person. The anger or rather mock-anger of the last two lines would then be a humorous ending to the poem again in the form of a ‘voiceover’, expressing his discomfort at being caught out, and projecting the blame for that discomfort onto her through the insults he addresses to her.

EMOTIONAL DISCOURSE IN CATULLUS

Having discussed some examples of the use of everyday rhetorical techniques in the poems, I want now to turn more directly to emotions and emotional discourse, and consider some of the different ways that emotional discourse is used by Catullus. Traditionally, emotions have been conceived as internal experiences, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate.⁴⁶ In some ways, we can see that Catullus’s use of emotion is very much in line with this view of emotions: for example, Catullus’s desire to share his negative narrative of love and to

form. Children’s play is often marked by very subtle code-switching as they slip in or out of role.

44 The switch in poem 1 to apostrophe is complicated by textual corruption at this point: the change of addressee from Cornelius to *patrona virgo* is here considered so abrupt that some commentators suggest an amendment, for example Gratwick (2002) suggests *patrocini ergo*.

45 Trans. Lee (1991), adapted.

46 Edwards (1999) provides a brief overview of this approach to emotions.

participate in the negative narratives of others seems rather similar to the finding in early work on appraisal theory, that participants in experiments who know that they are awaiting electric shocks prefer to be with others awaiting the same fate.⁴⁷ This would imply that people can make more sense of their emotions through comparison with others experiencing similar feelings.

It is also possible to see these poems through a discursive view of emotions, which sees emotions as being as much in our talk as in our heads. A key concept here is that rather than being ‘intrapsychic’, that is, within the person, emotions are seen to be ‘interpsychic’, that is, located between people and jointly performed in speech acts and constructed through those speech acts.⁴⁸ Emotions are therefore both the product and determinant of social action: they have appraisal, action, activation and expressive qualities.

When we consider Catullus’s poetry in light of this argument, what becomes apparent is that Catullus uses emotion in ways typically identified in discursive psychological accounts: to justify, explain or account in different ways.⁴⁹ One way in which he presents emotion is as something that can be alleviated by poetry, such as his request to Cornificius in poem 38 and Hortalus’s and Manlius’s requests to him in poems 65 and 68a. Emotion can be a flexible resource, however, and Catullus also deploys emotion rhetorically as something that can prevent the writing of poetry, to account for his lack of response to a friend’s request. Thus he argues in poems 65 and 68a, his grief for his brother’s death prevents him from writing. What he therefore stresses in his justification is an account of why he *cannot* rather than why he *will* not or does not *want* to.⁵⁰ We might even go further and – given the link to identity, mutual engagement and shared discourses – suggest that emotion here is a key element in the ongoing construction of a ‘community of practice’⁵¹ between these men and others linked to them.

Catullus also presents emotion as a psychological resource for his poems – as a subject to be explicated. Poems 8, 76 and 85 are examples of where he appears to explore an emotional state through poetry, positioning a version of himself as the ‘to-be-pitied’ rejected lover.⁵² Drawing on modern views of identity, such as the social interactionist sense of identity, we might say that in these poems, Catullus adopts both the positions of the ‘I’ (the ‘self-as-knower’, the observer)

47 Schachter (1959). There is a debate about whether our physical responses determine the emotion we feel or whether our cognitive appraisal/interpretation determines the emotion we experience. See Colombetti (2015) for her overview in the multidisciplinary ‘History of Distributed Cognition’ (HDC) series.

48 McGhee and Miell (1998).

49 See Wetherell (2012) for examples.

50 This might also be seen as what has been termed ‘facework’ – Goffman (1967).

51 Holmes and Meyerhoff (1999). Social identification is also relevant as the shared practice of ‘emotional labour’ enhances collectivity.

52 A discursive approach is not about exploring the ‘truth’ of the account, of answering a question about whether Catullus is describing a real or an imagined affair with a woman he calls Lesbia. Rather the approach sees the poet as constituting a version of reality through language. The questions a discursive approach does seek to answer are: why this version, why this reality? What function does this serve, and what are the consequences of this version?

and the ‘me’ (the ‘self-as-known’, the observed).⁵³ Social interactionism also suggests that our sense of identity is built through internalizing the view of the self that others hold. This viewpoint is gained by assuming the role of the ‘other’ in order to gain an understanding of ourselves.⁵⁴ In these poems, this is what Catullus appears to do: he has become an object as much to himself as to his audience.

In poem 8, we see how Catullus uses a breakdown in such objectivity to poetic effect:

Miser Catulle, desinas ineptire
et quod vides perisse perditum ducas.
fulsere quondam candidi tibi soles
cum ventitabas quo puella ducebat
amata nobis quantum amabitur nulla.
[...]
fulsere vere candidi tibi soles
[...]
vale, puella. iam Catullus obdurat
nec te requiret nec rogabit invitam.
[...]
scelestas, vae te, quae tibi manet vita?
quis nunc te adibit? cui videberis bella?
[...]
at tu, Catulle, destinatus obdura. (8.1–5, 8, 12–13, 15–16, 19)

Wretched Catullus, stop being silly
and consider as lost what you know to have gone.
Once the sun shone bright for you,
when you kept going where your girl led,
loved by me as no other will be loved
[...]
Truly the sun shone bright for you
[...]
Goodbye girl. Now Catullus is being firm;
he will not seek you nor ask you against your will
[...]
Wicked woman, woe to you, what life remains for you?
Who will now approach you? To whom will you seem beautiful
[...]
But you, Catullus, stay fixed and stand firm.

He begins by exhorting himself to move on from his failed love affair, contrasting his current wretched self with the happier days when the sun shone for him as a lover (*fulsere quondam candidi tibi soles*, 8.3, repeated in 8.8). As he addresses

53 Stainton-Rogers (2011) gives a good overview of the history of social interactionism and its link with George Herbert Mead. She explains how this view of identity is ‘intersubjective’ in that it involves a sense of the self in relation to others, and, being reflexive, can observe itself, hence the term ‘the looking glass self’. Also relevant to this poem is how the ‘me’ also internalizes the values and norms of society.

54 Stainton-Rogers (2011).

himself in a poem, he also presents himself as an actor in a scene with whom his audience can empathize. The move to addressing Lesbia directly, however, and the list of questions to her (8.12–18) redirects the audience's attention from the past to Lesbia's future, as she is now the 'you' of the poem, not Catullus. At the same time, what we experience as the audience is Catullus's emotion in the 'here and now', in a phenomenological sense, rather than observed and abstract.⁵⁵ Rather than telling us about his wretched state, he enacts his frustration and growing anger, and so our perception of his emotion is very direct. He moves quickly from the controlled 'goodbye, girl' (*vale, puella*, 8.12) to the more impassioned abuse of 'wicked woman, woe to you' (*scelesta, vae te*, 8.15). The final line, where we are brought back to the self-address ('But you, Catullus, stay fixed and stand firm', 8.19) returns us to a final exhortation and back to the 'observed' self. The fragility of this emotional self-control, however, has been persuasively demonstrated.⁵⁶

If we consider what function these versions of Catullus serve, we find much ambivalence. On the one hand, in an appeal to our sympathy, we are presented with a portrayal of unrequited love to pity. He appears as a man trying to do the right thing, of battling with a pointless desire, and wishing to show sense and self-control. On the other hand, there are provocative issues of masculinity at play here:⁵⁷ he talks of being 'powerless' (*impotens*, 8.9) and of following Lesbia's lead rather than being the figure of control and authority (8.4). This power imbalance has already been hinted at in the kiss poems (5 and 7) and we see the same power and gender-role inversion at the end of poem 11, in a more destructive form, in the image of the active phallic ploughshare destroying the passive meadow flower.⁵⁸

Golden ages are often rather ambivalent in Catullus,⁵⁹ and in this poem it is also true that the golden age of his love affair seems less than ideal. When the sun

55 For more on emotions in the 'here and now' and phenomenological approaches in general, see Zahavi's (2015) contribution to the HDC seminar series.

56 In demonstrating a high ability to understand his own emotions, Catullus displays what would now be termed emotional intelligence (EI). In Mayer *et al* (2008)'s model of EI, the highest level involves an ability to manage emotions so as to attain specific goals. As a poet, presenting emotion to sway an audience to different readings, Catullus demonstrates this level.

57 Wray (2001) 17 for example comments that gender identity was 'a fragile and elusive possession to be earned, won and carefully guarded.' He also points out that by the end of the Republic, alongside the hegemonic view of masculinity as restrained and dominating, there was also a more cosmopolitan, Hellenistic masculinity.

58 *velut prati / ultimi flos, praetereunte postquam / tactus aratro est* 'just like a flower on the meadow's edge, which has been touched by the plough passing by', 11.22–4. Miller (2002) discusses the metaphor of the plough, which was used for sexual intercourse in Latin and Greek, and considers Catullus's power to subvert this discourse by portraying Lesbia as the monster in this image, despite his own portrayal as effeminate and passive/castrated.

59 Catull. 64 presents a version of the 'golden age' which included filial betrayal, broken promises of marriage, wholesale slaughter and the death of innocents. The agrarian turmoil at Pharsalus with rusty ploughshares and weeds unchecked suggests a battlefield context rather than a wedding celebration – see Rowland (1970).

shone brilliantly, a phrase Catullus repeats twice in the poem (8.3, 8.8), the love affair was already highly one-sided: she led, he followed and she was loved with no mention of her affection for him. This might be compared to the bad omen of the squeaking slipper on the threshold in poem 68b (*arguta solea*, 68b.72)⁶⁰ and to his happy acceptance of a 'shared love' in that poem (*communes amores*, 68b.69). His construction of Lesbia too undercuts the bitter tirade at the end of the poem (*scelesta, vae te*, 8.15). Rather than being alone and unloved, Catullus has already revealed that she is the one who has ended the affair and that she was highly desirable. The versions that Catullus presents are therefore highly complex and the audience is invited to be more emotionally aware than the speaker who addresses himself.

As mentioned above, poem 85 also portrays Catullus's emotional turmoil:

odi et amo. quare id faciam fortasse requiris?
nescio sed fieri sentio et excrucior. (85.1–2)

I hate and love. Why do I do this perhaps you are asking?
I don't know, but I feel it happening and I am in torment.

Psychologically, it is interesting that Catullus talks about his behaviours (*faciam*), what he *does*. Behaviours are generally considered to be a matter of choice, but Catullus emphasizes his lack of control and choice with the passive voice in the next line.⁶¹ A key word that I would like to consider from a discursive point of view is *nescio* ('I don't know'). From an analysis of examples of where this has been used in modern discourse, Potter suggests that rather than being a 'throw away' phrase, 'I don't know' can serve as 'stake management', as dealing with concerns about vested interests or some stake in some position or other.⁶² In this instance, it might be serving to move the focus of the poem away from the 'why' to the 'what', from a questioning of rationale to the focus on the emotional outcome, which again like poem 8, is very much in the 'here and now'.⁶³ It might also serve to move us away from the question of responsibility as it allows Catullus to transition from being an active participator who loves or hates to being a passive victim of his torment.

It is also interesting to consider this poem from the point of view of the psychological appraisal theory of emotions. This suggests that emotions are not

60 Brenk (1987) provides an overview of the literary precedents of this term, arguing for a visual as well as an auditory interpretation. The various interpretations of *arguta* increase the ambivalence.

61 This contrast is further emphasized by the passive variation of the same verb *facio* (*faciam*, 85.1) used in the second line (*fieri*, 85.2).

62 Potter's analysis includes the highly confessional Panorama interview of Princess Diana by Martin Bashir (1995). At one point, Diana was asked why she supported the Andrew Morton biography. Her response was 'I dunno' – Potter (1997).

63 This strategic use of language by a speaker does not imply conscious language choice: as competent speakers, these strategies are part of our everyday language as we persuade others to our viewpoint.

physiologically different, but it is our cognitive appraisal of an emotion that determines what we feel.⁶⁴ In this case, Catullus is fully aware of the intensity of the emotional arousal he is feeling, but has conflicting cognitive appraisals in terms of how to attribute this arousal to emotions as different as love and hate. He is therefore in turmoil both emotionally and cognitively.

In these poems, a key rhetorical resource Catullus draws upon is the psychodynamic element of 'splitting'. 'Splitting' is where objects or people are divided into good and bad parts, and these divisions accentuated.⁶⁵ In psychoanalytic terms, it can also include the projection of the bad parts of the self onto a bad 'other'.⁶⁶ Lesbia as goddess/whore⁶⁷ appears to reflect such splitting, with Catullus apparently unconsciously projecting his 'bad' feelings about his uncontrolled desire and his sense of a 'diseased love'⁶⁸ onto the object of that love, Lesbia. So it is that the past was all good, the future all bad; he is all good, Lesbia is all bad; it is either love or hate, with no middle ground. Splitting therefore helps to explain how rhetorically Catullus can gloss over the issue of his early relationship not being as filled with sunshine as he portrays it, persuading us to empathize with his dislike of Lesbia. It is only when we go back and revisit the poem that such anomalies appear.

It has also been argued that if we follow the rules of narrative, for example narrative frameworks of cause and effect, then our story becomes more believable.⁶⁹ Catullus presents poems about his love that people have constructed into such narratives.⁷⁰ It is this Catullus – of the poems – with which people can identify – just as they do with fictional characters in the standard narratives of soap operas.⁷¹ Yet at the same time, discursive psychologists have challenged a view of the self as relatively self-contained, consistent and bounded, stressing instead how it can be fragmentary and contradictory.⁷² They argue therefore that multiple storylines are possible, depending on the context and function of a particular narrative.⁷³ In this sense, each poem constructs its own persuasive narrative and meaning.

64 For example, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected two groups with adrenalin and then put one group in a positive situation and the other in a negative situation. The study showed how people interpreted their bodily arousal through the context they were put in.

65 Wetherell (1997a).

66 Morgan and Thomas (1997).

67 Poem 11, for example, presents Lesbia with her three hundred lovers and in poem 58 she 'fellates' (*glubit*) the grandsons of Remus. In contrast, at 68b.70, she is a radiant goddess (*candida diva*).

68 Catull. 76.20: *pestem perniciemque*.

69 Gergen (2001) for example talks about our capacity to use stories to make ourselves comprehensible to others, and furthermore that 'our relationships with each other are lived out in narrative form' (247).

70 The overview of the love affair within poems 2 to 11 provides a structure for this narrative.

71 McGhee and Miell (1998).

72 Wetherell (1997a).

73 Wetherell (1997b) 307, drawing on Barthes, suggests: 'There is no one essence to the person, one identity, one enduring unification, or just one story to be told.'

The final area I wish to consider is the extent to which Catullus is positioned by culturally available language resources around emotions and to what extent he is able to fashion these to his own purpose. The ‘Sapir/Whorf hypothesis’ argues that language strongly influences thought.⁷⁴ In terms of emotion, the argument is that what we feel is to an extent prescribed by the words we use and that emotions can be culturally specific.⁷⁵ There is, for example, a debate on the existence of sexual jealousy in Classical Greece given the lack of a label for that emotion.⁷⁶ These issues were also explored by Cicero, for example, in his discussion of *invidia* (*Att.* 5.19.3), and how this term for ‘pain felt at another’s success’ was a coverall for what was distinguished in Greek into the two emotions of *nemesis* (pain at another’s undeserved success) and *phthonos* (malicious envy).⁷⁷

What we see in Catullus in several of his poems is an exploration of his emotion of love where the discursive resources available, such as the discourse of marriage, are inadequate. As he frequently says, his love for Lesbia is unique, both in its intensity and its phenomenological experience.⁷⁸ In poem 72, we see how Catullus draws on different concepts to try to describe his feelings:

dilexi tum te non tantum ut vulgus amicam
sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos.
[...]
‘qui potis est?’ inquis? quod amantem iniuria talis
cogit amare magis sed bene velle minus. (72.3–4, 7–8)

I cared for you then not only as a common man loves his girlfriend,
but as a father loves his sons and sons-in-law
[...]
How can that be?’ do you ask? Because such an injury
forces a lover to love more but to like less.

In the first section, he talks of his love as being more than sexual passion or common love: ‘I cared for you then not only as a common man loves his girlfriend’ (72.3). He then goes on to try to explain this different sort of love of his, and talks of the love of a father not for his sons and daughters, but for his sons and sons-in-law.⁷⁹ This emphasis on a dynastic type love possibly attempts to capture both his

74 Fitch (2001) provides a good overview of the development of this hypothesis, starting with the theorizing of Sapir in the 1920s and Whorf in the 1950s. A more extreme version suggests that language ‘determines’ thought.

75 Wetherell (2012) gives the example of the German word *Schadenfreude*.

76 Sanders (2014) 130–68.

77 Kaster (2005) 84–103. But see also Sanders (2014) 76–7, with note 70.

78 E.g. *amata nobis quantum amabitur nulla* ‘loved by me as no other will be loved’, 8.5; *nulla potest mulier tantum se dicere amatam / vere quantum a me Lesbia amata mea est* ‘No woman can truly say that she has been loved as much as my Lesbia has been loved by me’, 87.1–2.

79 It is also a man-to-man love, which I shall explore further below in the discussion about *amicitia*. Catullus is not therefore drawing on discourses of marriage to express his love, as women (wives and daughters) are excluded from this image. This also suggests that this image

affection and his rational love – love as sensitive *and* sensible. This theme of affectionate love as opposed to passionate love is also picked up in the final section of the poem where he describes himself as feeling more passionate, but with far less affection. While not expressed with the intensity of the emotions at 85.1 (*odi et amo* ‘I hate and I love’), as in that poem he portrays the reader (or possibly Lesbia) as asking a question (‘How can that be?’ do you ask?, ‘*qui potis est?*’ *inquis?*, 72.7). Unlike poem 85 where he has no answer (see above), here he is able to explain his emotional tension: that he is driven to love more but like less (*quod amantem iniuria talis / cogit amare magis sed bene velle minus*, 72.8).

This rational, familial type of love that Catullus portrays as superior to irrational passion is of course quite different to that of the unconventional ‘mad Catullus’ presented for example in poems 7 and 51 in a different stage (or version) of his relationship with Lesbia. It is also different from the Catullus in 58 who speaks of loving Lesbia ‘more than himself and all his kin’ (*plus quam se atque suos amavit omnes*, 58.3). This framing of non-passionate love in poem 72 therefore works rhetorically to align Catullus with socially acceptable notions of love, while at the same time constructing a very different sort of love, a special kind of love combining affection, esteem and love. Catullus accordingly draws upon the particular discourse that fits his function in the poem. At the same time, he provides some causal explanation of his current emotions, which implicates Lesbia while exonerating himself.

To bring these different threads together, what Catullus is doing is describing a complex type of love, but which he does not have the words to describe. Once articulated by Catullus, these constructions of affection-love, love-hate and effeminized love could become part of the thinking as well as emotional lives of others. His language, therefore, influences the thoughts – and emotions – of others. We can also see this in a dialogic sense, that Catullus’s voice has become part of the collective of voices.⁸⁰ His audience can hear his words and phrases, and reuse them for themselves. Furthermore, they can internalize Catullus’s thinking to form part of their own internal dialogues and emotional experiences.

There is another discourse that Catullus draws upon to evoke his love for his elite *amica*: the Roman discourse of *amicitia*. This adds a very different dimension to his love. A poem that clearly evokes the language of *amicitia* is poem 109, where Catullus talks of ‘this everlasting pact of sacred friendship’ (*aeternum hoc sanctae foedus amicitiae*, 109.6). Similarly, in poem 87, Catullus repeats the theme of no woman being loved as much as his Lesbia has been loved, and continues: ‘no faith was ever found in any bond, as great as on my part in my love for you’ (*nulla fides ullo fuit umquam in foedere tanta / quanta in amore tuo ex parte*

might have a sting its tail for Lesbia, by reminding her of her status as a woman, or alternatively reflect Catullus not thinking about how she might view this image, being so engrossed in his own viewpoint.

80 See above on Bakhtin’s dialogic view of thinking and his concept of ‘ventriloquation’.

reperta mea est, 87.3–4).⁸¹ The use of the term *amicitia* in conjunction with terminology such as *fides*, *beneficium*, *pietas* and *foedus* shows that the discourse of alliance (and political alliance at that) of the Roman elite is being called upon.⁸²

By using this terminology, Catullus can be seen as adapting the political language of *amicitia* as a metaphor for his love, and this use of *amicitia* and its related terms was highly innovative as an expression of this emotion. It was also not a discourse of marriage; in poem 72 marriage is constructed as a means of forming or cementing alliances where daughters and wives are purely instrumental.⁸³ Furthermore, as poem 72 makes clear, Catullus's attitude to his love affair itself was different to a casual sexual relationship. Only an innovative use of *amicitia* could capture the emotion that Catullus wished to convey to Lesbia, which included enduring commitment, but not exclusivity,⁸⁴ and mutual benefit. This can therefore be seen as a highly inventive emotional persuasion tactic; Lesbia, after all, was no blushing bride. She was a highly independent, patrician lady, a sister of Clodius, who had already been married, and was at least in her early thirties.⁸⁵

CONCLUSION

To conclude then, Bakhtin spoke of two forces: centripetal forces which are the authoritative discourses, the canon of the time, and working against this are centrifugal forces of diversification and variation.⁸⁶ When Catullus talks of emotion, we can see these two forces in action, as he takes the raw materials of the discourses available and fashions something new from them. Taking the discursive approach has also allowed me to explore how Catullus makes use of the performative functions of emotion, how he uses emotions to 'do' things for him, and to constitute new forms of emotion through his language. As a poet exploring his emotions before an audience, they become fundamentally social rather than inter-

81 See also poem 76.3: *nec sanctam violasse fidem nec foedere in ullo / Divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines* ('he has neither broken any sacred pact, nor abused any power of the gods to deceive men').

82 Ross (1969) argues compellingly that the language of *amicitia* and associated concepts should be considered as the terminology of political alliance, and that Catullus uses this as a metaphor to describe his relationship with Lesbia/Clodia. While Lyne (1980) disputes this interpretation, Dixon (2001) 102 comments that: 'Disentangling the material, social, political and moral elements of 'friendship' for élite Romans is ultimately an artificial exercise.'

83 Lyne (1980) 292 note 10 points out a similar idea in *Ov. Met.* 1.481: *saepe pater dixit 'generum mihi, filia, debes'* 'Often her father said: "Daughter, you owe me a son-in-law"'.

84 Catullus's love for Lesbia is not based on exclusivity of sexual relations: in poem 68b he makes it clear that it is being foremost of her lovers that counts.

85 Which sister is not clear nor their precise ages. Clodia Marci was widowed in 61 (*Cic. Att.* 1.16.10), Clodia Metelli in 59 (Metellus died before going to his province of Transalpinga). The youngest of the sisters was born by 87 BC as her father was expelled from Rome in that year. She was divorced by Lucullus in 66 BC (*Plut. Luc.* 34.1).

86 Bakhtin (1981).

nal experiences. Through the use of conversational analysis, I have demonstrated some of the ways in which Catullus adopts typical language patterns of everyday life for rhetorical effect, for example, to manage stake or play with authorship, and to add a greater layer of emotional verisimilitude to his poetry.

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
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Henning Börm / Marco Mattheis /
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Civil War in Ancient Greece and Rome

Contexts of Disintegration and Reintegration

HEIDELBERGER ALTHISTORISCHE BEITRÄGE UND
EPIGRAPHISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 58

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
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to the Rise of Macedonia

HISTORIA – EINZELSCHRIFT 239

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